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NOTES OF THE MONTH

The Commonwealth Economic Conference; The German Federal Constitutional Court and the Treaties; The U.N. and the French North African Protectorates; Iraq, a Military Government with a Difference; Decrease of Crime in Norway

NIGERIA UNDER THE MACPHERSON CONSTITUTION

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume IX No. 1 January 1953

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume IX No. 1 January 1953

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Notes of the Month

The Commonwealth Economic Conference

THE communiqué issued on 11 December at the end of the Commonwealth Economic Conference necessarily covered familiar ground, and had little new to offer. The broad objectives, 'internal economic policies designed to curb inflation . . . sound economic development . . . a multilateral trade and payment system', are unexceptionable. They include by implication 'an adequate and stable external balance', since inflationary conditions 'damage the external balance by stimulating excessive imports', and economic development will increase exporting power. 'Throughout the Commonwealth there is wide scope for expanding the production of the essential supplies which the whole world needs—food and agricultural products, minerals and engineering products—and improving the means of transporting them', and the communiqué deprecates 'development of a less sound and permanent kind', which overtaxes resources and fails to contribute to economic strength. That applies to the whole Commonwealth, including Canada.

In the Sterling Area countries 'development should be concentrated on projects which directly or indirectly contribute to the area's balance of payments with the rest of the world'. In some countries of the area, however, 'some basic improvement in the standards of living is a necessary foundation for further economic development'.

For development, *savings* are necessary, and 'the United Kingdom is the traditional source of external capital for Commonwealth investment'. The flow of capital from London for sound development throughout the Commonwealth can only be maintained and increased 'if the United Kingdom can sustain the necessary level of internal savings'. The United Kingdom Govern-

ment is to make a special effort to provide additional capital fo Commonwealth development 'by facilitating the financing o schemes', and the Conference welcomed 'the proposal by a grou of financial, industrial, and commercial concerns to form company to further development in other countries of the Commonwealth and the Colonial Empire'. It may be pointed out however, that financial machinery does not create savings. The adverse balance of the United Kingdom is a symptom of a deficiency of savings. Saving is the margin of income left after meeting consumption and Government expenditure. A deficiency of saving means an excess of capital outlay over this margin, in other words an excess of *spending* (consumption, *plus* capital outlay, *plus* Government expenditure) over income. Income for this purpose means output, and so such spending as cannot be met from output must be met either from stocks of goods, or from imports.

Excess spending is another name for inflation—'too much money chasing too few goods'. We have become familiar with various devices for staving off its consequences—heavy taxation; rationing and other controls to enforce austerity; credit restriction. If all these fail, there has to be a direct restriction of imports.

The Conference agreed 'that restrictions imposed because of balance of payments problems should be relaxed as the external position of countries improved'. Improvement of the external position means elimination of the excess spending. The effect of development in increasing output is only a hope of the future. For the present the remedy must be a reduction of the spending. The restriction of imports is itself a measure of austerity, in that it reduces that particular form of spending. If it is relaxed, spending is increased, and the saving available for capital formation or development is so much the less.

The communiqué says nothing as to *how* saving is to be increased either in the United Kingdom or in other Commonwealth countries. Direct taxation in the United Kingdom has long reached and passed the limit at which it is a direct encroachment on saving. Indirect taxation is very heavy, and there may be political difficulties in increasing it or in suppressing the remaining food subsidies. The principal resource is credit policy, and it is to be hoped that the Government will not be deterred from a continuance, or if need be an intensification, of the salutary credit policy which has been pursued in the past twelve months. That is doubt-

less implied in the 'internal economic policies designed to curb inflation', though it is not expressly mentioned.

If the measures adopted to attain a favourable balance of payments have the effect of reducing the volume of savings below what policy would require, recourse may be had to raising capital from abroad. Sterling is to be made available for lending by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. But of course loans raised in sterling will be no more than a new channel for drawing on the savings of the Sterling Area.

Investors from outside the Sterling Area in approved projects are given facilities for transferring back sterling equal to their initial investment. Henceforth they will be allowed also to transfer their profits. This will no doubt remove a serious deterrent on the inflow of foreign capital. But from the long-range point of view foreign capital in the form of profit-making investments places a more serious burden on the balance of payments than interest-bearing loans.

The Conference agreed that it is important 'that sterling should resume its full role as a medium of world trade and exchange', and regarded convertibility as dependent on three conditions: (*a*) action by sterling Commonwealth countries; (*b*) trade policies conducive to expansion of world trade; (*c*) financial support through the International Monetary Fund or otherwise. As between the second and the third, the Conference expressed a preference for 'trade, not aid'. But it is the first that calls for the Commonwealth's own efforts, above all to quell the excess spending.

The communiqué refers to the question of imperial preferences. Preferences cannot be increased consistently with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. A proposal to approach the other parties to that agreement with a view to a complete removal of this limitation failed of unanimous support, but it was decided to ask for a specific concession of a limited character.

The German Federal Constitutional Court and the Treaties

THE West German basic law of 1949 laid it down (Article 93) that a Federal Constitutional Court should interpret the basic law in the event of disputes concerning the rights and duties of any of the highest Federal Agencies, and differences of opinion or doubts as to the formal and material compatibility of Federal law or *Land* law with the basic law. Article 94 of the Constitution de-

clared that the Court should consist of Federal judges and othe members, that half of its members should be elected by th Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat, and that its constitution an procedure should be determined by a Federal law. This law wa duly passed by the Bundestag on 12 March 1951.

The Court consists of two Senates, each composed of twelve judges. Each judge must be over forty years of age, qualified as a judge, and may hold no other position except that of a legal teaching post in a university; he must not be a member of the Bundestag, Bundesrat, or the Federal Government, or of a *Land* parliament or government; but he must fulfil the necessary qualifications for election to the Bundestag. Four judges of each Senate are chosen from the judges of the Higher Federal Courts for their period of office. The remaining sixteen are elected for eight years. Both of these categories are elected as to half of each category by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat respectively. Those chosen by the Bundestag are indirectly elected. Twelve 'electors' (*Wahlmänner*) are chosen by proportional representation from members of the Bundestag on the nomination of each Party Committee (or Fraction). The twelve electors are then summoned by the senior amongst them, who presides, and after a week's notice the judges are elected. Each judge requires at least nine votes to secure election. Those judges chosen by the Bundesrat are directly elected by a two-thirds majority. The judges are divided into two Senates of twelve members each; nomination to the two Senates appears to be on the basis of the qualification of each judge for the particular kind of cases which, under the constitution of the Court, fall to be dealt with by each Senate.

The Court is called on by the Federal Constitution to give decisions in specific cases, fifteen in all, and the constitution of the Court itself lays down in paragraph 14 (1) and (2) which cases fall to each Senate. Thus the First (Red) Senate deals with the following matters: damage to the Constitution by the actions of the political parties or through decisions of the Bundestag (1–3); differences of opinion or doubts as to the formal and material compatibility between Federal and *Land* law and the Federal Constitution, or of Federal with *Land* law on a motion of the Federal Government, a *Land* government, or of one-third of the members of the Bundestag (6); the compatibility of a Federal law or *Land* law with the Constitution, or of a *Land* law or other *Land* right with a Federal law on the motion of a court (11); in case of

differences of opinion on the continuing validity of legislation as Federal law (14).

The Second, or Black, Senate, on the other hand, hears the following cases: complaints from the Bundestag or Bundesrat against the Federal President (4); interpretations of the Constitution arising out of disputes on the extent of the rights and duties of the highest Federal organs or others concerned who, through the basic law or in the rules of procedure of any one of the highest Federal organs, have been given their own rights (5); differences of opinion regarding the rights and duties of the Federation or the *Länder*, particularly in the case of the execution of Federal law by the *Länder* and in the exercise of Federal supervision (7); other public law disputes between the Federation and the *Länder*, between different *Länder*, or within one *Land*, in so far as no other legal procedure is laid down (8); indictments against Federal or *Land* judges (9); and whenever, in litigation, it is doubtful whether a rule of international law is an ingredient of Federal law and whether it directly creates rights or duties for the individual.

In addition, paragraph 16 (1), (2), and (3) of the constitution of the Court lays it down that if one Senate disagrees on a point of law with a decision of the other Senate, then the whole Court sitting together must decide; that the presence of nine judges in each Senate is required for a decision; and finally, that the whole Court decides in a given case when the First as well as the Second Senate is competent, and when the competence is in doubt.

Under the constitution of the Court just outlined, it might seem to the layman that the Second Senate has the duty to determine whether a given law is compatible with the Federal Constitution; but it is not difficult to see that a lawyer could easily so word a particular petition to the Court as to make it fall within the competence of either Senate. In the second place, since, as has already been explained, sixteen of the twenty-four judges were elected by the votes of a panel of Bundestag electors (5 C.D.U., 1 F.D.P., 1 German Party, and 5 S.P.D.) and by members of the Bundesrat who are themselves representatives of the *Länder* governments and therefore party men, it is not necessarily a reflection on the impartiality of the judges themselves that these politicians who have elected them should believe that their nominees would be sympathetic towards a given party line. The fact that nominees of the Opposition and of the Government parties are supposed to be in a majority in the First and Second Senates respectively

accounts for their being known as the 'Red' and 'Black' Senates.

It will be recalled that the S.P.D. Opposition has from the first insisted that the treaty now before the Bundestag, constituting the European Defence Community and involving the Federal Government in a definite contribution, is unconstitutional since no armed forces are permitted by the basic law. As early as January of this year the party asked the First Senate of the Constitutional Court for a ruling on this point before the Bill embodying the treaties had come before the Bundestag. This petition is still before the First Senate, which ruled that it could not hear the petition until the Bill had become law. During the summer, President Heuss asked the Court for an advisory opinion as to whether he would be acting constitutionally in signing the treaty when it had been passed by a simple majority of the Bundestag. If the Constitutional Court were to decide that the law embodying the treaty is unconstitutional, then the Federal law would have to be amended. Under Article 79 of the basic law, this requires a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. It is, however, unlikely that the Federal Government could command this majority.

After the second reading of the law embodying the treaty had passed the Bundestag at the beginning of December, the Federal Chancellor himself sent a petition on behalf of the Government to the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court asking for a binding decision as to whether the basic law permits the Bundestag to approve the treaty by a simple majority. On 9 December the Court considered President Heuss's request for an advisory opinion. The President of the Court declared that the Court's opinion on this request, which was based on purely legal considerations, would be binding on both Senates when they came to consider the other two petitions sent up to them by the Opposition and the Government respectively. The immediate consequence of this declaration was the withdrawal by President Heuss, after interviews with the Federal Chancellor and the Leader of the Opposition, of his request to the Court for an advisory opinion. President Heuss gave as his reason for this withdrawal his belief that the Court's ruling was incompatible with the advisory character of the opinion asked for and with the judicial freedom of the two Senates. The Court in its turn issued a statement on the subject of its decision. It drew attention to a gap in its constitution which it had endeavoured to bridge. Since opinions and judgments are arrived at by the

same legal method, they should in the Court's view be regarded as equally binding, although formally they are not. The Court expressed the hope that its action would help to obviate the employment of the two Senates for ends alien to their proper functions. There the matter rests until the Court decides when and how to hear the Government's petition.

The United Nations and the French North African Protectorates

THE British decision to support France and oppose discussion of the French Protectorates in North Africa at the United Nations Assembly was based upon legal grounds. Mr Selwyn Lloyd argued that the conduct of foreign relations was vested in France by the Protectorate Treaties, and that no threat to world peace and security existed. At the same time, those in France and elsewhere who feared that the action taken by the Asian and Arab promoters of the motions demanding discussion was likely to do more harm than good have, unfortunately, been justified. Not only is it a bad sign that the debates in the U.N. Assembly should have coincided with the assassination of a Tunisian trades union leader by as yet unidentified assailants, and with riots of unusual violence, including a number of fatal casualties, in Casablanca; it has also become unmistakably clear that if the object of the intervention was to advance the negotiations on administrative and political reforms now in progress between France and the rulers of the two Protectorates, and to facilitate the solution of questions pending between them, this object has not been achieved. France appears unmoved by U.N. resolutions on this subject, feelings in the Protectorates have been exacerbated, negotiations for the time being have come to a standstill, solutions are made more difficult, and the promotion of peace is endangered.

The question of the Protectorates could scarcely have been raised in the U.N. if the United States had not supported its inclusion in the Agenda. It is not possible here to analyse American motives for this step, which was much resented in France and regretted in Britain; but it should be asked whether the American statesmen who took the step were really convinced of the need to bring this local question out into the international field in order to solve it, or whether the opportunity of backing an international endeavour of the Arab League and thus perhaps winning sympathy for the desirable Middle East Defence Organization weighed more heavily than the merits of the case. As for the Asian States, the

role of mediator appeals to some of them who, indeed, have qualifications for it, and they may be inclined to regard every inter-racial problem as an international one. The Arab League desires to see the Protectorates joining it as independent States. And to all non-colonial Powers there appears to be moral justification for every attempt at weakening the strength of the colonial Powers. Among these wider considerations the local issues at the centre tend to be ignored, misjudged, or distorted.

The will to negotiate was certainly not lacking on the French side in the case of Tunisia. The French were anxious to develop their earlier administrative reforms and to begin introducing democratic institutions on the municipal and rural level. They have been ready not only to negotiate questions of method and detail, but to envisage further stages of national development in the Protectorate, once the first stages are implemented. But their plans for associating the Tunisian people with the French administration failed, until now, to obtain the assent of the ruler, whose extremist advisers demanded out-and-out sovereignty. In fact, it was the attempt to force on the Bey the reform he has now, at last, accepted which gave rise to the violence of recent months in Tunisia. In the case of Morocco, the Sultan's demands are large but measured, and centre on a radical revision of the Protectorate Treaty; the French Government have so far resisted these demands, using the arguments that there is no trained Moroccan personnel to carry out the Sultan's intentions and that the Protectorate Treaties speak, in fact, of 'reform' and not of 'revision'. The French acknowledge their duty to introduce reforms, but in the order and the manner determined by themselves, in other words gradually, carefully, and slowly.

The severest critics of the French attitude towards the two Protectorates are to be found in France itself, where informed opinion, irrespective of party, accuses the Government of indecision, lack of a unanimous policy, and the inconsistent use of alternately weak and harsh methods. If the U.N. votes help to produce a bold and progressive French policy in Morocco and Tunisia, they will at least have achieved something.

Iraq, a Military Government with a Difference

THE mob rioting in Baghdad which caused the fall of Mustafa al-Umari's Government on 23 November arose immediately out of a domestic issue which seemed unconnected with Iraq's foreign

relations. A general election was due shortly; and the Government proposed to retain the procedure of election in two stages (which seemed appropriate, in view of the high percentage of illiteracy, but also lent itself to Government manipulation), while the Opposition parties on both the extreme nationalist and the left wings demanded direct election (which favoured the return by such an electorate of extremist candidates). The Opposition rejected a compromise proposal, that a reform of electoral procedure should be deferred for consideration by the new Parliament, and proclaimed a boycott. A strike of some Baghdad students was used by the extreme nationalists and the pro-Communists to bring out the mob, which damaged the offices of the English-language *Iraq Times* and of the United States Information Service, and was repressed only by the proclamation of martial law. The Regent chose the Chief of Staff, General Nur ud-Din Mahmud, to form a new Government.

Iraq's internal affairs cannot, however, be thus divorced from her foreign relations. The abiding political influence for a whole generation has been that of the now veteran Nuri as-Sa'id, whether as Prime Minister or as manipulator of Cabinets headed by others, with relatively short intervals when he has been compelled to give way before outbursts of extreme nationalism. The Regent Abd ul-Ilah, who has represented the Crown during the thirteen-years' minority of King Feisal II, is a pupil of Nuri in holding Iraq's best interests to lie in collaboration with Britain and the West—whence, for example, the conclusion of the 1951 agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company which promises a huge accretion of capital for Iraq's development projects. Such collaboration is anathema to the extreme nationalists who demand complete independence of 'imperialist' influence, neutrality in the 'cold war', and nationalization of the oil industry. In making such demands they, like Dr Musaddiq, naturally have the support of the Communists.

The analysis must go still deeper. Moderate observers, both Iraqi and unofficial British, emphasize the extent to which power divorced from public responsibility has corrupted the men round both Nuri as-Sa'id and the Regent. The disappearance of a woman who had some claim on a member of the Royal Guard is compared with some of the unsavoury incidents of ex-King Farouk's later years; and British policy is blamed by these moderate and sympathetic elements for artificially maintaining in power

a regime which by its sins of omission and commission has, as they assert, lost the respect of the responsible public. To the obvious objection that the Opposition's attitude has been impossibly negative and destructive, they reply that that attitude arises largely from frustration and impotence, as a result of the inhibiting of the natural process of political change which they attribute to British influence. They add that the situation is now so poisoned that they doubt whether it can be remedied by the personal appeal of the young King when he comes of age next year; his education in England stamps him, in their eyes, as being intended to prolong the unpopular policy of Nuri and the Regent.

The new military Government on 28 November promised concessions to the demands of the Opposition; but to relatively moderate and responsible observers such as those mentioned above, this is not a government—like those now installed in Egypt and Syria—intended to purge a regime which has forfeited popular support, but a means employed by that regime to maintain itself in power. This criticism may in part conceal the self-interest of those who covet authority for themselves; but British policy seems again in the position (as recently in Jordan, in Persia, in Egypt) of trying to purchase one or two years' breathing-space by bolstering up conservative regimes which have become discredited, partly because public opinion is emotional and impatient but also because of those regimes' own deficiencies in public spirit. It is true that two years of political peace in Iraq might see the beginnings of improvements in the country's economy arising out of the increased royalties accruing from the Iraq Petroleum Company; but the enemies, on both the right and the left wings, of peaceful evolution will do their utmost to exploit public discontents during that waiting period; and an undiscriminating British loyalty to old Iraqi friends who during fifteen or twenty years have taken a helpful view of Anglo-Iraqi relations might now provide an example of what Professor Toynbee has labelled 'the Nemesis of an Ephemeral Technique'.

Decrease of Crime in Norway

THE Statistical Central Bureau in Norway has recently issued a most encouraging report of the decrease of crime in that country since the war. In spite of gloomy predictions, and in striking contrast to the tendency observed elsewhere, a marked reduction in criminality has taken place in Norway. There has been a specially

noticeable decrease in crimes committed for the sake of gai

In 1950 only 3,844 men and 312 women were convicted (crime. This is the lowest figure for the last twenty-five years. Th corresponding figures in 1939 were 4,540 and 476. The real posi tion is even better, since the population over fourteen years of ag has increased since 1939 by 8 per cent, while in the same space c time criminality has been reduced by 16 per cent.

In the 1930s crime showed a slightly rising tendency, whic continued right down to 1943, mainly in the capital, Oslo, an in the male category of criminals rather than the female. Yet th recession in the post-war years has been greatest in the capita though its figures are still considerably higher than in the countr districts. Taking the crimes per 1,000 inhabitants, we find 1·28 pe thousand for the whole country in 1950, as against 1·70 in 193 Analysis shows 0·85 per thousand for rural districts, 2·15 fo Oslo, and 2·25 for the other towns in the country.

There has been a relatively large reduction in thefts, especiall in Oslo, which has resulted in the capital for the first time fallin below the average figure for the other towns. About 60 per cen of the reduction in crime falls under the head of crimes for th sake of gain.

These facts will have an obvious interest for this country i view of recent discussions on the increase in crime here. They ar particularly remarkable since Norwegians, immediately after th war, were repeatedly stressing the difficulty of getting the yout of the country weaned from the frame of mind inculcated durin the Occupation, when untruthfulness, defiance of authority, an every kind of black marketing took on temporarily the characte of virtues. Official circles in Norway attribute this encouragin phenomenon to improvement in the standard of living and th full employment policy pursued by the authorities. Other reason may be found in the impetus given since the war to the cult o outdoor life and sports. It also seems likely that the school teacher deserve a good deal of credit.

Nigeria under the Macpherson Constitution[1]

WITH the formal opening on 11 March 1952 of the Nigerian House of Representatives elected under the new Constitution Nigeria embarked on semi-responsible government. The Macpherson Constitution (so called after the present Governor, Sir John Macpherson), which was promulgated on 29 June 1951, had been drawn up after a year of consultations with representative Africans. The three Regions into which Nigeria was divided as a measure of administrative devolution in 1946 have now become the constituent units of a federation. As with most federations, the boundaries of the units have been determined by historical accident and not by any rational criterion. The Northern Region is the old Northern Nigeria as it was before the amalgamation in 1914 of the conquered North with the ceded South, while the former Southern Nigeria is divided by the line of the Niger into the Eastern and Western Regions. Lagos and the Colony area, which had been administered as a separate unit since their annexation in 1861, were merged, after bitter controversy, in the Western Region. Very roughly, the Northern Region is the country of the large Moslem Emirates (the native kingdoms established by the Fulani conquests in the early nineteenth century), the West that of the Yoruba kingdoms, on a smaller scale than the Emirates and not politically centralized to the same extent, and the Eastern that of the 'democratic' Ibo peoples and other tribes of similar culture, who traditionally recognized no authority outside the 'clan' based on kinship, and not much within it. The North is the area of cotton and groundnut production, the West of cocoa, the East of palm oil. But in the 'middle belt', the southern part of the Northern Region, the people have more affinity with their southern than their northern neighbours, and in the eastern part of the Western Region are populations whose social structure resembles those of the East; and palm oil is produced in the Western as well as the Eastern Region.

The North covers much more than half the total area of Nigeria, and claims half the total population; it is far behind the other two regions in development of all kinds, and its spokesmen maintain

[1] The visit to Nigeria during which this information was obtained was made possible by a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation.

that it has been unfairly treated in the past in the allocation of revenue. In fact its material backwardness is due largely to the inescapable fact that it takes longer to penetrate the hinterland, and its backwardness in education in part to Moslem prejudice. But it has sought to secure its interests for the future by successfully insisting on the allocation to it of half the total elected seats in the central House of Representatives. The Western Region is by far the wealthiest. The Hicks-Phillipson Commission, which was appointed in 1950 to recommend an appropriate allocation of revenues between the three Regions and the centre, found that the East had been unduly favoured in the past, notably as regards grants for education, and indicated that it must reckon in the future on less central assistance; the implications of this situation are only beginning to be realized by Eastern politicians.

Each Region has its elected House of Assembly and an Executive Council consisting partly of officials and partly of elected members, the latter being in the majority. In the Northern and Western Regions there is an upper chamber, the House of Chiefs, consisting of hereditary rulers; the most important are *ex-officio* members, the others elected from among themselves by the whole body of recognized Native Authorities. A demand for similar recognition of 'natural rulers' in the East has been put forward, but is not likely to be seriously considered.

Every taxpayer has the right to vote in the area where he pays tax; the requirement that the tax receipt must be produced is said to have deterred some from seeking registration. Candidates must be resident in or natives of their constituency; thus a rural area can be represented by a 'native son' who has left his home to practise some profession in one of the large towns. But in fact such men were not elected unless they had kept in touch with the home district.

THE ELECTIONS

The elections, the first in the country's history, lasted several months and were only completed in January 1952. Election was indirect except in the case of Lagos Town, which had elected three representatives to the Nigerian legislature since 1923. The system varied in the different Regions. In both the North and the West there were three stages, and Native Authority Councils were given special representation at the intermediate stage. In the North the intermediate colleges had 10 per cent of their members

nominated by Native Authorities. In the West, they included members of Native Authority councils, with an equal or grea number of persons elected by the primary units, and this det mined the numbers whom the primary units had to choose. one district where the Native Authority consists of 238 fam heads, the intermediate college numbered 478, and one prim unit had to elect fifty-two representatives; a more usual numb however, was between one and nine. In both Regions thirty the members finally elected had entered by this door, out o total membership of ninety in the Northern and eighty in t Western House; it must be remembered, however, that in t Western Region most of the Native Authority Councils have majority of elected members. Mr Awolowo, the leader of t party in power in the West, came in as a Native Authority Cou cillor. In the Eastern Region there were only two stages, t primary and the final.

It is argued that under the indirect system candidates are p forward in the first place for their local standing, so that the u sophisticated voter is not exposed to specious demagogy fro strangers. In Nigeria local feeling at present predominates strongly over other considerations that a direct system might w give the same result. From constituencies in both East and We it was reported that those voters who were actively interested the proceedings were concerned from the first stage with t question of who would finally be their representative; they d not see themselves as entrusting the choice on their behalf to t wisest heads among them. The choice, however, was of the m considered most likely to further the interests of the locality. some elections no question of general policy was ever even me tioned. At the final stage, and sometimes at the intermediate stag lists were issued by organizations, local or wider, and in cas where a very large number of votes had to be cast (e.g. Ibada where the intermediate college elected eighty-five voters) the li of least resistance was to follow these. In other cases vote tended to choose the candidates whose names were highest on t paper, and some gave up long before they had cast all the votes which they were entitled. In the Eastern Region, though t officials who supervised the primary elections are confident th there were no irregular practices there, it is common talk that vot were bought at the final stage.

In the Eastern and Western Regions, after the elections most

the candidates who had stood as independents attached themselves to a party; occasionally one reads in the newspapers that the electors of some constituency (that is, in fact, the Native Authority Council, the only permanent organized body) have instructed their representatives to do so. In the East there was only one party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), led by Dr Azikiwe, but in the West there is a rival organization, Mr Awolowo's Action Group. In the West, therefore, there is a party in power and an opposition, though the division appears to be a matter of rival leaders rather than of contrasted policies. In the North the political affinities of many of the members are not known.

It has not proved, as the text-books assert, that indirect elections always give a conservative bias. The Northern House is conservative by comparison with the others, because the North is acutely aware of the probability that an independent Nigeria would be dominated by the Southern intelligentsia, and is therefore anxious that the final withdrawal of British authority should be postponed. The North is more interested in the democratization of the Emirates; whether direct elections would have produced a larger number of representatives anxious to insist on this it is hard to say. The non-Moslem 'middle belt' has chosen representatives who belong to organizations vaguely affiliated to the N.C.N.C. In the West the Action Group and N.C.N.C. vie with one another in the assertion of Nigerian nationalism; in the East there is a 'moderate' opposition of half a dozen members.

In the Eastern and Western Houses the Governor has the right to appoint three 'special members' who represent commercial interests. In the North the number who may be nominated is ten; they include members of otherwise unrepresented groups, such as indigenous or immigrant ethnic minorities or mission adherents.

CENTRAL AND REGIONAL LEGISLATURES

The central legislature is a single chamber. Nigeria's Constitution differs from that of most federations in that the members of the central House are elected from among those of the Regional Houses, thirty-four each from East and West, and sixty-eight from the North. Here again the position of chiefs has been recognized by special provisions for the North and West; the Northern members are elected by the Joint Council, a body consisting of forty members from each chamber, and must

include at least one chief from every Province, while in the We the House of Chiefs have the right to elect three members fro among themselves. Provisions, which differ slightly in ea Region, are made to secure an equitable geographical distributio Members propose themselves for election by writing their nam in a book, and almost all the members seem to have done so. A the prominent members of the party organizations were electe with one signal exception. Dr Azikiwe was returned for one of tl three Lagos seats, as he had been under the Richards Constitutic of 1946.[1] Since Lagos is now part of the Western Region, he is member of a legislature in which his party is in the minority. Bı since Lagos has been allotted two seats in the central House, a arrangement with one of his colleagues to stand down would hav been easy. It was generally supposed that such an arrangemeı had been made, when it transpired that all three Lagos membe had put themselves forward, and the Action Group majority tr umphantly secured the exclusion of 'Zik'.

In the Northern and Western Houses the Lieutenant-Governo have now withdrawn from the legislatures and only appear at tl formal opening to deliver the 'speech from the Throne'. Tl president of the Northern House is the Senior Resident. In tl West, after vain attempts to secure an African Speaker, tl choice fell on an administrative officer, Mr Milliken, whoı genial presidency is ideal in this period when the minutiae ı parliamentary procedure have not yet become second nature. manual of standing orders for each House was prepared by M E. A. Fellowes, Clerk-Assistant of the House of Commons, wh also presided at the meetings of the central House in August.

In each Region there is an Executive Council consisting of thre *ex-officio* members, the Civil Secretary, Legal Secretary, an Financial Secretary, not more than two other official membeı (who are in practice a senior administrative official and the De velopment Secretary), and up to nine Ministers. In the Northeı and Western Regions two of these are members of the House ı Chiefs and are without portfolio. In the Central Executive Counc (the Council of Ministers) the Lieutenant-Governors of the thre Regions are also members. The Governor presides over th Council of Ministers, while the Lieutenant-Governors presic over the Regional Councils.

[1] So called after the then Governor of Nigeria, Sir Arthur Richards, no Lord Milverton.

THE MINISTERS

The names of Ministers are presented to the legislature for its approval by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Region, or the Governor in the case of the central House. In the two bicameral legislatures this approval is given by a Joint Council consisting of forty members of each chamber elected for the purpose. In the East and West, where there are organized political parties, the lists were drawn up in consultation with them.

Ministers do not control their own departments as they do in the Gold Coast. During the constitutional discussions Northern representatives, fearing perhaps that in a central cabinet they would be out-manoeuvred by their Southern colleagues, or that the dignity of a Minister would overshadow that of an Emir, objected to the creation of Ministers. The present compromise arrangement was devised, it is said, to meet their views, though it is doubtful whether to people unfamiliar with constitutional minutiae it looks more like a ministerial system or no ministerial system. The groups of subjects for which the central Ministers are responsible are dealt with by various sections of the Lagos Secretariat, and to divide it into separate Ministries corresponding to the different portfolios would be a major reorganization. In the newer Regional secretariats the complications are not so great. The Ministers are described in the Constitution as exercising executive responsibility 'in association with the appropriate public officer'; thus they cannot overrule the Civil Service heads, and one Minister may be associated with different civil servants on different occasions. Also, executive decisions are taken, not by Ministers independently but by the full Executive Council. This may have the effect of reassuring the Northerners that, even in small matters, questions affecting them are not decided without their knowledge. It is also argued in its favour that it gives all the new Ministers an opportunity of acquaintance with the whole range of administrative business, and that it drives home the principle of collective responsibility. On the other hand, it may merely swell the volume of 'cabinet' business to a point where the Ministers give up the attempt to grasp it. Some of them have in fact taken independent lines on policy—more, perhaps, in the Regions than at the centre. But those who continue the policies of the 'old government', even when personally convinced of their necessity, find it hard, under such a system, to meet the accusation of the nationalist rank and file that they are mere puppets.

The Council of Ministers has four Ministers from each Region. In so far as the Regions represent opposed interests—and this is rather the attitude of each towards the others—this gives it the character of a coalition, and one not voluntarily entered into. But this will not result in serious difficulties as long as the different parties do not represent contradictory programmes. Since no one can be both a Regional and a Central Minister, the leaders of the parties have to choose between the two spheres. It has been assumed that the central posts are of greater importance, but in the West Mr Awolowo preferred to retain the leadership of the Regional House, and seems to have reserved for it the cream of his party's talent. In the East the vice-president of the N.C.N.C., Dr Eyo Ita, is a Regional Minister, but its Deputy Leader, Mr Jaja Wachuku, is not a Minister at all. Mr Nwapa and Mr Njoku, both from the East, are possibly the ablest of the central Ministers. The former is President of the Port Harcourt branch of the N.C.N.C.; the latter, who when he was elected had only recently returned from studying at Manchester to take up a post at the West African University College, was not a prominent member of the party.

PARTY POLITICS

Ministers belonging to one party should logically support the same policies and be supported by the same representatives, but in Nigerian politics this principle is not yet established. Whether or not the Western Ministers at the centre take their line from Mr Awolowo, he has strongly opposed certain central measures. He defends his position by the argument that in the House of Representatives he is merely a private member.

In the Northern and Western Houses there is reasonable certainty that a Government measure will command a majority; in the West the good party discipline of the Action Group may be a response to the presence of a fairly numerous opposition party. In the East the N.C.N.C. members do not appear to recognize any obligation to support the policies of their Ministers, and indeed have protested against what they call 'attempts to muzzle them'. In the main they keep to the old Crown Colony tradition that the business of an elected member is to oppose. In response to protest from private members, the Eastern Government withdrew a loan of £500,000 which had been actually granted to the town of Onitsha for a market improvement scheme,

and from which the first payments had been made, and requested the Onitsha Town Council to submit a new scheme which would require only £100,000. An interesting feature of this debate was that one of the members for Onitsha spoke in favour of the reduction. The Eastern House also passed a motion rejecting the proposal to create a model oil palm estate to be managed jointly by the Regional Production Development Board and the Colonial Development Corporation: in the debate on this motion the Government had the support of the 'Independent' (nominally opposition) members.

In the central House the Northern members tend to take the Government side; but their votes cannot be absolutely counted upon, particularly as so few of them speak in debate. The most controversial issue during the last session was a revised salary scale, the introduction of which was made the occasion for the unfailingly popular outcry against the 'expatriate allowance' paid to British officials. Outright opposition to the proposal was difficult because the majority of those who were to benefit from the revision were Africans. However, a series of N.C.N.C. speakers attacked it at length. The votes by which it was eventually passed came from all three Regions, but so did the opposition. There were some thirty abstentions—a convenient evasive tactic for members who are aware of the conflict between the reasonable and the popular attitudes; its frequent use helps to make the result of any vote incalculable.

Both in the Regions and at the centre there is general agreement that the Ministers are taking their work seriously and learning to appreciate practical realities. Not all the members of any Ministry can be men of outstanding qualities. But such men as Mr Nwapa, the Central Minister of Commerce and Industries, Mallam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Central Minister of Works, Mr Awolowo, and in his less spectacular way Mr Oli, the Eastern Minister of Local Government, have shown a good sense and a realism in the handling of their portfolios which augurs well for the future if they can retain popular support. Mr Nwapa has indeed already shown that he can handle a party revolt.

In the West one has the impression that Mr Awolowo has a concrete programme and has really considered the details of a constructive social policy. He has been described as 'a tireless machine', and he organized the preparation, for the July meeting of the Regional House, of a series of Sessional Papers outlining

programmes for education, health, agriculture, forestry, co operatives, and social welfare. His proudest achievement is th Local Government Bill, which provides for the transformation o Native Authority Councils into local governments closely modelled on those in the United Kingdom. This is of course the line of development already initiated by the Colonial Office and adopted in the Eastern Region; but it is largely in response to the views of people like Mr Awolowo that the policy has been adopted, and it has fallen to him, as Minister for Local Government, to work out the appropriate compromise in his own region between democratic representation and the claims of traditional chiefs. Before introducing the Bill he toured the whole region and held meetings with Native Authority councils to discuss his proposals, and was statesmanlike enough to modify his original plans when he saw how much support the chiefs still commanded; though it was not till the Bill reached the House that he compromised on his first intention of reducing the rulers to formal figureheads and accepted an amendment which would permit them to be chairmen of local authorities. Among his other aims are free and compulsory elementary education from January 1955; a free school medical service and a hospital in every administrative Division; the establishment of a Regional Agricultural Advisory Board; the rapid mechanization of farming; and a considerable extension of the activities of co-operative societies.

The success of the new experiment must turn very largely on the ability of Nigerian leaders to tackle the most difficult task of all leadership—the education of their supporters. Mr Awolowo is aware of this responsibility; he frequently impresses on his audiences the fact that benefits must be paid for in taxes, a consideration of which the average voter in Nigeria is even less aware than his counterpart in Britain. Mr Akintola, the Western Minister of Labour, has reminded trade union leaders that they have obligations as well as rights. Mr Nwapa seems to have successfully overcome a movement within the N.C.N.C. to disown him for accepting office under the 'unprogressive' Macpherson Constitution. But most Ministers do not at present seem to go beyond the formal defence of policy in the House, and one has the impression that they are not in effective liaison even with the private members of their own parties. It has been pointed out that their sub-ministerial status weakens their position in the face of critics who are unwilling to accept the argument for realistic policies.

Nigerian politics will be healthier when the parties represent genuinely opposed interests and programmes. At present they are little more than rival patronage groups. In the towns in the East, the N.C.N.C. ticket is coming to be the passport to success in local government elections. The Action Group, a much newer organization, has not yet perhaps achieved the same dominance in the West. In so far as there is opposition between the two, it is expressed in terms of 'Codlin's the friend, not Short'. The only serious opposition of policy is that between the N.C.N.C.'s utterly impracticable 'One Nigeria' and the Action Group's acceptance of the federal Constitution.

Yet there are real grounds for political opposition in Nigeria. The wealthy men who vote for State expenditure but themselves evade the payment of tax, the cocoa brokers who ardently advocate extensions of co-operative marketing which would put them out of business, would belong more appropriately to a conservative party, by whatever name it might be called. If their interests were organized and openly expressed, debate would begin to have reality.

Another great need, from the point of view of political education, is for an intelligently conducted press debate. The rival parties have their organs, of pathetically small circulation, it is true, but avidly read in certain circles. They abuse one another roundly, but in quite general terms. One never sees a specific promise or claim examined or contested. One of Mr Awolowo's less defensible claims is that the Action Group has reduced the price of gari (cassava flour). It has in fact taken no measures which could in any way have affected the price of gari. An assertion that should be meat and drink to his opponents is simply ignored, and the public loses that opportunity of learning to weigh political claims for which the mass of the voters in any country must depend on the press.

L. P. M.

Economic and Electoral Reforms in Norway

NEWS from Norway nowadays is mainly concerned with that country's reactions to various consequences of her membership of the Atlantic Alliance. The latest hare to be chased is the possibility of Norway providing bases on her territory in peace-time for forces from the other N.A.T.O. Powers. Of this more later; but the preoccupation with such external matters tends to overlook important developments in internal politics. And at present two measures in particular deserve attention as among the most significant handled by the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) for many years.

PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED ECONOMIC CONTROL

Of these, the most controversial and most important is the Price and Competition Regulation Bill[1] which was published on 19 September. Based on the unpublished report (in over 1,000 foolscap pages) which the Price and Rationalization Law Committee made last spring after four and a half years' work, this Bill has kept alive the deep disagreements which came to a head when the tenor of the Committee's report became known through its circulation to interested organizations. The Bill, as will be seen, proposes the perpetuation and extension of the sweeping powers of economic control and direction which all parties accepted at the end of the war but which were then regarded as a temporary and, so to say, an emergency measure. It is the clear intention to make such powers permanent that has roused the wrath of the Opposition and of the most important commercial organizations. Some control they accept as necessary in the present state of the country's economy, but they are strongly against the implications of the Bill that Norway's economy is to be State-controlled except for those sectors which the State chooses to leave free. Rather would they have it the other way round, that the economy is free except in so far as prevailing economic trends impose some measure of control, even though at a given time this may lead to controls as widespread and stringent as any provided for in the Bill. There is a fundamental matter of principle involved on which the forces opposing the Government's policy are not prepared to compromise.

[1] *Odelsting Proposisjonen* Nr. 60 (1952).

And scant satisfaction is derived from statements such as that of the Minister of Justice at Bergen at the end of September that this Bill, if and when it becomes law, will always be susceptible to repeal like any other law. The Bill is considered 'the beginning of socialization'.

Some of the personalities involved in this struggle, the reputed original programme of the Government for placing the Bill on the Statute Book, and certain constitutional aspects of the Bill itself have all helped, perhaps with insufficient justification, to increase the Opposition's distrust and determination. The chairman of the Price and Rationalization Law Committee and its most uncompromising advocate of complete economic control was Wilhelm Thagaard, Chief of the Directorate of Prices. Allegedly a Liberal whose main aim is the most efficient organization and functioning of the country's economy, Thagaard, though not a Socialist, has, from his position and the powers he possesses under the Lex Thagaard of 1945 and its successor of 1947, long been a *bête-noire* of non-Socialist opinion. The fact that he has made less use of his powers than was feared is, in the eyes of the Opposition, more than offset by the present attempt to make those powers permanent, and by irritating minor administrative measures adopted in recent years in the name of economic control and efficiency. Thus, to take a recent case, a man who had built his own house in Oslo declared the time spent on the job and paid taxes on it in accordance with prevailing wage rates. He was nevertheless required to pay additional taxes on the grounds that it was well known that no builders in Oslo would work for wages as low as the official ones. Therefore his own time should have been given a higher value, with a consequent increase in the tax payable.

The general belief, moreover, that the Government's original programme for this Bill permitted a quite inadequate time for the organizations involved to consider it and state their cases against such important proposals, did nothing to calm the troubled atmosphere. In the event, a few weeks' more time was given to allow of fuller consideration. But the Opposition would have liked longer still. This, of course, was partly for tactical reasons, just as the Government's desire to have the Bill passed as soon as decently possible was also to some extent caused by considerations of political timing. For next October there will be a fresh General Election in Norway. If, as was originally intended, the Bill could

have been published in the summer, it could have been discussed and voted on by the present session of the Storting. The next session would then have been free to dispose of various minor or routine matters and to clear the decks for the election campaign in the summer. Now there is the probability that the next session may be embarrassingly crowded; but there is little chance that, with 85 seats out of a total of 150, the Government will fail to carry the Bill through.

On the other hand, it is not likely that the extensive new powers of control it confers will be used before the elections. For one thing, there would not be much time. For another, such a move would act against Labour's interests at the elections. In fact, in spite of the alarm and despondency of the Opposition, it is indeed doubtful whether these powers will ever be used to their full extent. As has been mentioned earlier, there is a fundamental matter of principle involved in giving a permanent character to measures that were originally only temporary: and the Opposition is quite justified in stressing this aspect. But the record of the Norwegian Government since it has had potentially almost complete control of the country's economic life is certainly not such as to substantiate the more extreme fears of the Opposition. Allowing for the fact that it is Socialist and that Norway's economic condition necessitated a considerable measure of Government control, the Government has behaved reasonably and moderately.

The third line of attack against the Bill is derived from its alleged disregard both of constitutional practice and of the precision of language necessary at law. The Opposition fears that the delegated powers granted to the administration in respect of the Bill may undermine the authority of the Storting in important ways, not least because these powers, like the Bill as a whole, are described in subjective and sociological terms rather than in precise and legal language. Again, since decisions under the proposed law may be classified as 'administrative judgments' against which there is no appeal in the courts, it is felt that this technical device is being used to eliminate, or at least restrict, the fundamental constitutional right of appeal.

The Bill itself is not particularly long. It contains sixty-two clauses and occupies only twenty-three pages, but the explanatory memorandum and supporting documents run to another 518 pages. Its aim, as set out in the first clause, well illustrates the reasons for the Opposition's attitude:

This law has as its aim:

(*a*) through the control and regulation of prices, costs, and profits, and through other economic measures, to ensure a socially satisfactory development of prices and to counteract unreasonable prices and business conditions;

(*b*) through measures which the law otherwise prescribes, to create guarantees against unfair competition and restrictive measures which are unreasonable or harmful to the general interest.

The scope of the law and the machinery for putting its provisions into effect are then discussed. This latter consists of a Price Council of five members nominated by the Government and working through a Price Directorate with district offices in every county and in many communes. The major decisions of the Price Directorate are to be published in a Price Gazette and, in addition to making an annual report on its activity to the Storting, the Price Council must refer to the Storting any special or major regulation it seeks to make. The sort of measures envisaged here are primarily those described in clause 24 which gives the Council the authority to lay down:

(*a*) maximum prices, minimum prices, price-stops, decisions on prices, profits, and business conditions;

(*b*) decisions on the calculation of costs, decisions on the responsibility of traders to mark their goods or display information concerning them or to give other information on prices, business conditions, quality, or other properties of goods or services, as well as decisions on the provision of accounts, invoices, and receipts and the retention of such documents or copies thereof;

(*c*) decisions on production, turnover, and on such other aspects of business activity as may be requisite for the control or regulation of prices, profits, or business conditions.

Taxes may be imposed on businesses as a means of regulating prices and costs. Companies may not pay out in dividends a sum greater than 5 per cent of their share capital at the beginning of the accounting year in question. Under certain conditions, however, and provided the total amount distributed does not exceed kr. 10,000 (£500), up to 8 per cent may be paid out. The duty of the Price Directorate, it is stated, is to oppose unreasonable profits and support activities which are beneficial to the community. The lines to be followed in pursuit of these aims and the various powers to assist in their achievement include (clause 42) the promulgation of such decisions as may prove necessary to regulate competition when this is found to be unfair or harmful to the public interest,

and of decisions to counteract unnecessary turnover or middl man's activity.

All in all, the Bill thus proposes extremely comprehensi powers which could, but need not, be used to place the who Norwegian economy under the control of the State. It is expecte for example, that agriculture, fishing, and shipping will in practi be exempt from the provisions of the law. Fundamentally the di pute turns on intent. If the Socialists do not intend to use the powers, why, it is argued, should they now stir up such a hornet nest to obtain them? Conversely, from the Socialist standpoin such powers, although they will be sparingly used, as the exper ence of the post-war years illustrates, are still considered necessa to nurse the country's economy back to strength. To this the reto is: if the country's economy is so weak, why run the risk of ruinir it by such violent treatment? And so the argument goes on.

ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTION PROSPECTS

Such a basic division of opinion would make next autumn elections in Norway interesting enough by itself. But the questic whether the Labour Party will lose ten or more seats, and thı forfeit its absolute majority in Parliament as a result of tl antagonism aroused by this Bill, is further complicated by recent electoral reform. By a decision of the Storting on 2 November the constitutional over-representation of the country side in Parliament will henceforth be modified. Under article 5 of the Constitution two-thirds of the members of the Storting ha to come from country constituencies and only one-third froı towns. The growth of large towns such as Oslo, Bergen, an Trondheim had long made this provision unfair. Yet the resul rather surprisingly, was that at the last elections Labour was ove represented by 9 seats—in other words, if the new rules had the been in force there would now have been 76 instead of 85 Labou members in the Storting.

Under the new electoral rules[1] the Opposition appears to hav

[1] The reform has two aspects. The first affects the 'first divisor' used i allocating seats to political parties on the basis of their total votes on the electora lists in each constituency. This divisor is henceforth to be 1 4 instead of Subsequent divisors are the successive odd numbers. When these calculatior have been done, the top, say, seven figures (in a seven-seat constituency) a chosen and the seats allocated to the parties to whom these figures belon Space does not permit adequate tabular illustration, but a few moments' exper ments with voting figures will show that the general effect of the change is t permit fuller representation to the smaller parties.

The second aspect of the proposed reform is the combination of the formerl

a good chance of obtaining an absolute majority. If so, they will be able to nullify what the Opposition regards as the more obnoxious provisions of the Price Law. On the other hand, the fairer distribution of seats that will result from this change in electoral procedure is also likely to place a few Communists in Parliament again. In the 1949 elections they polled 102,722 votes but got no seats in Parliament, while the Agrarians got 12 seats with only 85,418 votes and the Christian People's Party 9 seats with 147,068 votes. Any Communist gains—and under the new rules their 1949 vote would have given them 4 seats—would tend to strengthen the position of the Labour Party, since they would obviously both favour measures of economic control.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

These changes are being made at a time when economic developments in any case give ground for concern. The three chief Norwegian exports—shipping services, oils and fats, and forest products—which together account for about two-thirds of all exports have all diminished greatly in value in the last year. Figures of foreign trade (including ships) in the first nine months of this year show a deficit of 1·498 million kroner. In more detail, this is composed of imports worth kr. 4,121 million (plus kr. 427 million of ships) and exports of kr. 2,841 million (plus kr. 210 million of ships). The figures for the corresponding period last year were much more satisfactory—imports kr. 3,882 million (plus kr. 642 million of ships), exports kr. 2,853 million (plus kr. 268 million of ships).

Exports of ore and metals have risen by kr. 168 million, the value of important alloy ores such as ferromanganese, ferrochrome, and ferrosilisium increasing particularly. Herring and other fish exports have also grown (by kr. 88 million). But staple exports such as oils and fats and paper and pulp have fallen enormously, the former by kr. 181·5 million and the latter by kr. 126 million. The net contribution of freight earnings to the

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separate town and country constituencies into twenty combined constituencies. This has brought the division of seats more into line with the actual division of the country's population. Thus the Oslo district now has 13 seats in place of 7. A more accurate division in proportion to population would, however, give the Oslo district 20 or 21 seats. The division of mandates in the other districts is: Östfold 8, Akershus 7, Hedmark 1, Oppland 7, Buskerud 7, Vestfold 7, Telemark 6, Aust-Agder 4, Vest-Agder 5, Rogaland 10, Hordaland 10, Bergen 5, Sogn Og Fjordane 5, Möre Og Romsdal 10, Sör-Trondelag 10, Nord-Trondelag 6, Nordland 12, Troms og Finmark 4.

balance of payments will also clearly be much less than the kr. 900 million it amounted to last year.

The picture at home is similarly dark. From January to September the index of wholesale prices rose by 13 points to 284·2 (1938 base) and the cost of living index (1949 base) from 129·3 to 136·2 points—and this at a time when world market prices generally were falling. The general effect of these developments has been to eliminate the temporary advantages obtained from nominal increases in wages. As a result, when real wages thus decline—and this has been the tendency for the past two years or so—attention is being focused on the possibility of checking the rise in prices rather than the desirability of continued increases in wages. Politically this has a polarizing effect. The advocates of price control point to the lessons of recent years as evidence for the need to extend control still further Those who oppose such policies use the same evidence to demonstrate their uselessness; price control has not only failed to control prices, it has even failed to take advantage of general falls in prices. These facts should be borne in mind when considering the significance and impact of the Price Bill discussed above.

Finally, as a corollary of the decrease in exports, the level of industrial production has fallen. The year 1952 is likely to be the first year since the war when production has not increased in Norway. Thus the total index of industrial production (1938 base) stood at 99·9 points in July and 139·3 in August, compared with 105·2 and 141·0 points for the corresponding months last year and an annual average figure for 1951 of 148·4 points. The figures for exports industries were 109·5 and 120·2 in July and August this year, as compared with 120·0 and 124·4 for the same months last year. On the other hand, many important industries—electro-chemicals, for instance, or ores and metals—show considerable increases in production. Construction activity is also at a high level. Thus on balance full employment is maintained.

DEFENCE DEMANDS

The increasing demands of the armed forces contribute to this situation. The current defence programme envisages an expenditure of kr. 970 million this year (or about 4·7 per cent of the national income) and some kr. 1,000 million next year. Conscription is to be for eighteen instead of twelve months, and this will obviously put a strain on manpower resources. Many airfields,

barracks, and depots are being built. Since the major part of this programme is dependent on human and material resources already available it is going ahead fairly smoothly, without the complications of engineering bottlenecks and resultant delays encountered in some other countries.

In these circumstances Norway has not felt obliged to reduce her contribution to the N.A.T.O. defence system. Her problem is indeed quite different from that of, for example, the United Kingdom. But in the possession of a common frontier with Russia and in her sovereignty over the Spitzbergen archipelago, which is demilitarized by the Paris Treaty of 1920 and where the Russians also work coal mines, she has particular and delicate problems.

As soon as it became obvious that Norway was going to join the Atlantic Alliance, Russia sent her a Note protesting against her participation in an 'aggressive' organization. Norway then replied that she certainly had no aggressive designs on the Soviet Union and would not permit foreign bases to be established on her territory except in case of war or the clear threat of war. With a clear conscience in this respect—for the presence of a few allied instructors or technicians in Norway is a vastly different thing from the establishment of allied bases—Norway has been able to reject the fairly frequent Soviet charges that she was breaking this undertaking. It is quite obvious that Norway will have to maintain this attitude. Reports to the contrary may safely be discounted. The Government, if it broke faith with the Soviet Union in this respect, would also break faith with its own people and might forfeit the support of many of them. Adherence to N.A.T.O. was, at the time, a very serious decision.[1] But owing primarily to its scrupulous maintenance of Norway's position, which, in the first place, involves the refusal to permit the establishment of allied bases, even assuming that a serious request for them had been made (which is doubtful), the Government now has with it the vast majority of Norwegians. Only the Communists and a small group of intellectual defeatists are opposed to membership of N.A.T.O. This does not mean that the rest of the population is enthusiastic about the necessity and implications of such a position, but so far they trust their Government to safeguard Norway's interests in the Alliance. Few actions could more quickly destroy the whole hardly-wrought fabric of the country's foreign policy than agreement to the establishment of allied bases

[1] See 'Norway and the Atlantic Pact', in *The World Today*, April 1949.

in Norwegian territory in peace time, and it would therefore appear to be highly improbable that the Government would ever embark on such a step.

A. G. S.

The Problems of Swiss Prosperity

IN October 1950 the Swiss Parliament voted nearly one and a half thousand million Swiss francs as extraordinary expenditure upon a five years' rearmament programme. This was in reaction to the outbreak of war in Korea, with the menace from Russia to Europe which it involved: neutral though they were, the Swiss were determined to be able to defend their neutrality against any Soviet threat. The Korean war, having spurred the Western world into rearmament, provided a tremendous stimulus to Swiss heavy industry; indeed, on the face of it, the boom created by the Korean war seemed likely to supply a large part of the money necessary to pay the rearmament bill.

It happened, however, that the fiscal organization of Switzerland was in the process of being overhauled; it had become essential, as the years passed, for the central, or Federal, Government to raise far more money than methods wholly consistent with the Constitution of 1874 would allow, for the Constitution had been amended in many other ways but not in this. Anti-Socialist or *anti-étatiste* though Switzerland was, the Federal authorities were bound to spend vastly more in the 1950s than anyone contemplated eighty years before. Since the Constitution made no allowance for the expansion of the revenue of the *Bund*, extra money had been raised by the prolongation of war-time emergency powers.[1]

In the nineteenth century direct taxation had been regarded as the affair of the cantons, which levied income tax at various relatively low rates. In 1950 there was still angry opposition to the idea of constitutional sanction for a Federal income tax. The opposition came chiefly from three directions, from the French-speaking minority, from the Catholic-Conservative Party, and

[1] The emergency powers, in fact, had originated in the days of the slump in the early 'thirties.

from certain wealthy business men: sometimes the latter belonged to one of the two former categories. The French-Swiss feared any weakening of cantonal rights in the *Bund*'s favour as being likely to cause a deterioration in their position vis-à-vis the powerful German-speaking majority. The Catholic-Conservative Party, strong among the German-speaking peasantry of the mountain cantons, was federalist[1] because it was opposed to any change. In particular it was federalist because the mountain cantons had far smaller populations than those of the industrialized cantons and yet enjoyed equal status with them so long as the rights of the cantons were unimpaired: in a more centralized Switzerland the voice of a small canton was likely to be submerged. As for a number of the wealthy Swiss, their influence with the cantonal authorities would naturally tend to be greater than with the officials of the *Bund*. Apart from these three categories there was fairly general irritation against the continuation of special prerogatives associated with the period of the war, and also against the steady expansion of the Federal civil service, an expansion which was regarded as an unnecessary extravagance bringing with it a deplorable degree of bureaucracy.

In these circumstances the central Government was hard put to it to raise the immediately necessary ordinary revenue with the help of a financial plan to run from 1951–4 inclusive[2] pending the new legislation to which the fiscal overhaul was to lead. The curious spectacle was constantly seen of the Government of the wealthiest country in Europe in the boom period which followed the clash in Korea cutting down its expenditure on worthy officials such as a few cultural attachés in foreign capitals. Military expenses being Federal *par excellence*, there seemed no possible way to meet the rearmament bill except by loan, by capital levy, or by *ad hoc* taxation. Though money was plentiful the financial experts of the Government were anxious not to increase the National Debt for fear of stimulating the inflationary pressure on prices and in order not to be faced with heavier debt charges. It remained to discover a new temporary tax which the country would sanction by referendum, or to institute a capital levy. This was the position in the spring of 1951[3] when the proposal for a *Getränkesteuer*, a tax on all drinks other than tea, coffee, and cocoa, was brought forward

[1] In the sense of supporting the federal form of government.
[2] See 'Switzerland Today', in *The World Today*, September 1951, p. 387.
[3] See ibid., p. 390.

in a tentative way in the parliamentary spring session. Loud opposi tion from the hoteliers and wine-producing peasants was immedi ately heard, and by tacit general agreement all fiscal decisions likel to be unpopular were postponed until after the General Electio at the end of October.

As usual, the Election altered the face of the Chambers ver little, the biggest change being the increase in the number o Catholic-Conservative deputies from 44 to 48. After the Electio the two, in some ways, most important of the seven *Bundesräte*, o Ministers, resigned. These were Herr von Steiger, Minister o Justice and Police and the representative of Berne and the Peasan Party, who was seventy years old, and Herr Nobs, the Socialis Minister of Finance from Zürich, who resigned on grounds of ill health. In their place were elected Herr Markus Feldmann, of th Peasant Party, and the Social Democrat Dr Max Weber, wh respectively succeeded to the same portfolios. Thus Dr Weber, a economist by training, became primarily responsible for th untying of Switzerland's financial knot.

His position appeared to be unfortunate in several ways. Th Swiss Social Democrat Party enjoyed much the same numerica support in the country as the two other big parties, the Radical and the Catholic Conservatives, and had even gained a seat in th Election, while the Radicals had lost one. But the Socialists wer still eyed with some suspicion by the others, and it was considere suitable that, with three Radicals, two Catholic Conservatives, an one Peasant Party representative in the Council of Ministers, ther should be only one Socialist, though the country had returne 51 Radical deputies, 48 Catholic-Conservatives, 23 members of th Peasant Party, and 49 Social Democrats. It had already seemed a little invidious that Herr Nobs should hold the financial portfoli when every attempt to alleviate the financial needs of the central Government was sure to be resisted as socialistic, but Dr Webe was known to have stood much farther to the left in his youth and was faced with fiercer opposition: nor was the Socialist proposal of a capital levy, which he was thought to support, calculated to make his position easier. It must, however, be recorded that in a surprisingly short time Dr Weber's patent integrity overcame the initial hostility felt towards him; he has something of the Quakerish quality of a Cripps which commands involuntary respect.

The Swiss Social Democrat Party had advocated a capital levy more than once in its career. Indeed, when the Socialists had de-

clared a general strike in November 1918—it was this which the other parties found hardest to forget—one of their demands had been that a levy on capital should be raised in order to pay off the National Debt. Even before the Election of October 1951 the Socialists mustered the courage to propose a capital levy to cover the cost of rearmament; indeed this became a plank in their Election platform. The business and banking worlds were horrified by what they regarded as a reckless proposal to destroy national wealth, and it was presumed that, apart from the industrial workers who voted Social Democrat, the humbler sections of society were opposed to any such tampering with private property. After the Election some of the Socialist experts completed a plan for a capital levy which would in fact have affected only about 80,000 people in the country. This was voted upon by referendum on 18 May 1952. Though it was defeated, the margin was narrower than might have been expected, 421,459 votes being cast against it and 328,032 in its favour. There was a hostile majority in every canton except Zürich, Basle, Schaffhausen, and the Ticino, the first three of which were industrial regions and the last an Italian-speaking[1] peasant canton unlikely to contain a member of the threatened 80,000 unless he were a banker from elsewhere who had retired to the shores of Lugano or Locarno. The insignificant Communist vote had, of course, been given in favour of a levy on capital, but the Zürich vote for it was due rather to the support of the once redoubtable Herr Duttweiler (who is reported to have given away his own fortune) and his *Landesring*. In general it seemed clear that, even in Switzerland, by 1952 there was support for a cautious levy on capital from a variety of people outside the Social Democrat Party.

With a capital levy nevertheless ruled out, the country prepared to vote upon a financial project prepared by the Government and approved by both Chambers earlier this year; the chief sources the Government proposed to tap were the emergency *Wehrsteuer* (roughly equivalent to income tax), to which supplementary payments were to be attached; luxury foods; and—once again—alcoholic drinks. To the disinterested this seemed to provide a commonsense solution. The Government, supported by the bankers and industrialists whose views are voiced by the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, pointed out that, although the boom had sent up

[1] The Italian minority in Switzerland does not fight for its political position as does the French because it is so much smaller and poorer.

customs and postal profits and the returns from the exi *Wehrsteuer*, something of a slump was now due; for this reas was important to pay for rearmament, whose cost had steadily, before the revenue shrank.

It soon became evident, however, that a vigorous camp against the Government project would be waged. The oppositional spokesman was M. Pierre Béguin, the editor o *Gazette de Lausanne*, the traditional voice of the Vaudois Fr against Berne. His main line of argument was to accuse the ernment of inventing superfluous taxes in order to intensify centralizing tyranny which it exerted, discovering perils to nation when the danger of war had receded[1] in order to explo patriotism. The fruits of the boom, the increased returns customs, turnover tax, the postal services,[2] and the *Wehrst* would provide all that was needed; if not there was more enough liquid money available for a loan to fill any gap. As fo danger of recession, the Government was magnifying this fo own greedy purposes. The distribution of often anonyr pamphlets expressing these views appeared to be facilitated by limited funds administered by propaganda offices with a siderable personnel; the best known of these was directed certain Herr Büchi, who was known to enjoy the support of portant members of the *Vorort des Schweizerischen Handels-Industrievereins*, the Swiss Federation of Industry, which declared itself officially in favour of the Government plan. It became evident that even parties the leaders of which Ministers and which had declared themselves in its favour we fact divided in their attitudes to the Government; in partic the Catholic-Conservatives—with two *Bundesräte*—seemed m hostile to the *Bundesrat* project. Among the Social Democrats even probable that a number were opposed because they regarded a capital levy as the right solution.

The referendum took place on 6 July 1952. Clearly the ave citizen was far readier to vote against rather than for any prop to increase taxation. It was none the less expected that com sense, perhaps without much to spare, would over-ride negati

[1] By 1952 the Swiss Foreign Office felt the need to assert Swiss neut perhaps as clearly as in 1950, both on account of West German resurgenc in order to manifest the strength of Swiss independence in view of the links between the Schuman Powers and of the latter's commercial policy, seemed to the Swiss too monopolistic.

[2] The telephone services have been making a big profit which obs losses on the postal service itself.

and the interests of wine-growers and hotel-keepers. When the votes were counted, however, it was found that only 256,035 people had voted in favour, to 352,205 against. On so important an issue, indeed, only 43 per cent of the electorate[1] had voted at all, and in Berne only 32 per cent; the wits said no one could be expected to turn out and vote for a tax on drinks on a hot July Sunday. In the cantons, majorities in only Berne, Zürich, and Solothurn had done so. The majorities against were particularly strong in French-speaking Switzerland, where Monsieur Béguin's views were welcome to the wine-growing peasants of Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Valais. The eastern Valais is German-speaking and may almost be classed with the Catholic mountain cantons of Uri and Schwyz, where the 'no'-votes also prevailed very easily. The traditional cleavage between the mountain population and the big Protestant German-speaking towns was evident, though Catholic Solothurn had slipped into the place of Basle.

The vote of 6 July 1952 was undoubtedly a serious blow for the administration, a blow concealed from the outside world by the 'irresponsibility' of the Swiss *Bundesrat* which never resigns because it is defeated. The Socialist press and some other papers diagnosed a major constitutional crisis, for this seemed to be the climax in a series of votes against the combination of *Bundesrat*, Chambers, and Party leaders, and suggested a permanent *impasse*. But the summer holidays brought welcome respite to the Government. By the time of the parliamentary session in September Ministers had decided that the *Getränkesteuer* would never really be worth the dust it raised: they had also had time to observe that the economic situation, allowing for purely seasonal fluctuation, was showing next to no signs of recession. In August President Truman vetoed the raising of American tariffs against Swiss watches, which continued to be exported in astounding quantities. The hotel-keepers had been filled with foreboding as gloomy as that of the watch-makers before the Presidential intervention, but the summer season brought many affluent tourists from France, Belgium, the United States, and Western Germany; these more than compensated for those British who found their allowances too small for visits to Switzerland. Even the textile industry, which had begun to feel the pinch of recession, showed signs of picking up.

[1] Still only the male population. The percentage of the electorate which votes on the referenda in Switzerland is seldom above 50 per cent; a reason for this is, of course, the frequency of such voting.

When in October the Swiss customs authorities published the foreign trade figures for the previous month it was possible to compare the prosperity of the first nine months of 1952 with the record-breaking first nine months of 1951. It was found that imports had fallen from the value of 4,467,200,000 francs to that of 3,941·9 million, 1951 having been a year when the Swiss Government was laying in stocks in readiness for war: the value of exports from January to September (inclusive) 1952 had only fallen to 3,389·8 million from the 1951 figure of 3,409·8 million. Still comparing the first three quarters of 1952 with the equivalent period in 1951, the number of watches exported had declined slightly from 25,518,700 to 24,847,000, but this lower figure had cost 42,700,000 francs more. While the chemical industry had done less well than in the previous year, the machine industry[1] and food-exporting had been positively more profitable; different branches of the textile industry had had varying fates, some doing worse but some better than in 1951.

The simplest course for the Swiss Government, clearly, was to try to cover the rearmament bill within the long overdue *Finanzreform* which must in any case be prepared ready to come into operation after the temporary financial system adopted for the years 1951–4 should terminate on 31 December 1954. There was bound to be a struggle over the new basic reorganization of the country's finances, and if this struggle could be utilized to pay for rearmament at the same time, so much the better. Meanwhile it might be necessary to borrow on a small scale. It was clear, when he met the Commission responsible for the drawing up of the new Finance Law in September and October, that Dr Weber regarded a direct Federal tax of some kind as essential, although it might be constitutionally restricted as to the persons affected and the rate and period of levy. The *Bundesrat* seems to have accepted his view and on 28 November entrusted his Ministry with the drafting of a constitutional amendment in this sense.

As 1952 draws to its close the problem of the revision of the Swiss Constitution necessitated by fiscal reform is thus halfway to solution seven and a half years after the end of the last war; as Government representatives have repeatedly pointed out, contrary to Monsieur Béguin's assertions, the problem is constantly aggravated by delay. Since 1948 the cost of living in Switzerland

[1] The Swiss are now proposing to construct their own tanks instead of relying on the import of tanks from France and possibly from the U.K.

has risen by only 5 per cent whereas the rest of the Western world, except for Belgium and Western Germany, has seen an increase of between 10 and 40 per cent. This means that Switzerland has ceased to find her prices inconveniently high for competition in the world market upon which her economy directly depends.

But now the steadiness of Swiss prices is threatened by a notable Budget deficit. The Federal Budget for 1953 shows an excess of expenditure over receipts by 169 million francs, which will send the Federal Debt up to 8,050 million. For this there are two main explanations. In the first place the expanded activities of the Federal Railways and postal services, which are the fruits of prosperity, are contributing to a steady increase—not decrease—in the personnel employed by the Swiss Central Government; the numbers have risen from 92,632 in 1951 to 93,994 in 1952 and are reckoned at 94,584 for next year. In the second place, in spite of much talk of a reduction in the subsidies paid in all directions by the Confederation, and one or two other economies amounting in all to 2·8 million francs, the Federal subsidy bill remains around 450 million francs.

It is, of course, one of the anomalies of the situation that many of those who complain most loudly of the extravagance and interference of the Federal Government are most insistent upon Federal help for their own economic group whenever the latter runs into any kind of difficulty. The agrarian law accepted by a popular vote at the end of March this year[1] required the continuation of Government help upon a generous scale to the farmers—recently a subsidy amounting to about 3 million francs was promised by the Government to make it possible for Swiss meat to compete on foreign markets. In the forthcoming debates upon fiscal reform the Swiss Government, it is thought, will at last be compelled to make clear to the public that if Federal subsidies are to continue on any noticeable scale the Federal authorities must be enabled to levy taxes which can pay for them. 'Much would be gained,' wrote the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* on 5 November 1952, 'if the cry for Federal help were not to go up on all sides with every little economic hitch, for this Federal help not only increases the expenditure of the Federal Government but also increases its power and extends its functions.'

E. W.

[1] The strongly protective agrarian law in March, a measure to protect the tobacco industry and two others to continue price controls in the autumn (all more or less confirming the *status quo*) were virtually the only ones to be accepted by Swiss voters this year.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

THE founding of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in December 1949 was a by-product of the cold war. By that time the illusion that the war-time coalition between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union could be preserved in the post-war world had been shattered by Russia's persistent hostility. The division of the world into two competing power blocs extended to almost all spheres of activity, and international co-operation between the trade unions in democratic countries and those under Communist domination became impossible.

War-time allied unity had been reflected in the labour movement by the creation in 1945 of the World Federation of Trade Unions,[1] in which for the first time all the major national trade union organizations, both Communist and non-Communist, with the exception of the American Federation of Labor, had joined in a single international federation. The W.F.T.U. was doomed to failure from the start, for disagreements between its two factions began immediately after its foundation, but the organization limped along, mainly by evading major issues, until world events caused the inevitable split. Symbolically, it was the Marshall Plan that brought the conflict to a head. The European Recovery Programme was supported by the unions in the United States and Western Europe, and bitterly opposed by the Communists. The issue was too great to be avoided. Early in 1949 the representatives of the Western trade unions finally walked out of the W.F.T.U. meeting. Within a few weeks all the free unions had withdrawn from the federation, which thus became, and remains, a completely Communist organization.

It is evidence of the strength of the feeling of international solidarity in the working-class movement that the free unions—this time including the American Federation of Labor—immediately opened discussions for the establishment of a new international federation. A series of conferences in the summer of 1949 worked out a draft Constitution. The British Trades Union Congress, on behalf of the preparatory committee, sent out the invitations, and on 28 November 1949 the Free World Labour

[1] See 'The World Federation of Trade Unions and its Trade Departments', in *The World Today*, August 1952.

Conference opened in County Hall, London, with the participation of delegates representing nearly 48 million union members in fifty-three countries and territories.

In three important respects the new Confederation differed profoundly from its pre-war predecessor, the International Federation of Trade Unions. In the first place, it was born in a world of tension, in which democratic principles, including the principle of free trade unionism itself, were being subjected to a total attack by a powerful, well-organized, and thoroughly unscrupulous adversary. It is true that the old I.F.T.U. had come into conflict with Communist opponents in the inter-war years. But this conflict was never as bitter or as deep-rooted as the present. Moreover, the I.F.T.U. was essentially socialist in philosophy. Many of its leaders still believed that it was possible to co-operate with the Communists, and actually attempted to do so in the Popular Front period of the 1930s. The disastrous experiment of the World Federation of Trade Unions removed all but the last vestiges of this outlook.

The realization that the I.C.F.T.U. was a child of the cold war can be seen in the Manifesto adopted at the London Congress: 'The free trade unions of the world will support with all their strength the efforts of the peoples suffering under police-state rule—such as those of the Soviet Union and its satellite "power democracies", Franco Spain, and all forms of military dictatorship in Latin America and throughout the world—to free themselves from totalitarian oppression.'

The recognition, too, that resistance to Communism must also be carried on within the trade union movement itself figures as one of the aims written into the Confederation's Constitution: 'to co-ordinate the defence of free trade unions against any campaign aiming at the destruction or at the restriction of their rights or at the infiltration and subjugation of labour organizations by totalitarian or other anti-labour forces.'

Secondly, the I.C.F.T.U. was formed at a time when trade unions were immensely more powerful than ever before. In the industrialized democratic countries the unions have come to be a decisive economic and political force. In the United States, for example, union membership had more than quadrupled in less than twenty years to reach a total of about 16 million. In many countries union-supported political parties formed the government; in almost all, labour representatives had acquired great

political influence. At the same time, unions were growing in parts of the world where labour organization had been rudimentary if it had existed at all. Millions of workers had joined unions in Japan, India, and the countries of Latin America; thousands of others were slowly being organized even in the economically most backward countries.

And as union strength has grown, so has the complexity of the problems with which the labour movement is faced. On a national scale in the industrialized countries the range of union activities has extended far beyond the limited scope of improving workers' conditions. In the international field, the range and complexity of union activities has similarly widened.

Thirdly, the I.C.F.T.U. is really a world-wide organization. The old International Federation of Trade Unions had been for all practical purposes a European federation. There were, it is true, a few affiliates from other continents, and the American Federation of Labor had been a member for a few years between the wars, but this had not significantly modified its European orientation. What is perhaps more important, the I.F.T.U. under this European influence had been basically socialist in outlook, for European trade unions were almost invariably closely linked with the socialist political movement. Now, although the European trade unions still make up nearly half the total membership of the I.C.F.T.U., the balance of power has decisively shifted. Of the nineteen members of the Confederation's Executive Board only seven are European (including two from Britain). There are three from Asia, one from Africa, one from Australasia, one from the West Indies, two from Latin America, and four from North America.

This change has had two important consequences. First, from the beginning the major proportion of the I.C.F.T.U.'s efforts has been devoted to non-European problems. Secondly, it is not possible to describe the I.C.F.T.U. in any true sense as a socialist organization. Although its economic policies would be subscribed to by any Socialist—full employment, universal social security, national and international economic planning, and so on—the overtly socialist ideology that characterized the pre-war I.F.T.U. has disappeared. The 'Declaration on Economic and Social Demands' adopted at the London Congress in 1949 was drafted by an American trade unionist. This is in itself a reflection of how the intellectual as well as the economic leadership of the labour movement has shifted since 1939.

Again, the Manifesto adopted in London outlines the new attitude:

The task before us is to mobilize the tools of abundance possessed by the industrially advanced nations of the world to assure full employment, security against want, old age, and sickness, and to provide ever rising standards of living and a richer and fuller life for peoples everywhere. The peoples of the colonies and other economically underdeveloped areas must be given every assistance in the development of their resources so that they may share fully in the fruits of modern science and technology.

In the first three years of its existence, the I.C.F.T.U.'s activities have been conditioned by the factors just described. It is in the field of aid for the growing trade unions in the so-called underdeveloped areas that activity has been most conspicuous and, as far as it is possible to judge at present, most successful.

When the Confederation was established it was decided that 'regional organizations' should be set up later—that is, subsidiary organizations each covering a particular geographical area, with its own office and staff, to deal on the spot with problems arising for the labour movement in that area. After two years, the General Secretary's report said: 'Even a cursory survey of the regional work of the Confederation since its formation indicates that the I.C.F.T.U. has moved at a faster pace than the first congress envisaged.'

Certainly in terms of distances covered, reports prepared, conferences held, offices opened, the achievements in this field are impressive. A seven-man delegation made an extensive survey of Asia and the Far East in July and August 1950, travelling over 35,000 miles and visiting East and West Pakistan, India, Burma, Hong Kong, Japan, Formosa, Thailand, the Philippine Islands, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaya, Ceylon, Viet-Nam, and Iran. Three delegations have visited Africa: the first, late in 1950, toured French North African territories; the second, early in 1951, visited West and Central Africa; the third, later in the same year, went through the East African territories. In 1952 another delegation visited the countries of the Middle East. In addition, there have been a large number of special missions, usually consisting of a single representative, to particular countries: for example, Burma, Turkey, the West Indies, and Korea. As a result of these preliminary surveys, the I.C.F.T.U. now has two regional organizations in operation: one for Asia and the Far East, with

headquarters in Calcutta, the other, called the Inter-Americ Regional Organization, with its office in Havana. The I.C.F.T.l has also established an office for West Africa at Accra in the Go Coast.

The problems which these regional organizations have set then selves to solve are in general the same in all the underdevelope territories. They may be conveniently summarized in the words the report made by the delegation to Asia:

(*a*) the need to tighten up the internal organization of the unions. .
(*b*) the crying need for trained trade union leadership coming from tl ranks of the workers. . .
(*c*) the generally prevailing anti-labour and anti-trade union attitude employers. . .
(*d*) the generally restrictive character of labour legislation. . .
(*e*) the terribly low level of wages and starvation budgets of millions workers and trade union members.
(*f*) the urgent need for the massive extension of trade union organiza tion . . . among peasants, landless workers, and plantation workers
(*g*) the constant threat from anti-democratic forces in the trade unio movement.

Obviously to tackle these problems successfully means a long term and expensive effort. The ordinary resources of the I.C.F.T.I are not sufficient for the purpose; indeed, a budget of £100,000 i scarcely adequate for the administration of the Confederation alone So a special fund has been created, financed by contributions fron the national trade union centres, of £250,000 for a three-yea programme of aid to unions in the under-developed areas.

The methods used are various, and in general very practical Much of the money is devoted to the education and training o future trade union leaders. Thus a few weeks ago the I.C.F.T.U.'s Asia labour college was opened in Calcutta. This college gives courses in trade unionism to promising members of unions in the Asian regional organization. The teachers are Asians, and the courses are adapted to Asian needs, though they naturally draw on Western experience and methods. The potential effect of this experiment over a prolonged period may be very great. A similar educational programme is under way in Latin America, where students attend courses at the university of Puerto Rico.

In seeking to improve labour relations in the backward areas the I.C.F.T.U. can sometimes call on its affiliates in, for example, Britain or France, to bring pressure to bear on their Governments

to make improvements in their colonial territories. Much progress had already been made, before the I.C.F.T.U. was founded in British colonies, through the labour advisers who were often experienced trade unionists. This has been carried further. In French colonies, however, there have been serious difficulties and I.C.F.T.U. spokesmen have been among the most hostile critics of French policy in Tunisia and Morocco. The recent assassination of the Tunisian nationalist labour leader, Farhat Hached, a member of the I.C.F.T.U. Executive Board, has caused the Confederation to send a delegate to Tunisia at once to report fully on the situation. It is undoubtedly true, and is admitted by French Government spokesmen, that the Tunisian nationalist movement derived great prestige and increased influence because of the support the nationalist trade unions received from the I.C.F.T.U.[1]

In a large number of individual cases intervention by the I.C.F.T.U. has brought positive results. Certain amendments were made to labour legislation in India, Turkey, Greece, Thailand, and Brazil as a result of representations made by the Confederation. Against these positive achievements, however, must be set some failures: the laws limiting trade union freedom in Japan, for instance, and the unsuccessful campaign against the Peronist labour organizations of Argentina and their satellites in certain other countries of Latin America. But on balance there can be no doubt that the I.C.F.T.U.'s programme of regional organization has already begun to bear fruit. One index of its success is the frantic propaganda of the Communists against I.C.F.T.U activities in Asia and Africa. The Communist-controlled W.F.T.U. has paid the Confederation the compliment of imitation: it, too, has begun to set up offices in these areas in an effort to compete with its rival.

In the long run, the I.C.F.T.U. cannot fail to contribute towards improving the standard of living in the economically backward territories. The growth of unions there will inevitably be one of the factors that will gradually bring up the level of prosperity, and the help that the I.C.F.T.U. is giving is likely to be all the more effective by being strictly practical in form, by being in fact 'straight' trade unionism without political orientation.

In other fields the I.C.F.T.U. has not as yet shown the same

[1] See 'Nationalism and the Trade Unions in French North Africa', in *The World Today*, June 1952.

promise, though it can record certain successes. One of its aims, as stated in its Constitution, is 'to represent the free trade union movement in all international agencies which exist or may be set up to perform functions affecting the social and economic conditions of working people and to further the implementation of their decisions wherever desirable'. With this purpose in view, the I.C.F.T.U. sought and gained consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the International Labour Organization, and the U.N. Economic Commissions for Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Branch offices were set up in New York and Geneva to maintain permanent contact with these bodies. At the U.N. Economic and Social Council I.C.F.T.U. representatives were conspicuous in providing evidence concerning forced labour in Communist countries. In the field of economic policy they have also presented the labour viewpoint wherever possible.

The I.C.F.T.U. played a prominent part in the six-nation negotiations that worked out the details of the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community. The composition of the various administrative organs of the Community shows the result of the I.C.F.T.U.'s influence. A former president of the Confederation, M. Paul Finet of Belgium, is one of the nine members of the High Authority. Union representatives sit in the Consultative Assembly. Similar I.C.F.T.U. participation is now taking place in the negotiations for the European 'Green Pool' for agriculture.

With N.A.T.O., however, the I.C.F.T.U. has been less successful. The rearmament drive, with its effects both on working conditions and on the workers' living standards, has been one of the I.C.F.T.U.'s major preoccupations since the outbreak of the war in Korea. The Confederation has given consistent support to the principle of defence against possible Communist aggression, and has called on its members to accept necessary burdens for this purpose. At the same time it has insisted that the trade unions should be represented on N.A.T.O., at least to the same extent as they are in United Nations agencies. Up to the present the I.C.F.T.U. has failed to achieve this, and it is doubtful whether the N.A.T.O. set-up would allow of direct representation of the unions in it.

But it is in the field of propaganda and publicity that the I.C.F.T.U. has most conspicuously failed. The very existence of

the Confederation is a political act. In the conflict against Communism the I.C.F.T.U. is a weapon in the cold war, and could be a decisive weapon against a movement that claims always to speak and act on behalf of the workers. Yet the Confederation's limited resources of money and man-power have not allowed it to make any real contribution in this respect. In addition to this, the variety of views and outlooks represented by the I.C.F.T.U.'s affiliates have prevented a unified and positive political message from emerging clearly. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the extreme anti-Communist attitude of the American Federation of Labor with, say, the Asian neutralism of the Hind Mazdoor Sabha. In trying to bring about this reconciliation, the I.C.F.T.U. has seemed at times to express nothing at all. At the same time, paradoxically, the prominent part played in the Confederation by the United States trade unions has caused it to be identified, particularly in Asia, with American foreign policy. This has meant that in many areas the I.C.F.T.U. has not become, as it should, a symbol to those workers seeking an independent policy, opposed both to Communism and to their enemies on the Right.

After three years the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has now established its place among international organizations. In those three years it has increased its membership to about 53 million. It has brought knowledge of trade unionism to thousands of workers who previously knew nothing of it. Directly and indirectly, it has already contributed much to improving workers' conditions in many parts of the world. But there remains a question. The tasks that face the world's trade unions are enormous and complex; the aims which the I.C.F.T.U. has set itself are world-wide in scope and complicated in detail. Yet its resources are extremely limited. One frequently has the impression, in studying its reports of activities, that it seeks to do too much, disperses its efforts too widely, and consequently does not achieve as much as might be expected, even from such limited resources. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the I.C.F.T.U is, after all, an organization that depends for its existence on the 'workers' pennies'. It is, indeed, a measure of the determination, the maturity, and above all of the admirable sense of international solidarity that has inspired the trade unions, in spite of all defeats and discouragements, that the Confederation exists at all.

R. F.

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Notes of the Month

Enter President Eisenhower

By his Inaugural Address President Eisenhower wiped out any justification there may have been for suspecting that in becoming the leader of the Republican Party he had himself ceased to be a true leader of the free world. He is the only Republican ever to devote to foreign policy this first speech after taking the oath of office, the speech in which the new President tells the nation the principles on which he plans to govern. Mr Eisenhower outlined nine 'rules of conduct' which are to guide him and the United States for the next four years. Disentangled from the somewhat florid eloquence that was maintained throughout the address, these principles are: (i) to develop enough strength to deter aggression and promote peace, but to be ready to participate in any genuine effort to remove the causes of international distrust; (ii) never to attempt appeasement; (iii) to put the country's cause before the comfort of the individual; (iv) never to use the country's strength to try to force American political and economic institutions on other nations; (v) to help 'proven friends of freedom' to become secure and assume their full share of the common defence of freedom; (vi) to encourage productivity and profitable trade everywhere; (vii) to assist the development of international 'regional groupings'; (viii) never to insinuate that one race can be inferior to another; (ix) to strive to make the United Nations an effective force.

These are inspiring principles, but it is how they are practised that matters. An Inaugural Address is, however, meant for inspiration; it will be brought down to earth in the message outlining his legislative programme which President Eisenhower must soon send to Congress. How Congress will receive at least some of these proposals is by no means certain. It is not so much

the smallness of the Republican majority there that may make difficulties as the fact that both Houses are dominated by the Republican conservatives. It is a measure of the change that has taken place in the atmosphere round the new President since he was elected, a change which does him credit, that his relations with his country's allies are now causing less concern than his relations with Congress. These have not been sweetened by the independence he has shown in selecting the members of his Cabinet.

One of Mr Eisenhower's permanent problems will certainly be the understandable tendency of both Congress and people, unless they are constantly stiffened by international crises, to relax their unpleasant efforts to build up the strength of the United States and its allies. President Truman left his successor a helpful legacy in his last message to Congress on the state of the union, in which he emphasized that the struggle against the Communist attempt at domination would test the strength, stamina, and steadiness of the free world for generations to come.

This farewell message of Mr Truman's was also devoted almost entirely to foreign affairs, to the history of the various attempts made during his term of office to counter the Communist menace. It is here, in the field in which he had least experience, that President Truman was always at his best, from the 1947 doctrine that bears his name through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty to his courageous decision to fight in Korea. He, too, was responsible for the constructive Point Four approach to underdeveloped areas It is certainly not Mr Truman's fault that the world he is leaving to his successor is not in good condition—and at least he is leaving the United States in a better condition, materially, than it has ever been, with the economy working at a higher and steadier level than ever before. President Eisenhower can be well satisfied when he retires to private life if he has as solid achievements to his credit.

The Asian Socialist Conference at Rangoon

THE first Asian Socialist Conference which met at Rangoon from 6 to 15 January was a very mixed gathering, assembled by a preparatory committee composed of representatives of the three sponsoring parties from Burma, Indonesia, and India which had been at work for ten months. The full members of the Conference, in addition to the sponsoring parties, were the Socialist parties of

Israel (Mapai), Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan, Malaya, and Japan (both Right and Left wings). In addition, there were fraternal delegations from the Socialist International (led by Mr Attlee), the International Union of Socialist Youth, and the Yugoslav Communist Party. There were also observers from the Neo-Destour, the M.T.L.D. of Algeria, the Congress of Peoples against Imperialism, the Nepal Congress, and the Uganda African Congress.

The observers were invited, not as Socialists, but as representatives of national independence movements with which the Socialist parties—particularly the Asian parties—sympathized. There was no examination of credentials: all who came were taken on trust. In consequence, colonial questions gained even greater prominence than they would otherwise have done, and the final series of resolutions on that subject was not always related to reality. There remained some confusion between policy and slogans.

More clarification was achieved in questions of world politics. Before the Conference there was some speculation as to whether it would result in the establishment of a separate Asian Socialist International. This was proposed at the Conference by the Lebanon and Egyptian delegates and supported by the Pakistan representative. Since some parties, especially those of Israel and Japan, were firmly committed to the Socialist International, a deadlock seemed imminent. But at that stage the Egyptian and Lebanon delegates discovered that they could not sit with the Israeli delegation, and walked out of the Conference. Pakistan did not insist on a separate International, and the problem was solved by resolutions establishing a permanent machinery for the Asian Socialist Conference in liaison with the Socialist International at all levels. Since the overlap of membership remains—Mapai and the Japanese left- and right-wing Socialist groups are full members of the Socialist International, and the Pan-Malayan Labour Party and Praja Socialist Party of India are consultative members—an open breach in the international Socialist movement was averted.

The possibility of such a split did exist. It arose partly from the dissatisfaction of many Asian parties with the attitude of some European parties towards colonial questions, but more from an inclination towards 'neutralism'. It transpired, however, during the course of the Conference that this question had not been thought out. There was some confusion between the idea of a

'Third Force' and the idea of a 'Third Camp'. When it came to the point, all parties recognized that they could not be 'ideologically neutral'—that is, neutral between democracy and totalitarianism; and the declaration by the Conference on the principles and objectives of Socialism stated in categorical terms the necessary connection between Socialism and democracy. In that declarat hi democratic socialism was conceived as a 'Third Force' opp by th capitalism and communism. rs of hi

With this confusion cleared away, the idea of a 'Thi presented no great difficulty. Although some delegate certainly b after the idea, it was appreciated that the elements ople, unles Camp' did not exist. Among the parties represented, to relax thei Burma, Israel, Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Ind United State office, and they were not much inclined to a 'Thir sor a helpfu final resolution on this subject, therefore, accep of the union possible policy—that each country and party must d Communis own policy in relation to the Cold War. mina, an

On this note of realism the Conference closed. The acceptance of a more realistic attitude was one of the main almos of the Conference, which emerges from the encounter of new npt adolescent parties with parties bearing governmental responsibility. The other main result was the creation of the permanent machinery, with U Ba Swe, Burma's Minister of Defence, as Chairman. Both the functions of this organization and its relations or 'liaison' with the Socialist International remain to be worked out.

The Army and Politics in Indonesia

THE resignation of the Defence Minister in the Indonesian Cabinet, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, on 2 January was the culmination of a series of events which illustrate vividly both the difficulties faced by those Indonesians who are anxious to organize their country efficiently on modern lines and the precarious hold of Parliamentary forms of government on the country. When the Wilopo Government was formed on 1 April 1952 it was faced with severe economic difficulties and a rate of Government expenditure which at the minimum would exceed by Rp. 4,000 million the probable income during 1952 of under Rp. 9,000 million. It became the task of the Sultan to reorganize the armed forces on modern lines and to reduce their size, and the Chief of Staff of the Land Forces, Col. Nasution, announced that during the

following four or five years some 75,000 officers and men would be returned to civil life. The great bulk of these were to be former guerrillas who had been incorporated in the army at the end of the struggle against the Dutch. The remaining army units were to be trained on modern lines with the help of the Dutch military Desion and many of those retired were to be resettled in Borneo against where. The former guerrillas objected to this process, Congress managed to gain the support of politicians from several

The ob ies, both by emphasizing the use of the Dutch in the sentatives ion and by attacks on the administration of the Defence Socialist pthe first point appealed to the anti-imperialist senti- There was ne politicians and the second to their desire to shake on trust. In the PSI (or Socialist Party) on the Ministry. prominence th24 September members of the PNI (or Nationalist series of resoI (or Communist Party), and other groups attacked reality. The Ministry in Parliament, and on 16 October Parliament slogans. 1 votes to 54 a motion demanding the reorganization

More Ministry. The chief targets of attack were the Secretary Before of the Ministry, Dr Ali Budiardjo, and the Chief of Staff it we Armed Forces, Maj.-Gen. Simatupang; a motion demanding the resignation of the Sultan was defeated by 80 votes to 39. On the following day there were demonstrations in Jakarta by crowds who demanded the dissolution of Parliament and general elections, a demand which had some force, since members of Parliament had either been appointed or been elected under the Dutch in elections whose validity was not recognized by most republicans. The crowds dispersed after a speech by the President, and the Army thereupon cordoned off the Parliament building and the Presidential palace and Parliament hastily went into recess. Demonstrations in favour of elections followed in Surabaya and elsewhere, and on 18 October the Cabinet apparently decided to ignore the motion passed on 16 October. It appeared for the moment that the challenge to the modernizing party in the army had been defeated.

On 31 October, however, both the Masjumi (or Moslem Party) and the PNI refused to agree to a dissolution, and it was reported that officers of the 5th Division in East Java who were opposed to Army reorganization had removed the commander of the Division on the ostensible ground that he was meddling in politics and favoured the dissolution of Parliament. On 17 November the commander of the 7th Division in Macassar was replaced by an

officer, Lt.-Col. Warouw, who demanded punishment for t[h]
officers responsible for the demonstrations on 17 October a[n]
expressed his loyalty to the President, who appeared to suppo[rt]
the guerrilla groups, but not to the Ministry of Defence. On 2[?]
November the commander of the 2nd Division was similarly r[e]placed, so that parts at least of three out of the seven Arm[y]
divisions were in the hands of officers hostile to the Ministry.

As a result of these developments the Cabinet, after discussion with the President, decided to compromise. It had already bee[n] announced on 14 November that Parliament would reconven[e] on 27 November and that it would give priority to drafting a bi[ll] for general elections. On 25 November Mr Soetan Sjahrir, th[e] leader of the PSI, announced that its two Ministers would n[ot] withdraw from the Cabinet if the Sultan should resign, thu[s] reversing the former stand of his party and reducing the risk o[f] the Government falling. Col. Nasution, who was formally declared responsible for the demonstrations of 17 October, and [a] number of other staff officers, though not apparently Dr Budiardj[o] or Gen. Simatupang, were dismissed, and an ordinance was issue[d] enabling members of the armed forces whose contracts had expired to be retained unless they wished to leave. The announcement stated that the measure was designed to prevent any declin[e] in the strength of the armed forces. A new Chief of Staff of th[e] Land Forces, Col. Bambang Sugeng, was appointed with the tas[k] of preventing 'disunity' in the Army and the Army command[s] were reshuffled. The actual resignation of the Sultan, which ha[d] been rumoured ever since Sjahrir's statement, came on 2 Januar[y] because Lt.-Col. Warouw was, on 1 January, confirmed in th[e] command of the 7th Division. The two Socialist members of th[e] Government were enabled to refrain from resigning by th[e] appointment on 2 January of a superior commander over Lt.-Col Warouw, and the fall of the Government was averted. It seem[s] clear, however, that the issue of the size and organization of th[e] Army has been decided for the moment not by the Government o[r] by Parliament but by a struggle within the Army itself.

The West German Political Parties and Rearmament

After the total collapse of German resistance in 1945, the main aim of the Allies was to set Germany on her feet again as a democratic State ready to live at peace with her neighbours. It was generally accepted that this would take a very long time. It was usual to talk of an occupation lasting as long as twenty years. During this time Germany would be allowed no army of her own. A whole generation of Nazis, and of fellow-travellers who had co-operated with their regime, was to be excluded from office. There was to be a lengthy period of 're-education', so that a new generation of Germans brought up in conditions of stable democracy would one day be able to take over the reins of government and bring Germany back into the comity of free, democratic nations.

It is worth while re-stating thus briefly Allied policy with regard to Germany at the close of the war, in order to bring home with all its force the completeness of the volte-face in policy which has taken place. The present aim of the three Western Allies is to persuade Germany to re-arm as quickly as possible. The rehabilitation of the generation which was governing Germany at the time of the collapse is regarded as inevitable, since it is barely half a decade older, and the complicated machinery of a modern State with modern armed forces simply cannot afford to sacrifice a whole generation of experience and talent still in its prime.

This dramatic change in policy is not the result of something which has happened inside Germany, among Germans. It is the local reflection of the wider sudden reversal of relations between the three Western Allies and Russia which has taken place in the same short period. Up to now, the German people have had no say in either the one policy or the other. It is true of all countries that the interplay between foreign and domestic policies grows increasingly complicated as distances shrink and economic *blocs* expand. But it is true to say of Germany that there, as in no other major country, the course of domestic policy is determined primarily by developments in the foreign policies, not of Germany, but of other countries around her. It is a common saying among Germans that they are the 'objects', not the 'subjects', of political events—a feeling the very reverse of the idea that 'it is up to each one of us' which is the basis of healthy democracy.

CHANGING ATTITUDES AND DR ADENAUER'S POLICY

Two years ago, when the Western Allies first made it clear that they intended to re-arm Western Germany, the shock to public opinion there was very great. It is true that Germans had still fresh in their minds the Russian blockade of Berlin which ended in 1949, and the Korean war had caused them to speculate gloomily on the comparative strength of the armed forces stationed in Western and Eastern Europe. But there was no scramble to re-arm. The thesis that a German army was *always* a bad army, an army that pulled the country into adventures of aggression which ended in disaster, had been too deeply impressed on the Germans themselves by recent history and Allied re-education. Large sections of organized public opinion showed their dismay. The Federal Youth Council, representing at national level all the major youth organizations in Western Germany, from Protestant and Catholic youth to the Socialist Falcons and the trade union youth, declared itself against German rearmament at its Congress in Berlin in December 1950. Large sections of the Evangelical Church, led by Pastor Niemöller, began an active campaign against the project.[1] The Social Democratic Party announced its determination to oppose it in the Bundestag and throughout the country. The small West German Communist Party took up the cry of the Communist-led Government of the Soviet Zone of Germany that West German rearmament would make free all-German elections impossible and would probably lead to civil war.

The past two years have been spent in passionate debate on the issue of rearmament between the West German Federal Government Coalition on the one hand, and the Opposition, led by the Social Democrats, on the other. Inevitably, this debate has tended to be a reflection of the debate on the same subject between the three Western Allies and Russia. Inevitably, therefore, it has tended to be highly theoretical, and each side has begun its propositions with 'If the Allies did this and the Russians did that, then we Germans could do such-and-such.' Nevertheless, some movement away from the original positions taken up by the main protagonists has been noticeable. It may be summarized as follows.

The original shock effect has diminished. The West German population has grown more used to the idea of a German army

[1]See 'The Protestant Church in Germany', in *The World Today*, October 1951.

at some time in the future. Some have accepted rearmament as a positive contribution to Germany's future, others have become resigned to it as the lesser of two evils. At the Christian Democratic Union party conference in Berlin last November, Herr Adenauer declared that his policy consisted in speedy ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties. Germany must not miss the opportunity to take the big step forward towards sovereignty which the General Treaty offered. With a large German contingent as part of the E.D.C., Germany would be able to turn later to the question of German unity. He denied any desire to settle this question by force, but said that experience had shown that it was no good to sit at the conference table with the Soviets unless one had military strength at one's back. Moreover, the internal situation in Russia and the satellite countries was not standing still. The standard of living in those countries was sinking year by year. In three or four years' time Russia would be much more ready for peaceful negotiations round the conference table.

THE COALITION PARTIES

Herr Adenauer can be confident of support for this policy in his own party. Since the defection of Dr Heinemann, the C.D.U. Minister of the Interior until his resignation last year on the issue of rearmament, there has been no serious trouble in the parliamentary ranks of the party. Nevertheless, Dr Heinemann and Helene Wessel (also a Bundestag deputy) have been active throughout the country organizing meetings against rearmament. Their main response has probably been found among pacifists and members of the Evangelical Church who support Pastor Niemöller's standpoint. The Heinemann-Wessel group have managed to keep themselves clear of the allegation that they are in the pay of the Communists. They publish a weekly anti-war newspaper, licensed in the British sector of Berlin. Their campaign has resulted in the foundation, last November, of a United Germany People's Party which will presumably take part in the federal elections in 1953. It seems likely to remain a splinter party.

Voting in the Bundestag after the first two readings of the Bonn and Paris treaties has shown that the Chancellor has sufficient control over the deputies of the Free Democratic Party and German Party, the other two partners in the Government coalition, to the extent that he can rely on a majority of 40 or 50 votes if the third reading takes place as expected in the next session of

parliament. The support of these two parties for the Chancellor's policy of speedy ratification was by no means certain earlier in 1952. The German Party has repeatedly demanded a 'magnanimous gesture' on the part of the Allies in the form of a mass release on parole of Germans still in Allied imprisonment. A section of the Free Democratic Party demands a general amnesty for all war criminals. Dr Mende, the spokesman of this group, said as recently as June 1952: 'If by the third reading of the [Bonn and Paris] treaties the problem of former German prisoners still held in and outside Germany has not undergone a fundamental change, some deputies of the war generation in the Coalition parties will have to withhold their approval in spite of their fundamental agreement with the foreign policy of the Federal Government.' (It was Dr Mende who, in January 1953, received in his room in the Bundestag one of the seven escaped Dutch S.S. war criminals asking for asylum in Germany.) It is doubtful whether Dr Mende's group would be numerous enough, even if they withheld their votes at the third reading, to enable the Opposition to achieve a majority against the Government.

The movement of opinion inside the Free Democratic Party during the two years since the launching of the rearmament proposals indicates very clearly that the German Right Wing considers that the moral case against the German army and large sections of former Nazi policy has now been abandoned by the Allies. The F.D.P. is very unevenly spread throughout the Länder of Western Germany. It is generally regarded as the business man's party, was formerly called the Liberal Democratic Party, and has inherited an anti-clerical tendency. It is strongest in North Rhine-Westphalia, where its regional association provides 73 per cent of the party's funds. Last July this association drew up a new party policy, called the 'German Programme', which was presented for debate at the national Party Congress in Bad Ems in November. The remarkable thing about this document was its avoidance of the word 'democratic'. This so shocked some sections of the party that a counter-programme was drawn up called the 'Liberal Manifesto', which stated, *inter alia*: 'We declare our faith in the democratic State which transforms subjects who obey laws into citizens who respect laws.'

The German Programme was carried by a large majority. It is a clever document, but the equivocal nature of many passages makes one doubt its sincerity, as the following extracts will show. 'The

liberty of each citizen is an unconditional right, which must be protected against all limitations by political and economic organizations.' 'We must dissociate ourselves from all those judgments of the victor nations which discriminate against our people and especially against our soldiery.' 'We undertake to build up a German Reich in the form of a decentralized unity-State (*Einheitstaat*).' 'With a sensible division of responsibilities between the Reich and its members there is no room for a costly federation. The German people must be able to express its will through plebiscite, as well as by direct election of parliament and President. The power of the head of the State must be strengthened. The President must have the right to dissolve parliament and order new elections. In addition to parliament must come a second chamber, made up of responsible prominent personalities in public life.' The programme goes on to condemn State-controlled economy, socialistic collectives, and the nationalization of the means of production as leading to a monopoly of the State. It demands the reform of the economic and social order on a basis of mutual trust and co-operation between employer and employed.

Finally, the programme appeals not only to members of the F.D.P. but to all Germans who acknowledge the principles of freedom and justice. As its sponsor, Dr Middelhauve, openly affirmed after the Congress had adopted the programme, and after he himself had been elected deputy chairman of the party, his aim was to create a third great party to the right of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. They would welcome all who were not attracted by those two parties, as well as ex-servicemen, returned prisoners of war, and former members of the Nazi Party. Clearly, Dr Middelhauve will absorb as much of the German Party as he can.

Opposition to Dr Middelhauve inside the F.D.P. is still very strong. It could not be otherwise in a party so 'federally' scattered and unevenly spread throughout the provinces. In the newly-formed South-West state, for example, the F.D.P. are governing in coalition with the Social Democrats. Indeed, it is this unusual arrangement which makes the voting in the Bundesrat (the second chamber, composed of a fixed number of representatives from each Land government) so precarious, and creates the constant threat to measures which have been passed by the coalition majority in the Bundestag. The extreme differences in views at present held by members of the F.D.P. can be illustrated by the altercation be-

tween Dr Maier, Minister-President of Württemburg-Baden, and Baron von Rechenberg,[1] another delegate from North Rhine-Westphalia, on the subject of whether Herr Fritsche, one of Goebbels' foremost propagandists, should be admitted to the party. Baron von Rechenberg supported his admission, calling him 'a clever man'. Dr Maier replied: 'Herr von Rechenberg says he is a clever man. I hold him to be a bad man.' Reports that Herr Fritsche helped to draw up the 'German Programme' have not been denied.

This is not the occasion to speculate as to whether Dr Middelhauve will succeed in transforming the F.D.P. into a mass 'people's rally' movement which will attract all nationalist opinion to the right of the C.D.U. and S.P.D. If he does, then his programme makes it quite clear that his party would take up a position with regard to the Federal Republic similar to that of de Gaulle's party in the French Fourth Republic, that is to say, a very much qualified willingness to co-operate in a form of democratic parliamentarianism of which they openly disapprove, and which it is their express aim to reform. But all it is wished to point out here is the very definite connection between the concessions the Allies can be expected to make in return for speedy German rearmament, and Dr Middelhauve's success in persuading the F.D.P. to adopt a programme clearly calculated to attract ex-servicemen's organizations and former Nazis.

THE REFUGEES' PARTY

Before passing from the Government to the Opposition parties, some mention ought to be made of a party which does not fit neatly into the orthodox political classification of right, centre, or left. The 'B.H.E.', as it is called (*Bund der Heimatlosen und Entrechteten*—association of those deprived of home and rights) is a refugee party which appeared on the scene after the elections to the Bundestag in 1948. It had been the policy of the occupying Powers to discourage the formation of separate political organizations of refugees, since it was felt that this would hinder their assimilation in the western provinces. Herr Adenauer's policy proved to be one of making the alleviation of refugee problems wait on the prior task of expanding Germany's industry and trade. The western, Rhineland provinces of the Federal Republic proved very reluctant to absorb the refugees from their over-

[1] Baron von Rechenberg died on 19 January 1953.

crowded camps in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria. Accordingly the B.H.E. refugee party was formed, and won for itself immediate success in provincial elections. At provincial level it is now taking part in government coalitions, sometimes with the Social Democratic Party (as in Lower Saxony) and sometimes with right-wing parties. It will certainly play an important role in the 1953 federal elections.

Its potential influence on the twin problems of German rearmament and re-unification need hardly be emphasized. In the budgetary debates in the Bundestag last autumn the items of expenditure for defence and for the alleviation of refugee problems (the 'equalization of burdens') came into direct competition with each other. The alternatives as to the fate of the 12 million Eastern refugees—assimilation in Western Germany or return to their homeland as a result of a 'strong-arm' policy by the Federal Government—stared the Bundestag bleakly in the face. The final decision on this question has not been taken. Dr Adenauer is obviously sincere in his declaration that Germany will never settle the problem of the 'lost provinces' by force. But the behaviour of subsequent Governments remains to be seen. And, as with so many vital German problems, the Allies and Russia must find a solution to the problem of the Oder-Neisse Line before Germany can determine a final policy for the assimilation or return of the refugees.

THE OPPOSITION

The attitude of the Social Democratic Party has from the start been one of strenuous opposition to the proposal to re-arm Germany. Nevertheless, the past two years have seen a gradual shift of emphasis from unqualified condemnation of any form of German army, an almost pacifist standpoint, to the present position of opposition to the particular form of rearmament and of limited German sovereignty which the Bonn and Paris treaties would give. At a press conference in Berlin on 27 October Herr Ollenhauer summarized the present attitude of his party. After dealing in detail with the special problem of Berlin, he went on to make the following general points on foreign policy.

The Saar policy of the Chancellor had failed completely. Herr Adenauer had been saying: 'Let us ratify the Treaties, get the E.D.C. and the Schuman Plan working, and then the Saar problem will settle itself.' The S.P.D. wanted to reverse this process, and settle the Saar problem as a preliminary to European unity.

(A month later the Saar elections, with the surprising result of a large majority for the pro-French Government party, gave a nasty shock to all sections of German opinion, and undoubtedly strengthened the Opposition's hand in the debates on ratification in December). The Chancellor, went on Herr Ollenhauer, intends to bring the problem before the European Council of Ministers. He cannot do this before February 1953. By then it will be too late. No new binding decisions regarding Germany in European questions must be taken until the Saar problem has been solved. The question of the unity and freedom of the German people is an indivisible one. There can be no question of one solution for the West and an entirely different one for the East. The Chancellor's policy towards ratification was over-hasty. The European Defence Community project in its present form means the final splitting of Germany. The final debates on ratification should not take place before the constitutional question has been settled, and in any case not before the beginning of 1953. There should be, continued Herr Ollenhauer, a four-Power conference on German re-unification as soon as possible, and in any case before ratification of the Paris and Bonn treaties.

Herr Ollenhauer was then asked what the next step would be when Western Germany had formed its twelve divisions. Naturally, said Herr Ollenhauer, the re-arming of the East would follow. 'Is it true,' asked one questioner, 'that you said in Milan that in case of a Russian "no" in the four-Power Conference you would review the position of the S.P.D.?' Herr Ollenhauer replied that he refused to speculate in anticipation of that 'no'. But on no account were the contracts acceptable in their present form. The exchange of notes between Allies was no longer a good system, he said. The last Allied reply was very inadequate. The order of an agenda was not important; much more important was the order of actions decided upon.

Asked what would happen if ratification went through, and the S.P.D. came to power in the 1953 elections, Herr Ollenhauer said his party would start negotiations at once to alter the treaties. He felt that an agreement of the four occupying Powers on German unity would bring with it an important relaxation of tension which would affect the German internal situation. He did not think it necessary to increase the German Frontier Police Force in face of the alleged increase to 100,000 of People's Police in barracks in the Soviet Zone.

Defining his party's attitude towards European Union, he said that they felt that the 'Little Europe' which was emerging would lead to further isolation of Great Britain and Scandinavia. The S.P.D. believed a broader organization on another basis was possible. Reminded that Great Britain had declined to join in the Schuman Plan, Herr Ollenhauer in his turn reminded his questioner that Great Britain had been asked to join on the undertaking that she accepted in advance all decisions of the conference to set up the Iron and Steel Community.

Finally, asked what his attitude was towards a policy of neutrality, Herr Ollenhauer said that at the moment a policy of neutrality was not a practical possibility. In all 'East-West' questions they were 'West'. But by the time Germany had attained a real sovereignty in the international field, the situation would be very different, and policies would have to be reviewed.

The small West-German Communist Party has contributed to the great argument by advocating all-German elections and the withdrawal of the armed forces of the four occupying Powers. In this, of course, it is following the line given by the Soviet Union and the Soviet Zone of Germany. The latter has intervened with repeated attempts to embarrass Herr Adenauer's Government by sending envoys from the Soviet Zone to discuss the holding of free elections. Curiously enough, it is the Social Democratic Party which reaps the benefit from such moves, since its demands for negotiation with Russia gain in credibility with each Eastern move for a rapprochement. The Communist party itself has lost ground in successive provincial elections in Western German Länder. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, have steadily increased their vote.

THE SOCIALIST REICH PARTY

No survey of the political background against which the ratification debate is being carried on would be complete without some mention of the banning of the Socialist Reich Party in mid-October 1952. The Federal High Court, in justifying its decision to outlaw the party, gave an admirably clear summary of the main characteristics of this attempted Nazi revival. The Socialist Reich Party, said the report, stood revealed as a successor organization to the Nazi Party. The leaders of the party were in the great majority old active Nazis who often held high positions. The organizational structure was similar to that of the N.S.D.A.P. The

party rules were of a barely concealed authoritarian character. Members could be collectively deprived of membership by arbitrary decision from above and the dissolution of whole regional associations. The aim of the Reich Party was to set up a political order based on absolute obedience. The officials of the party were mostly appointed from above, not elected according to democratic principles. The party programme contained no clear declaration in favour of democracy. The party paid homage without hesitation to Hitler, its propaganda imitated in detail his slogans and methods. The denigration of the organs and leading personalities of the Federal Republic, the unscrupulous use of falsification and slander, resembled closely the practice of the National Socialists. The very vocabulary they used was that of the Nazis. Moreover, unmistakable anti-Semitic tendencies were to be seen in the Reich Party. The self-dissolution of the Reich Party (one month before the verdict) was an offence against Article 21 of the Basic Law and was in any case void since the decision was taken only by the party leaders.

The judgment forbade all deputies who had been elected to any parliamentary body in the name of the S.R.P. from further engaging in parliamentary work even if they had left the party in the meantime. (This ruling caused difficulties in Lower Saxony, where the parliament contained a large body of S.R.P. deputies.)

The present constitutional deadlock is a natural outcome of an attempt to use a new parliamentary machine too soon to meet a situation which it was not intended to meet until much later. If Herr Adenauer were able to count on a two-thirds majority in support of ratification in the Bundestag, it is fairly certain that the constitutional problem would have been easily overcome. But his coalition majority is too small—about the same size as the Conservative majority which ratified the same treaties in Britain.

What general conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing brief survey of a very complex political situation? One could give way to gloomy forebodings for the future of German democracy at this strange spectacle of new political parties shuffling their programmes like a pack of cards, slipping in the joker in the hope that it will not be seen, and sometimes getting caught. But such gloom is not justified if one considers the remarkable steadiness under difficult conditions of the moderate parties, still by far the two largest, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. And

if they value German democracy, the countries around her need to remember that their foreign policies affect intimately developments in the innermost recesses of German domestic affairs, and to refrain from impatience at the apparent slowness of progress of Federal Germany towards ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties, since the prospect of the rearmament involved in them has imposed a far greater strain on her young democratic institutions than they have ever experienced before.

Postscript. The recent action of the British authorities in arresting Naumann and six other leading Nazis in the British Zone of Germany raises several important questions which can only be answered when the evidence held against the detained men has been published. Is this a case of a group of Nazis 'plotting' to take over the right wing of the Government coalition? Or ought we not to take at its face value Dr Middelhauve's open statement that his intention is to attract to the F.D.P. all the former Nazis he can get hold of? And how far are these two processes—absorption by the Nazis of the F.D.P. and absorption by the F.D.P. of the Nazis—complementary to one another, or even parts of the same process, namely, the increasing tendency of the German right wing to show its true colours on the assumption that the Western Allies are more concerned with a German defence contribution than with ideological questions of democratic theory and practice?

The effect of the arrests on the final stages of the ratification debates is also not clear. Some sections of German opinion will undoubtedly be more in favour of ratification as a step towards German sovereignty which will prevent such intervention by a foreign Power. But those who oppose ratification can also use the incident to strengthen their arguments, since the terms of the treaties will still leave Great Britain, France, and the United States in a position to take similar action whenever they consider that the security of their own forces in Germany is being threatened. And it is precisely on these grounds—'post-ratification' grounds, as one might call them—that the British High Commissioner acted in the present arrests.

Finally, there is the question whether it would have been better if the Allies had persuaded the Federal Government to take action itself against the Naumann group, just as it had done with such effectiveness in the case of the S.R.P. Here one must remember

that Naumann is a member of the F.D.P. No connection has yet been established between Naumann's group and that section of the F.D.P. under Dr Middelhauve which imposed its 'German Programme' so recently on the party and made such a successful bid for a share in the party leadership. Nevertheless the party faction and the group are bound to be associated in the public mind. Any action on the part of the Government would be taken with or without the agreement of those Ministers, including the Vice-Chancellor Dr Blücher himself, who are members of the F.D.P. In the first case Government action would look like an attempt by the moderate leadership of the F.D.P. to reverse its defeat at its own party conference by bringing Government pressure to bear on the victorious right wing of the party. In the second case, Government action would split the coalition and lead to the resignation of the F.D.P. Ministers. In either case a serious Governmental crisis would arise.

R. S.

South Africa on the Eve of Elections

South Africa's General Election is due to be held within the next three or four months. It has opened early on a bitter note and promises to develop into a ruthless struggle between the Nationalist Party, which seeks to defend its record of five years of government, and the United Party, the Labour Party, and the War Veterans Torch Commando, which have reached an electoral agreement to present an anti-Nationalist united front.

Both the Nationalists and the anti-Nationalists see the forthcoming elections as a turning-point in the history of South Africa. In the 1948 elections the Nationalists campaigned on the policy of *apartheid* with its promise of 'solving for all time the African problem' and of ensuring the maintenance of White supremacy. Even they do not claim to have succeeded in achieving these results. On the contrary, Dr Malan and some of his colleagues have recently admitted that the racial crisis is graver today than before. For this they blame the Opposition, the United Nations, the Communists, India, and the obstruction by the Supreme

Court. That is why their 1953 slogan will probably be 'Volkswil'—the Will of the People. This slogan has been chosen to emphasize their determination to over-ride the Supreme Court's ruling on the Separate Representation of Voters' Act. The 'people' will be asked to give the Nationalists a mandate to change the Union Constitution, if necessary, and to establish the supremacy of Parliament over the Supreme Court.

The Nationalist election programme has not yet been published but the following seven aims have been given by Dr T. E. Dönges, Minister for the Interior: [1] (i) withdrawal from the United Nations if there is any interference with the Union's internal affairs; (ii) equal rights for both language groups, but one flag and one national anthem (this involves the replacement of the Union Jack and 'God Save the Queen') and recognition of the fact that real national unity will only come when the broad will of the people favours a republic; (iii) economic welfare; (iv) sovereignty of Parliament, notwithstanding the ruling of the Supreme Court; (v) maintenance of a White South Africa through *apartheid*; (vi) maintenance of law and order; (vii) promoting a happy population which will include opportunities for development by non-Europeans.

While the United Party has also not yet produced its election manifesto, its leader, Mr J. G. N. Strauss, has given the following broad details of the policy he intends to pursue if the United Party is returned to power:[2] (i) rejection of *apartheid*, but the maintenance of full social and residential segregation between the races; (ii) preservation of Coloured and other voting rights; (iii) consultation with responsible African leaders on the highest plane; (iv) appointment of a Commission to examine contentious matters such as controlled freehold rights in the Native urban townships and the provision of better facilities in these townships; (v) rehabilitation of the Native Reserves; (vi) removal of restrictions on deserving Africans; (vii) Indian policy will depend on whether the Indians decide that they owe greater loyalty to South Africa or to India (his impression was that they favoured India). In other speeches Mr Strauss has emphasized the United Party's decision to maintain the present links with the Crown and the Commonwealth.

Mr Strauss's policy so far has not won the wholehearted agree-

[1] *Die Transvaler*, 3 November 1952.
[2] See *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 November 1952.

ment of his own supporters. During the past few years he has frequently been criticized for not being specific enough about his native policy. There are signs of deep schisms within the United Party, where a small but influential group of liberals has been waging an intensive campaign to try to force a more uncompromising policy on rights for non-Whites. This struggle has been strongly influenced by the War Veterans Torch Commando which, while not directly affiliated to the United Party, nevertheless draws its main support and strength from it. One result of their campaign has been an attempt by liberals to win the parliamentary nominations from less liberal members of the party, and in this they have achieved some success.

The liberal elements do not, however, appear to be entirely happy members of the United Party family. Those who are active in the party believe that its victory would at least be a guarantee that the democratic struggle will be allowed to go on. A split, if it is to come, should come after the elections, according to them. But if the United Party is defeated there is almost certain to be a split-away liberal party. A group of liberals has already begun to lay the foundations for a separate party based on the old Cape Liberal tradition. This was foreshadowed in a manifesto issued by twenty-two prominent South Africans calling for immediate reforms to include the repeal of 'the most mischievous measures' on the statute book such as the Groups Areas Act, the pass laws, and the Suppression of Communism Act in its present form.[1] There is no indication that the United Party is prepared to adopt any of these proposals.

But party schisms are by no means restricted to the United Party. There are equally serious divisions in the Nationalist movement. A strong republican group, led by Mr J. G. Strydom, Minister for Lands, believes that Dr Malan has not pursued the party's republican aims with sufficient vigour. Since Mr Strydom is often spoken of as Dr Malan's most likely successor, the views of this group carry considerable weight. A second group, which to some extent includes Mr Strydom's supporters, is concerned about the Government's failure to implement the programme of total *apartheid* as originally envisaged. This provided for territorial segregation between the races with the creation of separate White and Black states.

Total *apartheid* is sponsored chiefly by the South African

[1] *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 September 1952.

Bureau for Racial Affairs (S.A.B.R.A.), the Nationalist counterpart to the liberal Institute of Race Relations. S.A.B.R.A. draws its main support from the intellectuals of Stellenbosch University, the traditional home of Nationalist theorists. In a recent pamphlet[1] S.A.B.R.A. points out that 'the Europeans have built up a small paradise for themselves in South Africa, with convenience, ease, and comfort as the chief consideration'. It believes that such a situation can have no permanence and that the only acceptable alternative to the integration of the Africans into the White economy is to provide for their complete territorial segregation. To implement this policy 'the Europeans must be prepared to dig deep into their pockets for a long time to come'.

The rapid deterioration in Black-White relations, despite the determined efforts of the Nationalist Government, appears to have given renewed impetus to the case for total *apartheid*. It is a political issue that is bound to become more important if the Nationalists are again successful at the polls. Mr Oswald Pirow, former Minister of Defence, who while sympathetic to the Nationalists has kept aloof from party politics in recent years, has launched a campaign to propagate an even wider scheme for territorial segregation than has hitherto been considered by S.A.B.R.A. He proposed that two-thirds of Africa south of the Sahara should be given to the Africans where they could develop according to their own traditions and where, with European help, they could achieve self-government when they were ripe for it. The remaining one-third of the Continent south of the Sahara would become White territory. The White areas would be, roughly speaking, the highlands of Africa from Abyssinia to the Union, with the addition of certain coastal areas.[2]

Perhaps even more important than his actual proposals is the analysis which Mr Pirow has made of the present situation. He believes that the time at the disposal of the Europeans in Africa is running out. It is futile, he says, to imagine that equal rights can be withheld from a civilized person solely because of the colour of his skin. Therefore some radical change must be effected in Africa to ensure the future security of the Europeans.[3]

Mr Pirow's analysis reflects a significant new trend of thinking in South Africa—probably the most important change that has

[1] *Integration or Separate Development* (Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-aangeleenthede, Stellenbosch, 1952).
[2] *The Star* (Johannesburg), 20 October 1952.
[3] *Eastern Province Herald*, 21 November 1952.

come about in the past ten years. The European in South Africa is, for the first time, beginning to have serious doubts about his ability to maintain a position of White supremacy. The events of the past few years have weakened his self-confidence, though not necessarily his determination to maintain for as long as possible the *status quo*. He feels that he may still be able to take steps to deal with any internal threat offered by non-White resistance. But the real danger comes from the external threats—from the pressure of the United Nations, the rising tide of Black nationalism elsewhere in Africa, the growing criticism in the United Kingdom and in other parts of the Commonwealth, and the impact of British colonial policies in Africa.

Facing these dangers Dr Malan, speaking at the end of August, said that South Africa was at the cross-roads and that the choice of roads meant the choice of life or death to the people of South Africa. 'The Powers against us,' he said, 'are trying to make us do away with all Colour bars. They want us to pervert the whole past history of South Africa and to make a new beginning on the basis of complete equality. That is not the road Afrikaanerdom wishes to follow. To do what world opinion demands would mean suicide by White South Africa. We are not prepared to do that on anybody's orders.'[1]

The maintenance of White supremacy is the touchstone of all politics in South Africa. Almost all Whites are united behind this basic principle notwithstanding the bitterness of the political struggle between the Nationalists and their opponents. Disagreement between Europeans is a luxury that can be afforded only so long as the non-Whites offer no serious threat to the state of White Democracy in the Union. This fundamental agreement between Europeans always leaves the door open for new political realignments. There is nothing static about the party divisions. This was clearly illustrated in a speech made recently by the influential leader of the United Party in Natal, Mr D. E. Mitchell, M.P. 'Many a man has married the girl he quarrelled with the first time he met her,' Mr Mitchell said. 'Something is stirring in South Africa and in all Africa that we cannot see clearly. If the worst comes to the worst over the non-European question in the Union then all White men and women will stand together shoulder to shoulder.'[2]

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 1 September 1952.
[2] *Natal Witness*, 4 November 1952.

Although both European political forces are concentrating on their rival plans to solve the 'Colour problem', those most directly affected (with the exception of the Cape Coloured voters) are playing no part at all in the election struggle. The leaders of the Passive Resistance campaign have announced that irrespective of the result of the election their campaign of defiance against 'unjust laws' will go on. They profess to see no difference between the Nationalists and the United Party. Tweedledum, they say, is more ruthless and more honest in his attitude to non-Whites. Tweedledee wants to change nothing but will be less openly hostile in the method he uses to maintain the discriminatory laws.

There are many intelligent African leaders who, if they could influence the result of the election, would choose a Nationalist victory. This is not as surprising as it might appear. Under the old Botha-Smuts-Hertzog-Hofmeyr regimes African Nationalist leaders found it extremely difficult to maintain an organized political campaign. There was no possibility of creating a non-European United Front. But the more repressive the Government's policy the easier it is to organize the masses. These leaders, therefore, fear that a United Party victory would rob them of the militancy they have been able to inspire under a Nationalist Government.

There are, of course, many moderate Africans who disagree with this attitude. But these moderates are in the wilderness. They belong mainly to the older generation whose influence is being steadily whittled away. Tracing the changes in the leadership of the African Nationalist Congress it is significant that with each succession the leadership has become more militant and less moderate. Dr A. B. Xuma was replaced by Dr S. J. Moroka after the Nationalists came to power. Now Dr Moroka has been found to be too compromising and he has been replaced by Mr Albert J. Luthuli, an entirely new kind of leader. Until the Government lately made him resign he was chief of a Zulu tribe in Natal.

The 'Young Turks' among the Africans—many of whom belong to that unfortunate lost generation of Bantu youth living on the fringes of the White cities, born and bred in shanty towns, deprived of contact with their own tribal traditions and denied entry into the White urban society—are becoming more impatient and less willing to follow moderate counsels. Dr Ray E. Phillips, Director of the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work and one of the best-known authorities on urban African life, recently gave a warning that the time was coming when the defiance movement

would spread to workers in industry; extremists would grab control; violence would beget violence and the lights would go out all over South Africa.[1]

Moderate men like Dr Njongwe—whose skilful leadership has been chiefly responsible for the fact that the defiance campaign has been more successful in the Eastern Cape than anywhere else in the country—have become noticeably less moderate in response to the pressure of the Young Turks. 'Our aim,' Dr Njongwe told a Durban meeting in November, 'is to achieve freedom and liberty within five years and this is what we must tell our people '[2] A few days earlier he had said that the struggle for freedom must not be extended too long. 'It must be short, decisive, and occur without dislocation of the economy.'[3]

But the Africans are by no means united behind the defiance campaign, which is sponsored mainly by the African National Congress and the Indian National Congress. Many African leaders strongly criticize Congress leaders. Some do so because they disagree with the association of former Communists with the campaign. Others believe that it is 'reckless adventurism' to launch a mass campaign without first having organized mass support. A relatively new body, the Federation of Bantu Organizations, attacks Congress as being irresponsible. Congress alleges that the Federation is the tool of the Nationalist Government. The fact that Nationalist Ministers warmly commend the Federation lends some point to this accusation.

Despite these deep divisions between the non-Whites, the African National Congress has emerged as the most influential organization of Africans in the Union. This is mainly due to the success of the defiance campaign, its militancy, and the skill shown by its leaders—many of whom are now either in prison or have had their political rights circumscribed under the Law for the Suppression of Communism.

What emerges from this broad analysis is that a revolutionary situation has been allowed to develop in South Africa. On the one side is ranged the dominant European population, determined at all costs to maintain its position of White supremacy. On the other side are the non-White races, equally determined to overthrow this state of domination. These counter-domination, or revolution-

[1] *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 October 1952.
[2] *Natal Mercury*, 3 November 1952.
[3] *Die Burger*, 27 October 1952.

ary, forces are now felt to be a threat to the *status quo*. The response to this threat has been a strengthened determination by the White defenders of the *status quo* to maintain their position, if necessary by counter-revolutionary action. There is a fairly widespread assumption that the next phase in South Africa will see the mobilization by the non-White revolutionary forces of their power to challenge the authority of the State. This assumption overlooks the possibility that the counter-revolution may be called out before the revolutionary forces are able to mobilize their effective strength. It would be surprising if this were not to happen.

Over the past five years the political stability of South Africa has been disturbed by the defiance campaign and by the bitter political struggle between the European political groups in parliament. The parliamentary struggle was largely due to the Opposition's resistance to the attempts by the Nationalists to implement their *apartheid* programme. The effect of this internecine struggle between the Whites was to create a situation helpful to the non-Whites' campaign against White domination. It is for this reason that the Nationalists have, not without justification from their own point of view, accused the Opposition of playing into the hands of the militant non-Whites.

It is possible to conclude from this analysis that the underlying issue to be decided by the General Election is whether or not the counter-revolution will be called out in South Africa. If the Nationalists are returned to power, as they have every reason to believe they will be, there is little doubt that vigorous measures will be taken to break the power of the non-White political front and, as a necessary corollary, to circumscribe the power of the parliamentary Opposition and of the Courts to resist such measures. It is likely, therefore, if the Nationalists win the elections, that the present democratic processes in South Africa will, for a time at least, and perhaps for a very long time, be curtailed while the counter-revolution runs its full course. And there is little doubt that if the counter-revolution is called out it will, temporarily at least, break the back of the revolutionary forces.

The success of a counter-revolution in South Africa does not necessarily mean that it will have succeeded in defending the State against the enemies of the *status quo*, for the external 'enemies' will undoubtedly react sharply to such action in other parts of Africa, in certain parts of the Commonwealth, and most especially in the United Nations. C. L.

Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy

The Effects in Industry

'PRESIDENT GOTTWALD is leading Czechoslovakia along the path of Stalin.' 'There is no other road, there can be no other law for us than the one Stalin has decreed for the Soviet people.'

These characteristic passages from the Czechoslovak press are not mere slogans. They reflect contemporary reality. For at least fourteen months now Czechoslovakia's economy has been determinedly forced into the Soviet mould. The impetus of the process, which has been painful, and is not yet complete, is by no means exhausted. Not a single sector of life has remained unaffected by sweeping measures of legislation and administration.

This and a subsequent article, based almost exclusively on Czechoslovak official sources, will attempt to portray some of the objectives and difficulties of the regime in the economic sphere. From the Communist rulers' point of view there have been some solid achievements which the student of the Czechoslovak scene cannot afford to ignore or minimize, even if lack of space here prevents describing them in detail. In any case, such failures and shortcomings as this survey will indicate are always relative to the ambitious aims of the Czechoslovak planners.

ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION ON THE SOVIET PATTERN

In conformity with Soviet long-term requirements Czechoslovakia has consistently increased the pace of development of her heavy industry. This has been buttressed by concerted measures in the political and administrative spheres. Czechoslovakia is to become one of the chief suppliers of industrial equipment to the East European countries, and deliveries to the U.S.S.R. have top priority.

An outline of the economic reorganization might conveniently begin with the meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee in February 1950, when President Gottwald decreed a speed-up in the changes in industry. In that year a trade protocol additional to the 1947 trade treaty with the Soviet Union impelled the Government to order an even more rapid expansion of heavy industry. In February 1951 the already substantial Five-Year Plan targets were raised still higher. Simultaneously efforts were

cut production costs and to overcome raw material
rough developing indigenous resources. Then, at an
Central Committee meeting in June 1951, the Presi-
orders for a sweeping reorganization of the whole
tween October 1951 and June 1952 joint Government
ecrees were issued to improve the efficiency of the
l, cotton, power, and chemical industries, apart from
gulations relating to agriculture. All were based on the
l.

'apotocky, in his recent justification of the wholesale
on of industry, said in effect that without the switch-
equirements of the Soviet *bloc* Czechoslovakia would
d to depend on the capitalist world for 70 per cent of
nd that would now mean industrial standstill and mass
nt. Instead, he said, the position had been reversed,
lovakia now transacted 70 per cent of her trade with the
d the People's Democracies.

he Government's economic schemes and disappoint-
ve closer attention: they show how the excessive
the nation's industrial and human capacity led to an
ituation in which a top-level political purge and a
ere used to attach the blame to a set of people who had
lanned and executed official economic policies. It is
nbering that Vice-Premier and Party Secretary Slansky
d the Order of Socialism on Gottwald's decision as
31 July 1951, and that his tract, *For the Victory of*
ublished on 16 November 1951, was described as an
id in raising the ideological level of the Communist
her trial victim, Frejka, for many years economic
e President and in September 1951 still the head of
ic department of the Presidential Chancellery, was
onnected with the reorganization of industry in the
951. It was he who urged, in the Party press in mid-
that industry must be streamlined at top speed and the
ustrial Ministries split into smaller specialized sections.
U.S.S.R. was to be the model, and plan fulfilment at
ction cost the yardstick of efficiency.

r 1951 was, in fact, a turning point in Czechoslovakia's
Government then underwent a major transformation.
e new Ministries became predominantly economic
arrying out the political directives of the Party and

assuming ever-increasing responsibility for production and even for the budgetary control of their respective orbits. They now direct output through the Main Administrations, which are part of them and which normally form the only link with the factories.

Changes in the composition of the Government had been infrequent since the election of President Gottwald in the summer of 1948. But between September 1951 and April 1952 alone there were about seventy important changes of personnel in the Government and Party leadership, which have now raised Gottwald to his patent supremacy. The element of Soviet-trained men in the economic Ministries was significantly increased. The present Minister of Heavy Engineering, Maurer, is an example; so is ex-Red Army officer Harus, now in charge of the influential Ministry of State Control. Under existing law any neglect of Government decrees and orders aimed at the proper development of socialism is a violation of State discipline. Ministerial powers include the right to punish offenders; indeed, under the new Party Statute infringement of Party and State discipline is incompatible with Party membership.

Another leaf was taken from the Soviet book with the establishment of Soviet cost-accounting methods in Czechoslovak industry; and last August the post of principal accountant—acting also as State controller of financial and economic discipline—was created. One of the most far-reaching moves towards integration with Soviet economy was the introduction, by a Government decree of 28 October 1952, of Soviet standards into Czechoslovak industry. The standardization of materials and machinery is to be made easier and a great simplification of production of essential commodities for all Iron Curtain countries is expected.

A further move to bring the Czechoslovak economy into line with the Soviet system was the decision, in April 1952, to reshape the whole planning procedure. Excessive centralization was to be done away with; planning now conforms in essence to the Soviet model.Many measures to ensure rapid and consistent application of Soviet methods were decreed in July 1952, as the 1953 State Plan was to be based on the technique of the Soviet 'Techpromfinplan' (the co-ordinated Technical, Industrial, and Financial Plan). Output quotas are to be raised to a standard somewhere between that of the best and that of the average worker. The new planning insists on detailed technical and economic justification of all requirements from planners at all levels.

THE PLANS IN ACTION: MINING AND FOUNDRY INDUSTRIES

A brief examination of developments in the coal industry during the period since the reorganization (September 1951–December 1952) may throw some light on the arduous path of the Czechoslovak worker to promised prosperity and national power.

The coal industry was the first to receive detailed Government and Party directives in October 1951. That decree formed the pattern for all subsequent measures in other sectors. Its success—or rather its relative failure—has been typical in many ways. The decree specified schedules for progressive mechanization, new production techniques, and effective socialist competitive production; it enhanced the authority of pit managers and technicians; it also demanded an increase in output norms by an average of as much as 35 per cent. The Minister of the Interior, who was sent to supervise the new drive in the key area of Ostrava to which the decree principally applied, later reported a voluntary increase of 45 per cent in output norms.

In round figures total production in 1950 amounted to 18,847,000 tons of coal and 27,506,000 tons of lignite (brown coal)—an increase of 1,413,000 tons of coal and 1,157,000 tons of lignite over the 1949 production. The most important coalfield, that of Ostrava, which topped the list of socialist competitors in 1950, fell back to tenth place in 1951, remaining nearly 10 per cent below its target of 16 million tons, man-output having fallen to 1·6 tons as compared with 2 tons in 1933. Nevertheless the 1952 target for Ostrava was increased to 17 million tons, while the total for the Republic was to be 21,408,000 tons of coal and over 31 million tons of lignite. One cannot but wonder whether the Government can seriously have hoped to obtain such additional quantities from an industry which, besides the output short-fall, was also desperately short of skilled miners and handicapped by a housing shortage which, in turn, led to enormous fluctuation in the industry.

By November 1951 the 20,000 miners wanted for Ostrava had not been recruited, despite such inducements as a preferential miners' wage (about 25 per cent above the average industrial wage), far-reaching tax exemptions, the payment, in 1951, of some Kcs 600 million in bonuses for long service, and the compulsory transfer of some 72,000 administrative workers to industry to release more men for the key sectors, including mining. The reorganization of manpower recruitment and labour direction in conformity with the Soviet State Labour Reserves therefore came

as no surprise in December 1951. This scheme, first started in the Ostrava region, involved a fundamental change in the training of skilled and semi-skilled young workers for the mining and iron and steel industries. Over 10,500 boys had been recruited for coal and ore-mining in 1950, more than 12,000 in 1951, and at the end of June 1952 another 11,000 were drafted into the by then Soviet-modelled State Labour Reserve Training Centres. The cost of training a mining apprentice has been estimated at Kcs 100,000. Early in 1953 the Premier complained that the results of the lavish training scheme in industry left much to be desired.

Under a decree against labour fluctuation, in force since the beginning of September 1952, no public or private enterprise is allowed to engage a worker without the consent of his former employer or proof that his training has been completed. An earlier Government decision of June 1952 ordered industrial managers who had been sending 'voluntary brigade-workers' to the mining industry to replace them as soon as their term of duty expired, thus keeping a fixed number of volunteers in the industry. Understandably, no official report will admit the existence of forced labour in the mines or any other industry.

The decree on the reorganization of the foundry industry, issued on 13 November 1951, envisaged improvements in the organization, including higher mechanization and a 15 per cent increase in output norms. But in May 1952 there was still a high incidence of technical break-downs, waste of materials, delay in repairs, and unpunctuality of workers in the industry, and the Minister in charge publicly exposed these shortcomings. In July a number of engineers and officials from the Kuncice foundry were sentenced to long prison terms for 'scandalous malpractices'; they were charged, among other things, with having offered illegal bonuses to firms to induce them to speed up sub-contract deliveries. In late October 1952 consignments to the U.S.S.R., the People's Democracies, and the Czechoslovak Army were apparently held up through plan failure in the iron and steel industry, which has remained one of the Government's chief worries.

TASK AND ACHIEVEMENT

At the beginning of 1952 the Government's declared aim was an increase in Czechoslovakia's total industrial output of 21 per cent above the 1951 level; output in heavy industry was to be two and a half times greater than in 1937, and its share in total

gross production was to increase from 49 per cent (1951) to 55 per cent.

Proportionately, Slovakia's duties were to be even greater. The rate of expansion of heavy industry there was to be even more rapid than in the Czech provinces. Nevertheless in the first five months of 1952 Slovak coal output had dropped 20·6 per cent and iron ore production 8·3 per cent behind schedule, and Slovakia was 'dangerously behind plan' with important hydro-electric, transport, housing, and geological research projects.

By midsummer 1952 doubts as to the possibility of carrying out the Government's exacting demands must have become widespread, for the Party press blamed economic leaders for holding 'futile discussions' as to whether or not the Plan could be fulfilled and was 'realistic'. Especially in the Ostrava region the views of 'experts', as the press indignantly noted, seemed to induce even Party officials to ask for a lowering of Plan commitments. The press inveighed against 'lack of State discipline at the top' and 'leniency towards bureaucrats'.

But the Government continued to pursue their ambitious schemes. The example of the construction, in the Slovak region of Kosice, of the vast HUKO heavy engineering combine illustrates the magnitude of industrial expansion. HUKO is to turn out iron, steel-ingots, and rails, and is ultimately expected to produce 1 million tons of steel per annum. The construction site covers an area of some 2,500 acres and the building of the plant is to take about 60 million work-hours. When completed, it is expected to employ about 10,000 workers. The Kosice area holds over 70 per cent of Czechoslovakia's ore. Another huge foundry-engineering combine is to be built in the Czech-Moravian highlands. A third similar plant, started in 1950 at Zdar on Sazava, should employ several thousand workers by the end of 1955. These are only some of the many engineering and foundry projects under way. It is estimated that heavy engineering products will form half of Czechoslovakia's total exports in 1953. All of these are believed to be destined for the U.S.S.R., China, and the People's Democracies.

The industrial successes are unfailingly credited to the U.S.S.R.'s generous assistance. Taking the statistics with the necessary amount of caution one can at least discern major trends, although it is impossible to analyse the official figures. Statistics for gross industrial output in 1949 show a 24·1 per cent increase

above pre-war, with subsequent annual increases of over 14 per cent in 1950 and 1951, and of 17·8 per cent in 1952. In 1952, it was claimed, thirteen major foundry projects were completed, while three big power plants, eight large chemical factories, and more than twenty heavy engineering enterprises were put into operation. Industrial production in 1952 showed the following increases over 1951: pig-iron, 19·7 per cent; crude steel, 26·9 per cent; power, 13·3 per cent; coal, 9·7 per cent; lignite, 10·3 per cent; and coke, 12·9 per cent. The output of the Ministry of Heavy Engineering went up by 36·8 per cent and that of the Ministry of General Engineering by 39·7 per cent. Premier Zapotocky told a Central T.U. Council Conference on 22 December 1952 that these were undeniable successes but the plan had not been fulfilled in its entirety, partly owing to 'circumstances beyond our control'—a remark which he did not elucidate.

Reviewing industrial progress at the December 1952 Party Conference, President Gottwald said that in the first four years of the Five-Year Plan (1949–52) total gross production had risen by 82 per cent and reached 197 per cent of the 1937 industrial output. The immense emphasis on heavy industry during that period is shown by the President's figures of gross production increases since 1949, amounting to 108 per cent in heavy industry, 50 per cent in light industry, and 69 per cent for the food industry. Coal production during those four years had gone up by about 2,400,000 tons and lignite output by 9 million tons. In 1952 electricity production was over 11,000 million kw/h and steel output 3,700,000 tons (as compared with 2,300,000 tons in 1947.) The President also stated that gross industrial production in Slovakia in 1952 was four and a quarter times higher than before the war, and twice as great as at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan in 1949.

Although the 1952 plan was not fulfilled in a number of important branches, the plan for 1953 is again ambitious and will test the country to its utmost. It has been worked out in accordance with Soviet methods applied to Czechoslovak conditions. It aims at the 'gradual elimination of industrial disproportion' which was allegedly caused by the Slansky conspirators.

THE DIFFICULTIES

The difficulties besetting Czechoslovak economy have long been chronic, and authoritative spokesmen have, as has been shown, exposed them on many occasions. Party and Government leaders

now never tire of stressing the vast damage for which Slansky and the 'Conspiratorial Centre' were responsible. Two observations by competent spokesmen of the regime are of interest in this context.

After the conspirators had been hanged, Education Minister Nejedly made the surprising remark that much of the evidence given by the accused represented even more sabotage than the original indictment covered. The defendants, he said, had boasted of having inflicted damage running into thousands of millions of Kcs. That claim, Nejedly declared, was 'a lot of balderdash', merely to let their taskmasters know how well the gang had discharged its treacherous activities. Furthermore, the Premier, in one of his hard-hitting speeches at the Central Trade Union Council meeting in December, remarked, in connection with wages demands, that if an economic system resulted in national bankruptcy this 'need not always be the work of saboteurs; it springs from basic lack of understanding of the economic problems of socialist development'. If the workers failed to increase productivity, they endangered socialist progress and their own existence.

One of the most formidable hurdles has been the high cost of production. The 1951 aim of effecting a saving of Kcs 4,200 million was not reached. Only by attaining far higher productive efficiency, either through greatly improved methods or through cutting wages, could economies be made. But the wages bill was exceeded in 1951, and the reorganization of industry, drastic though it was, did not appear to result in greater efficiency. Thus the plan to save Kcs 50,000 million in production in 1952 must appear fantastic. The national wages policy, of such cardinal importance to cost-planning, is too complex an issue to receive adequate treatment here. It must, however, be noted that the anomalies in differential taxation of incomes created chaos without achieving the dual purpose of attracting workers to the key industries of mining and steel and raising labour productivity to the required level. Premier Zapotocky scathingly remarked last December that the only section of the coal industry reorganization decree which was 'promptly and consistently fulfilled and overfulfilled' was that relating to higher wages. Yet it was 'nonsense' to imagine that higher wages automatically resulted in better output. In any case, as he said, 'What good will the money be if the workers cannot buy anything with it?'

Three of the country's leaders, President Gottwald, Premier Zapotocky, and Vice-Premier Dolansky, have recently laid bare some of the Government's major anxieties. Industrial and civilian demand has outpaced the production of the fuel, power, and metallurgical industries which have fallen behind schedule. Engineering plant is not used to capacity on account of shortages of semi-finished goods. Equipment remains idle while simultaneously demands for new factories are put forward. The absence of co-operation between and within industrial Ministries and enterprises has caused great disorganization in industry. The common denominator for most of the difficulties is 'lack of State and labour discipline from top to bottom'.

The 'scourge of industry', absenteeism and high labour fluctuation, has been branded time and again. Absenteeism amounts to nearly 20 per cent, and even more in some sectors, 'without anyone seeming to mind'. As yet Czechoslovak heavy industry does not appear to possess the right type of Communist foremen. The Premier has complained of frequent opposition to them and a 'terrible decline' in their status: it is, after all, the foremen who must explain and apply the intricate industrial decrees in the factories.

The 1953 State plan categorically demands higher labour productivity, for with the very limited resources of new manpower the tasks cannot otherwise be mastered New production methods and much tighter labour discipline are to yield this result. The Government is planning also to draw on such sections of the population as are not yet fully enlisted in the output drive—which will presumably be the housewives and the semi-fit. The percentage of women in industry had already reached 32·7 by the end of 1951.

THE TRADE UNIONS

The task of putting Party and Government decisions into effect also falls on the trade unions. The decisions of the July 1952 Trade Union Conference, by which union officials were once more mobilized for an all-out effort in production, brought the Czechoslovak trade union movement substantially nearer to its Soviet counterpart. One might have assumed that the trade unions' paramount commitment—to spur the workers to higher output and better discipline, to ensure greater industrial safety in view of the steadily rising accident rate, etc.—would have become easier by midsummer 1952; for by then the trade union movement had

been strengthened by some 14,678 reconstituted Works Councils, 60 per cent of whose members were newly elected and included many young and fanatical supporters of the regime. But the goodwill of the workers was clearly not forthcoming, and bitter reproaches were showered on trade union officials by the Premier at the July Conference. They were charged with irresponsibility and indolence and with having allowed the Party and Government decrees to be 'distorted into a veritable farce'. His criticisms at the end of 1952 were in more moderate terms. Mere publication of decrees, the holding of conferences, and so on was not enough, he said. Every trade union official must learn enough about production to be able to check the work of the experts until the country had trained its own technical cadres.

It now remains to be seen how far the regime can count on active support from among the three and a half million trade union members (there are only about 600,000 workers outside the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement). The Government is certainly making every effort to give workers and managers an opportunity of acquiring industrial skill and knowledge. The large number of training courses and evening classes, including the study of technical Russian, is being further extended in 1953, and an industrial Academy for the training of managers is to be set up. Indeed, it is on the creation of a new class of efficient and reliable Communist industrial managers that success or failure in Czechoslovakia may well depend.

P. B.

Politics and Economics in Chile

THE election in September of General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo as President of Chile for a six-year term marked a turning point in that republic's history. It brought to an end a fourteen-year period in which three Radical Presidents, Aguirre Cerda, Rios Morales, and González Videla, with support varying in political complexion from Communist to Social Christian, had led the nation through the crises of the second World War and its aftermath.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Chilean politics in this century have been a notorious confusion of heterogeneous philosophies, and splits and re-fusions, often on the basis of personalities, are the rule rather than the exception. It is not easy, therefore, to simplify the alignment which the presidential campaign of 1951–2 produced, and its eighteen months' duration gave ample scope for political manoeuvring. Officially the following nine parties were registered: Conservative, Conservative Traditionalist, Democratic, Popular Democratic, National Falangist, Liberal, Liberal Progressive, Socialist, Popular Socialist; and in addition there were two other organizations the significance of which is basic in a consideration of political developments. These were, first, the Communist Party which the González regime had proscribed, but which has wielded considerable influence in Chilean politics in the last quarter-century; and secondly, the Chilean Women's Party representing many of the 328,000 women voters who were participating in a presidential election for the first time.[1]

The González regime, probably owing its existence in the first place to Communist votes which gave it its majority in 1946, had pursued, after an initial period of attempted co-operation with that party, a strongly anti-Communist line, and its support in Congress in recent years had been based on a coalition of Radicals, Social Christians, and National Falangists. This political grouping, under considerable internal strain, supported the candidature of Señor Pedro Enrique Alfonso, who became the officially designated heir of the González administration.

Of his three opponents, Senator Arturo Matte represented a coalition of elements predominantly of the Right, of which the Liberals were the most important political entity, but which included the Conservative Traditionalists and some supporters of the Agrarian Labour, Socialist, and Democratic Parties. Dr Salvador Allende, as candidate of the extreme Left, tried to rally those who were dissatisfied with both González's acceptance of support from the Right and Centre, and his suppression of illegal strikes. General Carlos Ibáñez, Independent Nationalist, participating in his fourth presidential campaign, had the initial advantage of being a nationally-known candidate who had been President of Chile from 1927 to 1931. This, however, was not an unmixed

[1] Legislation passed in 1949 enabled them to vote in the Congressional elections of that year.

leasing, for although his administration had been characterized y many efficient reforms and a great public works programme, is propensity for severe repression of opposition was equally well nown, and reaction to this had resulted in his overthrow in 1931. His return to political influence dates only from 1949 when he was lected Senator for Santiago by a record majority. Although sup-orted by several splinter groups from the principal political arties, and in particular those of Agrarian Labour, Democratic, nd Popular Socialist allegiance, he entered the presidential race rith the backing of no major group, relying on his own personality, is reputation for efficient government, and the dissatisfaction of he voters with all the political parties. Helped by only one daily ational newspaper, three or four weekly publications, and one iajor broadcasting station, he journeyed from the northern desert o the far south asking for a mandate to restore internal confidence i the Republic's government.

Although it became obvious that his popularity was great, the ecisiveness of the result surprised most observers: Ibáñez btained 436,345 votes, Matte 257,066, Alfonso 187,044, and llende 52,348. The popular choice was confirmed in October by Congressional vote of 132 votes to 12. This procedure was ecessary under the Constitution, which provides that where a andidate fails to secure one more than half the votes cast the ecision as to the choice of President from the two leading candi-ates is left to Congress.[1] The latter's acceptance of the popular rill is one of the most satisfactory features of the development of Chilean democracy in the last two decades. Not only is Ibáñez the fth consecutive President to be elected without any irregular itervention, not only have these elections been carried through emocratically with a minimum of disorder, but on the last two ccasions Congresses of diametrically opposed political composi-ion, both in 1946 and 1952, have respected the decision of the olls.[2] Thus it came about that on 4 November 1952—on the ay, incidentally, when the world's attention was focussed on he United States presidential election—Ibáñez was inaugurated, n his seventy-fifth birthday, into his second presidential erm.

[1] Ibáñez had secured 47 per cent of the votes cast in the presidential elec-on.

[2] Ibáñez, in 1941, was also the first defeated presidential candidate in Chilean olitical history to visit the President-elect (Rios) to congratulate him on his iccess, on the night of the election.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The political result was the outcome of Chile's economic troubles of the post-war years, and represented an amalgam of support for Ibáñez of many sections of Chilean life which felt that the way of salvation lay in firm control by a leader whose ability in this direction was not unknown. The central problem is continuous and unchecked inflation, a malaise to which Chile has always been susceptible, but which in the last five years has become increasingly acute. High taxation, high prices, budget deficits, heavy State borrowing, increases in currency emission, decapitalization of industry have all represented the classic symptoms associated with the disease. A spate of statistics could show the dimensions of the condition. The cost of living, which had shown an annual increase of some 20 per cent since 1948, accelerated in 1951 and 1952 to such an extent that in the latter year it was more than twice that of 1948. Daily earnings per capita in manufacturing, which were less than 13 pesos in the pre-war period, rose to 94 pesos in 1948 and over 150 pesos in 1951. Government expenditure, soaring from a total of 27,640 million pesos in 1951, was estimated to exceed 42,000 million for 1953, 12,000 million pesos of which was accounted for by increases in the salaries of civil servants and employees of semi-governmental institutions. The peso rate of exchange with sterling, standing at 180 in the spring of 1951, fell to 375 to the £ by the autumn of 1952.

The repercussions of such financial loss of control on the living costs of most households can be well imagined, and it is natural to assume that on this account alone many of the new women voters expressed their protest in support of Ibáñez, as did many thousands of citizens who had voted previously for the three Radical Presidents. It is significant that the Chilean Women's Party gave official approval and important support to the Ibáñez campaign, and the inclusion of a woman Cabinet Minister[1] in the new administration reflected his recognition of this help.

Wage and salary demands and requests for extra bonuses and allowances to meet the rising cost of living have caused an almost continuous sequence of strikes and threatened stoppages from one end of the country to the other and from all classes and sections of professional and manual employment. No sooner have these demands been met wholly or in part, than the inflationary wheel

[1] María Teresa del Canto, Minister of Education.

has spun still further, the gains won by the workers have proved ephemeral, and further demands are made. It is obvious that under such conditions the powerful Communist organization in the country exploited the dissatisfaction and unrest, but after the González regime had outlawed the Party and arrested or driven underground such elements, the financial crisis still remained, and inevitably continued to give rise to the perennial rash of strikes. Alternating between threats and presidential arbitration, González found himself obliged in most cases to concede most of the demands, and, in spite of warnings by the World Bank and excellent impartial technical advice as to a plan to curb the inflation,[1] neither President nor Congress succeeded in effectively grappling with the situation.

Though the crisis was mainly financial in origin, the strong impetus given to industrialization by the González administration, with its inevitable large capital outlay and high Governmental borrowing, certainly contributed a powerful economic factor. Yet few would deny either the need for freeing the Chilean economy from its 75 per cent dependence on mineral exports,[2] or the achievements of the late Government in this direction. Moreover, on the credit side the saving of foreign exchange by home production, and even the earning of funds by new exports, were already considerable;[3] and González, in his last annual report to Congress, stressed the contrast in Chile's industrial fabric in 1952 with that of 1946.

The chosen instrument of this expansion has been the Development Corporation, which is a good example in Latin America of State planning of industry, often with much support from private capital, and is partially financed by over $100 million in credits from the Export-Import and International Banks. Its programme, based on the sound economic principles of diversifying Chile's economy and developing its resources of power and raw materials for the national benefit, has three major triumphs to its credit. Its network of hydro-electric power stations[4] has been instrumental in quadrupling pre-war electricity production, a 50 per cent increase being recorded since 1948. The significance of this step in har-

[1] *Report of the United Nations Economic Mission to Chile 1949–50*, by United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. London, H.M.S.O., 1952.

[2] In 1951 55 per cent copper; 18 per cent nitrate and iodine; 3 per cent iron.

[3] Probably at least $50 million in 1952, particularly in respect of iron and steel goods, petroleum exports, and the refining of copper at the Paipote smelter.

[4] See 'Chile's Economic Problems', in *The World Today*, January 1949.

nessing the country's previously untouched reserves in this respect has been vital in the establishment and progress of many other industrial projects. Only relatively less spectacular has been the development of the Magallanes petroleum field, without the surrender of ownership of the resources to foreign interests. From modest beginnings in 1946 not only is the field supplying the two southern provinces of Aysén and Magallanes but considerable quantities have been exported to Uruguay until such time as the Concón refinery near Valparaíso is complete in 1954. Output from thirty wells at over 8,500 metric tons monthly is increasing by 20 per cent annually, and recent discoveries of the extension of the field on the mainland, north of Magellan's Strait, suggest that in the near future the country may become self-sufficient in petroleum and its by-products. Already surpassing Bolivia and Brazil as an oil producer, plans have been made to restrict production to 150,000 metric tons annually to conserve the supply for as long as possible.[1] The third achievement of the Corporation was the setting-up of a modern integrated iron and steel industry at Huachipato, near Concepción, and production, which had been running at a monthly average of 2,500 metric tons in 1948 and 1949, already exceeded 20,000 tons monthly in the second half of 1952.[2]

Less satisfactory was the agricultural scene. Increased population and the steady progress of industrialization with its concomitant urbanization (which now means that more than half the nation's population lives in the industrial provinces of Santiago, Valparaíso, and Concepción) has led to a rising demand for foodstuffs, and the country is less and less able to feed its 6 million people. In pre-war years normally an exporter of wheat, it spent in 1951 £10 million on imports of 234,000 tons of wheat and 8,200 tons of flour. Its increasing dependence on supplies of Argentine meat reflects the same phenomenon. Even the small but important export of mutton from the far south has dwindled to one-twentieth of what it was six years ago, the supplies being diverted to feed the Central Chilean cities.[3] In other staple items of Chilean agricultural export the same story is told:

[1] The equivalent of £8 million was spent on these hydro-electric and petroleum developments in 1952.

[2] The Export-Import Bank in 1952 was prepared to grant a further $10 million in credit for a 50 per cent expansion of the plant, contingent on the raising of another $5 million in the country.

[3] In 1952, 546 metric tons of mutton went to the United Kingdom, and 6,485 metric tons to Chilean consumption.

EXPORTS
(metric tons)

	1938	1951
Oats	52,000	19,000
Barley	76,000	10,000
Beans	39,000	16,000
Lentils	45,000	7,300
	212,000	52,000

A major feature of the country's foreign trade policy recently has been the conclusion of agreements with Argentina, Cuba, and Peru to secure supplies of wheat, meat, and sugar to meet its deficiencies in these respects.[1]

As a direct result of this deterioration of agricultural production State expenditure on agriculture rose steadily during the last years of the González administration. Some £10 million was devoted to the mechanization of farming by the purchase of tractors and equipment from Germany, Canada, and Italy; over £3 million was spent on the extended irrigation of 180,000 acres; and since 1947 £28 million was advanced in credits to farmers by the Agrarian Credit Institute.[2] One of the most promising steps taken towards replacing food imports by home production was the investment of over £3 million in a scheme to promote sugar beet cultivation in Bío-Bío province, and the erection of a refining factory near Los Angeles.

It is too soon to assess the new Administration's methods or success in dealing with the economic problems that face it, although the line taken in the presidential campaign and in post-election statements indicates the direction that the promised 'peaceful revolution' will take. The obvious first priority must be to seek a cure for inflation, and, just as its origins are mainly financial, so the solution must be found in that direction. It is assumed that an attack on the republic's top-heavy bureaucracy will be the starting point, and that Government expenditure and borrowing will be drastically reduced. To the same end the new Government plans to co-ordinate the many social security organizations into one unified system. Limitation of credit, restriction of imports to essential needs, and a simplified exchange system seem to be other aspects of its austerity programme. Most vital will be a scheme of wage and price stabilization, the rock on

[1] In 1952, 15,000 tons of copper were exchanged for 104,000 head of cattle from Argentina.

[2] *Caja de Crédito Agrario*

which the González regime repeatedly foundered. There seems no doubt that there will be a considerable shift of emphasis from industrial to agricultural development, but whether Ibáñez is prepared to consider a radical reform of the outdated agrarian system of the *hacienda*, against which no President has dared to act up to now, is problematical. It is worth noting, however, that both as a Senator and as a Presidential candidate the nucleus of his political supporters came from the Agrarian Labour Party. He also promised, in December 1951, on a visit to the pastoral far south, that if elected he would not renew the territorial concessions now held by the huge sheep-farming corporations there.[1]

It will obviously be in the interests of the new Administration to maintain the gains made on the industrial front, but whether the Development Corporation will be allowed to continue its programme at a similar pace to that of the post-war years seems extremely doubtful—and here its economic nationalism will be subject to a tug-of-war with the means to finance it. Ibáñez's policy is apparently based on a belief that State participation and private enterprise are complementary, and in an interview given to a correspondent of the *New York Times* (10 September 1952) he indicated that he was not opposed to the importation of foreign capital 'so long as it was divested of all colonial ambitions and prepared to work under the same conditions as Chilean capital'. Neither of these principles is in conflict with the pattern of investment encouraged by the previous regime, and, given the greater financial stabilization promised, industrial development should be, if anything, more soundly based in that it will attract domestic capital, and this in itself will retard inflation.

But Chile's economy is still tied to the prosperity of the copper and nitrate mining industries, and considerable interest has therefore been directed to the new Administration's policy toward them. By steady modernization and development,[2] in spite of frequent strikes, these industries have maintained a high level of production and brought the country increasing quantities of foreign exchange. In May 1952 a bold and astute move by President González increased the gain from this source still further. At that time, under a year-old agreement, 80 per cent of the exports from the three North American copper companies' mines in Chile

[1] These expire in 1955 during the new President's term of office.

[2] e.g., the introduction of the solar evaporation process, the mechanized loading of nitrate at the ports, and the construction of a new plant at Chuquicamata to utilize copper sulphide ores.

was being sold to the United States at 27½ cents per lb., which was considerably less than the prevailing world price of the metal. González denounced this agreement and placed all copper exports under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank, which offered to sell the product at prices more in conformity with the world level. The action was well-timed in relation to high world demand for copper, and, although at first the United States refused to buy and was forced to withdraw copper from its stock-pile, within three weeks that country had relaxed its price control on imported copper and Chile had begun to reap an additional 9 cents per lb. on sales, which now went to Western Germany, Pakistan, Argentina, and other markets besides that of the U.S.A. Continuing shortage of copper, exacerbated by loss of production through strikes in Northern Rhodesia, enabled this price to be maintained, and the total Chilean output in 1952 was sold without difficulty.

This successful action, however, did not reap much support for the Government, as during the previous months there had been increasing criticism of the policy practised by all three Radical Presidents, particularly in the war years, of submitting to American pressure in conforming to a fixed copper price. Supporters of Ibáñez had indicated that if better prices had been obtained in the past there would have been no need to resort to such heavy borrowing for the country's industrialization. The favourable result of González's denunciation of the agreement seemed only to confirm the accuracy of this viewpoint. Attacks on other aspects of the organization of the copper industry and their deleterious influence on the country's economy led many to believe that an Ibáñez victory would mean nationalization of the industry, a policy advocated also by the candidate of the Left, Allende. In the early days of the new regime the new Administration disclaimed its intention of pursuing this course, although the implied threat remained, unless foreign capital observed 'conditions of equity'. The onus is placed on the companies, and if they fail in their obligations 'the people of Chile will demand their nationalization as the people of Argentina and Bolivia have done'.[1]

FOREIGN RELATIONS

There seems little doubt that the critical press which Ibáñez received in the United States both before and after his election bore a close relationship to this fear of nationalization. There were

[1] Ibáñez interview in *New York Times*, 10 September 1952.

also other unfavourable portents. Never in the history of Chile had relationships with the United States been more cordial than under President González. The part played by North American credits in Chile's industrial development has already been mentioned, and she has been the recipient of more economic support from the United States, in relation to her population, than any other State in the continent. This was the outcome of a belief that, when so many other republics were falling to dictatorships of various forms, it behoved the United States to show in a practical manner their support for a country that had remained loyal to democratic ideals for twenty years. Ibáñez's victory, in American eyes, threatened this collaboration, and proof of this was seen in his opposition in the Senate in July 1952 to the ratification of the Military Aid Pact with the United States. This agreement, similar in character to those concluded with several other Latin American States, met with considerable opposition in Chile, and strikes and demonstrations against its ratification necessitated a strong police guard in Santiago during the Senate debate.

It is now evident that Ibáñez's advocacy of rejection of the treaty did not lose him any support in the country. Although first post-election statements indicated that no hasty step would be taken by the new Government towards abrogating it, there is in the country very considerable suspicion of entanglement with American policy, and the implementation of the Pact will need scrupulous care in this respect. Co-operation between Argentina and Chile, which has certainly been strengthened by the change of regimes, will also contain its anti-United States component, and Chile will move increasingly towards the 'third force' position adopted by her neighbour. Ibáñez has pledged himself to friendly relations with the West, but at the same time he looks forward to the establishment of commercial relations with Russia and denounces any attempt of either bloc to prejudice Chile's sovereignty and exert influence upon her policies.

This emphasis on nationalism and respect for the sovereignty of a small nation runs as a persistent theme through the Ibañista programme, and accounts for the enthusiasm of Argentina over the trend of events in her neighbour. Welcomed as another 'triumph of Latin America over imperialism and exploitation', Chile is seen to have taken 'the first step on the path to liberation', and the popular vote accorded to Ibáñez is regarded as the expression of 'the desire of the Chilean people to claim their national

sovereignty and attain economic independence'. Already the possibility of a Customs Union between the two republics, and the re-establishment thereby of an extended 'Free Cordillera'[1] has been mooted, but it remains to be seen whether this proposition, of considerable economic realism in view of the largely complementary nature of the resources and economies of the two nations, will materialize. The nationalism of Chile is not entirely devoid of anti-Argentine features, and many attempts at close co-operation in the last century have been wrecked on these incompatibilities.

DOMESTIC POLITICS

Both in foreign and domestic affairs the first five months of the new Administration will be, of necessity, a transitional period. In March 1953 the Congressional elections will be held in which a new Chamber of Deputies and half of the Senate members will be elected. The elements which supported Ibáñez in the presidential contest are now determined that the new President shall be backed by a Congress sympathetic to his policies. To this end these political groups have united to form a single organization in support of his Government. This People's National Alliance[2] will exert considerable efforts to win a majority in both Houses, although it must be remembered that the Ibañistas actually polled a minority of the total number of votes in September. Moreover, the new regime will have had insufficient time to effect any major change in the financial situation of the country and must inevitably campaign on a programme of austerity. However, the climate of the Chilean 'Mediterranean' summer, in which most of the voters live, is an environment in which the weight of economic difficulties seems temporarily less heavy, and it would be surprising if the Nationalist Presidential victory were not duplicated in a similar Congressional triumph in March, at least in so far as the Lower House is concerned.

In the meantime the National Alliance is agitating for electoral reform so that the March elections will be 'the authentic expression of the popular will', and the principal objective of the attack is the 'law for the defence of democracy', passed by the González regime, which cancelled the electoral rights of those accused of political instigation of industrial strikes. Although the law par-

[1] The title given to an arrangement which lasted from 1856 to 1868 by which all trade over their mutual land frontier was free of all duties.
[2] *Alianza Nacional del Pueblo.*

ticularly affects the Communist Party, the opposition to its undemocratic provisions has been widespread and has rallied diverse political elements in a campaign for its abrogation or radical amendment. This was reflected in a close Senate vote of 16 votes to 15 in September which thus narrowly rejected a motion to restore these electoral rights to the disenfranchised[1]. Ibañista support for this reform has been interpreted by some observers as an indication that the President received considerable Communist support at the polls in September. With the Party outlawed it is difficult to confirm or deny this assertion, or to gauge what the estimated 40,000 Communist voters, and probably another 40,000 sympathizers, did at the ballot boxes. They certainly did not vote for Matte or Alfonso, and Allende's total of 52,000 votes is surprisingly small as the expression of the forces of the extreme Left in Chile. It is possible to conclude that much Communist support was transferred from him to Ibáñez, in spite of their experience under his rule twenty years ago. The impossibility, under present conditions, of the direct participation of Communists in the Government of Chile may have meant that the establishment of a nationalist regime, with its possibilities of renunciation of co-operative policies with the United States, was regarded as being the next best thing. The condemnation of González's 'policy of submission and vassalage' to Washington is compounded of the same elements of economic and political nationalism to which Ibáñez did not appeal in vain.

It now remains to be seen if he can channel this popular and partially emotional revolt against Chile's economic ills into a constructive policy which will secure broad-based national support for even unpopular measures. In spite of her financial woes the country has a much sounder economic basis in 1953 than a quarter of a century ago when the same President faced the blizzard of the world depression. In that fact there is much hope.

G. J. B.

[1]The new Administration has since removed the electoral disabilities on Communists (article in *The Times*, 31 December 1952).

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Notes of the Month

The Sudan Agreement

THE Foreign Secretary's announcement in the House of Commons on 12 February of the agreement on the future of the Sudan, signed on the same day in Cairo, had a good reception; but the true measure of the importance of this understanding with Egypt could be gauged better from the enthusiastic welcome which it received in Cairo and from the Arab States. Whatever may be the defects of the pact, arising from the British determination to compromise with Egyptian nationalist demands, it is also clear that the northern Sudanese have got what they wanted.

The Sudanese political leaders had themselves gone to extreme lengths, both in the Cairo discussion and in their Khartoum agreement of 10 January with Major Saleh Salem, to show a united front and also to meet all the Egyptian demands. It can be suspected that they were under the impression that once the elections had been held and Parliament had met under the new Constitution the letter of any agreement signed by representatives of political parties would not matter very much. But it has already become apparent from the exchange of views on the possibility of the Sudan joining the British Commonwealth after achieving self-determination that the Co-domini must stand on the strict literal interpretation of the agreement which they have signed whenever any point for interpretation arises.

It would be a mistake for the British public at this stage to take up the matter too strongly, for none of the principal Sudanese parties or leaders has ever expressed the desire to exchange the Condominium status for that of membership within the Commonwealth. The Umma have always stood for complete independence, and the pro-Egyptian parties for unity with Egypt in one form or another: the Socialist Republican Party policy does not include any reference to the Commonwealth, and the Sudan Party of

Mohammed Ahmed Omer and Sayed Buth Diu, which did, has found few supporters.

The least satisfactory feature of the agreement from the point of view of the administrative and economic development of the Sudan is the provision that all British officials must be replaced before the end of the Home Rule period. A Sudanisation Committee, which includes Sudanese members, has been constantly reviewing the rate of progress in Sudanisation since 1944 in the most meticulous detail. Already more than 87 per cent of the Civil Service, including the technical departments, are Sudanese, and the young Sudanese now taking courses of study in England cannot be expected to take up the senior posts without any period of training after they obtain their qualifications. From the attitude adopted by General Neguib's advisers, the agreement may seem to have been drafted with the object of creating just such a vacuum, in the spheres of both administration and security, as will make the replacement of British by Egyptian (and not Sudanese) staff inevitable. But it is unlikely that the Sudanese would allow that to happen.

In his statement in Khartoum on 14 February the Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Robert Howe, made it clear that the powers now given to him, in consultation with the Governor-General's Commission, to ensure fair and equitable treatment to all the inhabitants of the various provinces are 'still a real safeguard to the southerners'. They will have twenty-two seats in the House of Representatives, a proportionate representation in the Senate, and two Ministers in the Cabinet.

There has been concern over the future of the British Civil Service; but Article 88 of the Self-Government Statute, as amended, imposes on the Governor-General a special responsibility for the Public Service. It states that 'It shall be his duty to ensure fair and equitable treatment for all members of the Public Service whose contractual rights and interests shall be safeguarded.'

The Draft Constitution for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

THE draft Constitution for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, published as a White Paper (Cmd. 8754) on 5 February, is the culmination of almost a generation of public discussion and two years of intensive study by the British Government and the Governments of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The controversy which has developed has little to do with the

merits of Federation as such, for almost everybody agrees on its desirability for political, economic, and strategic reasons. The difficulties are, first, that vocal African opinion in the northern Protectorates is clearly opposed to any such scheme from fear that it will lead to the substitution of 'settler' rule for the protection of the Queen, and, second, that many Europeans in Southern Rhodesia are also nervous of it for exactly the opposite reason—they fear that Federation may lead eventually to their political domination by the Africans.

The British and Southern Rhodesian Governments not unreasonably think that the very inconsistency of these two points of view indicates the strong objective case that there undoubtedly is for bringing Federation about without delay, since its foundation rests on the principle of close political and economic association between Europeans and Africans and the rejection of domination by one race or the other. Others in Britain think that it would be unprincipled, impolitic, and dangerous to force Federation through now in the face of the present African opposition, and that it must be postponed. But the Government's view, as expressed in the Report (Cmd. 8753) which accompanied the draft Constitution, is that if the scheme should be rejected the United Kingdom Government would see no prospect of re-opening the subject within any foreseeable period of time. Its rejection, Mr Oliver Lyttelton said on 5 February, would be a triumph for both European and African extremists who seek domination by their own race instead of partnership between them. Ninety per cent of African opinion, he added, is entirely ignorant of the meaning of the Federation, and most of the vocal opposition is not directed at Federation as such but at any form of political change other than towards a quite unrealistic conception of self-government by Africans alone, as in the uni-racial societies of West Africa.

The next step must, by the law of Southern Rhodesia, be a referendum on the proposal by that country's electorate—which at present is mostly European—and if this were to give an adverse vote Federation would be killed. It is natural, therefore, that the main changes in the scheme which have resulted from last January's final conference between the Governments have been designed not only to strengthen the safeguards for the rights and future development of the African population but also to meet some of the fears expressed by Europeans in Southern Rhodesia.

The most important changes are concerned with the much

discussed African Affairs Board of the Federal Government, with the machinery for future constitutional development, and with the protection of African land rights. The scope of the proposed federalization is limited to matters affecting mainly European interests and such general subjects as public utilities, customs, and economic development; all matters more directly affecting the lives of the Africans would be left, as at present, under control of the Territorial Governments, and the Protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be fully preserved. The African Affairs Board is a device to ensure that, even so, no legislation which discriminates against Africans can be passed by the Federal Government without reference to the Secretary of State in London. This Board was to have been a nominated, extra-parliamentary body, but it is now a Standing Committee of the Federal Parliament consisting of six Members (three European and three African) representing African interests, one of the Members being Chairman with an additional casting vote, which must be used to keep the question at issue open for further discussion. This change both meets the Europeans' objection to the proceedings of a sovereign legislature being subject to the rulings of an outside body and strengthens the hands of the Board by giving it all the privileges and rights of a Standing Parliamentary Committee and all the advantages of close day-to-day discussions with other Members of Parliament.

It is also proposed that no changes shall take place in the relative powers of the Federal and Territorial Governments for ten years (which is an additional safeguard for African interests); and that, meanwhile, another inter-Governmental conference shall take place, between seven and nine years after the Constitution is proclaimed, to review it in the light of experience. Finally, it is definitely stated in the Preamble that 'the Federation, when the inhabitants of the territories so desire, (may) go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth'—which meets the fears of those Europeans who feel that Federation may for ever preclude the attainment of Dominion status.

The existing land rights of Africans in all these territories are, as before, to be enshrined in the Constitution, but an additional safeguard has been inserted which states specifically that the Federal Government may not acquire African land for European settlement.

The draft Constitution, now to be submitted to the Southern Rhodesian Referendum, the Legislatures of all three territories, and finally to the British Parliament, is a complete instrument and includes the recommendations made by special Commissions on all matters concerned with the financial structure of the Federation, its Judiciary, and its Civil Service. It will, if the Referendum is favourable, pass through the local Legislatures by about April, and is expected to come before the U.K. Parliament in the form of an enabling Bill before the Coronation. The year 1953 is indeed, in the opening words of the Report, 'one of opportunity in Central Africa'.

Stalin and Bravo

SOME surprise was aroused recently by a laconic report in the newspapers that the Argentine Ambassador to Moscow had been cordially received by Marshal Stalin, apparently contrary to the usual custom at the Kremlin. A somewhat fuller report of the interview, as described by the Ambassador to press representatives, appeared in the Buenos Aires newspaper *La Nación*, from which it may be learned that Stalin was in good health and in a most conversational mood, and entertained Señor Leopoldo Bravo for an hour or so discussing all sorts of topics, including international football and the desirability of arranging a fixture between Argentina and the U.S.S.R., but not including the war in Korea. The only people present other than the two protagonists were Mr Vyshinsky and an interpreter.

Señor Bravo, it seems, asked for the interview when he presented his credentials in the usual way, and his main purpose was personally to convey greetings from General Perón to Marshal Stalin: the fact that the request was promptly and warmly entertained is interpreted in Buenos Aires as an indication that Russia sees possibilities of profitable trade relations with Argentina, which may be true. Stalin may also see some other advantages to be gained in maintaining friendly relations with one of the more important countries of the American continent.

It should not be imagined, however, that General Perón is developing Communist sympathies, or planning to make Argentina a satellite. People who are engaged in the cold war and in the various hot wars in the East sometimes tend to forget that the whole world is not actually divided into two camps, and that there are a few 'neutrals' left. General Perón is one of them.

When diplomatic representations were re-established in Moscow and Buenos Aires a few years ago, and on several other occasions, General Perón has said that there is no reason why Russia and Argentina should not be on friendly diplomatic and commercial terms. He has also said countless times that *Peronismo* is not Fascism, or Communism, or any extreme doctrine of the Left or of the Right. This is broadly true, though it might be added that *Peronismo* keeps its balance by being rather heavily weighted on both sides. It must be conceded that *Peronismo* has its own characteristics of absolutism which leave no room for Communism: the kind of discontent on which Communism thrives was catered for by *Peronismo* many years ago; and the methods by which law and order are maintained in Argentina would not provide a very favourable climate for Communism, even if it were to sprout.

Yet there can be no doubt whatever that Señor Bravo was obeying General Perón's orders when he applied for an interview. It seems doubtful that Argentina and Russia could in fact establish an important interchange of goods. Russia produces many agricultural commodities, and Argentina's exportable surpluses of the products mentioned by Señor Bravo (such as hides, oil seeds, tanning material) are not likely to be large or hard to dispose of; conversely, it seems unlikely that Russia has an excess production of capital equipment or materials such as petroleum.

Stalin's motives may be obscure, but General Perón's aim in establishing these friendly relations with Stalin may be fairly easily guessed at. He can demonstrate to the world and to himself that he is in no way whatever subservient to the policies, wishes, or opinions of the United States. He subscribes, a trifle reluctantly, to various manifestations of 'hemisphere solidarity', but he doubtless derives considerable satisfaction from an occasional gesture of independence if not of defiance.

President and Congress

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S first report to Congress on the State of the Union—the annual message, designed mainly for domestic consumption, in which the President outlines his legislative programme—did not devote as much attention to international affairs as did his inaugural address. Nevertheless, it was the foreign policy section of the message that attracted most attention, more because it was immediately controversial than because it presented any radical change from the policy of Mr Eisenhower's predecessor. But the new President did pay two quick dividends on the Republican election account: he announced that he would ask Congress to make it clear that America does not recognize secret commitments which permit 'the enslavement of peoples', and that the United States fleet would be withdrawn at once from the patrol of the straits between Formosa and the Chinese mainland, which had been begun in 1950 to prevent the Nationalists from attacking the Chinese Communists.

Neither of these announcements will have much, if any, effect on existing situations. However, the first will appeal to critics of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, while the second was a sop to Chiang Kai-shek's American friends. But it is already apparent that this sop, instead of satisfying the China lobby, has only made it ask for more; for example, certain members of Congress are demanding a full blockade of the China coast. The Democrats, on the other hand, share the fear of the European allies that this Formosa move may be the first step on the road to an extension of the Far Eastern war. Mr Eisenhower has thus made both co-operation abroad and a revival of a bipartisan foreign policy at home more difficult, without, as far as can yet be judged, having achieved much success in his wooing of the conservative nationalists in his own party.

These are the men who insist that the United States is bearing the whole burden of the fight against Communism alone. It is they who want to draw the teeth of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and who grudge every penny spent on foreign aid. Congress must deal with both these questions shortly, and it was therefore of the atmosphere for such measures in Washington, rather than of other capitals, that Mr Eisenhower was thinking in his State of the Union Message. This also explains Mr Dulles's admonitions on European integration—a project also very close to the Presi-

dent's heart—in his first broadcast as Secretary of State. His hardly concealed threat of 'unify—or else' was, however, surprisingly tactless, coming from a man with his diplomatic experience. Since his return from Europe Mr Dulles has, happily, been speaking in a style more suitable to the State Department.

Apart from asking for renewal of the Trade Agreements Act and passage of the Customs Simplification Bill, the President gave no details of the foreign policy measures he will be sending to Congress. There was no mention, for instance, of the Point Four programme for underdeveloped areas, except for a promise to foster private investment abroad, nor was there any indication of the amounts thought necessary for the Mutual Security Programme. It was hardly to be expected that the new President, after only two weeks in office, could have yet formulated specific policies, even in a field in which he is experienced and even though the transfer of government has been carried out so smoothly.

The clearest account of future policy in the message concerned the Treasury and confirmed the view that this department, under its able Secretary, Mr Humphrey, will be playing the leading part in the Government which it was denied under the Democratic Administration. A start has already been made with the task of extending the period over which the national debt falls due, by converting it to longer-term loans, and the appointment of well-known bankers as Mr Humphrey's assistants should ensure harmony, rather than the disagreements of the recent past, between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, the central banking system. This is essential if inflation is to be kept in check, as President Eisenhower hopes, by fiscal and monetary means, by indirect controls on credit, and by a balanced Budget, instead of by the direct controls on prices and wages of the last few years.

These controls have had more success than the new President will allow, but he had really no alternative to removing them, as he is now rapidly doing. For they were already moribund, and Congress was unlikely to have renewed the legislation authorizing them even if it had been pressed to do so. After 1 July the only direct controls that are expected to remain are authority to regulate rents in areas where housing is scarce because of industrial expansion, and to impose such priorities for machinery and materials essential to the rearmament programme as will still be necessary in a few cases. Plentiful production of all goods is now possible, most commodity prices are falling, and the majority of retail

prices that enter into the cost of living are below the fixed ceilings; and therefore it is not anticipated that the removal of price controls will cause any upsurge of inflation, although some prices will undoubtedly go up. There will be a number of wage increases, but this will be nothing new as wages have never ceased to rise in spite of controls.

Unfortunately the prices of the basic materials that are in demand for the defence programme—copper, aluminium, and probably steel—are among those that will inevitably rise. This will increase the cost of rearmament, which in any case will, according to present plans, go on rising this year, although more slowly than it has been doing. This is the great obstacle in the way of the Republican promise to balance the Budget. Contracts have been entered into, with Congressional approval, long in advance, as is inevitable when they are for such complicated products as jet aircraft. There is altogether over $80 thousand million of this accumulated authority outstanding. Ways of recapturing control over such spending are being suggested in Congress, but it is doubtful if the President would want to cut much of it even if he had the chance, for his first consideration is the national security. Indeed, a more aggressive Far Eastern policy might mean heavier spending on arms. A certain amount of saving can be obtained in the defence departments and other branches of the Government by administrative reforms and economies, but the only real hope of filling the gap between expenditure and receipts in the coming fiscal year—put at $10 thousand million by President Truman in January—lies in foreign aid. Mr Eisenhower may not propose much of a cut here, but it is Congress that disposes.

Mr Eisenhower said, and the leaders of his party in Congress now agree, that tax reduction must wait until the possibility of a balanced Budget is in sight. But that means that the Budget must be brought into something approaching balance very quickly, for tax reductions are already on the way, with the expiry, in June and December, of the special excess profit and income taxes imposed after the Korean outbreak. To extend these, after winning an election on promises of tax cuts, would be more than Congress could bear, and in the House of Representatives a Bill for advancing the income tax reduction to June has a good prospect of passage, under the auspices of Mr Reed.

Mr Reed's refusal to abandon his Bill at the Administration's urging is only one example of the new Congress's inclination to

take the bit between its teeth, a tendency which may however be checked now the President has mapped a definite road for it to follow during the present session. Another example was the list of amendments to the Taft-Hartley Labour Act, admittedly unobjectionable to the Administration, but produced by Mr Taft without waiting to hear what the new Secretary of Labour proposed. Another was the move, which has now failed, to bring the President's power to reorganize Government departments under closer Congressional control. This reorganization was started by Mr Truman, on lines laid down by the Republican Mr Hoover, and in it lies the chief hope of achieving that efficiency and economy which Mr Eisenhower promised to bring to the federal government. His ability to push the more controversial of these schemes through Congress will be an outstanding test of his relationship with the legislature.

Another battle that seems unavoidable in the interests of economy is that over the policy of keeping farm prices high by means of Government purchases and loans. The present legislation does not expire until 1954, but already skirmishes have begun over butter and beef. The International Wheat Agreement, now being re-negotiated in Washington, may also be the occasion for a struggle, for it is the decline in export demand that has caused the drop in the prices of wheat and cotton. Heavy production, too, has played a part and is almost entirely responsible for the recent sharp fall in the price of cattle. Price supports are being demanded for beef, while butter, which the Government has been buying at the rate of a million pounds a day, at nearly 5s. a pound, is at the moment a graphic example of what such price supports cost. The support level for butter can legally be reduced at the end of March, but Mr Benson, the Secretary of Agriculture, is being told by the agricultural spokesmen in Congress that if he does so he will prove that the new Administration is not prepared to keep its election promise of supporting the farmer in the style to which he is accustomed. Mr Benson has already caused an uproar by saying that in his view price supports should be no more than an insurance against agricultural disaster.

There are signs that the worrying decline in farm income may be levelling off, which will ease the immediate pressure on Mr Benson, but Congress will certainly look very suspiciously, especially since 1954 will be an election year, at whatever farm legislation is suggested. The President's admirable aim is economic

stability and full parity of income for farmers compared with other groups, to be achieved in ways that minimize governmental interference and encourage desirable shifts in production (away from surplus crops) and initiative on the part of farmers themselves.

The new Congress, as was to be expected, is even more ready than the old to investigate the activities of the departed Government and to search for Communists under every bed. Senator McCarthy is now in charge of the Committee on Government Operations, and Senator Jenner, nearly as notorious, has taken over Senator McCarran's old chairmanship of the internal security sub-committee, although not of the main Judiciary Committee. The rivalry between committees in this field has been accentuated by the presence of an ex-agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the head of the House Un-American Activities Committee. But one of President Eisenhower's strongest statements in his State of the Union Message was to assert the responsibility of the executive branch for keeping 'the disloyal and the dangerous' out of the Government. Mr Dulles had previously called on State Department employees for 'positive loyalty', in terms which caused some disquiet there but were justified by the fact that Congressional criticism had centred on that department. The President is now preparing a new loyalty procedure which it is reported will be more discreet than the old. It also simplifies what had, over the years, become a very complicated process, and it may induce Congress to give the executive a chance to show what it can do. This new security programme puts responsibility squarely on the heads of executive departments. The criterion will be 'reasonable doubt' that an employee will maintain security, which means that loose talk or alcoholism as well as disloyalty will provide cause for dismissal.

Senator McCarthy and Senator McCarran have had a set-back already, for the Senate, despite their protests, has confirmed the nominations of General Bedell Smith as Under-Secretary of State and of Dr Conant as High Commissioner to Germany, a much-commended appointment. The General had defended one of Mr McCarran's victims in the Government service, while Dr Conant has been an outspoken advocate of academic freedom against Mr McCarthy's attacks. All of President Eisenhower's other nominations to ambassadorships and high positions in Government departments have gone, or are going, through the Senate without opposition, except for those to the Defence Depart-

nent and service agencies. Mr Eisenhower's first open argument with Congress arose over the unwillingness of Mr Charles Wilson, of the General Motors Corporation, and his subordinates to sell their large share-holdings in firms with which they had been closely associated and which are large defence contractors. These men have all now been confirmed, after disposing of their holdings at considerable personal sacrifice, but the argument illustrated very clearly the sources which may well give rise to further friction between the new President and the new Congress, friction that had not been expected until the Republicans in Congress had lost the flush of victory and their enthusiasm for the presidential candidate who had given it to them.

But the flush of victory in fact explains Congressional aggressiveness. For twenty years the legislative branch has felt that it has been dominated by a determined executive—although it has not always looked like that to independent observers—and Congress is now trying to take the opportunity offered by the political inexperience of the new President to seize the initiative. The Republican leaders in Congress are very experienced politicians indeed; furthermore, they have the habit of opposing the President, and it may be difficult for them to remember that now he is a member of their own party they should support him. This difficulty may be accentuated by Senator Taft's leadership, for he will hardly be enthusiastic about making concessions to the man who, he probably thinks, kept him out of the White House.

The political inexperience of Mr Eisenhower, and even more the ineptness of his advisers, were demonstrated by Mr Wilson's troubles, for apparently no one had drawn the new Secretary of Defence's attention to laws which required him to give up his interests in firms with which he would be dealing on behalf of the Government. Mr Wilson did not help himself by his failure to show Senators the customary deference or by his apparent inability to understand why an exception to the law could not be made in his case, since no one had any doubts about his honesty. Such an exception was of course impossible for a party which had made political capital out of the scandals in Washington and had guaranteed to 'clean up' the Government. Moreover the Republicans are well aware that the new President's reliance on business men as administrators will lay him open to charges from the Democrats that the Government is being unduly influenced by 'big business'.

Mr Wilson came before a Senate which was already irked by President Eisenhower's propensity for making appointments without consulting the Senator or Representative from the appointee's home state or home town. This is a matter not only of traditional courtesy but of real political importance; on it depends much of the patronage with which the Republicans in Congress expect to give their local supporters the rewards they have been denied during the twenty years in which their party has been in opposition. Here again the difficulty was largely due to the President's inexperience, and it too appears to have been overcome, but it was accentuated by the fact that Mr Eisenhower was known to be taking the advice, on appointments at least, of Mr Herbert Brownell, the new Attorney-General. He has been closely associated with Governor Dewey of New York, and therefore with the liberal wing of the party, while Congress is dominated by the right-wing Republicans, who have nearly all the influential committee chairmanships, and no use for anything connected with Mr Dewey.

In view of the conservative sympathies of his Congressional supporters, and of the extremely narrow Republican majorities in both Houses, it was courageous, and somewhat unexpected, of President Eisenhower, who has conservative sympathies himself, to produce the progressive recommendations on domestic policy that were contained in the State of the Union Message. The most striking of these was his demand for a new immigration law, 'faithful to our basic idea of freedom and fairness to all', to replace the one that was passed as one of the last acts of the old Congress. The chances of a new statute are helped by the convinced liberalism, in this matter, of the new chairman of the Senate Committee concerned, Mr Langer, who has replaced Senator McCarran. Other legislative recommendations which the President considers to be urgent are for improvements in the old age insurance scheme and for federal help for the building of schools, both matters over which there has been controversy in the past, but which should have enough Democratic support in Congress to counteract the inevitable opposition from some Republicans.

The emphasis in the Message on freedom from federal interference for private enterprise and for state governments is designed to counteract Congress's inclination to stray to the right of the 'middle way', outlined in the President's message, when he fills in the details of it. The President himself has evidently realized, more clearly than have many other members of his party, that this

way offers the only possible road towards a Republican victory in the 1954 Congressional elections. The State of the Union Message shows that Mr Eisenhower understands that Americans voted for him, not for the Republican Party, that they voted against the men in power but not against the Democrats' welfare state.

N. B.

Floods in the Netherlands

THE floods which have attacked the Dutch coast and islands have come at a time when Holland, after some initial setbacks, seemed to have made an almost miraculous recovery from the devastation facing her at the end of the war. Areas flooded during the war by the Germans, and later by the Allies when attacking in 1944, had been restored to fertility. Bridges and harbours had been rebuilt. Trade, severely handicapped by the loss of the East Indies, had received a new impetus from the revival of one of Holland's main pre-war trading partners, Germany. The 1952 balance of payments showed a surplus of nearly 2,000 million florins, about 94 per cent of imports being covered by exports. Moreover from a position of heavy indebtedness Holland had by last year become a creditor nation with E.P.U. All these factors had combined to enable the Netherlands Government to state on 27 January 1953 that they could dispense with American financial aid this year, if they could count on further loans should the economic position deteriorate. On 1 February the floods came.

Dr Drees, the Prime Minister, told the Second Chamber on 10 February that 1,395 people were known to have lost their lives in the floods; but the final figure is expected to be higher. Nearly 70,000 had then been evacuated, but on 13 February most of those left on the island of Schouwen-Duiveland were ordered to leave within three days. At one time some 330,000 acres of agricultural land, or about 6 per cent of the total cultivable area of the Netherlands, was under water, including parts of the mainland of South Holland and North Brabant as well as the islands. There were serious losses of stock—about 25,000 cattle, 20,000 pigs, 2,500 horses, and 100,000 poultry—mainly in Schouwen-Duiveland and Goeree-Overflakkee. The cost of the damage has been provisionally estimated at £100 million.

As the Zuyder Zee was formed in the thirteenth century after violent storms that tore away and submerged most of West Friesland, which until then had been attached to North Holland, so now there has again been a storm which may completely alter the line of that part of the coast. For these destructive floods have aroused in the Dutch a desire to embark on a long-term plan to stop the ravages of the North Sea—a plan which has been on paper for many years, but which has never been put into action because of the enormous expense and labour entailed. It has not yet been decided whether this plan, which involves running a dyke from the Hook of Holland to Walcheren and closing up most of the channels between the South Holland and Zeeland islands, may not be the wisest course, and in the long run possibly also the cheapest. More land would also be gained for agriculture.

Facing the North Sea all these islands have sand dunes, similar to those along the sea coast of North Holland. (On the landward side of the islands are sea walls along what were once gently sloping coasts). The blustering winds and tremendous tides of the North Sea bank up the sand on the dunes, rendering them even more solid and stronger, and they form the best protection from the sea. The Royal Air Force had no easy task when they blasted a gap in the sand dunes at West Kapelle, the most exposed part of Walcheren, in 1944. (This was done to open up the Scheldt estuary, as no ships could pass to Antwerp while Walcheren was in German hands.) An artificial foundation dyke would benefit by the help of nature which would push up the sand and form new dunes. Even where it is sheltered by the islands, there are also dunes on the mainland coast, but these are not so impressive as those in direct contact with the North Sea, while in places they disappear altogether. If the proposed scheme were attempted, only the Nieuwe Waterweg approaching Rotterdam and the West Scheldt leading to Antwerp would remain open. The rest of the coast would simply be a continuation of the sand dunes (as they exist on the coast of North Holland) all the way to Flushing. The islands would become part of the mainland.

In Walcheren the 1953 floods were less serious than those caused by the R.A.F. bombing on the defences of Walcheren in 1944, for the town of Middelburg stands above sea level, and the burst dyke at Rammekens was quickly repaired. Nor does the Rammekens side of the island receive the full force of the North Sea, as at West Kapelle. Walcheren's history reveals the long

struggle between the Dutch and the sea. From the earliest days shepherds always fled to the dunes with their sheep in times of flood. The island existed in Roman days and Roman coins of the first three centuries of the Christian era have been found in the dunes. British sailors used to worship at the temple of the goddess Nehalennia at Domburg before crossing the wild North Sea to Britain. The remains of this pagan temple are still to be seen at low tide about 500 yards out to sea. In the third century A.D. came violent storms and floods, followed by the invasions of the barbarians. Nothing is known of Walcheren for three or four centuries; but it is thought to have been flooded and uninhabited. By the eighth century it had dried up, and Carolingian coins have been found in the dunes. Subsequently the island grew and flourished, to become the granary of Holland in the medieval period. It was only about three-quarters of its present size, for nearly a quarter of the island on the landward side is formed of polders reclaimed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some fishing villages of mediaeval days are now landlocked with no channel to the sea. But the sand dunes on the North Sea coast of the island have kept this side of the island to its old shape, although the dunes are gradually pushed back by the force of the gales. Houses built in the last century to landward of the dunes near West Kapelle are now partly encased by the dunes and have no back windows. The movement is steady and continuous.

After the Allies flooded Walcheren in 1944 each tide rushed in and out through the breaches, scouring the island and destroying roads, ditches, and landmarks. When the sea defences were rebuilt the land had to be re-surveyed, divided, and reallotted. This may be the fate of Schouwen-Duiveland and most of the Zeeland islands after the recent floods. Again, if the example of Walcheren is to be followed, after the land has dried out it will be covered with soil plaster (gypsum) to make it friable and ploughable. Rape will be sown and mostly ploughed into the soil to provide humus. In the second year there may be potatoes to be followed by cereals. It is unlikely that the regions flooded by sea water for any length of time can be brought into production for three years or more, while much capital and labour will be needed. But the remainder of the flooded land—and, fortunately, the greater part of it, where the dykes could be speedily repaired—should grow the usual spring crops, although the autumn sowings have been ruined.

It will be asked whether the recent disaster will fatally impede

the Netherlands' economic recovery. It was noticeable that immediately after the floods the Amsterdam Bourse remained firm, which was attributed by some people to a fear of inflation after the catastrophe. Certainly the money spent by the Government to help the victims will cause some inflation just at a time when the Netherlands is receiving no further aid from the Mutual Security Agency. But even if the florin should have a smaller purchasing power inside the country, that is not likely to affect its foreign parity; for the Netherlands still have their capacity to produce and to export. Industrial activity remains the same—apart from the breaking of communications, which will be very costly to renew. Swift repairs to damaged dykes saved the towns of Rotterdam and Dordrecht. Only agricultural land has been affected by the floods, and the struggle with the North Sea has always brought to light all the best qualities of this stalwart seafaring nation.

M.T.

Greece Under Papagos

THE RISE OF THE GREEK RALLY

AFTER seven years of political instability, Greeks last November elected a Government with a majority which was unprecedented since the Venizelist landslide of 1928. Field-Marshal Papagos's year-old Greek Rally won 249 seats in a Chamber of 300. The extent of this success surprised even his most optimistic supporters. Apart from Papagos's leadership the Rally did not present anything new in the way of a political group; most of its members, among the more important Markezinis, Kanellopoulos, and Stephanopoulos, had already been dismissed as failures by the greater part of Greek public opinion. In the previous Parliament its performance as a powerful Opposition had, on the whole, been carping and unconstructive. Moreover, a well-organized anti-Papagist campaign had had plenty of time to take root. The ineffectiveness of this campaign was apparent both in the increase of the Papagists' strength (they obtained 158,000 more votes than in the 1951 Election), and in the fact that the more vulnerable personality of the Rally's chief organizer, Mr Markezinis, re-

placed Papagos as the main target for attack. The following ta shows the 1952 Election results, as compared with those of 19

ELECTION RESULTS

Parties or Groups	NOVEMBER 1952‡ (Majority system; 99 constituencies) Votes	Seats	SEPTEMBER 1951 (Reinforced Pro portional systen 41 constituencie Votes	Seat
Greek Rally (Papagos)	783,129	239	624,316	114
Democratic Socialists (Papandreou)*†			35,910	—
Union of E.P.E K. (Plastiras*) and Liberals (S. Venizelos)*	586,237	61	401,379	74
			325,390	57
Populists (Tsaldaris)*			113,876	2
E.L.D. (Svolos)*			3,912	—
E.D.A. (Passalides)§	179,651	—	180,640	10
Independents	36,925	—	7,649	—
Farmers and Workers (Baltazis)‖			21,009	1

‡ Non-participation in 1952 of Armed Forces reduced total poll by ab 180,000 votes

* Ran as separate parties in 1951.

† Co-operated in 1952 with Rally, but retained own party's identity.

§ In 1952 represented in sixty constituencies only.

‖ In 1952 ran with the Independents' group.

NOTE. The figures for the votes vary slightly according to different offi sources, and cannot be taken as completely accurate.

The Rally is a one-man party in that it has come to office mai on the strength of its leader's prestige. Many Greeks, includi those who voted against the Rally in 1951, felt this time that th was no alternative to Papagos. The Election, which was the thi in three years, and the use, for the first time since the war, of t majority system were partly the result of influence from t United States Embassy. For many months the Americans h been growing increasingly apprehensive at the extent to whi Plastiras's E.P.E.K.-Liberal Coalition was forced to make conc sions to the Deputies of the extreme Left party, E.D.A., in or to maintain their small majority. In contrast to the 1950 Electi when, under straight Proportional Representation, eighteen part participated, the re-introduction of the majority system l November forced the politicians to combine and form three m groups. These were Field-Marshal Papagos's Greek Ral General Plastiras's E.P.E.K.-Liberal Union, and Dr John P salides's E.D.A. The Greek Rally, which assimilated all the m Right-wing elements in 1951, was reinforced by substant desertions from the Centre, led by Mr Tsouderos (a form Deputy-Leader of E.P.E.K.), and by the outside co-operation

Mr Papandreou, leader and founder of the Democratic Socialists. Neither of these two had been elected in 1951. At that time Mr Papandreou was one of Papagos's most vehement critics, and his continued support for the Greek Rally is now a matter of uncertainty. General Plastiras's E.P.E.K.-Liberal Union was joined by men as widely divergent in outlook as Mr Tsaldaris, the Populist leader, whom Papagos refused to accept, and Professor Svolos, leader of E.L.D., the Greek Socialist Party.

The majority system in Greece resembles the British method only in the small single-seat constituencies. In the large urban districts many Deputies are elected on a single ticket, and the party with the most votes wins all the seats. Thus in certain constituencies a few votes can make the difference of as many as twenty-five Deputies, which accounts for the Rally's huge majority in Parliament even though it polled only 49 per cent of the total votes. The Papagists, however, claim that the country's support for them is greater than the figures show. They argue that had the Armed Forces taken part (which were 60 per cent in the Rally's favour last time) and also the women, they would have obtained an absolute majority of the votes. Women were granted suffrage under the amended Constitution of 1951, but on the ground that their registration was incomplete their exercise of this right in the 1952 General Election was suspended by the outgoing E.P.E.K.-Liberal Government, which always suspected them of a weakness for the Field-Marshal. Women voted for the first time last January in the Salonika bye-election and a Greek Rally woman deputy was elected. Many unknown factors make it impossible to draw definite conclusions, but the results of this bye-election suggest that both the Greek Rally and E.D.A., and especially the latter, profited by the women's vote in this vital constituency, to the disadvantage of the E.P.E.K.-Liberal Union.

SALONIKA BYE-ELECTION

	JANUARY 1953 BYE-ELECTION (1 Seat)	NOVEMBER 1952 GENERAL ELECTION (16 Seats)
Parties or Groups	*Votes*	*Votes*
Greek Rally	47,232	38,577
E P.E K.—Liberals	23,946	32,997
E.D A.	43,037	23,227
Independents	26,281	—
Total	140,496	94,801

NOTE The figures for the votes vary slightly according to different official sources.

The Leftist vote, which again formed 10 per cent of the total, was particularly important in the 1952 Election. E.D.A., which replaces the proscribed Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.), is well organized; its Deputies differ from the general run of Greek professional politicians. Among them are doctors and writers, as well as officers who were with E.L.A.S., some of whom are still interned. It is, however, unlikely that these men are the real power behind the party.

Running for the first time in 1951, E.D.A. obtained ten seats under modified Proportional Representation; faced last November with a majority system, its best chances appeared to lie in co-operation with the E.P.E.K.-Liberal Union. But General Plastiras, irrespective of any possible personal reluctance to compromise himself with the near-Communists, was in no position to accept E.D.A.'s offer. The attitude of the Americans, and the fact that his opponents had constantly labelled him as a 'fellow-traveller' when in office, made this impossible. In accordance with last-minute instructions broadcast from abroad by Mr Zachariades, leader of the K.K.E., the extreme Leftists voted for E.D.A. Had their votes in Salonika, Kavalla, Athens, and Volos gone instead to the E.P.E.K.-Liberal Union the Rally could not have won these constituencies and might possibly have lost the Election. The situation was aptly presented by the newspaper cartoonist who portrayed the Greek Rally's leaders on their knees offering prayers of thanks before the image of a burly workman symbolizing E.D.A. In certain constituencies the Rally defeated E.D.A., which returned no Deputies, by only a few hundred votes.

Having failed to infiltrate by means of the 'Popular Front' tactics which proved effective in other countries, there is little doubt that the Communists preferred a Rally victory to one of the E.P.E.K.-Liberal Union, whose leader made many concessions to the Left, not only out of political expediency but also from a sincere desire to unite the country. The Rally, which the Leftists helped to bring to power, is a better target for Communist propaganda than a centre Government under Plastiras. So far, Papagos's home policy has not been sufficiently clearly defined to be identified with any political label; nevertheless his group is, by origin and by the past activities of its leading members, reactionary in character. Moreover, on a long-term basis, if the Rally fails to fulfil the high expectations of the people Communist strength is likely to increase, especially if there is no revival of the centre parties.

The fact that E.D.A. did not poll still more votes in Piraeus than it did can be attributed chiefly to the personal popularity of General Plastiras with the Asia Minor refugees who inhabit large areas of sprawling slums. Failing health makes it unlikely that General Plastiras will continue to play an active role in politics. Some liberals are confident that there will be a revival of the Centre, mainly for the reason that a vast sector of Greek opinion is too deeply inured in the traditions of Eleftherios Venizelos to transfer its allegiance permanently to any other political force. In the meantime, although the prospects of stability have improved owing to the new Government's numerical strength, Parliament suffers from the poor quality of the Opposition, led by Mr Sophocles Venizelos. For many of the Liberal and E.P.E.K. Deputies who failed to be elected last time were not only the best men in these parties, but some of the most capable politicians in Greece. They included Mavros, Kartalis, Kassimatis, and Tsatsos.

PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The first three months of the new Government's life have been marked by intensive activity in foreign affairs. The steady progress made by Greece over the past year in improving her relations with former enemies is in contrast to the decline of goodwill, especially noticeable in the press, towards her traditional ally, Great Britain, and towards the United States. Field-Marshal Papagos has shown that he intends to go ahead with his predecessor's efforts to bring about closer co-operation between Greece and her non-Communist neighbours. He believes that Greece and Turkey, given sufficient equipment by the Western Allies, can in time by their joint efforts overcome the difficulty of defending Thrace. He also considers that the establishment of airfields and military installations in this region would extend the striking power of the Balkan bridgehead to the limit of the Danube basin, thus constituting a threat to the flank of any army which attempted to advance on the West through Eastern Europe. Despite the bickerings of the Greek and Turkish press over Cyprus, and the arrests of Greek fishermen from time to time off Asia Minor shores, the prospects for Greco-Turkish co-operation have never been more encouraging. The welcome given by the Greek people to the Turkish President during his recent State visit to Greece was almost unprecedented for its great warmth and spontaneity.

Whether the tripartite talks just held in Athens (February 18–22) between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia will develop into more than a formal pact remains to be seen. Even the present exchange of military and diplomatic views between Athens and Belgrade is a considerable advance on the situation in 1941, when, in the opinion of Field-Marshal Papagos, the lack of co-ordination with Yugoslavia added to the confusion of Allied military operations in the Balkan sphere.[1] Any co-operation which these countries can achieve in the interests of mutual defence against Cominform aggression is likely to increase their bargaining powers in negotiating with the United States for further military assistance.

On the diplomatic level progress has also been made in Greco-Italian relations, although Signor De Gasperi's visit in January did not, according to Greek accounts, evoke a warm response from the public. The Right-wing *Kathimerini* implied that the occasion might be a useful opportunity to discuss compensation for Greeks whose property was destroyed by the Italians during the war. *Elleniki Imera*, a Centre-Left paper, stated that Signor De Gasperi was very welcome, but that he should not be surprised if the hearts of the Greeks were absent from the festivities. This, the writer added, was not an indication of any hostility—it simply meant that 'the hearts of Greeks still bleed for the crimes and atrocities committed by Signor De Gasperi's countrymen'.

DIFFICULTIES AT HOME

Most post-war Greek Governments have been in agreement over foreign policy. The true test of the Greek Rally's ability will be its management of home affairs. The new Government started its career with a dramatic flourish. Within three days the editors and publishers of the entire Athenian press were summoned by the Public Prosecutor, who warned them that they should keep their journalistic activities within the law. Apart from the fact that two of the most brilliant cartoonists work for anti-Papagist papers, it is doubtful whether any one political party suffers more than another from the libel and rumours which circulate in the daily press. For some time the low state of journalistic standards has been causing concern in responsible Greek and foreign circles. Many newspapers today are undermining public confidence at home, and at the same time fostering xenophobia by vicious

[1] *The Battle of Greece* 1940–1 (Chapter VI), by Alexander Papagos (1949, Athens, J. M. Scazikis).

nd frequently ill-founded attacks against friendly Powers.
Immediately after the Rally came to power Papagos took over
ie Ministry of Defence for two weeks and drastic changes were
ıade in the Armed Forces. The resignations of several high-
ınking officers, including Generals Tsakalotos and Grigoro-
oulos, were accepted; and General Kitrilakis, one of the most
ble Greek Staff officers, was recalled from retirement and
ppointed Chief of the National Defence Staff. This upheaval in
ıe defence and security services shook the confidence of many
reeks and was not well received in Allied circles, which feared a
isorganization in the upper ranks of N.A.T.O.'s eastern flank.
ut since a number of the dismissals affected officers who had in-
ulged in anti-Papagist activity, it was argued in some quarters
ıat the changes were a necessary precaution which any demo-
ratically-elected Government was entitled to take.

Field-Marshal Papagos has pledged his Government to wide
ational economies, an honest administration, decentralization
nd the revival of provincial life, the improvement of agricultural
onditions, and full employment. He has delegated wide powers in
ıe economic and political field to the forty-three-year-old Mr.
Iarkezinis who, as Minister of Co-ordination, holds the most
nportant post in the Government with direct control over four
Iinistries. Markezinis is primarily responsible for the organiza-
on of the Rally and the campaign which finally brought Papagos
office; and his associates predominate in the present Cabinet.
Ie shares with American experts the conviction that unless there
a complete overhaul of the administration Greece's economy can
ever be put on a sound footing and all aid must inevitably fall far
ıort of its target.

Administrative reform is among the first of the Rally's objectives.
start has been made in the amalgamation of the two largest com-
ıercial banks, the Bank of Athens and the National Bank of
reece. This action, which met with strong resistance from many
f the shareholders and the employees, is a first step towards
educing the excessively high rates of interest, which have con-
stently frustrated local enterprise. Immediately on coming to
ffice the Government imposed a ban on the enrolment of new
nployees in the Civil Service, and working hours were extended
include afternoons. This led to complaints, because owing to
w salaries many civil servants have to do two jobs, and the
ıange of hours made this difficult. Markezinis is in agreement

with the economist Professor Varvaressos, who in his report to th Greek Government a year ago recommended that the civ service should be drastically reduced in size, and that savings thu effected should be used to raise the salaries of established staff.

At present Government offices are swollen by inefficient an redundant employees, many of them friends of the numerou politicians who have held office at some time or other during th twenty-six changes of government that have taken place betwee the liberation and the Greek Rally's rise to power last yea Papagos believes that because he has no party interests to serve h can, given time, eradicate the deep-seated and corrupting practic known as *rouspheti*. This is the system in which the politicians i power, and others in key positions, pay their supporters by givin them jobs or special privileges. Papagos, who insists that merit wi in future determine employment and promotion, managed to en favouritism in the Army when he took over the Command in 194 but the task in political life is likely to prove still harder.

Equally vital to the nation's progress are the measures fc decentralization which the Greek Rally supports, and which th American Mission has repeatedly urged, but only with limite success. It is a disturbing factor that the commune should hav functioned in many parts of Greece more effectively under th Turkish occupation than under the modern Greek State. A American adviser reports[1] that since the beginning of the centu demes and communes have been 'systematically deprived of the powers, revenues, and functions to the point that the centr Government absorbs 95 per cent of the total governmental revenu and local councils are without any semblance of autonomy an self-government'.

It will be the difficult task of the Papagos Government, as it wa of its predecessor, to try and check the flow of population from th provinces to Athens, and to induce the people who normall belong to the country to return there. War and rebellion are onl partly responsible for the excessive over-population of Athen where destitute villagers lead semi-parasitic lives and are a con stant prey to Communist influence. The concentration in th capital of authority and opportunity by successive Government who were indifferent to the needs of the provinces, are also largel

[1] Dr H. Alderfer, Local Government Specialist, in a paper given to E.C. Mission to Greece, 'Greece and the West Today', April 1951. See also *Repo on Greek Local Government*, (M.S.A., Greece, August 1952) and *Facts of Gre Local Government*, (E.C.A., Athens, December, 1950).

to blame. A possible remedy for this major ill lies in the provision of work, better houses, and improved communications in the villages and country towns. The availability of cheap electric power in the provinces, when four major hydro-electric schemes scheduled to start at the end of 1953 and early in 1954 are completed, is expected to encourage local industries. Legislation, which in Greece covers almost every contingency but which is seldom effective, already exists to prevent the opening of new factories in Athens and Piraeus. Nevertheless, flagrant errors still persist, such as the use of American aid for the construction, in the heart of the metropolitan area, of a new agricultural college.

But since approximately 65 per cent of Greeks live from farming fuller development of agriculture is also essential, especially in view of the pressure of a rapidly rising population. Although only 25 per cent of the land is arable Greek agricultural resources are far from fully exploited. Many difficulties and unnecessary waste arise from antiquated methods and from the breaking-up of the land into uneconomic units. As the Greek rural population has increased family holdings have grown smaller, and in many districts are insufficient to provide a living. Erosion presents a major problem. Where the peasants have been persuaded, as in parts of Macedonia, to pool their land and adopt contour ploughing, yields, according to the Agricultural Division of the American Mission, have increased by amounts varying from 30 to 80 per cent. Under Marshall aid 82,000 acres of waste and swamp land have been reclaimed, and American advisers estimate that about 650,000 acres could be added to the total cultivable area of 8 million. By 1952 the spectacular rice-growing experiment at Lamia had already given Greece a surplus for export of this crop, which before the war she had to import from abroad for home consumption. But with the change in emphasis since the Korean war from economic to military assistance many projects which were originally planned under American aid have had to be slowed down or abandoned. Further development will from now on largely depend on the ability of the Government to create conditions favourable to the investment of Greek and foreign capital from private sources. Many changes will be needed in the present labour laws, which are a severe deterrent to foreign enterprise.

A serious blow was dealt by the previous Government to Greek agriculture and to the prospects of attracting foreign capital, when

under a land reform Bill it ordered last August the expropriation of the British-owned Lake Copais Company. With the exception of the Church lands most of the large estates were broken up years ago, and the drafting of the law so that it applied to the Copais was chiefly prompted by political motives rather than by a desire for agricultural progress. The British Lake Copais Company took over in 1887 from a French firm which went bankrupt. The estate, which has the highest yield per acre in Greece, has brought great benefits to the country's economy. Three-quarters of its total area of about 53,000 acres is cultivated on a co-operative basis by tenants, mostly local peasants. Profits from the highly productive direct cultivation by the Company of the remaining acres of poorer land, which the tenants declined to take up twenty years ago, help to offset engineering and administrative costs.

The successful cultivation of the Copais depends on central control, planned agriculture, and the efficient operation and maintenance of a complex network of irrigation canals. In consequence it is impracticable, as the Greek State proposes, to divide the area up into thousands of small plots under private ownership. Many problems arise over future management, and it is feared that when the British leave the Copais may revert to its former state of unhealthy swamp. In 1935–8 flood protection works were carried out by a British company[1] on behalf of the Greek Government. Their permanent maintenance became the responsibility of the State, with the result that today one of the three flood basins is out of use, and the lowest basin is seriously overtaxed in time of flood, with imminent danger to large tracts of land. The Papagos Government has shown no sign of revoking its predecessor's decision, and however desirable this might be in the interests of the Greek economy, such action in a country where many peasants are desperately short of, or altogether without, land would be rapidly exploited by a small but vocal minority.

The Greek Rally has better prospects than previous Governments of being able to carry out a strong policy. Field-Marshal Papagos is helped in his task by the fact that he enjoys the confidence of the Western Powers, and as a man who leads a simple life he can demand austerity with all the authority of personal example. Nevertheless, the difficulties ahead should not be underestimated. Papagos faces the dilemma of how to enforce measures

[1] Messrs Henry Boot & Son—works on the Upper Kephissos river, Beotia.

which will be resisted by many of his most influential supporters, without losing his huge Parliamentary majority. But if the Rally can convince the public that it is able to stay in power for the full four-year term, Greeks may at last be able to devote their attention to the burning problems of economic and social reform.

N. C.

Forced Labour in the Satellite States

AMONG the clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights which was signed on 4 November 1950 by the representatives of fifteen Governments,[1] there is one which can be considered as a definition of forced labour. It is an attempt to distinguish between, on the one hand, the corrective labour of prisoners and the civilian or military *corvées* which all States demand of their citizens and, on the other, the system which, under the same name, permits totalitarian States to use slavery as a political and economic means of furthering their ideological aims. This clause, Article 4 of the Convention, states that:

1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article, the term 'forced or compulsory labour' shall not include:
   (*a*) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such detention;
   (*b*) any service of military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognized, service instead of compulsory military service;
   (*c*) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community;
   (*d*) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.

This was the first time that forced labour had been included among the official provisions of a convention. It is to the credit of the Council of Europe that it has here gone further than the United

[1] Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal German Republic, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Saar, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Nations, whose only achievement in this respect was a Declaratio of Human Rights, issued in Paris on 10 December 1948, whic with the draft convention which embodies it still awaits the approv of the United Nations Assembly. Moreover, compared wit Article 4 of the European Convention, Article 4 of the U.N Declaration seems limited and evasive, merely stating that 'no on shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trad shall be prohibited in all their forms'.

The reluctance of the United Nations to deal with the whol problem of forced labour in its first years is no doubt largely du to the opposition of the Soviet Union and its *bloc*. It is, indeec difficult to see why it should be expected that the Communis Governments should ever agree to an international regulation c so important and mysterious a feature of their regimes. As long ag as 8 March 1931, Mr Molotov, then Chairman of the Council c People's Commissars, said in a speech to the All-Union Congres of Soviets in Moscow: 'We have never attempted to conceal tha in certain operations we use the labour of prisoners who ar healthy and capable of work. We have done this in the past, w are doing it now, and we shall do it in the future.' After the openin of the Volga-Don Canal on 27 July 1952, high rewards were give to chief officials of the M.V.D., the Soviet Ministry of Interna Affairs which supervises G.U.L.A.G. (the Main Administratio of Corrective Labour Camps, Labour Settlements, and Places o Detention), thus revealing the part played by forced labour in th latest achievement of public works in Soviet Russia. Between 193 and 1952 the importance of forced labour in the structure of th Soviet regime has continually increased. It undoubtedly has definite pattern and a key function in the Soviet society. Th pattern and this function have appeared more clearly since 194 by reason of their reproduction in a lesser degree in all the satellit countries. Under such conditions, to agree to international regula tion, and moreover to control, would be folly; to deny the existenc of such conditions would be impossible.

THE SOVIET PATTERN

Some of the principal legal texts dealing with forced labour i Soviet Russia go back twenty years or more. These are: the 'Basi Principles of Criminal Legislation', passed in 1924 and revise in 1929; the 1930 statute on corrective labour camps; the 193 Corrective Labour Code which regulates all other types of force

bour; a 1930 law which provides for deportation, exile, and forced bour; and the various regulations passed at the beginning of the ar and still in force, such as, for instance, those concerning the abour education colonies' for youths of between eleven and xteen years of age.

Any attempt to find a definition of the purposes of forced labour such texts is made difficult because there is a constant confusion etween the three officially recognized objects—the educational, e economic, and the political. The following quotation from the oviet *Encyclopaedia* (volume 29, page 601) is symptomatic of this coherence, both in its attempt to link together the three main urposes and in the obscurity of its wording: 'The view is incorrect hich regards corrective labour establishments as purely educa- onal or even as purely economic establishments and glosses over e elements of compulsion in (their) work . . . and in this way ips into a denial of the class question in the carrying out of orrective labour policy.' This point is again stressed further on: n corrective labour establishments, a strict class policy is carried it and class hostile elements are not permitted to enjoy the ivileges laid down for those persons deprived of freedom and ndergoing corrective labour who are of working class origin.' his means that while, from the point of view of the State, the stitution of forced labour can serve for economic purposes as ell as for political and social repression, from the point of view the forced labourers themselves a distinction must constantly be orne in mind between those coming from different social back- ounds.

It is difficult to make any estimate of the total numbers employed forced labour because the means of recruiting are so varied and e force as a whole contains permanent (penal) as well as tempor- y (for re-education) categories. Experts working from various gles produce enormous discrepancies in their final figures, which nge from 3½ to 13½ million. The Russian Research Centre of arvard University suggests a figure of 10 million[1] for those nually engaged in the Soviet Union either in camps, colonies, nishment, exile, and deportation or even in forced labour without nfinement. The State uses their work in any of the following ays: through contracts between the State co-operative and public terprises and the corrective labour institutions; through pro- ssional and re-educational institutions; through mass work

[1] See *Forced Labour in the Soviet Union*, (U.S. State Department, 1952).

organized also by contract; in colonies for mass work; or in prisons and mines.

The economic importance of forced labour to Russia was exposed clearly for Western research in the 1941 Economic Plan, the text of which only recently became available in the West, and which gives information on the 'extent of production activities of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs'.[1] Under that Plan forced labour was asked to provide more than 14 per cent of the capital construction, 12 per cent of the production of industrial timber and firewood, 22·5 per cent of railway sleepers, and 40·5 per cent of chrome ore. Moreover this general evaluation did not take into account the part played by forced labour in the programme for canals, irrigation, and hydro-electric schemes at that time in progress.

The administration of forced labour is supervised by G.U.L.A.G. which in turn is supervised by the M.V.D. From one point of view, G.U.L.A.G. and the other departments are simply contractors; but G.U.L.A.G. nevertheless imposes its own quota of recruitment upon the Departments of Justice, Instruction, Agriculture, Labour, and the Army, which are supposed to furnish yearly contingents of forced labourers.

Conditions vary in the Soviet camps according to the category of prisoners and to the camps themselves. The usual form of lodging is a standard type of barracks, 36 metres in length, 5 metres wide, and 2 to 2·5 metres in height. They are made of wood, with an earthen floor, and are divided into two rows of sleeping shelves. They accommodate from two hundred to a thousand people. Food averages 1,292 calories a day. Clothing is provided only when the prisoners have worn out their own, and generally consists of old garments which do not correspond either to the work or to the climatic conditions of the Northern regions where many of the camps are situated. The legal duration of work is eight hours a day, but from the evidence collected it appears that the minimum is usually ten hours. Conditions are hard in themselves and are made more so by the imposition of the system of norms-production. By law, forced labourers should receive wages, but these are retained by the administration to defray the cost of the prisoners' upkeep and only a few specialists, with preferential treatment, receive any payment after all the deductions have been made.

[1] *ibid.*, pp. 23 ff.

THE SOVIET PATTERN IN EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Government deliberately imposed their own pattern of forced labour upon all the countries of Eastern Europe under their domination. It is possible that they made a particular point of imposing this feature of their own regime (more necessary in Russia than, for instance, in far more highly industrialized Czechoslovakia) in order to present it as an indispensable feature of Communism in any genuinely Communist country. The U.N. international inquiry into forced labour in Russia began in 1947, when there was as yet little organized forced labour in the satellite countries.

The 'Gleichschaltung' decided upon in 1949 did not take long. By 1952 all the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe showed the same general features. The required intensification could thus be easily produced. Reliable sources estimate the total number of forced labourers, which up to 1949 could be numbered in tens of thousands for the whole area, as almost one million by 1952. With the intensive recruitment now in force, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that next year the figure may be doubled.

Moreover, it is important to notice that in this general process a permanent legal and social mould has now been imposed upon all these peoples. Instead of the haphazard and violent operations of arrests, deportations, and forced conscription, a permanent, smoothly-running system of administrative discrimination will year by year produce the necessary contingents. The terms used to describe citizens in the two most recent Constitutions, those of Poland and Rumania—'men of the work' or 'men in the field of the work'—suggest that a permanent class of people, not 'in the field of the work', in other words pariahs, is being kept in being, and that forced labour is the effective means for isolating them socially from the rest of the community.

CATEGORIES OF FORCED LABOURERS

Those engaged in forced labour activities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can be divided into three large categories: the permanent or penal inmates; the social or reformatory recruits; and the seasonal or contractual workers.

Both judicial and administrative prisoners have to be included in the first category. The arbitrariness and confusion which reigns in these countries in the sphere of arrest, detention, and loss of freedom in general makes it difficult to distinguish between the

different legal pretexts under which individuals are drawn into the common pool of prisons and camps. The status of the prisoners is completely fluctuating, regardless of the original reasons for their arrest. Those with a penal sentence can be released from prison in order to do reformatory work and on gaining a certificate for good work can also leave the camp. On the other hand, suspects called for interrogation can, without any trial, be sent to prison or to a camp, and their families may never know what has become of them. There are three main channels through which the penal battalions are kept up to strength. The largest category, and the one common to all the countries, is that of political prisoners. Secondly, there are the unreliable social elements, whether individuals, as, for instance, the 'idlers' in Bulgaria or the 'vagrants and beggars' in Rumania, or whole groups of deportees, as in Hungary since May 1951 or in Rumania since February 1952, made up of the population of entire towns or villages. The third category is that of economic saboteurs who are either sentenced by special Commissions, as in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, or left to the discretion of the Militia without any semblance of a trial. These saboteurs include workers who cannot fulfil the ever-rising norms of production, or farmers who cannot deliver at the time of harvest the compulsory quotas fixed by the Governments in periodic decrees which state the penalty for failure. The hundreds of thousands of 'kulaks' also fall automatically into this 'economic' category.

The second group of forced labourers, tentatively described here as recruits, is made up of the yearly contingents of young people who are of the age to do their military service or begin a professional training. In each country now an alternative form of compulsory service has been organized for all those who for social or hereditary reasons are considered unworthy of the honour of becoming soldiers of the Republic and are therefore relegated to work-battalions, differently named in each People's Democracy, but with an identical structure. In the same way, qualification schools or national services for young apprentices, students, and children in their 'teens provide, for instance, in Rumania, yearly contingents of 45,000 to 55,000 young people for service of at least two years. Those rejected either from the Army or from industry find themselves working in labour camps, from whence they either emerge as reformed citizens or else remain for indefinite periods as political, economic, or social offenders.

The third category of labourers is formed of contingents of *kolkhozniks*, workers, students, or even soldiers who are lent by their respective departments for certain seasonal work on the sites of labour camps. It also includes individual applicants who prefer to enrol rather than remain for ever unemployed, and free workers who are necessary at some particular stage of the work, as will be seen below.

CAMPS AND CONDITIONS

According to the evidence given before the U.N. *ad hoc* Committee on forced labour last November, there are now 175 camps in Poland, with more than 180,000 inmates; in Bulgaria, 54 camps with 80,000; in Rumania, 45 camps, with at least 175,000; in Hungary 42, with 150,000; and in Czechoslovakia 371, with 195,000. The difference in the number of camps in the various countries is due to the fact that in some of them, for instance in Hungary and Rumania, many small camps are centralized in a major public enterprise, while in Czechoslovakia and Poland small camps are dispersed around the pits and mines. In Czechoslovakia the most important labour camps are all located in the uranium ore triangle Jachymov-Karlovy Vary-Marianske Lasse; nearly half the prisoners work in uranium mines. In Poland the camps are mostly concentrated in the Silesian coal basin. In Rumania they are on the Black Sea-Danube Canal. In Bulgaria most of the camps are situated around the coal mines of Dimitrovo, and more than one-third of the total number of prisoners is employed by that industry. In Hungary the camps are grouped near the iron foundries at Dunapentele and the canal and irrigation works near Debrecen.

Conditions for the prisoners are tragically uniform in all the countries. Information gathered from the thousands of interviews and reports collected from the countries concerned suggest something like the following description of a prisoner's life. The camp consists of wooden barracks, heavily guarded, with searchlights, barbed wire, and police dogs. The prisoners are awakened at .30–5 a.m. for roll call and breakfast—a cup of coloured hot water and a slice of bread. They are then marched to the site of their work, which may be as much as five miles away. Work lasts from a.m. to 7 p.m., with a half-hour break for a meal, which always consists of potato or bean soup and a dish of vegetables. Meat is occasionally given on Fridays, which are fast days. Food can never

amount to more than 1,500 calories and is often very much lower. Outdoor work consists of digging, carrying stones or earth, and clearing timber. Spades are the only tools. At the end of the day the norms are checked, and those who have failed to fulfil them are deprived of food. Men go barefoot and their heads are shaved. Striped uniforms are sometimes provided; otherwise the prisoners wear their own rags. Hygiene and medical care are for the most part non-existent. Tuberculosis, ulcers, and venereal and blood diseases are rampant. In the evening there is a programme of political re-education which lasts for two hours.

Conditions are known to be particularly severe in many of the camps. There are, for instance, the military punishment camps (*Disciplinarno Yadro*) in Bulgaria, such as Krushare and Kozluduiare, notorious for their high rate of violent deaths; the fifty-three special forced labour camps for priests and nuns in Czechoslovakia; the Woccieszow and Knurow camps in Poland, where norms are especially high, as well as the special camps for women; the Isaszeg and Sajobabony camps in Hungary, overcrowded and with a high death-rate; the Poarta Alba and Tasaul camps in Rumania, the worst of those in the Black Sea-Danube Canal area. There are also in some of these countries several camps on the Soviet frontier (Uzhorod in Hungary, Ungheni in Rumania, Ciernati u Copu in Czechoslovakia) where, it is said, people are sent before being forwarded to Lwow, the collection centre for deportees to Russia.

THE ECONOMIC PROPOSITION

Assuming that for the most part the work done by prisoners is confined to digging, whether in mines or in canal-building, does the saving in machinery and capital equipment compensate for the slowness of the work, the outlay on each prisoner, and the administrative cost of guards and buildings? This is the economic equation which must be solved in order to discover whether forced labour is economically beneficial, as well as politically necessary, to these countries.

In attempting to answer this question various factors must be taken into account, such as the state of industrial backwardness of each country, its manpower, and the urgency of its need for basic irrigation, electrification, or any other kind of public works. The answer for the Soviet Union would be an affirmative one (especially in 1929, when forced labour began to assume its present huge pro-

ortions); but it would probably be in the negative in the case, for nstance, of Czechoslovakia, where the cost of capital equipment s so much lower and the available number of skilled workers much igher, and where industrialization was undertaken long before the Communists seized power.

The difference in size and in general productivity between a mall Eastern European country in, say, 1946 and Soviet Russia in, ay, 1929, when the economic pattern of Stalinism was established, nust constantly be borne in mind when dealing with problems of conomic 'Gleichschaltung'. Forced labour, which for the Russia f the 'thirties could combine in an economic equation the need for ublic works with the absence of technical means and of an ducated and skilled working class, cannot be justified, even from his amoral point of view, in the more harmoniously integrated conomies of the Eastern European countries which were already vell on the way towards industrialization before 1946. The pernanent drainage of manpower resources towards forced labour in ll these small Eastern European countries, in need of further ndustrialization, cannot operate to their advantage.

However, in the relation between a dominating great Power and dominated small country it is the former's interests which preail. And Soviet Russia has definite interests in establishing forced abour as an institution in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, or Poland, no natter what the views of these countries may be. Historically, too, t should be recalled that the intensification of forced labour actiities coincided with the stronger hand taken by Russia in the dministration of the whole region. It was in 1949—immediately fter the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance —that major operations based on forced labour were launched in ll these countries and that systematically intensive recruitment tarted.

From the administrative point of view, it seems that all these ctivities are organized in a similar way in each country, with a egional interlocking. The Departments of the Interior, Justice, Army, Labour, and Agriculture are obliged to produce a yearly quota of forced labourers. The sum total is put at the disposal of a general directorate, sometimes autonomous, sometimes dependent upon the Ministries of Interior and of Security. This Directorate of Manpower Reserves distributes the prisoners among the proects planned for the current year, and switches them from project o project whenever the first stage of the work is finished and

technical equipment, machines, and skilled workers are needed to complete the job. All these national directorates seem to depend upon a Central Office of Labour, which since the end of 1949 has been in Prague.

For economic reasons Russia is bound to concentrate upon what can be generally defined as regional incorporation into her own orbit and, in the present phase, on the military preparations of the *bloc*. The first general economic plans of these countries (which were all, with the exception of that of Rumania, drafted before the Council for Economic Assistance took the regional organization in hand) have been suspended and their whole effort directed towards defence plans, imposed by the Soviet High Command upon the satellite Governments. Here, as well as in their general trade relations, the partnership of the Eastern European countries with the U.S.S.R. is heavily one-sided, for Russia sells armaments at exorbitant prices, while the satellites have to provide her with the necessary raw materials at production cost. In the same way, the building of the navigable canals as a network over the whole region, at this time and in such haste, confirms the view that the reason for doing this is to be sought in the strategic requirements of the Soviet High Command.

The uranium mines in Czechoslovakia and the coal mines in Poland and Bulgaria are being exploited by the economic representatives of the Soviet Army; and the building of the gigantic iron foundries at Dunapentele in Hungary, with the intensive use of forced labour, comes under the rearmament sacrifices recently mentioned by Rakosi. Forced labour enormously reduces the cost of production of such undertakings. The working of the uranium mines does not appear in the Czechoslovak Budget, but is hidden under some obscure point of defence. The construction of the Black Sea-Danube Canal was not included in the first One-Year Plan of Rumania announced in January 1949, but was launched immediately afterwards in March 1949 as the 'greatest economic operation' undertaken 'on the initiative of the Council for Mutual Assistance'. Definite figures of expenditure on it do not appear in the Five-Year Plan, published two years ago, although it will not be finished until the last year of the Plan. Expenses incurred on behalf of Russia are included in the various accounts for regional defence, which are obviously secret.

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that forced labour is dedicated in all the Eastern European countries to certain public

regional projects, primarily military, and profitable not so much to the national economies of the satellite countries as to the Power which is organizing the whole region and so seeks to profit by the cheapest possible means of production.

FIRST REACTIONS

The third session of the *ad hoc* Committee, set up by the United Nations and the International Labour Organization to deal with the question of forced labour in Eastern Europe, ended on 22 November 1952. A preliminary report was adopted and a letter addressed to various Governments, among them those of Soviet Russia and the satellites, for comment on 'allegations made against them'. An informal document listing allegations as to laws and regulations, administrative practices, and the existence of forced labour camps and conditions therein was attached.

This is the second time that the Committee, which was established in March 1951 by a vote of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, has tried to induce the Communist Governments to reply to the accusations brought against them. On 27 October 1951 a questionnaire was submitted to every Government, regardless of whether it was a member of the United Nations or of the International Labour Office, inquiring into the existence of forced labour or of laws providing for coerced labour in any of the countries. Thirty-five Governments answered, but no reply was received from Russia or from her satellites, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, who refused to supply the information.

Nevertheless, public opinion is gradually awakening; and perhaps the most important development in the campaign against this particular aspect of Soviet policy is the reunion of those forces which in the early 'thirties fought on the common platform of human dignity. These forces are the workers and the intellectuals. During the preliminary debates, both of the United Nations and of Unesco, it was clear that there was a difference in interpretation of Human Rights as to whether the mainspring of freedom is political or economic. The Communists and their adherents championed the latter point of view. But the issue of forced labour reveals that the present Communist practice destroys human rights in both senses. Politically, it is as severe a means of repression as were the Nazi camps. Economically, it represents the end of any defence against the employer. It is therefore not surprising that the principal organizations which denounced slave labour at the

United Nations were either organizations of workers, such as the International Confederation of Trade Unions or the American Federation of Labour, or else were organizations of free intellectuals from all countries.

G. I.

The Political Scene in Ecuador

President Velasco Ibarra Takes Over

ECUADOR, one of the smallest of South American republics, rarely attracts the attention of the international press. Twice only in recent years events in the country were given a few lines in the European press: in August 1949, after an earthquake laid waste a fertile inter-Andean valley and killed about seven thousand people; and on 31 August 1952, when a new President took over.

The latter event was noteworthy not because of any irregularity in the procedure—no revolution or *coup d'état* had preceded it—but for the very opposite reason: for once, in more than a quarter of a century, a President who had been constitutionally elected and had come to the legal end of his four-year-term handed over the insignia of office to his freely elected successor. To comply with the rules of the Constitution was, and perhaps still remains, the exception in Ecuador as in so many Latin American republics.

Galo Plaza, the President who achieved the near-miracle of completing his term of office, had made of it his programme-point number one, avoiding on occasion necessary action that might have involved him in conflicts with certain groups or individuals. Three minor attempts at revolution he dealt with leniently, and succeeded above all in maintaining cordial relations with the bulk of the army. He wanted to show, he said, that the Ecuadorian people were capable of living under a peaceful democratic Government in an atmosphere of respect for the laws and the Constitution.

Born in New York while his father (also twice President of Ecuador) was on a diplomatic mission there, Galo Plaza because of his democratic ways and personal charm enjoyed an extraordinary popularity in the United States, but was unable to turn it into major advantages for his country. He merely obtained the

same type of aid open to all 'insufficiently developed countries' under Point Four and the various United Nations and Pan-American schemes for technical assistance.

The election of his successor, held on 1 June 1952, took place in an atmosphere of confusion. All the traditional political parties were in a state of decadence. The two principal ones—Conservatives and Liberals—were split, as usual on personal issues. The candidates they represented did not meet with the approval of large sections within the parties, still less with that of the electorate as a whole.

THE NEW PRESIDENT

Suddenly several recently-formed political groups combined and invited Dr José Maria Velasco Ibarra to stand as 'the people's candidate'. Twice already (in 1934–5 and in 1944–7) Dr Velasco had occupied the presidential chair, to be both times deposed for his anti-constitutional procedures, which he himself justified by declaring the Constitution and the laws deficient for serving the real interests of the country. That something might be said in favour of this argument is shown by the fact that up to the present, in 122 years of independent existence, Ecuador has had a total of fifteen written Constitutions, which is to say that each in turn except the last one was considered unsatisfactory.

In spite of his failures, a kind of myth had grown around Velasco Ibarra. A well-known Ecuadorian journalist thus described him in the capital's leading newspaper, *El Comercio* (8 June 1952): 'Velasco Ibarra is the permanent *caudillo* which the country has had during the last thirty years. His star began to rise from the nadir of a tumultuous National Congress. From then onward, his figure stands out lean and ascetic, inflamed by vehemence, his accusing index finger eagerly extended. An oratory *sui generis*, repetitive, contradictory, rings out to the delirious multitudes. Dr Velasco is without doubt the man nearest the masses. Like them he acts emotionally, in flux and reflux. This is the secret of his success, apart from his extraordinary personal magnetism. On two occasions he has been the man of Providence for the country. Both times he failed . . . caught in the net of his own contradictions.'

The faith he inspired was, of course, due to something more than remarkable feats of oratory. A highly-strung man, Velasco Ibarra found satisfaction only in incessant activity which led him to the

farthest corners of the country and caused him to further the building of new schools and bridges and the creation of new institutions, tangible proofs of his energy and honesty long after he had retired once more into self-imposed exile.

The question arose, when his new candidacy was discussed, as to whether his voluble nature had settled sufficiently to avoid a third calamity. The first reaction of most potential voters was a shrug of the shoulders. 'The Great Absent One' seemed no longer a vital political figure, his candidacy a mere political manoeuvre to cover up the ambitions of other men. But the tide changed in his favour when victory seemed already secure in the hands of the Conservative candidate. The latter used the religious question as his main platform, and though Ecuador is a Catholic country it nevertheless has behind it half a century of a Liberal tradition in politics. Many people were especially afraid of the rigid attitude of this particular Conservative candidate, who might well have introduced restrictions of hard-won liberties and a new era of bigotry. They therefore, at the last moment and in sign of protest, cast their votes for Dr Velasco. To everyone's surprise, Dr Velasco won the elections, obtaining 150,000 votes against the 116,000 of his Conservative opponent.[1]

Soon afterwards, Dr Velasco assured a group of his followers[2] that should his political enemies and the oligarchy prevent him by any means from terminating his new four-year period, the people would call him back a fourth time. Declarations of this kind could hardly assuage the widespread apprehension. They were increased by the tenor of his inaugural speech on 31 August. In the presence of his predecessor, who cordially expressed the wish that the new President like himself might happily reach the end of his term, Dr Velasco did not hesitate to point out that though there had been peace during Gala Plaza's regime, it had been on the surface only. Underneath, there had existed 'a dangerous anguish, a vehement irritation'.

In his detailed analysis of the state of affairs which he inherited, he found the economic situation desperate. 'In my judgement,' he said, 'the anarchy, the lack of authority in the State, the lack of

[1] The two Liberal candidates together obtained an additional 84,000. The total number of votes—351,000—was the highest ever registered in the country, which has 3·2 million inhabitants. Suffrage is limited to literate men and women over eighteen years of age. The percentage of illiteracy was given by the first national census of 1950 as 43·7 per cent, but is probably somewhat higher.

[2] *El Comercio*, 19 June 1952.

responsibility have precipitated us into backwardness.' He blamed the grave defects in the national character: indiscipline and distrust. 'We spend our lives arguing, and arguing about things that we know nothing about, and never finish arguing and putting up difficulties.' Wherever he looked, he noticed lack of responsibility and therefore failure. 'But,' he promised, 'I am ready to make an effort to save the people.'

He then demanded certain organizational changes and offered to take measures destined to improve the backward conditions he had so passionately denounced. Since a good many of his years of exile had been spent in Argentina, suspicions arose, especially in certain United States circles, that he might feel more inclined towards *Peronismo* than towards the continuous close co-operation with the U.S.A. for which Galo Plaza had been so much applauded. However, Dr Velasco repeatedly protested against such allegations, underlining his Liberal faith, his hatred of any form of totalitarianism, and his fervent wish to act within the limits of the democratic framework of the Constitution. Since his Liberalism in the past had not always been too firmly maintained, the Opposition decided on a policy of watchful caution.

THE ARMY

That the President was this time doing his best to ensure his stay in office was shown immediately after his inauguration when, in addition to the usual sweeping changes in the administration and the diplomatic service, over fifty high-ranking army officers were pensioned off or temporarily retired.

Throughout the preceding presidential election campaign rumours had circulated that the army would not allow Dr Velasco to win since he was too unstable a personality to guarantee the untroubled progress of the republic. Whatever truth there was in these stories, the army evidently considered it preferable not to intervene, and by abstention to enhance its reputation as a bulwark of the Constitution. A different attitude would in any case, it was argued, have been foolish. Whoever became President of Ecuador would inevitably have to respect and flatter the army, and to endeavour to increase its annual budget. Velasco Ibarra would certainly not forget these obligations, notwithstanding the changes effected by him in the top personnel. And in fact, in his inaugural speech, he called the armed forces 'one of the most sublime institutions of history' and concluded his appeal to them with the

words: 'Only Alexander and Caesar, Napoleon and Bolivar are worthy of you, soldiers of the world, soldiers of the armed forces of Ecuador.'

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

But less than three months sufficed to reveal the inherent weakness in the odd agglomeration of the new President's followers. During his election campaign Dr Velasco had enjoyed the backing of three organized groups: the A.R.N.E. (Arne), the C.F.P., and the authentic 'Velasquistas', his own genuine supporters.

Arne (*Asociación Revolucionaria Nacionalista Ecuatoriana*) is a Falangist-inspired group which recruits its members chiefly from among the Quito university students, young office and Government employees, and perhaps the younger army officers. So far it has acquired little but a nuisance value by organizing 'spontaneous' attacks on Liberal newspaper offices and street fights with university students of opposed political ideologies. It has probably not more than about two thousand members, chiefly in the capital. One of its leaders, in recognition of services rendered by the youthful party, was appointed General Secretary of the Administration, another private secretary of the President, but no other influential positions have been allocated to it.

The C.F.P. (*Concentración de Fuerzas Populares*) is of a different mettle. It owes its existence to Carlos Guevara Moreno, the self-styled 'Captain of the People'. He represents the not uncommon type of demagogue, ruthless, quick-witted, boastful, and eternally conspiring. For a time, during Dr Velasco's second regime, he was a great favourite of the President's. He even rose to the post of Minister of the Interior while still in his early thirties, but behaved so much like an *enfant terrible* that the President finally had to get rid of him by sending him as ambassador to Chile. On his return, Guevara Moreno formed his own party from among the discontented and the riffraff of Guayaquil, Ecuador's biggest town (260,000 inhabitants) and port on the Pacific, and once again began to conspire. In July 1950 he was caught red-handed while engaging in one of the most foolhardy *coup d'états* ever known in Ecuador. As a result he spent a year in prison, until President Galo Plaza, in yet another gesture for 'democratic peace and forgiveness', ordered his release. The 'Captain of the People' at once resumed his political activities, which included violent press campaigns in his own weekly *El Momento* against anyone

who was not his supporter, and against any ex-supporter. At last he managed to get himself elected mayor of Guayaquil, using methods which the serious newspapers qualified as those of gangsters, but profiting too from the general lack of faith felt in any of the traditional parties.

His group, the C.F.P., joined the presidential election campaign in favour of Dr Velasco Ibarra when the latter's name had already caught the popular imagination in Guayaquil. With one of his characteristic gestures, Guevara Moreno resigned his own candidacy for the presidency and instructed his followers to vote for the 'Great Absent One'.

The third group behind Velasco consists of the authentic 'Velasquistas', a small band of idealists who continue to see in him, through all the ups and downs of his career, the 'man of Providence'. They have no other creed but this personal faith. There are many middle-aged men among them, but also quite a number of younger ones. Socially they range from lawyers to cooks, racially from white to mestizo. The Indian, generally illiterate and representing about 50 per cent of the population, as yet takes no part in Ecuadorian politics and in almost every respect lives in a different way from the rest of the population.

No sooner had President Velasco entered upon office than the three groups which had backed him each went their separate way. Arne and C.F.P. started quarrelling, both demanding the majority of jobs available in the administration. Those who fared worst in the distribution were the authentic 'Velasquistas'.

Once more Dr Velasco revealed a new skill in handling people when he assigned the most important diplomatic positions to his two chief political opponents, the defeated Liberal and Conservative candidates. Other leading Liberals were similarly honoured. Thus all possible rivals were eliminated. Probably unintentionally, these appointments contributed to a further weakening of the two principal parties, neither of which can count on sufficient outstanding personalities to replace easily the men sent abroad.

Things seemed to be going rather more quietly than had been expected when all of a sudden, early in December, Dr Velasco's Government arrested Carlos Guevara Moreno, in his own mayoral office in Guayaquil, accusing him of having attempted yet another *coup d'état*, and of the misuse of public funds. Within twenty-four hours of his arrest a plane of the Ecuadorian Air Force flew him to exile in Colombia, together with his wife, who is his

most fervent collaborator, and five members of the C.F.P. executive. The news of the Government's rapid and energetic action caused a sensation, but also relief.

However, some of Dr Velasco's political opponents were quick to emphasize that once more he had taken steps in defiance of the Constitution, which expressly forbids exile as a punishment. A Socialist university professor, at a public discussion on the subject organized by Quito university students, declared that the criminal code contained all the necessary provisions to judge Guevara in accordance with the law; imprisonment, not exile, would have been the correct procedure. Since one of the Cabinet Ministers had somewhat unwisely thought to strengthen the Government case by affirming that exile had been chosen to comply with an express wish of the army, the students' meeting condemned this new interference by the armed forces, but insisted at the same time that the fight against the 'Nazi-Fascist' C.F.P. be continued by all the democratic institutions. Guevara, on the other hand, in an interview with Colombian journalists accused President Velasco of having acted thus unconstitutionally from spite, since in the municipal elections of Guayaquil on 2 November the 'Velasquistas' had been beaten by the powerful C.F.P.

The attitude of the Socialists reflects the old dilemma between the defence of principles—a defence which generally benefits the political opponent, as has been proved in many democratic countries—and practical politics. The Ecuadorian experience hardly varies from that of the rest of the world. The Socialists, once an influential party, have lost all their former significance, in part because for years now they have been unable to make up their minds as to how far to the left they should go. They have frequently taken up opportunist positions, as for example when they agreed to collaborate with Galo Plaza's regime after having fought it bitterly for nearly three years. It is now only among the university students that the Socialists can count on much support: and even there the suspicion seems justified that quite a number of so-called Socialist students are at heart Communists.

The Communist Party as such, in about thirty years of existence, has made little headway in Ecuador. For a time it disputed with the Socialists for the dominance of the trade unions chiefly centred around the small textile industry, but of late nothing has been heard of the dispute, nor of the trade unions either. It almost looks as if they were quietly fading away.

THE CHURCH

The Catholic Church, as an organized force, is powerful in Ecuador. It has received new vigour from the beatification two years ago of an Ecuadorian seventeenth-century nun of pure Spanish descent, Mariana de Jesus, and from the appointment by the Vatican, on 29 November, of the first Ecuadorian Cardinal as one of twenty-four newly chosen Cardinals from many parts of the world. In his first talk to the press, the new Cardinal stated that the relations between Church and State in Ecuador, especially at the present moment, were extremely cordial.

The political force of the Church finds its chief expression through the Conservatives (though many priests and nuns are reputed to have voted for Dr Velasco because the too rigid Catholicism of the Conservative candidate was viewed with a certain apprehension since it might have produced an undesirable resistance). The Conservatives just now seem to be gaining influence. The present Vice-President of the Republic, for instance, is a Conservative, and in the last Congress, which came to an end in November, twenty-seven out of the sixty-four deputies and eighteen out of the thirty-three popularly elected senators belonged to the Conservative Party. The latter's organizational weakness seems less important in a country where all parties are similarly afflicted.

To sum up: Ecuador, after a politically successful attempt at a democratic and constitutional regime, is once more being governed by an educated but highly-strung President of the *caudillo* type. Intent on providing cures for the many maladies from which the country is suffering, the President is hindered by the lack of funds, by the existence of too many autonomous institutions outside Government control, by the lack of roads, widespread illiteracy, and general backwardness. Dr Velasco's political backing at present is precarious. As to the situation of the country as a whole, it can only be described as 'somewhat uncertain'.

However, surrounded by the military dictatorships of Venezuela and Peru, and with years of devastating civil war in the Colombian Republic to the north, Ecuador must be considered an island of democracy in the midst of a stormy sea.

Diplomatically, Ecuador's relations with the Latin-American countries and the rest of the world are friendly, excepting with Peru, the 'hereditary enemy' of Ecuador. Territorial disputes go back to colonial times. They flared up into a brief unhappy war

in 1941 when Peru invaded the southern coastal province of Ecuador. As a result, Ecuador was finally persuaded by the Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro to renounce her claims to the Amazonian hinterland.

International demarcation committees have been busy for years, without having finished their task. Only recently some bitter declarations were published by Ecuadorian diplomats abroad refuting Peruvian pretensions. Ecuador can hardly consider it a fortunate coincidence that today's dictator-President of Peru is one of the generals who directed the attack in 1941. In the present circumstances, her special sympathy goes towards countries like Bolivia which are similarly unhappy because of comparatively recent territorial losses, and with whom she further shares a great many other problems.

L. L.

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Notes of the Month

The New Soviet Government

WHEN the news of Stalin's fatal illness was released, there was naturally much speculation both as to his successor and as to the effects of the change of leadership. The first question was solved within a day of his death when G. M. Malenkov became Premier. The second will probably remain open for some time to come.

The changes in State and Party administration, far greater than had been expected by the outside world, were announced swiftly and—on the surface—with great firmness. It is possible that these matters had been discussed and decided some time beforehand. There is, however, little evidence that Malenkov seized power by forcing a defeat on his 'rivals'. He had been singled out, and probably briefed, by the 'great leader and teacher' himself when in place of Stalin he presented the report for the Party at the 19th Congress in October 1952. It is much more likely that the new set-up is a compromise between him and his colleagues reached at the crucial moment of the master's death in face of the complete uncertainty as to the country's and the world's reactions.

Two main themes dominated all proclamations and announcements emanating from Moscow between Stalin's death and funeral: for the outside world there was the professed desire for peace, coupled with statements on Russia's preparedness for defence; for the Soviet people, the assurance that the Party leadership was in firm and reliable hands, and the appeal to rally even closer around it. Subsidiary themes were the wooing of 'the great Chinese people', and the promise of a further improvement in the material and cultural well-being of the Soviet masses. The urgency and emphasis with which the first two themes were pursued forced upon an attentive observer the impression that their mainspring was a great anxiety and uncertainty as to what was going to happen without the domineering and restraining authority of the 'teacher and leader'. This anxiety—rightly or wrongly—is probably not

yet over. All the changes undertaken reflect the necessity felt for concentration of power, centralization of administration, and tightening up of controls. Questions of promotion or demotion would seem to play a small part, changes of personnel being dictated mainly by political and administrative expediency. They appear to be, on the whole, emergency measures of a conservative nature, making for steadiness, rather than spectacular and revolutionary steps taken by a usurper of power.

To assist Malenkov, four First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers are appointed: Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich. Jointly they will form the Presidium of the Council, i.e., the inner Cabinet. L. P. Beria has been re-appointed head of the M.V.D., the Ministry of International Affairs, which, as at the beginning of the Russo-German war, is now once more fused with the Ministry of State Security (the two Ministries were split in 1946). V. M. Molotov is again Foreign Minister, a post he held from 1939 to 1949, through the Stalin-Hitler Pact, the war-time alliance with the West, and the first phase of the cold war. His first deputies are A. Ya. Vyshinsky and Ya. A. Malik. A further deputy is V. V. Kuznetsov, ex-Chairman of the Trade Union Council, simultaneously appointed Soviet Ambassador to China. This appointment no doubt stresses the importance attached to relations with China, just as that of Vyshinsky as permanent representative to the United Nations probably reflects the desire to have an experienced top-level man at that post. Marshal N. A. Bulganin has been re-appointed Minister of Defence (Army and Navy). He was previously chosen for this post in 1947, to succeed Stalin, and relinquished it in 1949 in favour of Marshal A. M. Vasilievsky, now one of his deputies. (The other is Marshal G. K. Zhukov, after the war said to have been somewhat in disgrace). Only L. M. Kaganovich, the able organizer and administrator of industry and transport, holds no other official post.

The appointments to the Council of Ministers, the 'highest executive and administrative' State organ—constitutionally a prerogative of the Supreme Soviet (the 'highest organ of State power')—were the result of a decision signed on 6 March jointly by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. It was implicitly admitted to be an emergency measure 'to ensure the uninterrupted and correct leadership of the whole life of the country' in order to prevent 'any kind of disarray and

panic'. But recommendations for changes were also made in regard to the Supreme Soviet itself, and were subsequently adopted at a hastily convoked session. N. M. Shvernik, who became nominal head of the country in 1946 after Kalinin's death, has now ceded his place to the seventy-two-year-old Marshal K. E. Voroshilov. As President of the Supreme Soviet the latter will accept the credentials of foreign envoys and ambassadors, present orders and medals, and sign decrees.

As to changes in the Party administration, they are completely arbitrary and amount to an undoing of the 19th Congress's decisions, when a Presidium of thirty-six members and candidates replaced the old Politbureau. The Presidium will now consist of ten members (Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khruschchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin) and four candidates (Shvernik, Ponomarenko, Melnikov, Bagirov)—all, but for a few exceptions, people of the Stalinist 'old guard'. Apart from Malenkov there are only three other secretaries—S. D. Ignatiev, P. N. Pospelov, editor of *Pravda*, and N. N. Shatalin, who will be replaced by L. I. Brezhnev as head of the political department of the Navy. N. F. Khrushchev, who at one time played a prominent part in the Ukraine and was later first Secretary of the Moscow region, is to concentrate on work for the Central Committee of the Party.[1]

The trend towards greater concentration, reflected in the abolition of the Bureaux of the Council of Ministers and the Party Presidium, is even more marked in the economic and cultural administration. The merger of whole groups of related ministries and State Committees is envisaged: from over fifty their number (and consequently that of the full Council of Ministers) has diminished to some twenty odd. Among the newly formed organs are the Ministry of Internal and External Trade, headed by A. I. Mikoyan, the able business man and one-time admirer of American factory methods, who was released from his duties as Foreign Trade Minister in 1949; the Ministry of Machine Building; the Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machine Building Industry; and the Ministry of Power Stations and Electrical Industry.

The almost inevitable result of the merger of industrial ministries, equally affecting light industry and the metallurgical, timber, food, and other industries, will be an identical fusion of the trade

[1] On 20 March he was appointed Secretary-General of the Party in place of Malenkov.

unions, since these are built on the industrial and not on the trad principle. It is probably because of this new upheaval ahead tha the sixty-five-year-old Shvernik has been recalled to becom Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Iı 1930 he was appointed its Secretary-General and later Chairman during the war he headed a trade union delegation to Britain.

Alternate splits and mergers are not a new phenomenon iı Soviet economic life, but since the war the trend had been to wards a certain dispersal and decentralization which, in 1948, ha even affected Gosplan. This trend has now been reversed, an Gosplan is to incorporate the two State Supply Committees set u at that time. The new Chairman is G. P. Kosychenko, not know of in the West. A new Ministry of Culture under P. K. Pono marienko is to include higher education, art, radio, and printing as well as the State Labour Reserves. No doubt the aim is greate co-ordination and efficiency, as well as stricter control. Muc overlapping overhead expenditure will also be saved by these re organizations. It remains to be seen whether the people or th armed forces will benefit from the savings.

The Chinese Election Law

THE remarkable success of the elections in India in the winte of 1951–2 made it difficult for any Asian country to delay muc longer the holding of elections if it was not to admit to administra tive inefficiency or to a lack of popular support. It was therefor to be expected that China, which competes with India for th ideological leadership of Asia, would make at least a show of hold ing free elections. Hitherto the supreme authority in China ha been, in theory, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con ference (CPPCC). This met once, in 1949, to approve the 'Com mon Programme', to pass the Organic Law, and to elect th Central People's Government Council in which was vested th power of exercising State authority. Between meetings the remain ing functions of the CPPCC rested with its National Committee, which in turn acted through a Standing Committee. In the local field there were 'Conferences of All Circles'.

Article 2 of the Organic Law stated that 'the Government of th People's Republic of China is a Government of the People's Con gress system based on the principle of democratic centralism'. On 24 December 1952 the Communist Party submitted to the Stand ing Committee of the CPPCC a proposal to establish an All-China

Congress and local congresses; the proposal was endorsed unanimously. On 13 January 1953 the Government Council met, announced that the All-China Congress would be convened 'to establish a Constitution, ratify the basic outlines of China's Five-Year Plan of construction, and elect a new Central People's Government', and set up two committees, one under Mao to draft a Constitution, the other under Chou to draft an election law. On 11 February the Government Council passed a law for the election of People's Congresses at the lower levels in 1953 and for the subsequent convening of an All-China Congress.

Article 4 of the law provides that 'every citizen . . . who has reached the age of eighteen shall have the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of nationality or race, sex, profession, social origin, religious belief, education, property holdings, or length of residence.' Article 5, however, denies these rights to members of 'the landlord class', and to 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'others who have been deprived of political rights according to law'. Article 7 provides that 'the people's armed forces and Chinese overseas may conduct separate elections', and subsequent articles provide for the election of delegates from the armed forces to each People's Congress at all levels. A series of articles provides for special representation for the 'minority nationalities' in local congresses and for 150 minority representatives in the All-China Congress, this being rather more than their numbers would entitle them to if equality of representation was aimed at. Inequality of representation is however deliberately ensured, especially as between peasants and industrial workers: Articles 11, 14, and 16 provide for heavy weightage for urban and industrial areas as against rural areas in the county, provincial, and municipal congresses. In the All-China Congress the weightage is even greater: it is elected by the congresses of the provinces, the municipalities and minority nationality areas directly under the central Government, the armed forces, the Chinese overseas, and the industrial municipalities with a population of over 500,000 directly under the provincial governments. These last appear to get more than a double vote since they are already over-represented in the provincial congresses. In addition, by Article 20, while the provinces only elect one delegate to the All-China Congress for every 800,000 people, these large industrial municipalities and the municipalities under the Central Government elect one delegate for every 100,000 people.

At the lowest levels the delegates are directly elected. At the higher levels election is by the lower-level congresses. But while at the higher levels election is by secret ballot, at the lower levels it is carried out at 'election meetings' where election 'may be done by a show of hands, or by secret ballot,' while 'electors who are unable to write . . . may ask other electors to record the votes for them'; in India successful efforts were made by the use of symbols to enable the illiterate to cast their votes themselves in secret. Article 47 provides that parties or individuals may put forward lists of candidates, and Article 51 that electors may vote for the lists or 'any other electors they choose'.

The key to the elections would appear to be the election committees. The central election committee is presided over by Liu Shao-chi, the Communist Party's party manager. It is empowered not only 'to direct and supervise' the elections but also 'to deal with . . . charges against those who commit illegal practices in the course of the elections and to decide on final measures to be taken'. The lesser election committees have similar duties in their respective spheres, and the lowest have amongst other things 'to convene and conduct the election meetings'. The Communist leaders clearly have little doubt of the results of elections conducted under this law. On 13 January Mao remarked that conditions for such an election were ripe 'with . . . the people of all walks of life organized throughout the . . . the country', and concluded that 'the Government based on thesystem of People's Congresses will still be a united front Government'.

Germany and the Treaties

ON 19 March the Bundestag voted for ratification of the Bonn Conventions ending Allied Occupation and of the treaty establishing the European Defence Community. After Easter these treaties will go to the Bundesrat, in which the Government is not yet certain of a majority. It is possible that a ruling by the Constitutional Court may once again be sought before they can be signed by the President. But ratification by the Bundestag, after long delay, marks an important step forward, and also, incidentally, lends particular interest to the first two articles in this issue, which are the outcome of an invitation to a leading member of the Federal Government and a representative of the S.P.D. Opposition to put before an English audience their respective views on Germany's place in Europe.

Motives and Methods of European Integration

A German Government View

At the present time throughout Europe and the free world men are engaged in far-reaching and anxious deliberations as to how the responsible Governments can best preserve the prosperity, freedom, and security of their nations. In Germany this discussion is particularly animated because her geographical situation and the post-war partition of the country bring home to every individual citizen the fact that his own personal existence is threatened in different ways. The present article will attempt to indicate why it is that Germany must seek the solution of her problems in partnership with other nations. On her own she cannot regain her unity, attain economic prosperity, or protect the freedom of her citizens and the integrity of her territory; in other words, alone she can find no security.

The symptoms and needs which manifest themselves in Germany are met with in other European countries too, but in Germany they are more sharply accentuated. The motives and methods of her foreign policy may perhaps best be understood by an analysis of the reasons which have led her to support the cause of European integration.

First it is necessary to recall how twice in this century Germany's attempts to pursue a self-centred policy resulted in isolation and defeat. After each of the world wars disappointment led to nihilist trends; but whereas in the 1930s this nihilism was followed by an excessive nationalism, after 1945 the quest for some new and positive goal led to the recognition of a new factor—European unity.

A variety of reasons, political, cultural, and economic, some based on past association and some on new factors in the present industrial age, have caused this ideal to appeal to the free nations of Europe. Yet another motive at the present time is, of course, the need for common defence in the face of a common danger.

In Germany, owing to her special position, these motives made themselves felt with particular force and vigour. Germans, irrespective of their political views, are virtually convinced that they can find a better future only within a larger community. This conviction is the fruit of painful experience gained within the

short span of a man's life. Germany's work for European unity is thus, in her view, not a ladder which one climbs up to reach a good firm position and which, the object once achieved, can then be kicked away. It seems to her that there exists a harmony between national and European interests in the light of which any attempt at hegemony appears senseless. This concord of interests furnishes a guarantee of the permanence and durability of the efforts towards European integration and, beyond that, towards co-operation throughout the free world.

In the workshop of European co-operation three 'dimensions an integration' have to be taken into account: intensity, extension, and time.

Intensity signifies here the closeness of co-operation, carrying with it a definite degree of renunciation of sovereignty. Since, however, these sovereign rights do not vanish from the earth, they become vested in a new joint body, the supra-national community. The basis of international co-operation is that several partners should jointly pursue some representative interest. In an earlier type of international co-operation the principle of unanimity governs the body formed to pursue this interest; this amounts to equality in voting rights, where every State remains its own judge in the question as to whether and to what extent its interest is identical with that of the community. A right of veto is the result. In international associations of this kind sovereignty always remains inviolate.

But there is also the type of supra-national organization which has come to the fore on the Continent after the second World War. In the Council of Europe and its Consultative Assembly a compromise between international and supra-national co-operation obtains. The principles both of unanimity and of equality of votes have been abandoned in the Consultative Assembly. There are majority decisions, and the number of delegates from the various member States is unequal. A system of that kind is feasible only if a collective interest is recognized as being of such transcending importance that it prevails in any conflict with lesser national interests. There is thus a readiness to sacrifice a representative national interest to an obvious collective interest because the predominant significance of the latter for the national existence is recognized. It is this train of thought which logically requires the majority decision and the surrender of the veto. In the Council of Europe, however, the Assembly has only advisory functions. This

means that the collective interest has not been given the same value in the case of all the States represented in the Council of Europe. The risk involved in equipping the Assembly with real powers seemed to many to be too great. Consequently the principle of unanimity applies in all major questions. This is obvious in the case of the Committee of Ministers.

Even a brief glance at the Council of Europe will show that the extension in space of the association is in inverse proportion to its intensity. The looser the tie, the larger is the circle of participants. But the greater, too, is the danger of disintegration, and the less the certainty that the problems which arise can be mastered.

In the supra-national institutions, on the other hand—the Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community, and the plan for a political community—by a renunciation of national sovereignty the degree of intensity has been heightened. In the Coal and Steel Assembly the principle of weighted votes also applies. But this Assembly has powers of control. As a controlling organ it not only makes recommendations, as does the Strasbourg Assembly, but it makes decisions as well. It can, for example, compel the resignation of the executive, in this case the High Authority, by a vote of non-confidence. The High Authority itself—a purely executive organ with comparatively far-reaching powers—is 'completely integrated', to use the new functional language of European integration. That is to say, it has a direct European responsibility, it permits of no national division, and its members must not accept instructions from national Governments. The powers of the legislature have, as far as possible, been laid down jointly by the national Governments in one great enactment: the treaty on the Coal and Steel Community. The Council of Ministers, lastly, has obvious similarities with a Second Chamber. Its chief instrument of action is the majority decision. Decisions requiring unanimity are the exception. But even in the case of these exceptions there can be seen a desire to overcome the possible use of the veto. Article 10 of the Schuman Treaty illustrates this point. The designation of the members of the High Authority is to be by unanimous agreement. But if, for example, a Government has used its right of veto with respect to two successive candidates in the case of an individual designation, another Government may refer the matter to the Court, and the Court may declare the veto null and void if it considers it abusive. Here is clear evidence of an endeavour to overcome the principle

of the veto by the Community's corporate sense of justice. Not every objection, but only the justified objection of a member State prevents a decision. But precisely what constitutes a 'justified' objection will be decided in accordance with criteria determined by the interests of the community.

It is interesting that in the case of the European Defence Community the degree of intensity, that is, of renunciation of sovereignty, appears to be slightly less than in the case of, say, the Coal and Steel Community. It is in the nature of things that in the sphere of defence the legislative act, namely the treaty itself, could not provide equally for all conceivable vicissitudes, as was possible in the field of coal and steel. Consequently the Council of Ministers, the institution in which the Governments are represented, is in a stronger position in relation to the Commissariat, which here takes the place of the High Authority in the Schuman Plan.

On the other hand, judging by the existing drafts, it would seem that in the projected political community there will be a certain curtailment of the powers of the Council of Ministers, which in this case will become a genuine Second Chamber. The drafts would retain the principle of unanimity, and thus, too, the possibility of a veto, only in a very few cases of cardinal importance, for instance in the definition by the Council of Ministers of fundamental aims of foreign policy.

The degree of integration achieved thus finds expression in a genuine transfer of sovereignty, in the majority principle—that is, in the renunciation of the veto—in the weighting of votes, and in the provisions of the attributes of a sovereign community organized on a democratic basis, with two Chambers, an executive, and a Court. This degree of integration is slightly diminished by the principle of unanimity which prevails in a few important matters.

Coming now to the problem of the *extension in space* of European co-operation, let us first recall the inverse proportion of the organizations' intensity to their extensiveness. Not only are the extensive communities less intensive and the less extensive ones more intensive, but there also exists a vast range of shades between extreme cohesion and extreme looseness. Where a solution involving the maximum of intensity, in other words a supranational organization, has been achieved, the possibility exists for a great variety of gradations in co-operating and liaison, from the compact nucleus to the extreme periphery. The problem is, in fact, to use the new European terminology, one of 'association'.

This category of thought is not alien to Anglo-Saxons and Germans. German jurisprudence and political science are familiar with federal principles, recognizing between the two extremes of 'full power' and 'no power at all' an infinite number of stages and shades which reflect the political organization that has shaped our political existence for many centuries. The United Kingdom—as its name suggests—is acquainted with similar conceptions. The British Commonwealth may also be taken as an example of the way of thinking here under discussion.

Association, too, provides the pattern for the relationship which Britain can establish with the supra-national communities. Basically, British policy has for a long time past concerned itself with the co-ordination of the different European elements. Through centuries it has been Britain's endeavour to prevent any single State from achieving hegemony on the Continent, and to construct a European balance of power. Perhaps it is not too rash to draw a parallel between the European balance of power and European integration.

To Britain, too, it cannot be a matter of indifference that a United Europe can contribute, on a world-wide scale, to the maintenance of the political balance of power. It is a matter for common agreement that Europe can be conceived only as a community of equals and of free men, in which the strong should help the weak but where no one nation is to predominate.

British participation in the European development is ardently desired by all responsible people in Germany. The British sense of proportion can make an essential and happy contribution to the work of European co-operation. The empirical way of thinking and the empirical method of the British would prevent the continental European—who likes to aspire to theoretical perfection—from falling victim to what the Americans would call perfectionism. Finally, British experience in dealing with problems of world policy can only be of advantage to continental Europe.

As far as the European supra-national organizations are concerned, the development of associative links with States or groups of States is only at the beginning. New conceptions and new patterns will have to be evolved. All the same, some interesting and very promising beginnings have already been made. The contact of the European Defence Community with N.A.T.O. on the one hand and with Great Britain on the other, established by means of the Paris Protocols, is an example of this. The Coal and Steel

Community furnishes other examples. As regards its executive, a Joint Committee has been set up, consisting of members of the High Authority and members of the British Mission to that Authority. This Joint Committee has a joint secretariat whose members are appointed partly by the British Delegation and partly by the High Authority. So far, practical work within the Joint Committee has been carried on by three working groups charged respectively with problems of productive capacity and its development, of workmen's housing, and of supply and demand. Among the subjects which are to be treated by these working groups are exchange of information, either on the basis of special questionnaires or on a permanent basis; studies concerning the comparability of statistical definitions; and exchanges of views on improvements to be made in the supply of coking coal.

Yet another example offered by the Coal and Steel Community is the proposal made by M. Monnet, the President of the High Authority, that the Parliament of the Coal and Steel Community and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe should hold joint meetings from time to time.

The method of association permits of any degree of co-operation, whether it be a mere comparison of views, or the exchange of information, or even the execution of joint decisions. Through association, not only can the whole of Europe be included, but the necessary links with the rest of the free world can be established, as is shown by the appointment of an American mission to the High Authority of the Schuman Plan and by the contact initiated between the E.D.C. and N.A.T.O.

The third dimension of European integration—*time*—can be viewed under two aspects: as a power to which we must yield, and as an instrument which we can use. It was the time factor which hastened the establishment of the European Defence Community. M. Robert Schuman has rightly said that the Defence Community should really have marked the final phase in the development; but the anxiety that it might otherwise be too late forced its sponsors to act sooner.

On the other hand, time is a constantly moving vehicle to which we entrust our thoughts and decisions. It is up to us to decide at what moment and with what luggage we enter this *perpetuum mobile*. We can get in and load up everything all at once and 'commend it', as the somewhat pathetic saying is, 'to the broad stream of history'. But we can also proceed step by step and determine

not only the length and rhythm of our steps but also their order of sequence as circumstance may require. That is the less perfectionist, the more elastic, perhaps the more politically-minded, the wiser solution, and it is in fact the method adopted in European affairs. Rome, too, was not built in a day. The choice of the moment for making a particular move marks the main point of intersection with the domestic policy of the countries concerned. Domestic policy will, for example, often set limits to a speeding-up, desirable in itself, of the development or implementation of a given project. In the realm of domestic policy, there is likely to exist a greater readiness in the economic sphere to take into account the necessities arising in a compact and approximately predictable field than is found in the political or military spheres, where emotions, memories, and deep-rooted habits constitute imponderable factors difficult to assess. To limit or to eliminate these factors again requires time.

Conversely, considerations of domestic policy can speed up the European development, especially where public opinion tends strongly towards the achievement of European objectives, or where a certain European solution is demanded by strong elements in domestic policy as a prerequisite for another solution (for example, the political community as a prerequisite of the Defence Community). These tendencies become visible in the parliamentary situation at a given moment and in the majorities for or against this or that project which, it must be remembered, always requires parliamentary approval for its realization. This phenomenon can be observed most clearly where the Constitution of a country provides for a less stable executive. But the problem exists everywhere. To sum up, then: the third dimension is not to be ignored. The European structures cannot be projected on one plane as on a drawing-board; they have been placed in the deep perspective of history.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate the significance of the time factor in the European field, bringing out the passive as well as the active role of the politician in relation to it. In December 1950, when the Atlantic Council met in Brussels, the question of Germany's participation in the defence of Europe was discussed. The reason that this question arose was because the outbreak of war in Korea proved once again that Bolshevism had not renounced its aggressive aims. The North Atlantic Council came to the conclusion that German participation would materially

strengthen the defence of the free world without altering its defensive character. Confronted with the question of the shape which the German contribution should take, the idea was put forward in Paris, and accepted in the Federal Republic, that the question of joint defence, too, should be given a European answer. In this context the special factors underlying the Franco-German relationship played a considerable part.

In the sphere of coal and steel, important though it was, a beginning was easier than in the political or military sphere. But the architects of the Schuman Plan knew very well that this first step would of necessity lead to others; that very soon the need for co-ordination of measures of social policy and of trade and transport tariffs would arise, to mention only a few examples; that, furthermore, co-operation in the field of heavy industry would soon produce signs of a tendency to bring the aims of foreign trade policy, and ultimately of foreign policy, into line with each other. Later, when discussion of joint defence began, it could safely be foreseen that the work for a Defence Community would necessarily soon reach the point where the question would arise of who should decide how these integrated forces were to be utilized, and of the need for a political authority. The moment when the spark caught fire, so to speak, arrived in that memorable meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the six contracting States in December 1951 at which the Italian Premier Signor De Gasperi, urged that the treaty on the Defence Community should also stipulate the drafting of a statute for a political community.

Again time speeded up these designs. When the Council of Ministers met last September at Luxembourg with Federal Chancellor Dr Adenauer in the chair, a lively desire was expressed to go beyond the E.D.C. treaty, over which some delay had arisen. This led to the formation of the *ad hoc* Assembly, of the constitutional committee presided over by a German Deputy, Herr von Brentano, and to the drafting of the statute for the political community.

However great may be the efforts towards European integration, and however sound the idea, it is clear that this undertaking can only succeed if it is based on the approval of the free world as a whole. The merger does not rest on domination or oppression, but on a voluntary principle, on agreement. Actions towards it are taken not in isolation from the concepts of the Western world, but in harmony with, and in the service of, these concepts. There can

be no question of attempting a new political and economic autarchy in a larger area than those previously known; rather the aim must be to place at the service of all the economic and intellectual achievements of Europe, by ensuring harmony between all elements, ranging from a compact European centre to the utmost confines of the free world. This cannot and must not conflict with the ideals and interests of Great Britain in particular, whose continued understanding and support counts for so much to a United Europe.

The difficulties and obstacles are great. Germany and her friends in the free world hope that these difficulties can be overcome and the work completed. Ratification by the Federal Republic of the German-Allied set of treaties will mean that Germany will place her resources at the service of Europe. By so doing she will best serve her own interests as well. One day she will be able to put the spiritual and material resources of the whole of Germany at the disposal of the good cause and thus attain a better future within a comity of free peoples based on an identity of ideals and interests.

W. H.

Germany and World Peace

A German Social Democrat View

It might well be thought that the question of Germany's contribution to the maintenance of peace had been settled by the signatures attached to two treaties—the Bonn treaty on relations with the three Western Powers, and the Paris treaty on the constitution of a European Defence Community. Professing adherence to the free world and desiring to give proof of their goodwill, the Germans now face the question why they should not ratify these two treaties as soon as possible. Unfortunately the answer is not so simple, and it is necessary to examine the hard facts so often hidden behind high-sounding terms.

A first and essential fact is that the treaties will not and cannot be concluded with Germany and the Germans, but only with a western fragment of the Federal Republic of Germany. The

18 million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone, as well as those of the western sectors of Berlin and the Saar Germans, would remain outside. The fact is that Germany is in a special position in two respects: she is a borderline state facing the Soviet Union in the most exposed position, and she also shares courageous Austria's fate in being divided between East and West.

There can be no doubt that the ratification of these treaties, which establish a rigid link between a part only of free Western Germany and the N.A.T.O. system via the particular process of integration, will make the peaceful reunion of Germany in freedom very difficult if not impossible for a long time to come. The sufferings of the oppressed Germans in the Soviet Zone of the Federal Republic of Germany became more acute after the treaties were signed, and there also are indications of increased Communist persecution of the Churches. It is therefore necessary to face the question whether the *status quo* can be stabilized, and an at least provisional world peace assured, by a German sacrifice of national unity, which would be tantamount to making Germany's dismemberment the basis of a balance between East and West.

The reunification of Germany is in any case often regarded as a purely domestic problem for the Germans, whose achievement would certainly be welcomed on humanitarian grounds, but which is nevertheless not recognized as a fundamental and essential factor for world peace. Arguing from this point of view, Germans are frequently asked what *quid pro quo* they would be prepared to offer in return for reunification, since German unity is, after all, supposed to be a domestic matter and others cannot be expected to pay for it. But to some Germans this question does not seem to correspond to the circumstances. It is true that German unity may be first and foremost a national, and even more a human, affair—it concerns, after all, the release of 18 million prisoners of the Cold War—but it can also be argued that the peaceful re-establishment of German unity is from its very nature an international task too, and a common concern of all Western nations, because in it lies a key to world peace. If one accepts this view, it becomes impossible to isolate the German question and its solution. The dismemberment of Germany was imposed from outside; it can be seen as the expression of the unsolved tensions in the world at large, and relates to matters of conflict which are not situated in Germany and cannot be settled by Germany alone.

The possession of the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany gives

Russia an advanced field of strategic operations directed not against Bonn but against Washington. Besides providing advanced air stations and air signalling arrangements, it allows of the transformation of the Baltic into a *mare clausum* and the encirclement of Scandinavia with a view to submarine operations in the Atlantic, all adding up to pawns serving Soviet world politics, which could not be redeemed by anything which Western Germany alone can offer. A détente in the international situation is, in fact, an essential prerequisite for any solution of the German problem; and, equally, no such détente can take place without a solution of the German problem, and without it there can be no hope of security for Western Europe, and that carries with it the security not only of Great Britain but also of the United States.

The question of Germany's reunification has forced itself upon the world as a result of the decision to rearm the Western part of Germany. This decision was reached when the United States looked around her for allies who, in the face of the threat from Russia, could in the future take over the role of arsenal and ally on America's behalf similar to that played by the U.S.A. on behalf of Europe in the first World War and the early years of the second. The U.S.A. realized that her power could not develop without such alliances and without bases all over the world.

Thus the Atlantic Community of the second World War was revived, and in the course of its organization it was realized that Germany was a necessary link in the defensive forces of the free world. But the decision to include the free part of Germany in the military alliance, and to rearm her, inevitably brought up the political problem of Germany as a whole. For the security of Western Europe cannot be assured merely by the provision of German divisions without at the same time providing for the security of Germany itself. But Germany remains insecure so long as it constitutes merely an outpost zone for the protection of other nations, and it can know no peace, and for that reason too must remain insecure, as long as the measures for the defence of Western Europe continue to rest upon the division of Germany. Walter Lippmann, himself hardly to be reckoned as a German nationalist, has rightly recognized that otherwise the strategic interests of the Atlantic Community must inevitably conflict with the national interests of the German people. And it serves no intelligent purpose to arm German soldiers who will be exposed to such a conflict of conscience.

It is at this point that we arrive at the treaties and the mistakes which, in the view of many Germans, they embody. They offer no security for Germany, and therefore, because of the common interests involved, no security for Western Europe either. It is for this reason that the democratic Opposition in Western Germany is demanding fresh negotiations, on lines to be described later in this article. In the Opposition's view, it is better to voice their doubts clearly now, before the treaties have been ratified. For it is never a good plan to conclude treaties while reckoning in advance less on their durability than on their impermanence and on the probable impetus of future developments.

A careful examination of these treaties reveals that, despite much goodwill, they fail to achieve a compromise between the conflicting interests involved. Many of the provisions show clearly how strong is the presumption of a conflict between the strategic interests of the Atlantic Community and the national interests of the Germans. Without going into all the details, two outstanding examples may be mentioned.

1. To ensure the fulfilment of the Bonn Treaty an arbitration tribunal is to be set up whose powers operate in a discriminatory sense in relation to Western Germany. For on the one hand this arbitration tribunal is to have no powers of jurisdiction as to whether the three occupying Powers are exercising their special rights in relation to a state of emergency, or in relation to Germany as a whole, within the contractual limits. But on the other hand the tribunal can proclaim laws affecting individual citizens, but it can do so only in the territory of one of the treaty signatories—in other words, of Germany. There are also other examples of discrimination which deny equality of rights to Germany.

2. Article 5 of the Bonn Treaty contains the so-called state-of-emergency clause. The three Western Powers are empowered, according to their own judgment and without any limitation or legal control, to take such measures in Western Germany as they (and they alone) may think necessary for the protection of their armed forces if in their view the democratic order is threatened, or in case of the imminence of war. Germany is to bind herself by treaty not to encroach upon these unlimited and uncontrolled emergency powers of the three Western Powers, and is even bound to facilitate their being carried out.

A practical example may perhaps serve to elucidate the importance of this provision. If the U.K., the U.S.A., and France were

one day to consider that war threatened, they could then, if they thought it advisable, demand that the German Government should cease from all activity and the German Parliament be suspended. The Germans and their State institutions are then bound by treaty to facilitate the carrying out of these orders. At a time of supreme danger, in which German divisions are to go into battle, Germany alone is to lose her Parliament and her democratic Government. This is an extreme example, but the text of the treaty admits of this interpretation, and there would be no appeal to any court of arbitration. Thus the Occupation Statute is revoked only in form, while in fact an occupation regime continues.

Similar anomalies appear also in the treaty establishing the European Defence Community. For example, in the event of war the German divisions are to be placed under the Supreme Commander of N.A.T.O., without the German Government's having any part in deciding (since Western Germany is not included in N.A.T.O.) who that Supreme Commander is to be, or under what directives he is to carry out military operations. Furthermore, there has been a reluctance to give E.D.C. an adequate democratic parliamentary basis. True, a sort of parliamentary Assembly elected indirectly, is provided for, but in practice it carries little weight. Thus no equivalent of a genuinely democratic parliamentary organ is provided on a supra-national level, while at the same time national Parliaments lose their right to determine their own defence Budgets, and are even, in the event of attack, deprived of the possibility of deciding whether such attack constitutes a case for defensive war. Could all these misgivings be outweighed by progress towards a free and peaceful reunification of Germany?

It is frequently pointed out that in the Preamble to the Bonn Treaty the three Western Powers commit themselves to the reunification of Germany as their common aim. But to many Germans such formal recognition seems to betray but little common sense as long as each of the treaty signatories has in mind different conditions and prerequisites for that unification, and so long as there is no basis for a common plan to achieve it. For military divisions are, unhappily, an inevitable adjunct of policy, but they do not in themselves constitute a policy.

The text of the treaty itself lays down two conditions which in themselves practically exclude a reunification of Germany. First, reunification can only be pursued with the agreement of each of the signatories, and only via 'integration'—in other words, by way

of rigid incorporation as a dependent member in a supra-national organization; and secondly, and as a consequence, if Germany is reunited, N.A.T.O. is to extend to the Oder. Now, if there is one condition, as the whole world knows, that is unacceptable to the Russians, it is precisely that the U.S.S.R. should give up the Soviet Zone to be a levying-ground for recruits for the N.A.T.O. supreme command.

It is recognized in Germany that these treaties are welcomed in the world in general as representing a considerable step forward, giving Germany security and equality while also preparing the unification of Europe. Unfortunately neither the text nor the meaning of the treaties appear to justify this favourable estimate. A conscientious business man does not buy an article because of its attractive appearance alone—he has first to test its value; and this is equally true in politics. No democrat in Germany can fail to realize the seriousness of the times in which we live; and for that very reason he is bound to reflect that a false step may make the danger even greater. And official communiqués and press campaigns cannot conceal the fact that among very wide circles in Germany, and especially among the democratic working classes, there is a strong antipathy towards these treaties—an antipathy arising from such sound impulses as the love of democracy and of the Western ideals of freedom and peace.

For much too long the debate has been going round in a circle, one side arguing that only the establishment and integration of German divisions will make subsequent and promising four-Power negotiations possible, the other rejoining that four-Power negotiations represent the one and only way to the establishment of German divisions. On what basis is it possible for Germany to make a profitable and necessary contribution to world peace?

1. For German democrats, irrespective of party, there can be no alternative between East and West, no see-saw policy, and above all no return to Rapallo. The aggressive Soviet regime of 1953 bears no comparison even with the Russia of 1922.

History will regard it as one of the main achievements of Kurt Schumacher that the German working classes, more than those of any other continental country, despise Communism and are wholeheartedly in favour of a free democracy. The Social Democrats consider it their duty to preserve this heritage of Schumacher's, because they regard it as an indispensable foundation of security and freedom for the whole Western world that the Ger-

man workers are immune from Communist infiltration. It is their especial concern to make the German people realize even more fully than hitherto that the solidarity of the Western democracies is a source of strength and a common advantage. Everything that strengthens democracy in Germany also strengthens the defensive power of the Western world—but unfortunately that cannot be said of the present draft treaties, and even less of the manoeuvres which are being employed to bring about their acceptance.

2. It has always been beyond argument for all German democrats that they must make their full material contribution to the common defence. It is therefore a mistake to suggest that the treaties are a necessary means towards curbing excessive German competition. German democrats fully realize that a proportion of the country's national product must be sacrificed to pay for re-armament, and they are ready to do so. But they hold the view that this burden should not be allowed to stifle democracy, and that the tremendous liabilities of Germany in respect of war veterans, of the millions of refugees from the Eastern Zone, and of the free part of Berlin should also in fairness be regarded as direct defence expenditure.

3. The alpha and omega of all German policy is the absolute recognition that the very existence of the German people depends on the maintenance of peace. However a third world war might be fought, and however it might end, the exposed position of Germany in the centre of Europe permits of no illusion that the outbreak of war would in itself mean the end of the Germans. This view is so fundamental and instinctive for Germans that it is impossible to over-estimate its consequences. Thus Germany's vital interests are equally concerned both with a defensive strengthening of the West such as would deter the East from war, and with a policy of détente, indeed of world-wide détente extending also to the Far East. Any speculations about German intentions of regaining unity and the Eastern territories through force of arms are quite unrealistic. They fail to take into account the profound exhaustion of the German people, their longing for peace, and the unanimous opinion that German unity is only worth striving for by peaceful methods.

4. In consequence of this German need for a policy of détente the Germans have a real and personal interest in satisfying the need for security of their neighbours in the East and in the West. To take this question first from the Western angle. Although Ger-

many's geographical situation as a border State with the Soviet Union may appear comparable to that of Sweden, Finland, or Yugoslavia, her own interests forbid her to pursue a policy of no alliances, still less a policy of neutralization, which the Social Democrats have always rejected. To neutralize Germany merely means letting her stew in her own juice in preparation for the Russian cauldron. Neither can Germany be, or wish to be, without alliances, because she cannot live alone on the edge of the Iron Curtain without Europe. Europe signifies the alliance of all free and equal peoples of the continent.

But because of this conception of Europe which the Germans believe in and hope for, many of them consider it a mistake to narrow down the European alliance to the Franco-German question. They consider that it can only weaken Europe as a whole to split it up into a combination of the Schuman Plan States, to the exclusion of the other States.

The Franco-German question must not be isolated, neither can it be solved by the Chinese method of binding the foot to prevent its growth. In economic potential and in population the Germans have, so to speak, bigger feet than the French, and so it would be unwise to attempt an artificial restriction of the German body if the ultimate aim is to strengthen German democracy and place it at the service of the common defence of the West. The policy of integration leads into a blind alley: it endangers democracy and weakens Europe. On the other hand, a multilateral pact of trade, friendship, and mutual assistance between all European nations would relieve Franco-German tension and satisfy France's need for security.

5. As far as the East is concerned, such a policy of détente also means that the tension between East and West cannot be regarded as purely regional, and therefore cannot be treated as an isolated German question. As was said at the beginning of this article, the restoration of German unity in liberty and by peaceful means is in no wise a purely national concern. Rather is it an essential goal on the road to world peace, through a détente between the White House and the Kremlin, and should therefore be solved on an international basis.

It is neither permissible nor possible to act as if a third world war, with all its attendant calamities for the countries of Western Europe, were inevitable. And therefore the Cold War cannot be perpetuated in a divided Germany; instead, the united forces of

the West should combine to seek points of negotiation, both in the Far East and in Europe, which, while establishing security and peace for the free peoples of the world, will at the same time appear to the Soviet Union more advantageous than their present possession of the Soviet Zone of Germany. Thus the price of German reunification should, for the sake of world peace, lie in a new balance between West and East, through the particular way in which the reunited Germany is included within the comity of nations. This is a difficult task, but it should be attempted. The present treaties do not appear adequate for it, precisely because the necessarily special relationship of Germany to N.A.T.O. will influence Russia's feeling of need for security.

In the writer's view, it would be possible to adopt a different attitude towards the establishment of German armed forces if it is considered necessary for the common security, but there are two prerequisites: the Western co-ordination of these forces should take place within the framework of an all-European pact of friendship and mutual assistance; and the possibility should be kept open of controlling these forces through global West-East agreement and making them a factor for world balance.

It would, indeed, be a wonderful work for humanity if common efforts could bring Berlin out of its state of siege, reuniting it once more to the free West and preserving the Germans east of the Elbe from sinking into the darkness of Soviet slavery.

Those who may not agree with the views expressed here may still bear in mind that the democratic opponents of the present draft treaties in Germany, equally with the whole German people, desire to serve the cause of our common civilization, our common security, and our common ideals of freedom, humanity and social justice, and are deeply conscious of their duty to make a German contribution of goodwill.

A. A.

Peaceful Change in the Lebanon

The 'Rose-water' Revolution

THE Lebanon, no less than some other countries of the Middle East, has recently experienced a political upheaval—but with a difference. For the 'bloodless revolution' of last September—it has even been termed a 'rose-water revolution'—took place within the framework of the Constitution and resulted in the strengthening rather than the abandonment of the existing parliamentary system.

The economic structure of the Lebanon is very different from the agrarian economies of the other Arab countries, since she produces little, relying on imports for 85 per cent of her needs and paying for them by invisible exports, which form three-quarters of her total export trade. There is not the same pressure of a large land-hungry peasantry or an easily inflamed urban proletariat as there is in Egypt; and the national income per head of the population is approximately double that of the other Arab States. Trade is decisive for the country's economy.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTION

During the early months of 1952 the internal situation began noticeably to deteriorate from a political and psychological point of view. The President, Bishara el Khoury, had been in office since 1943 and, though himself by repute an able man and shrewd politician, had built up around himself an entourage which insulated him from public opinion, with the result that he perhaps failed to realize the strength of popular feeling which had for some time been developing against himself, his family, and the vested interests involved in the regime. The first real crack in the façade had appeared with the General Election of 1951, which saw for the first time the emergence of a very small and uncoordinated Parliamentary Opposition. Moreover, the assassination of the ex-Premier Riad Solh, while on a visit to King Abdullah of Jordan in July 1951, deprived the majority party of its strongest and most able Moslem politician.

On the economic front, the signature in February 1952 of a new agreement with Syria failed to improve the stagnation caused by the loss of the Palestine market and by the earlier economic break, of March 1950, with Syria, which had hitherto been an essential

complement to the Lebanon's economy, particularly since the Palestine war. Against the background of Musaddiq's activities in Iran, the Lebanon's agreement with the various foreign oil companies whose pipelines terminate on the Lebanese seaboard seemed to the man in the street highly unsatisfactory; and public opinion was further disgruntled by the apparently insignificant results of American technical aid under the Point Four Programme, from which it had been led by ignorance and unwise propaganda to hope for far too much. Confidence in the Government was also shaken by the discovery that many of the £L100 (about £10) notes in circulation were skilful forgeries that could only have been produced abroad. A number of trade scandals came to light, none of them of such cataclysmic dimensions as the arms scandal in Egypt, but showing in the aggregate the underlying lack of order and stability. For instance, it was found that 10,000 cases of Argentine corned beef, sent as a gift by Eva Perón for the Palestine refugees in the Lebanon, had been sold on the black market by the Deputy who had solicited the donation.

The life of the capital was dislocated by a series of strikes. Bakers ceased work; taxi-drivers, the most lawless and yet the most 'protected' section of the Beirut population, went on strike; and for six weeks the courts were closed because the lawyers had struck. Most serious of all, February saw the beginning of an organized refusal by consumers to pay the bills of the Electricity Company, and squads stood by all day and night to reconnect the current for householders as fast as they were disconnected by the Company for non-payment. This boycott was maintained for over six months, until the regime fell in September and a 22 per cent reduction in the price of electricity was finally obtained.

Another symptom of the corruption prevailing in the administration was the periodic outbreak of crimes of violence, amounting almost to gang warfare, conducted by the private agents or hirelings of influential persons. If this had involved only ordinary citizens the 'bloodless revolution' might have been indefinitely postponed, but as it happened a series of criminal assaults of a political nature were also made on members of the press. Although it was known where the culprits were hiding and who had instigated the affair, the police were rendered helpless by the importance of the 'protectors' involved and the refusal of President Bishara el Khoury to authorize action. This failure of justice roused the press into bitter attacks on the Government, and by the

late spring the existence of corruption and the necessity for reform had become the subject of open discussion in the Chamber. However, the only practical outcome, as might be expected from a virtually packed House, was a vote of confidence in the Government.

If one man can claim to be the moving spirit of the 'bloodless revolution' it is Kamal Jumblatt, an ascetic young man in his early thirties. The son of Sitt Nazira, a famous and powerful lady who was the acknowledged leader of the Druzes in the Lebanon, he was educated at Oxford, and after the war paid several visits to India where he came under the influence of Asian socialism. He became Minister of National Economy at the early age of twenty-seven, and in 1951 founded the Progressive Socialist Party (P.S.P.) of which he was the sole representative in the Chamber.

Once in Parliament, Jumblatt proceeded to conduct a one-man crusade against the corruption and confusion prevailing in political life. For instance, on one occasion, when his plea for the free movement of grain was opposed in the Chamber on the ground that it would be fatal to Lebanese economy, he pointed out that goods prohibited by law were simply smuggled, and to prove his point he loaded a couple of lorries with wheat, and having provided the drivers with hard cash he followed them at a discreet distance in his own car to the Syrian-Lebanese frontier, at that time still a political but not an economic barrier. By dint of handing out £L15 here and £L10 there, the drivers with their loads of contraband succeeded in passing through five control posts into Syria. Jumblatt then turned them round and headed triumphantly back to Beirut, collecting on the way the names of the guilty officials and how much each had received.

THE CRISIS

On 30 May 1952, not long after the assaults on members of the press, Jumblatt, who owns *al Anba*, one of the thirty newspapers and periodicals published in the Lebanon, himself wrote and signed an article entitled, 'They were put in by foreigners, let the people turn them out', violently attacking the whole regime. This article was in effect an incitement to revolution, and it was so regarded by the authorities. The issue of *al Anba* that carried it was promptly seized; policemen could be seen running after newsvendors in the streets, and the last copies fetched the equivalent of half a crown each. Under Lebanese law it is the editor of

a paper who bears the legal responsibility, and it was therefore the editor of *al Anba* who was sought by the police; but he was nowhere to be found, since Jumblatt had sent him away the night before. Jumblatt pointed out that he was both the owner of the paper and the author of the article and invited the police to arrest him instead; but the authorities, uneasily conscious of the extent of his following among the warlike Druzes, stood virtuously upon the letter of the law and demanded the editor or nothing.

Jumblatt used his freedom to good effect, for it was at this moment that he conceived a masterly idea that greatly precipitated the crisis. He persuaded his small following of seven supporters in the Chamber (who together formed the F.S.N.—Front Socialiste et National) to prepare a written question to the Government on the *al Anba* incident, incorporating the full text of the offending article. Since in this form it could be legitimately published, seven of the most important papers did so. They were all suppressed. The Government had now been adroitly pushed into a plainly illegal action, and from then on it was war to the death between the Government and the press. In the face of this flagrant act of oppression the press called a strike, and for three days Beirut was without newspapers despite the Government's offer of the equivalent of £L100 a day to any paper that would go into print. For over a month thereafter the press refused to publish any picture of a member of the Government or any mention of official activities; blank spaces were left for Government communiqués.

The trials of these eight papers lasted for two weeks. On the day of the *al Anba* hearing an imposing array of P.S.P. supporters descended from the mountains and surrounded the Palais de Justice. Jumblatt, carried shoulder high by the crowd, appealed for unity among the opposition parties in order to save the country from the tyranny and chaos that now threatened it. The police did not interfere in this demonstration, but every day throughout the trials the army was ordered to stand by in case of real trouble, and on all main roads into Beirut posses of policemen stopped incoming traffic, searching for arms and P.S.P. supporters. Several prominent lawyers who were also Opposition (F.S.N.) Deputies (including Camille Chamoun and Hamid Frangie) offered their free services for the defence of the eight newspapers, and there was even applause in court for their denunciations of the Government. Nevertheless, the latter's hold over the judiciary was such

that judges did not dare to give acquittals, and sentences of fines and suppression for periods up to nine months were meted out in every case. A month later there was a second press strike, this time lasting three weeks, and several prominent editors escaped imprisonment only by fleeing to Syria and requesting political asylum.

However, about this time a minor but significant event also took place in the courts. The same majority Deputy who had sold Eva Perón's corned beef was prosecuted by a banking firm on a charge of issuing an uncovered cheque for a large amount. Although he had the full backing of the Government he was convicted and ordered to make restitution—a remarkably mild sentence by ordinary standards, but this was the first time that any member or protégé of the Government had ever been convicted in the courts; and the judge who had had the courage to do so not only received telegrams and congratulations from all over the country but was even sent flowers by the press.

During August the struggle, which had hitherto been confined to the Government and the press, spread to the people as a whole, greatly stimulated and encouraged by the news of the overthrow of the corrupt regime in Egypt at the end of July. The parliamentary Opposition of the F.S.N. united with the extra-parliamentary parties, such as the Liberals and Falangistes, to form a Popular Front which organized and directed subsequent events, the first of which was a series of mass meetings in the mountains, advertised by means of leaflets scattered from the air. These meetings marked a turning point in the affair, since for the first time the President himself was publicly attacked, and once it was realized that it was possible to do so with impunity, popular discontent acquired a focus and events moved more rapidly towards their climax.

The press incessantly attacked the corruption, confusion, and irresponsibility of the Government; and the Government, no longer able to ignore or stifle the clamour, sought desperately for a remedy—but what? Nobody wanted to touch the prerogative of the President's men. Prime Minister Sami Solh, cousin of the assassinated Riad Solh, though less able than his cousin made up for it in boldness and opportunism. He had been willing to institute reforms, but was continually frustrated by the vested interests that originated from above him; and so, subjected to pressure from both directions, he finally exploded what was to become his famous 'bombshell'. Its first intimation came at a

Cabinet meeting held on the eve of a special session of Parliament convened for 28 August to discuss the situation, when he announced that he would add a few words of his own to the Government statement.

This extraordinary session of the Chamber, which was to prove the most momentous in Lebanese history, opened in a tense atmosphere with an incongruous two minutes' silence to the memory of Eva Perón. Journalists, foreign diplomats, and other notables filled the gallery, and special security measures were taken in case of disturbances. The Cabinet spokesman rose and read the prepared statement setting out the achievements of the Government in education, public works, and other fields, but this pallid and unconvincing document was entirely overshadowed by the 'few words' of Sami Solh himself. As soon as the statement was finished, the Prime Minister rose to his feet and launched into a violent diatribe against the corruption in high places, the like of which (even stripped of its more picturesque phrases, such as 'dancing on the skulls of dead men' and the 'nauseous stink of corruption') can seldom have been heard from a Prime Minister on the floor of any Parliament.

He began by disavowing all responsibility for the state of affairs. He then proceeded to cite concrete instances of the perversion of justice and interference by named members of the President's family and other highly placed persons, and referred to Government attempts to protect the press, destroy the hashish crop, inquire into the origin of wealth, and break down the pernicious system of chits, all of which had been frustrated by the influence exerted by interested parties. Having finished reading he said, 'We are not asking for your confidence, gentlemen, we are informing you of the situation. As for our resignation, we will present it to the President,' and then walked out.

Chaos broke out in the Chamber. While Sami Solh was still speaking Deputies pounded on the desk, rang the bell, and banged the gavel to drown his voice; and as soon as he had finished Ministers (who while he was speaking had left the Government benches and gone to sit among the Deputies, leaving the Prime Minister as a one-man Government) hastened to assure the House that the Cabinet had not been consulted. Somebody tried to detain Solh to answer questions, but the quorum melted rapidly away as Deputies rushed out into the corridors to discuss the 'bombshell'. After the sitting the few remaining Ministers went posthaste to

the President's summer house in Aley to hand in their resignation, but Solh himself, despite his words, went home to bed.

The President, in a last attempt to save the situation, dismissed Solh by decree, in virtue of his declared intention to resign, and set up a provisional Government of three men with Saeb Slam, a former Minister of the Interior and a prominent business man, as Prime Minister, while preparations were made to appoint a constitutional Government to carry out reform. This was considered by many to be unconstitutional, since although the President was allowed the choice of a Prime Minister he should have consulted the Chamber first.

From 9 to 18 September the old regime fought for its life. Desperate attempts were made to form a Government, first from parliamentary groups, and when that failed from public figures (such as Charles Malik) outside the Chamber or even overseas. Decrees announced the dismissal of eleven heads of Government departments, three colonels of the gendarmerie, and the Administrator of Beirut. A commission of lawyers was charged with the reorganization of the magistrature. All this, as the press pointed out, was an attempt to use officials who had only obeyed orders as scapegoats for the men at the top; and most of these functionaries came back to their offices the next day as if nothing had happened.

The authorities again attempted to muzzle the press. The papers that had reported Solh's 'bombshell', in full or in part, were seized. Since there was no law against publishing the statements of an active Prime Minister, a group of papers decided to sue the authorities for abuse of power. The latter retaliated by sueing 'persons unknown' for publishing treasonable statements. The press was also forbidden to publish a manifesto put out by the F.S.N., and the only paper that did so printed it in the middle of an article on foreign news in order to mislead the censors and delay seizure of the issue.

In the meantime the small parliamentary Opposition party of the F.S.N. came together with the extra-parliamentary opposition for the organization of a general strike. But a divergence of opinion was apparent from the first, since the latter's aim was to form a strong and neutral Government with full powers (including the dissolution of the Chamber) to carry out the necessary reforms, without touching the person of the President. The F.S.N., on the other hand, dominated by Jumblatt, held fast to the radical course of refusing all partial solutions and maintaining a general strike

until the President should resign. Both parties therefore went ahead independently with the organization of the general strike, which was called for Monday 15 September. At the same time efforts were being made to prevent the strike, particularly by a certain prominent Deputy who distributed pamphlets and called meetings of trade union and local leaders, promising to pay £L50 a day to any shop that kept open, as well as compensation for damage. His horses were booed on the race course that Sunday.

In spite of such counter-attacks the strike, the first general strike in the history of the Middle East, was an unparalleled success; and with the exception of chemists' shops and a few grocers in the foreign quarter, commercial life was almost completely arrested in the whole of Beirut and the larger provincial towns. This was an astonishing feat in a country where self-interest and the short view predominate; and the steel shutters of a nation of traders were a symbol too menacing to be ignored by the most impervious authorities. Accusations were made by the majority party that the object of the Opposition was to upset the delicate balance of religious representation by putting in a non-Maronite as President, but this was promptly denied in declarations published by several parties, including the Moslems.

On the third day of the strike the President summoned the majority Deputies to Aley, and there occurred the astonishing spectacle of fifty-eight of the seventy-seven Deputies in the Chamber making a written declaration of 'absolute confidence' in a President against whom the people had pushed their opposition to the point of revolution. Thus encouraged, President el Khoury that evening refused Prime Minister Saeb Slam's demand for his resignation. Slam, pointing out that it was the support of the people, not of the Deputies, that was needed, himself resigned. As a last resort the President called upon an ex-Premier, Oueni, who agreed to try to form a Government if he could obtain the support of the army and if the President agreed to go abroad for six months. But the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Shehab, replied that he could not pit the army against the will of the people, and the only solution was the resignation of the President. This firm stand effectively barred the only loophole, and in the early hours of 18 September Bishara el Khoury finally resigned, nominating General Shehab as both Prime Minister and Head of the State in order to maintain constitutional continuity until the Chamber could elect a new President.

Though the main objective had now been accomplished the situation was still extremely delicate. The President had gone, but his majority in the Chamber remained, entirely unrepresentative of the will of the people; and the small parliamentary minority that had achieved such a resounding victory would now have to accept (in the election of a new President) the choice of a majority that had supported el Khoury up to the eleventh hour. The fear that the Chamber might refuse to accept the resignation was allayed by reference to Article 75 of the Constitution, which stated that when assembled for the election of a President the Chamber met as an electoral college and not as a deliberative body, and could therefore not debate the resignation at all. But there were also rumours that the majority would elect a friend of el Khoury's in order to save their own skins, and Jumblatt announced that if this happened 'blood would flow in the streets'.

In these circumstances there was naturally considerable clamour for the dissolution of the Chamber, and a delegation went to Shehab with this request, backed by the threat of strikes and mass demonstrations. The Commander-in-Chief replied that it was essential to have a President elected under the Constitution, and he considered that the dissolution of the Chamber, followed by revision of the Constitution and a General Election, would merely prolong the present dangerous period of uncertainty and intrigue. Moreover, any demonstration would be suppressed by force, since such a course of action had been rejected by written declaration from all the principal parties.

The date of the election was fixed for 23 September, five days after the President's resignation, and for safety's sake a curfew was imposed until mid-day. Since General Shehab himself, who appeared to be by far the most popular candidate, had declined nomination, the choice lay between Camille Chamoun and Hamid Frangie, the former being considered to be the British 'candidate' and the latter the French. The majority finally resigned itself to the inevitable. Since most of the Deputies knew that they would not be returned at the next election, they were anxious to make hay while the sun shone, and one Deputy is said to have asked £L100,000 (£10,000) for his vote. There were strong rumours that considerable sums were put at Chamoun's disposal by the British for this purpose. The night before the election Frangie withdrew. The majority, which had maintained the most bitter attack against Chamoun until a few days before, raised the cry of 'national

unanimity' in order to justify its *volte-face*, and on the morning of 23 September Chamoun was elected unanimously except for one blank ballot paper.

THE AFTERMATH

The Government, when finally formed after nearly two more weeks of crisis, was entirely extra-parliamentary, and consisted of Khaled Shehab (a distant Moslem cousin of the Commander-in-Chief) and three other ex-diplomats. The extreme difficulty found in forming a Government was largely due to the attitude adopted by the F.S.N., or rather by Kamal Jumblatt, who demanded at least half the seats in the Cabinet and stuck to his programme of radical reform. The result was that within a few weeks the F.S.N. had ceased to exist and Jumblatt himself, whose very virtues had been his undoing, had lost—at least so far as the towns were concerned—a good deal of the prestige acquired during the past six months. A socialist of the Asiatic brand is perhaps more idealistic and unpractical than his Western counterpart, and Jumblatt's uncompromising stand succeeded in antagonizing every articulate section of the community. The wealthy classes were outraged by his declared intention to investigate not only illegally acquired wealth, but even fortunes made by ordinary commercial profiteering; the trading section of the community, the most important in the Lebanon, was alarmed by his proposals for a controlled economy which goes against the whole tradition of free trade and free enterprise by which the country has hitherto existed; and lastly the landowning element was antagonized by his insistence on land reform, which is not of such overriding importance in a small and mountainous country.

Moreover, the greater part of Jumblatt's permanent following (as opposed to the recent temporary coalition) has always consisted of his own feudal and religious supporters, but in his passionate adherence to principles he would rather dispense with this loyalty and rely upon purely political and idealistic adherence. Thus he finds himself in the position of having lost the support of the older parties, though at the same time he is gaining more following in the countryside; he is now waiting with serene patience for the social revolution which he predicts will come. This total, if temporary, eclipse is a pity, since the Middle East needs such men as Jumblatt; but he is undoubtedly a figure to watch for the future.

Since the Presidential election, progress, though not as spec-

tacular as some may have hoped, has been appreciable. Faced with the paradoxical situation of a Chamber almost solidly hostile to the Government, the only logical course was to dissolve Parliament and hold a General Election. However, under the Constitution not more than two months may elapse between dissolution and new elections, and since it is not customary to hold these in the winter, the Government and the Chamber had to get along together somehow till the spring. It was therefore arranged that the Government should have plenary power for a period of six months from 15 October 1952. Thus the most essential reforms would be made by decree, and the only subject to be submitted to review by the Chamber was the Budget. This, it was thought, would keep Deputies harmlessly occupied in haggling over public works allocations.

Meanwhile the essential revision of the electoral law has at last been effected. The main points of reform were partial female suffrage; no second ballot; a compulsory vote (which will bring in the more educated classes); the reduction of the number of seats from 77 to 44; and, lastly, the introduction of 'small lists'. This is the most important change of all, since the old system, under which the Lebanon was divided into five districts each with a list of twelve or more names (each representing some religious or other community) which were entered as a block, gave a stranglehold to the leader of the majority in each district, so that in practice five men might dominate the whole Chamber. Now there will be thirty-three districts instead of five, and each list will have only three or four names.

Secondly, a certain amount of house-cleaning has been effected in the Government services. For instance, no fewer than two-thirds of the 3,000 municipal employees in Beirut, from street cleaners up, have never done more than draw their pay, their posts being rewards for political favours. These sinecures are gradually being abolished, in spite of threats from those involved and predictions of disastrous unemployment. Lastly, a thoroughgoing overhaul of the judiciary has been put in hand, and the position and pay of the civil service, particularly in the lower grades, has been greatly improved, so that minor officials need no longer be corrupt in order to live.

The most recent step has been the promulgation of the much-discussed law permitting the investigation of any fortunes acquired since 1943. This has caused a certain uneasiness in the

Chamber, and has intensified its demands that a new Cabinet should be formed from among its members. The present Government's plenary powers end in April, and if a parliamentary Cabinet is not formed the Chamber will have to be dissolved and a General Election held in May or June. Feelings are still running high. A prominent majority Deputy recently threatened Jumblatt and another member of the F.S.N. with a revolver on the floor of the House, an incident which has increased public dissatisfaction with the Chamber. Even President Chamoun has begun to be attacked by his ex-colleagues of the F.S.N. for his alleged failure to take a radical line.

It is too early as yet to make any real assessment of the results of the 'rose-water revolution', since the country is still going through an interim period. But as far as past events are concerned it may be said that, considering that the Lebanon is not a dictatorship and there was no strong centralized control, the 'revolution' was carried out with considerable dignity and moderation; and the absence of bloodshed is really worthy of remark in an area where passions flare up for a trifle. The President, though the symbol and focus of popular resentment, was not subjected to any indignities or restraint of either his person or property; and he himself, once persuaded of the necessity for resignation, was careful to ensure that it was handled in a constitutional manner. The various religious communities, between which there is a far deeper cleavage than could be imagined by the average European, succeeded for a short time in working together most admirably for a purpose wider than the usual sectarian aims. Perhaps most important of all was the wisdom and sense of responsibility shown by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In fact there is some justice in Jumblatt's claim that the bloodless revolution showed the country's political maturity.

J. L.

Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy

The Effects in Agriculture

A PREVIOUS article[1] has described the remoulding of the pattern of Czechoslovak economic development, with its emphasis on the expansion of heavy industries, aimed at enabling Czechoslovakia to play her part as one of the chief suppliers of heavy industrial equipment to the Soviet *bloc*.

In accordance with this re-orientation of the whole Czechoslovak economy the farming community is now being compelled to abandon its long-standing traditions of individual tenure and cultivation and to exchange them for the Soviet-inspired ideal of communal work on the land. Despite opposition on the part of certain sections of the farming community, and despite conflicts within the Czechoslovak Communist Party which led to the elimination of the chief planner of collectivization, Rudolf Slansky, the growth of so-called 'higher type co-operatives', involving a complete pooling of members' resources, has proceeded apace since 1950.

THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

The Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Nepomucky, has described the Government's agricultural policy as 'emulation of the example set by collective farming in the U.S.S.R.', and all means at the regime's disposal are being used to achieve that end. In the economic field a major aim of collectivization is to gain much-needed labour for new industrial projects by introducing large-scale mechanized agricultural production based on units bigger than the individual holding. In this way, the Czechoslovak planners believe, rationalized organization of work, new methods, mechanization, and scientific progress will enable them to drain off labour released by the 'transformation of agriculture' for other purposes. At the same time the break-up of the old system of tenure will destroy the only social class left which is passionately interested in the maintenance of private property—the land-owning peasants.

These aims can only be achieved by the thorough application of

[1] See 'Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy: The Effects in Industry', in *The World Today*, February 1953

Soviet methods, and the introduction of collectivized farming is the main prerequisite of success in this respect. The chief Soviet expert attached to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Agriculture, K. G. Golovaty, controls a considerable staff of Soviet agronomists, and he himself appears in public frequently, ranking second only to the Minister of Agriculture himself. Wide publicity is given to study trips undertaken by Czechoslovak farmers and agricultural officials to the U.S.S.R., and visitors from the Soviet Union come to Czechoslovakia eager to impart their expert knowledge to their Czechoslovak comrades.

Recently particular attention has been paid to the application of Soviet agricultural science, and last November a delegation of Czechoslovak scientists was received by Lysenko himself who informed them of the latest successes of Michurinist science. It is claimed that the application of Lysenko's teaching has led to the successful cultivation of rice and the rubber plant (*kog sagyz*) in Slovakia and Southern Moravia. The inauguration of the Czechoslovak Academy of Agricultural Science in January 1953 was made the occasion of many speeches and articles designed to popularize and stress the special value of Soviet agricultural science. Addressing the National Front Action Committee in January Premier Zapotocky said: 'We must force the soil to produce more.' It is possible that the Czechoslovak authorities believe that Michurin and Lysenko have discovered the best way of increasing yields.

Agricultural production is said to be lagging behind the pace of industrial development, and it would appear that it can only be increased through improved yields. Nepomucky told the Agricultural Co-operatives' Congress last February that the ruling industrial working class would continue to help the farmers only in return for satisfactory food supplies. At the same time, the late President Gottwald's message to this Congress warned against the use of harsh measures in persuading farmers of the benefits of co-operative farming as practised in Czechoslovakia.

In conformity with similar developments in industry, Czechoslovak agriculture has been placed under the control of a number of new economic Ministries: the Ministry of Agriculture proper, the Ministry of Forests, the Bulk Buying Ministry, and the Ministry of State Farms. All these new economic authorities have been set up since September 1951, replacing other bodies such as the Directorate of State Farms, which was alleged to have been

permeated by Slansky's agents. The setting up of these Ministries has led to a certain degree of centralization, but the abolition of intermediate administrative bodies hitherto accountable only to the Ministry of Agriculture has thrown more work on to local government officials. Nosek, Minister of the Interior, complained at the Communist Party Conference in December 1952 that 25 per cent of the staff of District National Committees had to concern themselves with agricultural matters. It remains to be seen whether the number of economic Ministries will now be reduced in accordance with latest Soviet practice.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND MECHANIZATION

Originally the main emphasis had been placed on the purely co-operative aspect of communal work, and in 1950 many villages had adopted the basic type of co-operative, which merely implied the joint execution of certain seasonal tasks such as sowing, ploughing, and reaping, and the temporary pooling of the necessary equipment. But this was only a first step, and soon the authorities began to urge farmers to proceed from mere co-operation to socialist farming by ploughing up field boundaries and pooling all resources, including livestock, now to be housed in communal cowsheds and pig-sties. The 'highest type' co-operatives, where all these conditions have been fulfilled and where members' income is reckoned exclusively on a basis of 'working units' (i.e., units of work done for the co-operative), approximate to the officially acclaimed pattern of Soviet collective farms and are co-operatives in name alone. The extent of land farmed by co-operatives with ploughed-up field boundaries has increased as follows:

Date	*Agricultural Land*	*Arable Land*
31 December 1950	1,134,393 hectares[1]	816,095 hectares
31 December 1951	1,305,610 hectares	971,350 hectares
31 December 1952	2,598,073 hectares	1,859,987 hectares

[1] 1 hectare = 2·471 acres

In February 1953 these co-operatives tilled nearly 38 per cent of the country's whole area of agricultural land.

The part played by co-operatives in animal husbandry increased proportionately. Co-operatives with ploughed-up field boundaries held the following percentages of the national livestock totals in 1950–52:

	1950	1951	1952
		Per cent of total	
Cattle	12	14·5	33·8
Dairy cows	11·5	13·6	32·4
Pigs	11	17	37·7
Sows	11·8	19·6	39·7
Sheep	9·8	21·5	39·7
Hens	11·8	13·8	30·1

Co-operatives of all types numbered 5,115 at the end of 1950, 6,126 at the end of 1951, and 8,558 at the end of 1952. It is obvious that during 1952 collectivization had made considerable progress. Out of approximately 14,000 villages in Czechoslovakia 8,558 now have a co-operative, and 66 per cent of the total number of co-operatives have progressed to the higher type, involving the pooling of all resources. In 1951 only 48 per cent of co-operatives had reached that stage, but by the end of 1952 these higher types controlled 230,000 former holdings covering 2,000,000 hectares of agricultural land.

It is interesting that collectivization has made comparatively little headway in the Olomouc and Hradec Kralove regions where high standards of scientific farming have prevailed for many decades. The greatest progress, on the other hand, has been made in Slovakia, where in the past there was considerable hidden rural unemployment; almost 50 per cent of Slovakia's agricultural land is now in the hands of co-operatives and State farms.

Co-operatives and individual farmers depend on State tractor stations for their agricultural machines, and, as in the U.S.S.R., the tractor stations are the keystone of the agricultural system. In Czechoslovakia persuasion still has an important part to play in gaining farmers for the Government's rural policy, and only successful utilization of machines will convince sceptics of the benefits of co-operation and collectivization. Large areas are needed to make full use of tractors and other machines, and the ploughing-up of field boundaries therefore represents an important step in the development of a co-operative. The 256 tractor stations hold a virtual monopoly of all available machines and tractors and are under constant surveillance by the Party and Government authorities.

In March 1952 a Decree was passed calling on tractor stations to improve their performance and instructing them to give absolute priority to work for co-operatives. Throughout the year intensive training of station managers went on, directed by the Soviet expert A. F. Deviatkov, and apart from home-produced

tractors and implements an unspecified number of caterpillar tractors, 300 combine harvesters, about 1,000 quintuple share ploughs, 300 disc harrows for use with tractors, fifty-two beet combines, drying equipment, potato lifters, and other machines were imported from the U.S.S.R. According to the 1952 official harvest report, the work of tractor stations during the harvest improved by 25 per cent in comparison with 1951. Last year the degree of mechanization rose by 4 per cent to 31 per cent, and 75·4 per cent of the work of tractor stations was done for co-operatives, as against 66·9 per cent in 1951.

Despite these solid achievements criticism of tractor stations still continues. Maintenance is a sore point, and although Soviet forms of repair organization are being advocated the 1952 maintenance plan remained unfulfilled. Last autumn when all available tractors were needed in the fields 25 per cent of the national total was laid up for repairs. In his policy statement to the Communist Party Conference in December 1952 the late President Gottwald emphasized the importance of tractor stations, criticized maintenance work, and called for more suitable machinery. 'This is a grave problem,' he said; 'only mechanization will enable us to improve yields and to cut down the number of workers at the same time. Without mechanization we cannot hope to establish the co-operatives on a permanent basis and to extend the co-operative movement.'

STATE FARMS

Hitherto State farms have proved to be the weakest link in the agricultural system, and Premier Zapotocky has often chided them for running up huge deficits, overpaying workers, and wasting labour. The State farms had originally been intended to provide an example of socialist agriculture which would set the highest standards to be emulated by co-operatives. In October 1952 Zapotocky told an agricultural conference that 'for the time being co-operatives had nothing to learn from State farms'. Apart from the poor labour morale of employees on State farms, they also suffer from a chronic manpower shortage. A labour recruiting drive in 1951 was a complete failure, and in 1952 State farms were faced with the problem of finding 3,000 new workers—with what success has yet to be announced.

In the main these State farms are a product of the 1948 land reform under which about 800,000 hectares were allotted to them.

At present they cultivate about 10 per cent of the total agricultural land. Their primary duty is to provide the country with first-class seeds and to concentrate on meat production: they hold a virtual seed monopoly and in 1952 were expected to provide 18 per cent of the total delivery of livestock for slaughter. A special decree published in April 1952 told State farms to improve their work and to apply Soviet methods, and it would appear that their performance last year was better than in 1951.

Nevertheless, the State farms still fail to show any signs of operating without considerable financial deficits, and this year the authorities seem to have decided that the time has come for wholesale reorganization and more thorough introduction of Soviet practice. As a pilot scheme the State farm in Ličkov in Western Bohemia has been refashioned as an exact copy of a Soviet sovkhoz, and favourable results have been reported. Last February State farms were separated from the Ministry of Agriculture and placed under a Ministry of their own; but as the Soviet Ministry of State Farms was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture in the reorganization of the Soviet Government after Stalin's death, its Czechoslovak counterpart may not enjoy a long life if the Soviet example is again to be followed.

LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

Although the Czechoslovak planning authorities seem to have abandoned the hope of growing enough grain to cover the country's needs, considerable efforts have been made to secure sufficient supplies of home-produced meat. In the second half of 1951 the meat supply position was critical and meat rations had to be cut drastically. Shortages of trained workers and of fodder were described as the main causes of the crisis, and in March 1952 a special Government resolution laid down precise targets for 1952, together with the means of achieving them. Special stress was placed on the emulation of Soviet methods and on communal stabling of livestock in co-operatives. State farms were called upon to make a particular effort. The total number of cows was to be increased by 150,000 and that of sheep by 246,000 by the end of 1952, and although quarterly economic reports in June and September complained of shortfalls in the planned totals, it was announced at the end of the year that the targets set in March had been reached, and that in the case of pigs the planned total had been exceeded by 16 per cent.

DEFICIENCIES AND DIFFICULTIES

A Congress of Agricultural Co-operatives met in Prague in February 1953 to discuss and approve a draft model statute for co-operatives. Many shortcomings of farming in general and co-operatives in particular were criticized during the debate, and the hope was expressed that the draft statute, 'modelled on the best experience of Soviet collective farms and leading Czechoslovak co-operatives', would help to eliminate them. Executives and accountants have failed to come up to the required standards in many co-operatives, and existing training courses for officials and foremen are to be extended. There are constant complaints of pilfering and petty thieving by members of co-operatives and State farm workers. The inefficiency of many co-operatives is ascribed to their failure to recruit medium farmers, whose expert knowledge is badly needed. Above all co-operators are blamed for devoting too much attention to their private household plots, now limited to half a hectare.

The Communist policy of draining surplus manpower from the countryside, although successful in countries such as Rumania or Bulgaria where more than 70 per cent of the population had earned its living from the land before the war, has been carried too far in industrial Czechoslovakia. Whereas 33 per cent of Czechoslovaks depended on the land for their livelihood in 1938, today this proportion has been reduced to approximately 20 per cent. As a result agriculture is suffering from labour shortage, particularly in Bohemia and Moravia. The plight of State farms has already been described, but the gravest development is the desertion of the land by young people. Industrial wages are more attractive, and despite constant exhortations by Youth League leaders young people appear to have lost all interest in the land. Agriculture Minister Nepomucky informed the Co-operatives' Congress last February that young people (aged sixteen to nineteen) formed only 2·5 per cent of the membership of co-operatives in Bohemia and Moravia and 6·8 per cent in Slovakia. He particularly criticized their reluctance to take up the unpopular work of cowhands and pig-keepers. Periodical calls for volunteer labour to help with seasonal tasks are accepted as part of the normal state of affairs.

The Communist Party Conference held in December of last year also produced a crop of criticisms. Nosek, Minister of the Interior, described the effects of insufficient control of agriculture

on the part of local government authorities: hostile element labelled 'kulaks', were free to indulge in harmful activities rangir from negligence to outright sabotage such as wilful damage machines and rick burning; huge quantities of sugar beet, potatoe and straw had been left to rot in the fields; and, worst of all, mar local officials and village Party units had had to be purged durir 1952 for their opposition to collectivization.

Krosnař, Minister of Bulk Buying, speaking at the same Cor ference, said that insufficient attention had been paid to th cultivation of vegetables and industrial crops and that in som parts of the country the bulk buying plan had not been imple mented because deliveries had not been taken in hand in goo time. Transport difficulties, caused mainly by the chronic shortag of rolling stock, had impeded deliveries, the whole bulk buyin system was too expensive, and costs would have to be reducec Nevertheless the bulk buying plan for 1952 had been fulfilled eve though its targets had exceeded those of 1951 by 17 per cent.

DELIVERIES TO THE STATE

The model statute approved in February 1953 as valid for a co-operatives stresses the absolute priority of deliveries to th State, and the same principle governs the State's relationship wit individual farmers. Heavy penalties have been imposed in man cases of individual farmers who had failed to meet the quotas, and new rationing regulations introduced in Januar 1952 inflicted serious disadvantages for failure to fulfil deliver obligations. Members of co-operatives and tenants of agricultur land exceeding half a hectare were classed as self-suppliers an deprived of the basic food ration, with the exception of suga In reply to complaints that in many cases a farmer could not hop to feed his family and meet his delivery quotas from the proceed of half a hectare, it was pointed out that he could improve hi opportunities by joining a co-operative where he would be deal with according to his work.

The issue of sugar and clothing coupons to farmers and member of co-operatives is invariably conditional on their fulfilment of a delivery obligations. When co-operatives default all their member are penalized. This policy has led to a change in attitude, and th view of a woman delegate to the 1953 Co-operatives' Congress i worth quoting:[1] 'As long as we could get away with anything an

[1] *Zemedelske Noviny* (farmers' daily), 13 February 1953.

it made no difference whether the co-operative's contractual obligations were met or not, our people just shrugged their shoulders. But when we were given no sugar coupons for a whole month, when we saw that the authorities insisted on the implementation of contracts, people began to farm better.' It must, however, be borne in mind that a free market exists where rationed goods can be bought freely at much higher prices.

The Minister of Bulk Buying announced a reorganization of the bulk buying system to the National Assembly in November 1952: the old system, under which delivery contracts had been concluded between farmers and co-operatives on the one hand and the State, represented by local officials, on the other, had resulted in 'egalitarian practices, favouritism, and leniency towards kulaks'. As from January 1953 the Soviet system, introduced in the U.S.S.R. in 1940, would be applied: contracts would be replaced by compulsory State deliveries based on delivery norms and yield averages worked out according to districts. Individual quotas would be allocated in accordance with the type and extent of land under cultivation.

THE RESULTS: FOOD PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS

Official statistics on the whole paint a favourable picture of results achieved. In 1951 agricultural production increased by 6 per cent compared with 1950 and 12,000 tons of bread grain were harvested in excess of plan. Sugar beet and potato yields were unsatisfactory, and the production of feeding crops was 1·3 per cent below its target. Consequently bulk buying of cattle and pigs for slaughter failed to reach the 1950 level. Higher targets were nevertheless set for 1952—production was to be increased by 15 per cent, bulk buying by 17 per cent, and the livestock production resolution already mentioned called for increases in numbers of livestock, production of feeding crops, and average weights of animals for slaughter.

The 1952 Plan Report gave no overall figure for any increase in agricultural production, but stated that the provisions of the livestock production resolution had been met and that the harvest of grain, potatoes, flax, and hemp had been better than in 1951. Harvesting had been completed earlier, and production targets of wheat and oats had been exceeded. Yield improvements compared with 1951 were: wheat, 5·1 per cent; barley, 3·8 per cent; oats, 8·3 per cent; potatoes, 7·6 per cent. The livestock bulk buying

result improved by 10 per cent as against 1951 (in the case of porkers by 23 per cent) and the following percentages of planned average live weights of livestock for slaughter were recorded in the report: beef cattle, 98 per cent; calves for veal, 93 per cent; porkers, 91 per cent. The socialist sector (co-operatives and State farms) supplied 27 per cent of grain, 52 per cent of oleagenous crops, 11 per cent of potatoes, 30 per cent of beef cattle, 47 per cent of porkers, and 18 per cent of poultry delivered to the State in 1952.

Although the 1952 Plan Report records improvements, particularly in livestock production and grain yields, the year's bulk buying plan of leguminous and oleagenous crops, potatoes, sugar beet, vegetables, hops, fruit, and particularly of milk and eggs remained unfulfilled.

The 1952 sugar beet harvest was a disaster of the first magnitude in view of the importance of sugar exports to the Czechoslovak economy. The sugar beet harvest was the worst for thirty years, the sugar content of the beet being 6·5 per cent below plan, so that only 13 kg instead of the planned 15 kg of sugar could be produced from 100 kg of beet. Only 64 per cent of the yield target had been fulfilled. This failure was due to delays in sowing and singling, insufficient application of Soviet methods, and non-implementation of the sugar beet spring sowing plan. As a result the sugar ration has had to be cut severely in 1953 and the sweet ration has been completely abolished. Although Czechoslovakia offered to export sugar at the Moscow Economic Conference in April 1952, her sugar exports last year totalled only about 20 per cent of a good pre-war year.

At the 1952 Party Conference it was announced that in comparison with 1937 the production of meat, yields of grain, and totals of pigs and sheep had risen during 1952. But no details of the rate of improvement were given, and it was admitted that production of eggs and milk, yields of roots and feeding crops, and numbers of cattle, dairy cows, and hens were below pre-war levels.

Czechoslovak spokesmen claim that the pre-war level of agricultural production is being maintained, but it would appear that too much is being expected from the individual farmer, who is given none of the incentives such as tax relief and priority in the use of machinery which are so liberally showered on co-operatives. Although shortages in supplies are attributed to the improved living standards of the working class, bringing with them a

corresponding growth of demand, the fact remains that food is rationed in Czechoslovakia today, although rationing by price rather than by coupons seems to be the latest policy. The claim of maintaining pre-war production levels seems hollow in view of continued rationing, especially when it is remembered that post-war population moves and territorial adjustments decreased the number of mouths to be fed in Czechoslovakia by some 20 per cent.

In spite of statistics, it is officially admitted that Czechoslovakia cannot produce enough to feed her population, although before the war she was self-sufficient to a considerable degree. In 1937 food accounted for 13 per cent of all imports; the comparable figure for 1951 is 29 per cent. The most important aspect of this development is Czechoslovakia's reliance on food imports from the U.S.S.R. and the other People's Democracies: in 1952 more food was imported than ever before, and 48 per cent of the country's wheat requirements, 7 per cent of lard, 5 per cent of meat, 39 per cent of poultry, 25 per cent of butter, and 14 per cent of egg needs were covered by imports from the Eastern *bloc*. Both in 1951 and 1952 the U.S.S.R. exported about 1 million tons of grain to Czechoslovakia, and last January Premier Zapotocky[1] told the National Front that 'without the U.S.S.R. the country would have to do without bread and flour for nearly half the year'. In 1952 Soviet supplies of butter accounted for fully nine-tenths of butter imports, and the raw material requirements of the fat-producing industry were entirely covered by imports from the Eastern *bloc*, including China.

It is, in fact, obvious that today Czechoslovakia depends on the U.S.S.R. for a large proportion of her food, and although it would be rash to claim that this has been the aim of Czechoslovak planning, it has been one of its results and represents probably the most important factor in the Sovietization of the Czechoslovak economy. Its importance as an incentive to do everything humanly possible to fulfil industrial delivery obligations towards the U.S.S.R. cannot be underestimated.

J. A.

[1]On 21 March 1953 Zapotocky was elected President.

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Notes of the Month

Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy?

SOME important changes have taken place in the Soviet scene over the last few weeks. The first, after the establishment of the new Government, was the announcement on 20 March that Malenkov had relinquished his post of Party Secretary in favour of N. S. Khrushchev (named first of a total of five secretaries). On 27 March the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet proclaimed an amnesty and reduction of sentences for various categories of convicted persons, without, however, extending this measure to those condemned for 'counter-revolutionary activities', or for large-scale theft of socialist property, banditry, or premeditated murder. Then, on 1 April, the Council of Ministers jointly with the Central Committee of the Party decreed price reductions, more substantial and for a wider range of consumer goods than in previous years. Finally, on 4 April, came the astounding announcement by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the release of the nine doctors previously accused of murder and espionage on behalf of foreign Powers, together with six other doctors not hitherto mentioned. These doctors, it was said, had been arrested on trumped-up charges, and 'inadmissible methods' had been employed to extort confessions from them. The woman doctor, Timashuk, was now to be deprived of the Order of Lenin awarded to her for 'exposing' the plotters, and the MVD officials concerned had been arrested. Later information mentioned Riumin, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, as the chief culprit. S. D. Ignatiev, who, it was now revealed, was Minister of Internal Affairs up to Stalin's death, was severely criticized for 'gullibility', and released from the post of Party Secretary to which he was elected in March. So far, however, he has not been reported as under arrest.

These are the facts. Their significance is as yet not quite clear. It is too early to say whether any of these events reflect a struggle

for power among the top leaders, or their common desire to dissociate themselves from the era of totalitarian dictatorship and to inaugurate an era of collective rule, which, at the moment, appears more likely. So far, the major concern has been to ensure that no such struggle should disturb the smooth functioning of the State apparatus, and that neither the Soviet people nor the outside world should gather any impression of disunity among the leadership, if indeed disunity on any considerable scale exists.

How are these new trends reflected in the Soviet press? For one thing, writers and journalists seem to be free from the compulsion to indulge at every point in unlimited eulogy of Stalin's genius. For the first fortnight after his death long daily articles were dedicated to his memory. These ceased a few days after the Supreme Soviet session which installed the new Government. Since then the stereotyped lifeless references to, and quotations from, Stalin have also ceased. His name is mentioned in editorials and other articles, but not frequently, and almost always without eulogistic attributes. Even the Constitution, quoted in connection with the doctors' release, is no longer referred to as the 'Stalin' Constitution. There are, on the other hand, frequent references to the last Party Congress and its decisions—a stress on the collective principle. Nor is there any build-up for a new leader, though Malenkov is quoted now and then, and earlier on there was a half-hearted attempt to give him some prominence, placing him close to Stalin and Mao Tse-Tung in a reproduced but telescoped photograph.

The amnesty decree has had no more publicity since its announcement. The doctors' case, on the other hand, has been given considerable prominence. The people were assured of the inviolability of their constitutional rights. At the same time they were warned that 'so long as capitalist encirclement exists, further attempts to send spies and diversionists into our midst are being and will inevitably continue to be made'. The price reduction has been utilized to the full for internal propaganda purposes. This decree was preceded and followed by a series of articles contrasting the rising standard of living in the U.S.S.R. with the deterioration of living conditions in the capitalist world. Often these articles make unscrupulously selective use of Western publications, such as the E.C.E. *Economic Survey of Europe since the War*, the U.N. *World Economic Report for* 1951–2, and the daily press. An article on British schools (*Pravda*, 9 April) still maintains that conditions

have not changed much since the time of Dickens. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 28 March brings heartbreaking stories, with photographs, of the misery of the British working people, 'finding themselves on the brink of death from starvation'. The issue of 2 April describes the budget of an American family under the title 'Tragedy of the Ordinary People in the Capitalist World'. Articles in *Izvestia* or *Trud* carry the titles 'Under the yoke of Capitalism', 'Sweated Labour in Capitalist Countries', and so on. Admittedly, they are for home consumption, designed to make the Soviet people appreciate the little they have, but they also indicate that—at any rate in the general field of propaganda against capitalism—little has changed. On the other hand, it is not to be expected that the Soviet regime should abandon its ideology and renounce its right to proclaim it.

In the field of foreign relations the almost unprecedented vote of the Soviet bloc for the Western proposals on the Korean question may mark a definite turn of policy. Before that, the negotiations in Berlin and Molotov's statement on Korea were hardly more than straws in the wind.

As to anti-Western propaganda, there is no doubt that it has become less stridently abusive; there is less invective, and the 'hate' propaganda has abated. But in spite of this general toning down, the essence of the Soviet attitude has so far changed little. At the U.N. General Assembly, at the preliminary East-West trade conference in Geneva, Soviet delegates have continued, as before, to go over the same ground of Soviet foreign policy and peace efforts, capitalist re-armament, economic crisis, colonial enslavement, and so forth, and the same line is reflected in the press. True, the crude anti-American cartoons have for the moment disappeared, but a cursory glance at the daily press over the past three weeks (post-Stalin periodicals are not yet available) shows that prominent topics are Western Germany and her Bonn and Paris 'war treaties'; Adenauer's visit to the U.S.A.; the situation in Italy; and events in France, which are presented as the people's protest against the 'orgy of reaction'. One article (*Pravda*, 3 April) speaks of the 'militarization of French economy' and its adherence to the 'aggressive Atlantic Pact'. Articles on the Schuman Plan warn the French people against the West German steel monopolies and forecast a growing antagonism between the U.S.A. and Britain, which has refused to join the Coal and Steel Community in order to avoid losing her independence still more.

The theme of Western dependence on U.S. monopolies is still being ventilated. Mr Morgan Phillips is attacked for placing a further eighteen organizations on the Labour Party's banned list (*Pravda*, 24 March), but otherwise Britain is less under fire than the U.S.A. The latter are accused of atrocities in Korean prisoner-of-war camps, of using poison gas, of bombing peaceful settlements, of employing spies in Poland (who are now under trial), and of interfering in the affairs of other countries.

More prominence than for some time is also given to the colonial and semi-colonial peoples (South Africa, the 'country of racial atrocities'; 'Imperialist Plans for the Enslavement of [Central] Africa'; Indonesia; the 'misery and depravity' of the Moroccan people, and so on). The peace offensive, on the other hand, has somewhat subsided. It was mentioned in connection with the recent Vienna Congress and the World Youth Week, and there are articles stressing, in an orthodox way, the desire for peace of the peoples of all countries and the possibility of 'co-existence'. But that is all.

Since Stalin's death the Soviet Government has taken measures, on the one hand, to strengthen its position in the country, and, on the other, to give the Western Powers some indication of a change of policy. But the signs are still insufficient to justify the conclusion that there is a real 'change of heart', and the whole of past experience cannot but dictate caution until more tangible signs are forthcoming.

The Federation Referendum in Southern Rhodesia

THE referendum required by the law of Southern Rhodesia for any amendment of the Constitution was held on 9 April and the electorate gave its support to Federation by 25,570 votes against 14,729 on a poll of over 82 per cent. Of the 40,614 registered voters in the country less than 500 are Africans.

If the referendum had gone against Federation the plan would have had to be abandoned without further argument; if the majority of votes in favour had been only, say, 53 per cent instead of 63 per cent it might well have been decided not to proceed with the scheme in the face of the known opposition of most of the Africans in all three territories, of almost half the European voters in Southern Rhodesia, and of the Labour and Liberal Parties in this country. As it is, with the passing of the necessary legislation a foregone conclusion in the legislatures of both the Protectorates,

which are dominated by the official and non-official European members, and a Conservative majority of forty-four in the recent debate in the House of Commons, there will be no hesitation. The debates in the Legislative Councils of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will be held immediately, and it was expected that the enabling Bill would be introduced into the House of Commons before the end of April. If this time-table is adhered to the Federation may well come into being shortly after the Coronation.

Although the voting in all four countries will have been almost entirely by Europeans, it is worth noting that in Southern Rhodesia more than 4,000 Africans are said to be eligible to vote on the common roll who have not registered, and that two Africans have recently declared their intention of standing for the Southern Rhodesian Parliament at the next General Election with the object of rousing those people to their political responsibilities and future opportunities. Such a declaration is very significant in the light of Sir Godfrey Huggins' eve-of-poll speech. 'Leadership,' he said, does not mean domination. In the end the people will take their place according to their worth and standard of civilization, not according to the colour of their skin. Let us show the world that we can create a great multi-racial State where the interest of all is to see that a civilized way of life is the common standard and where opportunity to advance in the economic and political spheres becomes a common heritage.' Sir Godfrey, who will be the first Federal Prime Minister, believes neither in *apartheid* nor in permanent white domination, but rather that the only way to abolish racialism is to abolish it in politics. Most people outside South Africa will agree with him and will consider that the device of the communal roll, as it is being developed in East Africa, should be only a temporary expedient, to be abandoned as soon as a sufficient number of Africans has acquired enough education and that minimum economic standing which is necessary to make them responsible individual voters in a largely tribal society.

In handing over more political power to their fellow-countrymen in Central Africa, the British people will be acting in accordance with the traditional policy which has, for a hundred years, been building nations out of colonies, and in particular they will be trusting Sir Godfrey Huggins and Mr Roy Welensky. The record of both over some twenty years certainly justifies that trust, but much will depend on the way in which African opinion is handled during the next twelve months. Passive resistance has been

threatened, particularly in Nyasaland. Whether it materializes at all, and, if so, whether it will be entirely passive, remains to be seen, but whatever happens those in authority will do well to ensure that inter-racial partnership is not only a reality but is seen to be a reality, and, above all, they must keep their eyes on the future. If difficulties do arise in the next few months it may not be easy to keep them in perspective; but it must never be forgotten that this great venture is being undertaken as an act of trusteeship for generations of Europeans and Africans yet unborn.

The Italian Electoral Law and After

THE passing of the new Italian electoral law, after five months of bitter struggle in both Chamber and Senate, has brought some surprises with it. It will be recalled that this law, which applies only to elections for the Chamber, whose five-year term of office ends this month, was introduced by the Government to replace the modified form of proportional representation under which the 1948 election was held; and its aim was to ensure a comfortable working majority for whichever party or group of parties obtained more than half (i.e. 50·01 per cent) of the total votes. To this end the party or group obtaining the initial majority is to be awarded a bonus of seats bringing their total number of seats up to two-thirds of the entire House, i.e. they will have 356 seats out of 535, while the remaining 179 seats are to be divided in proportion to their poll among the other parties. During its passage through both Chamber and Senate the law was violently attacked by the Opposition, both from Left and Right, on the grounds that it was, as they termed it, a 'swindle law' designed to secure a large majority for the Government-sponsored centre alliance (the Christian Democrat, Social Democrat, Liberal, and Republican parties) which was practically certain to obtain at least the requisite 50·01 per cent of the total votes; and its constitutionality was even, though unjustifiably, impugned. However, the Chamber passed the law on 21 January by 339 votes to 25, the Communist and Socialist Left abstaining; and there was a general tendency to take its approval by the Senate as a foregone conclusion.

This proved far from being the case. The passage of the Bill through the Senate was even more stormy than in the Chamber, for this was the Opposition's last chance to quash it, and, relying on their greater strength in the Senate, which includes several of the most astute and experienced Left-wing politicians in Italy, they

used every conceivable method of obstruction to prolong the debate until it should be too late for the Bill to come into effect. These tactics culminated during the last week in March in all-night sittings so stormy that free fights took place, the elderly President of the Senate tendered his resignation, parliamentary prestige was gravely compromised, and the final vote was taken on 29 March in conditions of such chaos that the Left failed to vote at all because, as one correspondent put it, they were so busy fighting their colleagues. So the Bill was passed by 174 votes to none, out of a total of 350.

As a result of this attack on the authority of Parliament Signor De Gasperi decided to recommend the dissolution of the Senate as well as the Chamber. Under the Constitution the Senate is elected for six years—a year longer than the Chamber—and elections for it would therefore normally not have been due till next year. In the unforeseen situation that now arises, the electorate will vote on 7 June for both Houses, but by two different methods, since the electoral law just passed concerns only the Chamber. Elections for the Senate will therefore be held under the old law of 1948, by the method of proportional representation and single-member constituencies.

This raises various problems. For one thing, the present Senate includes among its 350 members eighty-seven Senators 'by right', not elected but appointed under a temporary clause of the Constitution which provided for the nomination to the first Parliament of the Republic of former Senators, anti-Fascist parliamentarians of long standing, and men who had suffered long terms of imprisonment under Fascism. This provision now lapses (how far it is to survive, and under what conditions, is one of the questions of Senate reform which the new Parliament will have to settle), and the eighty-seven Senators, who include not only thirty-nine Communists imprisoned under Fascism but also several independents without party support, will have to stand, if they wish, in the ordinary way for election as either Senators or Deputies.

A more cogent problem is the question of party alliances. For the Chamber elections the four centre democratic parties, as already mentioned, had agreed to stand together and present 'related lists', as in last year's administrative elections, while the formerly allied Communists and Nenni Socialists had decided to stand separately, as, too, did the Monarchists and the neo-Fascist M.S.I. But the tactics designed to meet the demands of the

new electoral law may not necessarily prove equally sound in relation to the Senate elections, held under proportional representation; and at present most of the parties, including the centre ones, seem to incline towards standing separately. Great heart-searchings and calculations are going on, for they must reach a decision by 8 May, when the proposed alliances must be announced. The bewildered elector may then find that the party of his choice is in close alliance with certain other parties in respect of the Chamber elections, while it is opposed to them as well as to all the other parties in those for the Senate!

In this welter of pre-election technicalities it is perhaps too easy to lose sight of the real significance of the situation. The present Italian Government under Signor De Gasperi, though it has undoubtedly made some mistakes and has outlived its tremendous popularity of 1940, nevertheless can still claim to be the country's best bulwark against extremes of Left or Right, and a guarantee of stability for the West. Signor De Gasperi has stated that one of the first tasks of the new Parliament will be to approve the E.D.C. Treaty, and he has reminded the Italian people that when voting they will be deciding not on domestic problems alone but on problems of world security and European union too. If the Senate vote, under its different method, shows substantially the same result as the voting for the Chamber, this will provide the justification for Signor De Gasperi's claim that the new law enables the will of the people, in whichever direction, to be fully represented.

The Future of the Saar

SINCE M. René Mayer has been Minister-President in France he has repeated more than once that France cannot ratify the Contractual Agreements with Germany or the E.D.C. Treaty before a Statute or definitive settlement of the status of the Saar is agreed to between France and Germany. So long as the Germans hoped for a pro-German vote in the Saar it was they who wished to preface agreement with France by a Saarland settlement, based, of course, upon the principle of the incorporation of the Saar in the West German Federal Republic. Since the election to the Saar Landtag on 30 November 1952, however, it has been the Germans who have wished to postpone any long-term undertaking on the question of the Saar.

For the election last November provided an unexpected and a personal triumph for Herr Johannes Hoffmann, Premier of the Saar and leader of the Catholic *Christliche Volkspartei* there. The dissident pro-German Socialist party and the Saar C.D.U., both of which had sprung up last spring, having failed to convince the Minister of the Interior that they were loyal to the autonomous Constitution of 1947, were not allowed to contest the election. German and pro-German propaganda therefore advocated the spoiling of ballot-papers. This, it was suggested, would show great courage, for there would be tremendous intimidation from the Hoffmann side, the authorities quite certainly disregarding the secrecy of the ballot with dire consequences for the recalcitrant voter. In fact, when the election campaign began, pressure from the pro-German opposition and from Germany was at least as strong as that from the side of the Hoffmann regime, while French pressure did not come directly into play. Meetings were held just across the German frontier at which Herr Hoffmann was abused with customary violence as a separatist traitor paid by France and a tyrant *à la russe*. At times there seemed to be more anti-Hoffmann leaflets in the streets of Saarbrücken than leaflets in support of him. But the claim that he had suppressed all political freedom was made slightly absurd by the series of press conferences quite openly held in the Industrie Hotel by his political opponents, as also by the presence of members of the Bonn Foreign Office in Saarbrücken and even by that of Prince Hubertus Löwenstein, the self-appointed champion of the Back-to-Germany cause. Further, the most prominent of the pro-German Socialists in the

Saar, Herr Conrad, openly called for the spoiling of ballot-papers at a number of political meetings attended by him. He was not, of course, able to stand for the Landtag.

The first surprise came when it was established that, in spite of teeming rain all day, 93 per cent of the electorate had voted. Of these 579,331 voters, 141,903 spoiled their papers—a substantial number, but still only 24·4 per cent. It should not be forgotten that the 41,346 Communist votes were also pro-German.[1] So, too, were nearly all the 14,744 votes cast for the Democratic People's Party, which had been legitimized very much at the last moment, no doubt as a liberal gesture.[2] On the other hand, some of the spoiled papers, as in any election, and particularly in the Saar where the overwhelming majority of the electorate is working-class, were spoiled by mistake. Thus even without his Socialist allies Herr Hoffmann had a comfortable lead with the 239,383 votes cast for his party. The autonomist Socialists, whose leaders had hoped to run him close, only scored 141,855 votes—almost exactly the same number as that of spoiled papers. They were glad enough, in view of trade union divisions, to accept the Government posts which Herr Hoffmann offered them, for their exit from his Cabinet in the spring of 1951 appeared in retrospect as a tactical error.

Herr Hoffmann's success surprised everyone, perhaps even himself. Since there was no other outstanding personality in his party the votes cast for it were in effect votes for him. It was true that he had addressed an astonishing number of political meetings with ever-growing applause. At the beginning of the electoral campaign it had been expected that the Catholic clergy in the Saar, inspired by their diocesan head, the German Bishop of Trier,[3] would encourage their flocks to vote against the autonomous regime—the Bishop did indeed draw up a Pastoral Letter to this effect. But Herr Hoffmann, well aware of the weight of priestly influence in so Catholic a region as the Saar, was able to appeal to the Vatican. In consequence the Pastoral Letter was countermanded and only read in one of the churches, while the greater number of the clergy

[1] The Communist Party of the Saar leads a schizophrenic existence, since it was suppressed in September 1952 yet was able according to the electoral law to fight the election because it was one of the parties originally accepted by the French Military Government.

[2] Desired by the French, it was rumoured.

[3] The formerly Prussian part of the Saar belongs to the diocese of Trier; a small portion to the south-east was formerly part of the Palatinate and belongs to the diocese of Speyer.

encouraged their parishioners to vote for Herr Hoffmann after all.

Of equal importance was the announcement made on 26 November, four days before election-day, that the French Government was willing to revise the Franco-Saar Conventions of March 1950 which, together with the Saar Constitution, comprise the existing Saar Statute. These Conventions were based on the Preamble to the Constitution which linked Saar autonomy with a Franco-Saar economic union. In practice, however, economic union had only too often conflicted with autonomy, or so it had seemed, and the very offer of revision, though suspiciously like an election manoeuvre, had a notable effect. For older people in the Saar, those who grew up in the Germany of Wilhelm II, the Saarland is by definition not simply German but an inseparable part of Germany. But for those under forty who grew up under the League of Nations regime or under Hitler, particularly those who are business men and fear unbridled German competition, the economic union with France has a lot to recommend it if once combined with genuine autonomy such as that of Luxembourg in relation to Belgium. Thus after 26 November the proportion of people who decided that Hoffmann could help them best certainly increased.

The results of the Saarland election brought humiliation for Germany—to some extent for the Foreign Office in Bonn, but particularly for the Federal Ministry of All-German Affairs and for the Social-Democratic Party which had identified itself with the conception of an irreducible Germany. But even for the French Herr Hoffmann had become almost too strong, and this for three reasons. On the one hand he could now appeal to them to beware of increasing the pro-German third of the electorate. On the other hand, being the only outstanding politician in his own camp, he had become indispensable to the French, and able, therefore, to make them uneasy whenever he might threaten to resign. With the election behind him, moreover, he had taken drastic steps in the trade union world where pro-German propaganda, backed by the German Social Democrats and the *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund*, had made itself strongly felt through most of 1952.

It was during the election campaign that the pro-German miner Paul Kutsch, Chairman of the *Bund der Einheitsgewerkschaften* (approximately the T.U.C. of the Saar), was expelled from his office by members of his own committee upon which he had only minority support. But Kutsch was still chairman of an important miners' union, the *Industrie Verband Bergbau*, in which the Com-

munist leader Alois Körner and his men were active. With the not unfounded excuse that the *I.V. Bergbau* was being used as a political instrument and a Communist weapon, the Saar Government suppressed it on 5 February of this year and confiscated its funds. Another miners' union, the *Industrie Gewerkschaft Bergbau*, controlled by Socialists who support the Hoffmann regime, took the place of the *I. V. Bergbau* in the *Einheitsgewerkschaft*. A strike threatened by the supporters of Kutsch and Körner came to nothing, and Kutsch, who was in poor health, retired from the scene.[1]

A few days later, on 9 February, negotiations opened in Paris between Herr Hoffmann and the new René Mayer-Bidault Cabinet for the promised revision of the Franco-Saar Conventions of March 1950. Revision was relatively easy on the political points at issue. For instance, the right of the French representative in Saarbrücken to veto Saar legislation was dropped before Easter, and it was agreed that disputes over the interpretation of the new Saar Statute, to which these negotiations were to lead, would be referred to a joint court of arbitration under a neutral president. Similarly the French agreed to recognize the independence of the Saar to the extent of accepting the appointment of Saar diplomatic and consular representatives wherever their Government might ask to place them. Elsewhere France would continue to represent the Saar, which is clearly too small to support more than a foreign service in miniature. For the defence of the Saar the French army would as heretofore be responsible.

The economic issues between Paris and Saarbrücken have unfortunately proved themselves far more intractable. The Saar contribution to the French Budget, fixed some time ago at 7½ per cent of the Saar Budget (since then the Saar Budget has increased but not the Saar money contribution made to France), has long caused acrid disputes, the Saarlanders complaining that they are taxed twice over. Though they more than half expect to be represented abroad and defended for nothing—or, in their view, in return for the economic benefit they bestow upon France by their export surplus—the French will not accept these suppositions, and a compromise will have to be made. The intensification of French

[1] The German Socialists, as also the *Deutsche Saar-Zeitung*, declared that Herr Hoffmann had to have Kutsch out of the way before he 'crawled on his knees to beg terms in Paris'. This was all the more necessary, they said, because the *I.V. Bergbau* had a plan for a triple French-Saar-German direction of the Saar mines, a plan which it was about to publicize.

economic difficulties and the further restriction of imports on 31 March have inevitably made the negotiations more critical, for instance as to the Saar demand that import licences for the Saar shall be distributed in Saarbrücken. This claim arouses the resentment of French competitors, especially in Alsace and Lorraine; indeed, it has been suggested that the concession to Alsace over the Oradour trial was made partly to mollify feelings aroused over the Saar.

By far the most difficult of all the economic issues between France and the Saar are those arising out of the administration of the basic industry of the Saar, i.e. the coal-mines which were leased to France for fifty years by Convention IV. The French have insisted all along that although the Saar mines are managed by a council and a committee each half-French and half-Sarrois, final decisions must be left to the French Minister of Mines. The Saarlanders propose a mixed Board (*Vorstand*) to exercise the ultimate authority, but the French regard this as unworkable. The Saarlanders also complain that the mining engineers are all Frenchmen, to which the French can reply that, until the new University of Saarbrücken has trained Saarland technicians, it is impossible to find them, the older generation having been drawn away to Germany.

A special difficulty is created by the coal-field called the Warndt which lies beneath Saar territory but has always been mined from Lorraine. A year or so ago it was discovered that the miners working from Lorraine (most of these are French, but at least 4,500 are Saarlanders) had advanced unexpectedly far. Saar opinion, which is excessively sensitive about this encroachment, demands that the mining of the Warndt from Lorraine shall cease, that the French shall retrospectively pay more than the 90 fr. per ton agreed to in 1948 for what they have brought to the surface since then, and that in future the Warndt shall be mined only from the Saar. French mining engineers point out that this would be technically most difficult, and in consequence quite unnecessarily expensive. Meanwhile the fear of unemployment is in any case rising in France, and there has been an outcry of anxiety in Lorraine where it is claimed that the Saar demands would throw 7,000 miners out of work. While the Saarlanders complain that the French are never ready to invest capital in industrial expansion and modernization, the French claim that they have spent far too much on the Warndt if the pit-heads they have developed are to fall into

disuse. On 22 March Herr Hoffmann, returning to Saarbrücken between the sessions of the negotiations in Paris, made a remarkable speech[1] in which he pleaded for a common-sense approach to the question of the Warndt and pointed out that the obvious solution would be to combine the administration of the coalfields of Lorraine with those of the Saar; this should be all the easier since at present two French authorities, the Charbonnages de France and the Régie des Mines de la Sarre, are concerned, but the Houillères de Lorraine, producing much less than the Saar, are afraid of being placed at a disadvantage. It is certain at any rate that the French cannot consider the earlier Saar proposals on the Warndt, and it is probable that they will only undertake to prevent the mining from Lorraine from penetrating further beneath Saar territory. As Herr Hoffman pointed out on 22 March, the French can well say that the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Pool, if and when it comes into its own in the coalfields, could never allocate funds to the working of the Warndt unless it was carried on from existing pitheads in Lorraine.

In the background of the Paris negotiations further resentments and conflicts between the Saarlanders and the French exist to hamper the conclusion of what should in effect be the contractual agreement—the quasi-Peace Treaty—between them. From the Saar side there are two contradictory sets of complaints. First come complaints from the people who grumble because France does not give the Saar more economic help and protection than she already does. They fear the competition of the new SOLLAC strip-mills near Thionville; but their main grievances centre around commercial relations with Germany. They complain that high French prices and German tariffs and double-pricing hamper their competition with the Ruhr in supplying Southern Germany with steel products, chemicals, and gas. These people clamour for free trade with the Federal Republic. At the same time others, and often—in order to use every known argument against the French—the very same people as well, complain that the economic attachment of the Saar to France gives the Saar an artificial and illusory prosperity, the more so in view of French subsidies to exporters, which vary between 10 and 18 per cent. These particularly affect light industry in the Saar. The manufacture of clothes, for example, is helped by a French export premium of 12 per cent. Even so it cannot compete with the same industry in Western Germany which

[1] At a rally of the *Christliche Volkspartei*.

produces about 20 per cent more cheaply. Saar clothing manufacturers, indeed, complain that owing to the national difference in taste and to the French popular tendency to spend on food rather than upon dress, the French market is useless to them, while their own people constantly cross the frontier into Germany, buy their clothes there, and then smuggle them back. In present circumstances the Saar clothing industry can only compete with Germany by re-exporting half-finished textile goods imported from countries such as Britain or Italy and finished in the Saar; without French protection the industry would not be viable.

The heavy industry boom created by the war in Korea is now, of course, subsiding, and the Saar in consequence has orders for only about four months ahead whereas it has been accustomed to be booked up for about a year in advance; a further deterioration is to be feared in the future. The feeling of insecurity is increased by the artificially high value of the franc and also by the alarming prospect of a world glut in coal, the economic *raison d'être* of the Saar. Without French protection for Saar coal, Ruhr coal would probably be preferred for most purposes, even in the French Union; it is both superior in quality and more cheaply produced, and its transport presents no special difficulties (French interest in the Moselle canal arises directly out of the need for France to import a certain amount from the Ruhr). It is for the production of coke that the coal from the Ruhr is so much more satisfactory than that of the Saar, which is softer and more volatile: even today, after much experimentation, the Saar iron foundries use coke made from a mixture of 20 per cent Ruhr coal with 80 per cent coal from the Saar. The Warndt controversy is exacerbated by the fact that the Warndt mines produce the best coking coal in the Saar.

Anxiety about these hot-house conditions and about the lack of investment is expressed both by German nationalists, Saarlanders or otherwise, who believe that the Saar must and will be reincorporated in Germany, and also by more impartial Saarlanders when they consider the probable effects of the Coal and Steel Union in the long run. When the common market in coal is established within the Schuman area, while Saar coal will cease to be protected against the Ruhr within the French Union, it should, all the same, stand a better chance than it does today in competing for the South German market because German double-pricing and the higher charge for the transport of foreign goods within Germany will be abolished.

At present the complete pooling of coal is still fairly remote. The first stage of the practical realization of the Coal and Steel Union was inaugurated on 10 February by the removal of all interference with the free movement of iron ore within the territories of the six Powers of 'Little Europe'. After the abolition of all 'unnatural' charges upon iron ore, scrap-iron, coal and coke, and finally steel were to have been set free within the Schuman Union by 1 May. M. Monnet's vigorous initiative, however, seems to be blocked for the time being. Even if the Franco-Saar negotiations reach a conclusion which is half-way satisfactory, the impasse between France and Germany over this new statute for the Saar will remain. Dr Adenauer has never formally replied to M. Schuman's letter of 23 December on this subject, and, owing to the attitude of the German Social Democrats and the other oppositional parties, it will be difficult for the Chancellor to do so in any but a negative tone until after the German elections. Thus in spite of American impatience, French adherence to the European Defence Community might be postponed until then.

Clearly the adoption of the constitution for 'Little Europe' will also suffer from these inhibiting circumstances. For Herr Hoffmann, the Saar Statute, which he hopes to work out with France, is largely transitional, for he envisages the guarantee given by France as guarantees which 'Little Europe' as a whole will inherit. He does not take too seriously the economic friction between the Saarlanders and the French within the French Union, because he is confident that the French customs area in Europe will in time be merged into that of the Schuman Community. In his speech in Saarbrücken on 22 March he recalled that at the opening of the Franco-Saar negotiations on 9 February M. Bidault had repeated M. Schuman's hope that Saarbrücken itself would become the seat of the chief organs of the 'new Europe'. 'Through the choice of this town,' M. Bidault then said, 'the new function of the Saar may be expressed, the function of symbolically bringing together the French and the German peoples'. 'Our aim remains,' Herr Hoffmann continued, after quoting the French Foreign Minister, 'to arrive at a solution of the Saar problem with Germany in the form of a European statute for the Saar.'

Generalizations of this kind are not enough for Herr Hoffmann, who further aspires to see the Saar recognized, not in the inferior position of an associate member which is hers in Strasbourg, but rather as the seventh member of the community of 'Little Europe'

which is to unite France, Western Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries for their mutual advantage, economic, military, and ultimately political. When the draft Constitution for this union was published at the beginning of March it was interesting to find that according to Article 101, thanks to the initiative of the German representative, Herr von Brentano, the delegates of the Saar were not to be sent by the Saar Landtag, but to be elected by the Saarlanders on a different basis; this was presumably to give weight to the opponents of Herr Hoffmann who had been allowed to talk but not to vote in the Saarland election. Through some curious slip-up, not only a Belgian colleague but also the Saar representative, Herr Heinz Braun, originally accepted Herr von Brentano's proposal. Herr Hoffmann, however, swiftly put an end to this, pointing out that all the other Parliaments were responsible for the choice of their delegates, and denouncing special treatment for the Saarlanders.[1]

The Saar Premier has achieved far more than anyone would have thought possible a year ago. Nevertheless it is uncertain whether France in her present troubles can concede enough for him to maintain his new position. From Germany it had seemed that he had little to hope, until Dr Adenauer startled his hearers on 12 April at San Francisco by saying that some of Herr Hoffmann's proposals were acceptable. Meanwhile German Saar propaganda has sobered considerably; it has become less Nazi in tone, and is indeed mainly in the hands of the Social Democrat Dr Karl Mommer. If the federation of Europe favoured by Dr Adenauer, as by Herr Hoffmann, continues to hang fire, both of them will be subjected to a severe test. Herr Hoffmann will be obliged to face municipal elections in the Saar before the end of the year. Although he has acquired considerable self-confidence, it is difficult to suppose that he can come through with flying colours for the second time.

E. W.

[1] The Saar Government makes a larger contribution than Luxembourg to the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Union; to this fact Herr Hoffmann is sometimes glad to draw attention.

Argentina's Problems Today

TOWARDS the end of 1952 General Perón called a special sessi of Congress at which he announced, and caused to be read alou the Second Five-Year Plan, for the period 1953–57. The first Pl expired in 1951[1], which was a poor year agriculturally—which Argentina means bad in general—and so the end of the first fiv year period was not celebrated with any special fanfares: in fa there was not really very much to show for five years of plannin Prospects for 1952 appeared even worse: drought for the secor successive summer had resulted in very poor harvests, and tl cattle losses were considerable. The year began badly and provid no opportunity for expansionist planning; so it was designat 'Year of Economy', and was in fact a year of contraction and rece sion. It only failed to be disastrous by perhaps a couple of month late on, in the Southern Hemisphere spring, it began to rain.

The announcement of the second Plan was nicely timed f December and could thus be made against a golden background one of the most successful wheat harvests ever recorded[2]—not tl largest in total volume, but the best in yield in relation to the ar sown. The announcement and reading of the Plan was a wel staged and highly publicized performance, and everybody with a interest in Argentina's economic affairs studied the text for deta of fact or of policy that would be useful or instructive. Actually tl few factual and financial details that it contained were buried in mass of pompous verbiage and Peronista platitudes and clich which it took Dr Raúl Mende four days of Congressional time read.

The only solid figures that can be extracted from this plethora words are the planned expenditure under various headings, an various production figures that are to be aimed at; but even the prove disappointing on analysis. The Plan allows for a total expe diture over the five years of 33,500 million pesos.[3] No indication given as to whether the annual expenditure will be an even 6,7c million pesos or whether it will start small and rise to a peak; n is it stated whether any allowance is to be made for the declinin

[1] For the first Five-Year Plan, and for other particulars of the econom background, see 'The Argentine Façade' and 'Reforms in Argentina', in *T World Today*, January and April 1952.

[2] The Argentine wheat harvest is gathered in December.

[3] This might be 'translated' at the 'parallel' exchange rate as about £5 million.

purchasing power of the peso in what are almost bound to be inflationary conditions. Of this massive total, however, about one-third is to be spent on 'Economic Action,' the greater part of which goes to the development of fuel and power resources, and about a tenth of this third—that is to say, 3 per cent of the grand total—is allocated to agricultural development. This fact, this apparent failure to recognize the importance of devoting investment resources to the country's outstandingly successful and rewarding activity, must immediately brand the whole Plan as a piece of meaningless bombast. The same conclusion may be reached and confirmed from numerous other details: some very simple arithmetic is enough to show, for example, that an increase in the area of land under arable cultivation from 25 million hectares to over 35 million hectares, *simultaneously* with a 10 per cent increase in cattle, would mean something like a 50 per cent increase in the country's farm land, and this seems hardly possible of achievement in five years. Some allowance may be made for land that has been abandoned and would therefore be not too difficult to bring back into production, but this would represent only a small proportion of the increase planned: the greater part would be new land which is not at present farmed, no doubt for some good reason, such as lack of water.

The plan for sheep farming deserves mention: an increase of 50 per cent in the production of mutton is to be achieved with a simultaneous increase of 5 per cent in the sheep population. Whether this implies that the production of wool is to cease, which seems unlikely, or that sheep are to grow much larger, which seems unduly optimistic, or is just a piece of stupidity, may be left to personal opinion. Examples could be multiplied to show that the Plan has no real meaning at all, that it is an elaborate and massive, but ill-made, addition to the now towering, not to say top-heavy, façade of Peronismo.

General Perón is by no means the first ruler to find himself in political difficulties for economic reasons. The recession that began to be felt in 1952 did not reach the proportions of a slump, but its symptoms were ominous. Prices outstripped incomes to the extent that consumer resistance became marked, and sales of manufactured goods, notably textiles, declined substantially: industrial wages ceased to rise, many establishments worked short time, and unemployment, actual or concealed, became serious. But food prices continued to rise: General Perón made the old mistake of

applying ceiling prices on steers, and a shortage of meat—after it had just begun to be less scarce after the drought—was the inevitable result. The farmers, finding the prices imposed in Buenos Aires unremunerative, have not unnaturally diverted their animals to other markets, of different shades of grey, where demand is keen and ceiling prices are not strictly observed. Beef is a necessity to the average Argentine citizen, and the demand for it will persist when the textile merchants or manufacturers of vacuum cleaners are bankrupt. The basic fault to be found in the second Plan is its failure to allow for the inescapable fact that Argentina's industrial economy depends entirely on the workers being cheaply fed on what they want. As a General, the President cannot be indifferent to the unwisdom of plunging his resources into a vast industrial programme without having ensured his industrial army's food; perhaps the analogy does not strike him: he is perhaps still thinking, as he did ten years ago, of the rich landowners who used once to make their fortunes from cattle ranching.

What is so obvious in the domestic economy of Argentina is also basically true of the country's foreign trade: the products of other nations' industries must be paid for in food, which Argentina should be able to produce more efficiently than any country in the world. Increased farm production would yield adequate supplies for home consumption and exportable surpluses that would restore the country's foreign trade to the level essential for prosperity.

General Perón is in a somewhat difficult position. Even if he thoroughly realized the need for greatly increased agricultural production, it could still be achieved only at the expense of industry. Argentina's economy is in a very low state: inflation has eaten up capital and there is a shortage of liquid resources and investment funds. An attempt to restore lost capital, and labour, to farming could not be carried far without a severe industrial recession. For example, the whole of the country's meagre foreign purchasing power should be devoted to importing tractors and fuel for them, other agricultural machinery, selected seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, bloodstock, and so forth, in all of which Argentine farming is decapitalized or in arrears. The rest of industry would creak to a standstill. The urban industrial labour force would not happily return to the land after years of city lights, especially as they tend to associate farm work with low wages, as used to be the case.

General Perón came to power on the urban trade union vote: he dare not do anything tending to disrupt the unions that he helped to create unless he can be quite sure of remaining master of the situation. It is interesting to observe that he has eliminated from his immediate circle of collaborators several people who were the particular protégés of the late Señora de Perón, including her late brother. It is also important that the trade unions were apparently devoted to the late Señora, and it could be supposed that the collaborators who have gone were obstacles to a plan to disband, or at least to weaken, the unions as a preliminary to driving surplus labour back to the land.

These are pure surmises, in the absence of adequate knowledge, but they would fit the reported fact—for what it may be worth—that the recent differences of opinion between the General and his ministers and secretaries concerned the cost of living. He has publicly stated that the trade unions have 'held the knife to his throat' over food prices, but nobody gives serious attention (except the victims) to his having many butchers and grocers arrested and threatening, with somewhat heavy jocularity, to behead them. And yet even he cannot conjure cuts of beef out of the air, or at any rate not cheaply. The unions have noticed that food has become dearer and scarcer, and their wages less elastic, since the death of Señora de Perón: they can hardly be blamed for reading more into this coincidence than it really deserves, and General Perón has no convincing answer: he cannot even blame the drought, and he cannot decree further wage increases without inducing a large increase in bankruptcies, which would cause more unemployment. Now that the sorcerer is dead the apprentice is in real difficulties, and, apart from the doubt that must be cast on the General's comprehension of the uselessness of hanging grocers or beheading butchers, he probably finds it very difficult to know whom he can trust, not only to be honest, but to be efficient and wise also.

The economy of Argentina is at present so precariously balanced between inflation and slump that prediction is impossible. The textile recession has set off a downward movement within an inflationary economy: food prices are higher than ever, and incomes are stationary or even declining, since wages cannot be increased. The country's productive mechanism, both in agriculture and in industry, is inefficient through capital erosion and inadequate replacements, and through insufficient imports. In essence, the development of industry, partly for political purposes,

has been too rapid for the country to support it. In Argentina it is theoretically agriculture which supports industry by feeding the workers, providing raw materials and exportable surpluses that earn imports of machinery and other raw materials. The industrial plant has outgrown the capacity of agriculture to maintain it; and now it is withering in the weakest places.

It is, of course, fairly easy to trace the causes and diagnose the ills; somewhat less easy to prescribe solutions; and nobody would want to be in the executive shoes of General Perón. It looks very much as if the industrial tree may have to be pruned; but the political consequences might be disastrous for the General. He has, so far as can be determined, one hope. The money earned by the farmers for their grain harvests has hardly flowed fully into the system yet: it will, in theory, stimulate a flagging consumer demand for the products of industry, and might halt the recessive trend. A general rise in wages, though inflationary, would avert the political crisis for a few months and would give General Perón time to think and to plan some subsequent step to prune industry as painlessly as possible, or merely to check its growth while devoting more serious attention to agriculture. Another bumper harvest and a substantial increase in cattle—aims to be achieved only by giving farmers remunerative prices and other forms of help—would probably enable the General to continue governing.

There are two facts which enter largely into Argentine politics and economics. One is that it is perhaps the most fertile and productive land in the world, and consequently has an economy of amazing resilience; and the other is that political loyalties tend to be governed, or affected, by beef-steaks. Perón was vociferously acclaimed once for bringing wages to a level at which every worker could have his steak every day. The lack of steak may be laid at his door too: the industrial recession, if it grows worse more rapidly than the inflationary pressure of new money tends to check it, will put the workers back where they were, in relation to the steak, in the 1930s; and they will not be slow to notice it and to find someone to blame for it.

It is hardly surprising, in these circumstances of unrest and instability, that Argentina's foreign relations should turn out rather disappointingly for General Perón. Cunning observers and political correspondents have been building up a very impressive story of General Perón's bloc-building activities: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile, it is observed, are governed by men who are known to be

ympathetic towards Perón, even to the extent, it is whispered, of eing his creatures. Any day, the public is invited to believe, there ill be an alliance of the southern Republics and General Perón ill be the ruler of most of South America. This is a most mis- ading thesis, and it is one which will not be subscribed to by nybody who knows the Latin Americans even superficially.

General Perón will naturally place a certain amount of assistance, oupled with sympathy and expressions of solidarity, at the dis- osal of the rulers (actual or potential) of countries that produce ie valuable minerals that Argentina lacks and badly needs for the ontinuance and expansion of industry. Bolivia produces tin and etroleum and other useful metals; Ecuador produces petroleum; Chile produces petroleum, coal, iron, and of course copper. These ountries are all partly mountainous and have certain agricultural equirements that Argentina would normally be well fitted to upply. But in recent years these countries have been promoting heir own agricultural production, in order to be less dependent or their food on scarce dollars or the capricious economies of other Latin American republics. In Chile, for instance, the suggestion nade by General Perón that Argentina should supply all kinds of gricultural products has been met with vigorous protests from he Chilean farmers, or at least from those who claim to speak for hem. It would seem that their fears are rather exaggerated, since he volume of produce that Argentina has available for shipment o Chile after other commitments have been met is not likely to e very large: but their attitude is plain.

A more important argument used by the Chileans is that their nineral exports can be sold for dollars or sterling, which can be sed to purchase goods that are not obtainable in South America. They are obstinately willing to feed less luxuriously in order to btain industrial and agricultural equipment, and they refuse to e lured by General Perón's offers of abundant beef-steaks. As ne comment puts it, Chile's economy is complementary to that f Argentina, but Argentina's economy is not complementary to Chile's. The same could be said of Ecuador, and, with reservations, f Bolivia. General Perón comes up against the difficulty that Argentina is competing—particularly in Chile—for commodities hat are in demand in the United States, and he cannot offer lollars, or what they will buy, and so remains at a disadvantage. Moreover, as Bolivia has found, and as Chile is likely to find if too nuch reliance is placed on General Perón's promises, the agreed

shipments of commodities or the stipulated investment does not always take place. Argentine promises are now regarded with suspicion, which does not promote amity and economic co-operation.

If there are marked declines in the prices of copper, tin, petroleum, coal, and so forth, and the countries that export these commodities run into serious payments difficulties, Argentina's position as a potential buyer may be somewhat strengthened. Meanwhile the rulers of the countries towards which General Perón has been making economic overtures are certain to behave like Latin Americans, which means that national pride comes first, and the mere suggestion of an infringement of national sovereignty by another country is enough to induce paroxysms of patriotism. This characteristic attitude may be found all over Latin America and may be one of the ingredients of the somewhat complicated history that has resulted in ten separate republics in the South American continent.

Theories propounding unions, blocs, hegemonies, or the like in Latin America deserve to be regarded with the deepest suspicion. It may be quite true that General Perón has openly sought agreement or union with neighbouring republics, but his aim is undoubtedly domination, and the hyper-sensitivity of Latin American nations to this form of trespassing is a guarantee that Perón will never succeed in being the Colossus of the South. The most he can aspire to with any chance of success is the role of Samson.

S. A.

Political Prospects in Sierra Leone

It is perhaps unfortunate that Sierra Leone has become so widely known in Britain through the pungent writings of Mr Graham Greene. The sense of stagnation, of miscegenate values, which that perceptive writer has so skilfully expressed, certainly begins to obtrude itself after a short residence in Freetown. But the moods of the country, like its people, are of great diversity; preoccupation with the futile, the incongruous, and the tragic should not obliterate the interesting things that are going on, the con-

structive energy which so many of the people are devoting to the difficult problems of their small country.

Sierra Leone consists of a Colony and a Protectorate; the social and political problems underlying this legal and administrative division are serious, though probably becoming less so. The Colony comprises Freetown, the adjacent rural areas, some islands, and, ninety miles away, the river port of Bonthe. Of its population of 125,000, about 40 per cent are estimated to be literate. The Protectorate, more than a hundred times as large, has an estimated population of 1,750,000, belonging to fourteen tribal groups; of these, perhaps 3 per cent are literate. There is more to this situation than the familiar tension between westernized townsmen and tribal communities in the early stages of a drastic social change; in some ways it resembles the Habsburg problem of 'historic' and 'submerged' nationalities. For the sense of history is so real to some sections of the Colony population that they are in danger of living in the past.

The Colony was first founded in 1787 as a settlement for liberated slaves from Britain; to these were soon added others from Jamaica, Nova Scotia, and the intercepted slave-ships. The controversial word 'Creole' is most generally used to refer to the descendants of these former 'displaced persons'; but sometimes the name is assumed by local men aspiring to bourgeois status. The settlers were long the favourite subjects for the educational work of British evangelical philanthropists, and their response was a remarkable one. The later nineteenth century, now almost a legendary age to the Creoles, saw their evangelists, teachers, doctors, lawyers, clerks, and traders (many of them remarkable men by any standard) acting as 'cultural agents' in West African countries as far south as the Congo. Self-government for Sierra Leone Colony seemed to at least one Governor of the 1870s to be practicable in the fairly near future. Yet today, not only is Sierra Leone behind Nigeria and the Gold Coast politically and economically, but it is gradually and painfully realizing that it has even been outstripped in its special field of education. Fourah Bay College, in Freetown, which for a century after 1827 set the pace in African higher education, has become a patchwork institution, clinging to its university work as a political gesture and gallantly struggling, with inadequate funds, not to be left too far behind the University Colleges of Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Over-confidence has given way to disillusionment and sometimes a plaintive self-pity;

using one of the Biblical clichés still current in Freetown, some Creoles complain that their birthright has been sold. Joseph, in this deplorable transaction, is represented by the peoples of the Protectorate.

It was in 1896 that the British Government, overcoming their reluctance to exercise full authority in the interior, declared their Protectorate over a sphere of influence already seriously restricted by the prior claims of the French. The problems of government were transformed, and in some directions progress was certainly retarded, by this accession of responsibility for primitive and fragmentated tribal communities in an area the size of Ireland; but it was an area with which the Colony's position in the world economy was already inextricably bound up. Before 1896, as now, the prosperity of the Colony depended on trade with the interior. Freetown, while preserving all the contrasts of present-day Africa within itself, is now a modern capital, the centre of the country's administrative, mercantile, and professional activity, and of its exiguous secondary industries; but as the capital of any smaller area than the whole country it would be impossibly top-heavy.

A brief economic survey may help to put the political situation in perspective. The country's best assets in the world market are its extractive industries; though only employing 6,500 people, in 1949 they accounted for 42 per cent of the country's domestic exports. Their chief products are iron ore, diamonds, and a little chrome. But these resources, though adequate for the immediate future, are not inexhaustible; the great outcrop of iron ore at Marampa is shrinking almost visibly, and heavy capital expenditure will be necessary before the rich ironfield of Tonkolili can be developed. All the more important are current plans for agricultural development. At present much of the population is producing for subsistence or local sale; although 88 per cent of the country's people are estimated to be 'directly dependent upon one form or another of agricultural activity', the price received by producers of export crops in 1948 averaged only just over £1 per head of the whole population. Nearly three-quarters of the export crops were oil-palm products, which are still largely gathered by primitive methods from uncultivated trees.

The Government's approach to this fundamental problem of agriculture is to multiply schemes to encourage small-scale production of promising crops, to promote co-operative enterprises and to aim at raising internal consumption rather than at any very

spectacular increase in exports. The introduction of Pioneer oil-mills (machines costing about £8,000 each), the provision of tractors to help prepare swamp-land for rice-growing, a recent (and almost shame-faced!) proposal to spend £2,500 from Produce Marketing Board Reserves on a small experimental groundnut scheme near Port Loko—these are among the largest-scale schemes yet introduced. With this modest approach to the 'grass-roots' of agriculture goes a rather more spectacular attempt to extend the utility services essential to any expanding economy—water and electricity supplies, and above all transport. The 2 ft. 6 in. gauge Government railway is to be re-aligned, in an attempt to make its running more economical. (This picturesque curiosity is a rather sad reminder that in 1896 Sierra Leone still led West Africa; as the first railway in the region, it had to experiment with gauge and other features. The results of many of these experiments, being largely negative, have been of more value to later projects elsewhere than to Sierra Leone.) Existing roads are to be improved, new ones built, and a start made with bridge-building to replace the eighteen major ferries which so gravely impede motor transport in the Protectorate. The deep-water quay which Freetown has needed for at least sixty years should be completed in 1953.

This, then, is the economic background of Sierra Leone politics: a small country, with a capital city long-established and somewhat top-heavy, but a population predominantly poor, illiterate, and, as in so many neighbouring States, subject to disease; a primitive agricultural economy, growing many crops but with exports dominated by oil-palm products; mineral resources which, though rich, are not inexhaustible; a desperate need for improvement of transport and other public services. Colonial Development and Welfare Funds provided Sierra Leone with about £300,000 in 1951; but here, as elsewhere, plans for assisted development are often retarded because the United Kingdom cannot spare the materials and the men who are needed. Public revenue has risen greatly since the war, and for 1953 expenditure of £5¾ million is estimated, including allocations from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds; but the economic foundation for political progress seems weaker than, for example, in the Gold Coast. If prices of oil-palm products were to fall, if mineral production declined considerably, Sierra Leone might find itself a new 'depressed area'. Some foresee the possible appearance of a *deus*

ex machina if strategic needs should lead N.A.T.O. to develop Freetown as a major naval base; but this solution would be accepted by many of the inhabitants with very mixed feelings. In any case, Dakar and Monrovia would, superficially, both seem to offer a better combination of developed harbour-works with conveniently sited airfields if the Atlantic again became a theatre of war. The country's economic future remains, at best, uncertain.

This sober background is not forgotten among the people of Sierra Leone; there has been much response to the gospel of self-help, co-operation, and local initiative so energetically expounded by the late Governor, Sir George Beresford-Stooke. But the examples of Nigeria and the Gold Coast have made it inevitable that demands for rapid political development should simultaneously be energetically pressed. There has been no resistance by the Government to the principles of change; the chief retarding influence has been the reluctance of many people in the Colony to accept any Constitution which might give control of their future into the hands of the 'backward masses' of the Protectorate. Under the Constitution of 1924–51, the Colony received representation in the Legislative Council out of all proportion to the population figures. All three elected members represented the Colony; four of the seven nominated unofficials were either Europeans or Colony men. The only unofficials from the Protectorate were three nominated Paramount Chiefs. Yet the significance of these figures was qualified by the presence of eleven official members; this permanent Government majority meant that any serious conflict of communal interests would be resolved by decision of the Imperial trustee. The unofficials were there to 'represent interests', to express grievances, to advise the Governor about local opinion; the distribution of their seats was never intended to foreshadow the future distribution of power under responsible government. Only with the opening of discussions about constitutional revision in 1947 did the question of distribution of seats assume its present importance; and the difficulty of finding an agreed solution of this and allied problems was the principal reason why no new Constitution could be implemented until 1951. Creole organizations, most of which eventually merged in a body known as the National Council of Sierra Leone, bitterly criticized successive proposals, made by Government after discussion locally, as 'undemocratic'; they have only accepted the

present Constitution under plaintive protest.[1] Objection is taken, not only to the distribution of seats, but to the method of electing the Protectorate representatives.

In the new Legislative Council there are fourteen elected members from the Protectorate, and seven from the Colony; the officials are reduced to seven, and the nominated commercial representatives to two. On an average, each Protectorate member represents perhaps 124,000 people and each Colony member 17,000; if heads alone are counted, the distribution is clearly unfair to the Protectorate. Yet this is not the real objection of the National Council, though some of its spokesmen, tongue in cheek, have used the argument to discredit the Constitution as a whole. The claim of the Creole particularists is rather that their higher educational achievements and social status, and their rights as British subjects, should entitle them to more representation than the more backward 'British protected persons'. They make the shrewd debating-point that 'the European settlers who are in a minority in Rhodesia have been given more status in the Rhodesian Legislative Council because they are British subjects, but in the case of Africans democracy means another thing entirely'; but arguments from Rhodesian experience do not command wide support on the West Coast nowadays. No one in Sierra Leone denies the justice of extra representation on grounds of educational and political experience; but most people would think the present ratio amply generous to the Colony.

On the other hand, the present electoral system in the Protectorate is quite evidently a transitional arrangement. Twelve of the fourteen Legislative Councillors are elected by the twelve District Councils from their own membership—which consists primarily of the Paramount Chiefs, plus one other representative elected by each Tribal Authority. Provisions for extra members to be elected by each chiefdom of more than 2,000 house-tax-payers, and for the co-option of up to three local men on to each District Council, improve the openings for the educated 'professional class' which is becoming increasingly important in the life of the Protectorate, but still leave the influence of the Chiefs predominant. Eight of the twelve District Council representatives in the Legis-

[1] More recently, a 'Positive Action Party' has emerged in the Colony, under a former member of the old Legislative Council, Mr Otto During. Its leaders have been trying, so far unsuccessfully, to challenge in the Courts the validity of the way in which the new Constitution brings 'British subjects' and 'British-protected persons' under the same government.

lature are therefore Paramount Chiefs. This is a natural consequence of the very desirable constitutional safeguards against 'carpet-bagging' in the Protectorate, and to express doubts about the permanency of this position is not to accept the naïve thesis that chiefs are necessarily 'unprogressive elements'. There is at least as much variation among the opinions of chiefs as there is among their abilities, their personal backgrounds, and the size and wealth of their chiefdoms. But they do have this in common, that their status depends essentially on their role in the local community; hence, while very willing to sit in the Legislature, they are often reluctant to accept office or duties which would necessitate prolonged residence in Freetown. Meanwhile they are occupying seats through which educated 'commoners' from the Protectorate, who might be admirably fitted for political leadership, could enter politics. There is, indeed, some provision for this latter class in the allocation of two Legislative Councillors to be elected by the otherwise largely advisory Protectorate Assembly. These seats are at present occupied by two of the ablest of the prospective Ministers.

All are agreed that there should be changes in the Protectorate electoral system before the next elections (due by 1956); but these will not necessarily imply direct elections on a wide franchise. A more probable line of immediate progress will be to broaden the basis of representation in the District Councils—which, besides acting as electoral colleges, are assuming important and rapidly increasing duties in local government. There is also talk of transforming the Protectorate Assembly, possibly strengthened by Colony representatives, into a House of Chiefs, or national second chamber. It is clearly right that African democracy should try to build on the foundation of existing tribal institutions; what is no longer possible is to use the 'myth' of Utopian tribal society, supervised by paternal British administrators, as a constructive alternative to a transfer of power at the centre. The demand for political progress is no longer confined to 'town-bred intellectuals'.

This is strikingly illustrated by the composition of the majority party in the present Legislative Council, the Sierra Leone Peoples' Party. All fourteen Protectorate representatives are members of it, though the eight chiefs all owed their election to local influence and prestige rather than to party support. But the party, though dependent on the Protectorate for its majority, tries to be more

than a sectional organization; the moderate, practical, radical nationalism of its programme is based on 'political unification of Colony and Protectorate', and it has keen supporters among the younger Creoles. About 10 per cent of the 10,000 members which the party claims, and four of the most effective of its twenty-six branches, are in the Colony. Two of the Colony Legislative Councillors—who are directly elected, on a franchise limited by literacy and property qualifications—are S.L.P.P. members, against three supporters of the National Council, and two independents.[1] The S.L.P.P. was founded only in 1951, and much of its organization and policy is necessarily still improvised; but it is the only body which is attempting the political education and leadership of the country as a whole.

This is the rapid course which Sierra Leone has followed towards responsible government since the new Legislative Council first met in November 1951. Almost immediately, after discussions which became the subject of local controversy and speculation, the Governor invited six members of the S.L.P.P. majority to join his Executive Council, although the Royal Instructions specify only a membership of four officials and 'not less than four' appointed members. The S.L.P.P. thus accepted responsibility for the advice to be given to the Governor by his Executive Council; the Governor still retains ultimate responsibility and his specifically reserved powers follow the general Crown Colony pattern, much as in the Gold Coast. During 1952 five of the appointed Executive Councillors assumed 'special interest' in groups of Government departments; this did not imply executive responsibility, but carried the right to investigate, to advise, and if necessary to raise matters in the Executive Council. This 'special interest' is about to be converted into departmental responsibility by legislation, first announced last October, for the assumption of ministerial portfolios. The Ministers-designate are to have responsibility for initiating policy, for submitting matters to the Governor-in Council, for implementing decisions of the Executive Council, and for conducting Government business in the Legislative Council. (The Directors of Agriculture, Education, and

[1] Mr Wallace-Johnson was elected as a member of the National Council, but has now left the party, and is reported to be trying to create a new party on the basis of the moribund Youth League, whose programme used to be well to the left of the present S L.P.P. policy. Such a body might have better chances than the predominantly Creole National Council of rivalling the S.L.P.P. in the Protectorate.

Medical Services, however, retain their seats in the Legislative Council, to provide 'professional and technical' advice.) Official heads of Government departments retain 'executive charge' in these departments—a necessary corollary of the breadth of the fields for which the ministerial 'overlords' are to be responsible.

The prospective Minister of Health, Agriculture, and Forests, who is also informally known as 'Leader of Government Business', is Dr M. A. S. Margai, the quiet, restrained, respected, and able leader of the S.L.P.P.—a leader after the pattern of Baldwin rather than of Nkrumah. Mr A. M. Margai, a barrister, will become Minister of Local Government, Education, and Welfare—a heavy load, but falling on an energetic man, reputed to have done well in office so far. Mr Siaka Stevens, prospective Minister of Mines, Land, and Labour, and a former student of Ruskin College, has risen to prominence through his great services to the mineworkers' Union; he is an impressive and much respected figure, perhaps the Ernest Bevin of Sierra Leone. Mr M. S. Mustapha, a Freetown Muslim, will be Minister of Works and Transport; Mr A. G. Randle, a retired Creole merchant from Bonthe, Minister of Trade, Commerce, Posts, and Telegraphs. Paramount Chief Bai Farima Tass II, who felt unable to assume departmental interests last year, will be Minister without portfolio. All these men have been members of the Executive Council since December 1951, and have shown their abilities as they have grown in experience.

Among the greatest tests of the statesmanship of the Ministers will be their success in reducing sectional rivalries. But the ultimate answer to this problem will lie not in legislation, but in the readiness of Creole leaders to accept the implications of belonging to a united Sierra Leone which they might lead but cannot dominate—to rise above self-pity and an opposition which often boils down to simple 'me-tooism'. This 'historic nationality' has much to offer the country as a whole; but the conditions of their leadership must be the abandonment of the claim to monopolize office in the Colony, and readiness to join as equals in the task of developing the Protectorate. It is among the great merits of the S.L.P.P. that they realize that Sierra Leone is one country, and that the futures of all its peoples are inescapably connected.

But can even Colony and Protectorate together look forward confidently to complete national independence? Sierra Leone is more happily placed than the Gambia; but, though it may prove possible, it is by no means self-evident that a country of 2 million

people, created within largely artificial boundaries and not over-rich, can hope to stand alone, even within the Commonwealth. Certain solutions are academically discussed; each has its drawbacks. Union with the Gambia would be administratively difficult, and an incomplete solution; British West African Federation, even if Nigeria and the Gold Coast were willing, would also be administratively difficult, and would leave Sierra Leone a very small voice in policy; a united West Africa is politically even more remote; Lord Hailey's suggestion, on the French colonial principle, of organic association with the United Kingdom, is rarely considered locally. The inertia of the British Colonial Office when the French began their great expansion of influence in the later nineteenth century has left an unforeseen and difficult legacy to the leaders of the new Sierra Leone.

J. D. H.

Soviet Statistics

An Essay in Interpretation

The Russian Government only survives by living in the dark, and that is why complete and truthful information about the life of the people in the whole country is rarely collected in our country.

V. I. Lenin, 1903

In bourgeois States a statistician has a certain minimum amount of professional honour. He cannot lie. He can be of any political conviction and inclination, but wherever facts and figures are concerned, he will submit to torture, but will not tell a lie. If only we had more such bourgeois statisticians, people who respect themselves and possess a certain minimum of professional honour.

J. V. Stalin, 1924

Gigantic achievements were claimed by the Soviet leaders during the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, held last October in Moscow. Stalin and Malenkov, Saburov and Mikoyan reported enormous economic and social advances. Most of the factual evidence was given in the form of indices, whose composition and base are unknown. In these circumstances, unbiassed Western observers are inevitably somewhat sceptical as to the validity of these claims and are anxious to investigate and test Soviet statistical methods.

While all relevant data on the British economy can be obtained from such official publications as the Economic Survey and the White Papers on National Income and Expenditure and the Balance of Payments, in Soviet Russia the closing stage of the New Economic Policy also witnessed the end of economic reporting in the Western sense of the term. Now economic reporting is limited to brief annual statements at the end of the Plan year and the beginning of the Budget year.

Any analysis of economic development requires information on the balance of payments, net industrial production, consumption, income and wage levels, prices at producer, wholesale, and retail level, and the distribution of national income and expenditure. In Soviet Russia little of this is available. In fact, the Soviet Union is the only major industrial country for which, during most of the last two decades, almost nothing has been officially published even about the most innocuous aspects of the country's economic and social life. Since 1947 Soviet planners, economists, and statisticians have been exposed to heavy sentences of imprisonment for disclosing statistics. Foreign visitors have been unable to obtain an answer to such questions as the size of Moscow's population or the average wage level of the Russian worker. Similarly, it has been impossible to obtain any relevant details of the statistical methods applied in Soviet Russia. On some occasions, such as the Methodology Conference of the Central Statistical Administration, conflict between opposing groups of statisticians is apparent, but little emerges about statistical theory and practice as developed and applied in the Soviet Union.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that nothing whatever can be learnt about the economic situation in the Soviet Union, as expressed in statistical terms that are understood by Western observers and allow comparison with conditions in Western countries. Painstaking analysis by some individual scholars and international organizations of the limited Soviet sources available permit a reasonably accurate appraisal of Soviet statistical methods and data.

STATISTICAL THEORY

As Soviet economists, planners, and statisticians insist on their allegiance to the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine, it may be well to remember that Lenin himself held firm views on the subject of statistics. Writing at the end of the last century on the 'Develop-

ment of Capitalism in Russia',[1] he stated that 'statistics must illustrate the socio-economic relationships established by an all-round analysis, and they must not become an end in themselves'.

Russia had made some outstanding contributions to the science of statistics until, after the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan, the conventional statistical services were replaced by data which, in the language of Soviet professional publications, are styled 'class statistics'. Many leading statisticians of the early period of the Soviet regime disappeared, and the statistical services underwent several drastic reorganizations. By the outbreak of war Soviet statistics were fully integrated in the pattern of Soviet science and administration. The Marxist approach had prevailed over the objective approach, and statistical fabrication had taken the place of unbiassed reporting.

The end of the war brought new men and new disputes to the fore in statistics as in other fields, and, after another purge of statisticians, once again only 'statistics based on historical materialism' were tolerated. While the details of the internal struggle may never become known to the outside world, some light has been thrown on recent trends and events by the summary report of a statistical conference held early in 1950. It is to the credit of Stuart A. Rice, the President of the International Statistical Institute, that during the Institute's Session held in New Delhi in 1951 he gave publicity[2] to this controversy, which came to a head during the Methodology Conference of the Central Statistical Administration of the U.S.S.R.

On the one side were those who considered statistics to be a universal science suitable for the study of nature as well as society. In their view, the theoretical basis of statistics is the law of large numbers. Pisarev, for example, of the Central Statistical Administration, has held that statistics, with whose aid mass phenomena of nature and society are studied, is an independent science with its own object and methods. Academician Nemchinov has also insisted that mass phenomena relating to any field of nature or social life are the subject for statistics, the theoretical basis of which is the law of large numbers.

The opponents of these statisticians consider their views harmful;

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th edition, Vol. 3, Moscow 1946.

[2] In a paper on 'Statistical Conceptions in the Soviet Union, examined from generally accepted scientific viewpoints' (*The American Statistician*, Vol. 6, No 3, Washington 1952).

for they are said to show bourgeois influences and anti-Marxist distortions of Soviet statistical science. While the adherents of the so-called universal theory and the formal mathematics schools are centred largely in the colleges, their opponents are found mainly in the official posts of the central and regional statistical administration. Foremost among them are V. N. Starovskii,the head of the Central Statistical Administration and convenor of the Methodology Conference, and V. A. Sobol, a member of his staff.

Dispassionate argument on matters of substance had no place at the conference. Starovskii, at the opening session, proclaimed that Soviet statistics were based on the great works of Lenin and Stalin and were the most progressive statistics in the world, solving complex scientific and practical problems which were beyond the resources of bourgeois statistics, and asserted that one of the most prominent bourgeois distortions was the formal mathematics school which is ultimately based on the law of large numbers and not on Marxist-Leninist theory. He made no attempt to substantiate his arguments.

Sobol, too, proclaimed that the writings of Lenin and Stalin provided the theoretical basis of statistics which, in a socialist society, are used for the planned direction of the economy with the purpose of building a Communist society. As Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin had always emphasized the uniqueness of social phenomena and their basic difference from natural phenomena, the views of statisticians such as Nemchinov and Pisarev were to be considered incorrect. Again, no attempt was made to argue the theory and to support it with facts.

Whilst Academician Nemchinov seems to have preferred not to speak at the conference, Pisarev was anxious to adjust himself to the changed situation. After his printed works and oral statements had been severely criticized, he acknowledged that this criticism was basically justified and promised to correct his errors. The fact that all bourgeois statisticians uphold the universal theory was considered all the more reason why Pisarev should give a serious Party criticism of universal statistics. He did not break his promise. In a recent review of a textbook on population statistics, he dissociated himself from his former associate A. Boyarsky, the author of the book, and criticized him for having in the past treated the theory of statistics incorrectly and for having erroneously regarded the law of large numbers as the basis of statistics.

It would be a mistake to think that with the end of the Metho-

dology Conference the issue was closed and Soviet Russia's statisticians could settle down to practical work. Since the conference, a survey by T. Kozlov of the periodical *Statisticheskii Vestnik* (Statistical Herald), published at the end of 1951 in *Problems of Economics*,[1] asserted that 'certain Soviet statisticians, who had committed gross mistakes and had been guilty of distortions of Marxist-Leninist theory in the past, had remained stubbornly silent instead of honestly admitting and correcting their mistakes.' The *Vestnik*, whilst publishing articles on 'V. I. Lenin and Soviet Statistics' and 'Statistics in the Works of Marx and Engels', had been guilty at the same time of printing ultra-formalistic articles on the calculation of the average annual rates of growth of the national economy, in which the question of the rates of development was transferred from the sphere of economics to that of mathematics.

STATISTICAL RESEARCH

Soviet statistical practice is strictly in line with the state of Soviet statistical theory. As theoretical controversy has deteriorated from the scientific to the dogmatic level, so Soviet statistical services have been reduced from a record of economic and social reality to a tool in the hands of planners and propagandists who consider it their duty to show an uninterrupted series of successes but to suppress any evidence of setbacks or failures.

From the outset, the statistical data of the Five-Year Plans excluded much vital information on the economic and social conditions of the country, but a certain amount of unbiassed reporting was allowed. However, the volume and value of statistical information shrank with every new Plan. While the first Plan was a formidable economic study of several volumes, the statistical information given in the subsequent four Five-Year Plans was reduced to little more than a list of targets frequently related to a base of which nothing is known.

Since the end of the war the Soviet Union has released hardly any data that resemble statistics in the true sense. It is seldom realized that Soviet Russia is the only major industrial country in the world for which practically nothing is known from official sources about the most innocuous items of economic and social conditions.

Up to 1936 the Central Statistical Administration of the

[1] T. Kozlov-G. Krygin, 'Concerning the Journal *Statistical Herald*', in *Problems of Economics*, No. 10, Moscow 1951. (*Note:* Russian titles translated.)

U.S.S.R. released fairly comprehensive statistical abstracts; the 1936 volume contained 560 tables. But by 1938 their number had shrunk to a sixth of the previous volume. During the war the publication of statistical data ceased completely, and it was not resumed after the war. The only information of a statistical nature that is made known in the Soviet Union nowadays is the annual economic progress report, given by a high-ranking official on the anniversary of the Revolution, the Budget statement, and a list of indices on the fulfilment of the current Plan. The directives of the fifth Five-Year Plan and the extensive statements by Malenkov and Saburov during the 19th Party Congress have not been any more informative than previous post-war releases. The Soviet authorities have made most of the production figures meaningless by presenting them as percentages of a base of which the absolute figure is unknown. This applies in particular to all commodities that in the widest sense may be considered of a military character. Production indices are still given, as in the past, in terms of so-called constant prices which are in fact meaningless. The same applies to national income data. Against this, State revenue and expenditure are published in current prices, and thus they cannot be related to the national product.

In recent years security measures have been tightened up. In June 1947 a decree was issued 'on the liability for divulging State secrets and for losing documents containing State secrets'. This decree affected almost all major statistical sources, since it prescribed penalties of eight to twelve years' imprisonment for disclosing statistical information on the following subjects: industry as a whole and its various branches; agriculture, trade, and means of communications; monetary reserves, balances of payments, and plans for financial operations; location and method of storing and transporting precious metals belonging to the State reserve, foreign currency, and banknotes; plans and planning proposals relating to imports and exports of different types of goods. Thus the disclosure of statistical information which in Western countries is readily available in yearbooks, abstracts, and trade returns leads automatically in the Soviet Union to long terms of imprisonment.

Demographic statistics have not been issued since the census results of 1939 were published. There are no figures available for the post-war population in the former and present territory of the Soviet Union, for military and civilian war casualties, or for the distribution of the population by age, sex, or occupation. Vital

statistics were last published in 1938. Birth, death, and infant mortality rates for the post-war years can only be estimated. Statistics on the conditions of health and the incidence of disease have been withheld since 1927.

Labour statistics have been kept secret for many years. Some conflicting statements have been made by Soviet officials on the total number of workers in the national economy, including labourers on State farms, but nothing is known of their occupational or regional distribution, their age or sex composition. Data on industrial migration and unemployment are kept secret.

Industrial statistics are rarely published in absolute quantities of production or turnover. Index figures are released from time to time for such basic commodities as coal, oil, electric power, pig iron, and crude and rolled steel. The number of manufactured goods for which indices are issued is steadily declining. The production and turnover of major consumer goods is not made known. The few figures that have been published on the output of processing plants are meaningless, as small-scale industries which were previously excluded from statistical reporting have been incorporated in large-scale industries in recent years.

Agricultural statistics are limited to acreage and harvest data of a few major crops. Since 1933 grain yields have been determined in the field, and have thus ceased to be comparable with data on crops in Russia before 1933 and in foreign countries where harvests are estimated in terms of barn crops. Since 1939 all crops are estimated in terms of biological yields. A special law prohibits the publication of harvest estimates in terms of barn crops.

The last estimates of the consumption of foodstuffs and other consumer goods were published in 1936. References are no longer made to total or per head consumption, except for some vague statements on the overall consumption contained in the annual reports on the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan. No family budgets have been published since the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan. Thus variations in income and consumption levels among different social or professional groups cannot be gauged.

Wage, price, and cost of living statistics have been suppressed since the early 'thirties. The same applies to indices of prices and industrial production at current prices. The volume of industrial production and national income are given at so-called constant 1926–7 prices, but are in fact inflated. They cannot be compared with data published in current prices on capital investment or

public income and expenditure. Thus no overall economic balance sheet can be constructed from official sources.

INTERPRETATION OF PRODUCTION STATISTICS

In these circumstances, any attempt at obtaining a comprehensive picture of economic and social trends in the Soviet Union can be made only indirectly. It has been undertaken recently by the Economic Commission for Europe[1] as well as by a number of individual scholars, the most eminent being N. Jasny.[2] Their work suggests that agricultural statistics are particularly affected by the use of the biological yield, which estimates the crop grown under favourable climatic and economic conditions but does not represent an estimate of the actual harvest. Whilst Soviet sources, in their original calculations of the biological yield, made in 1933, allowed for a harvest loss of 10 per cent, this practice was later abandoned and the harvests are now over-estimated by at least 25 per cent. With regard to livestock, changes that occur on the collective farms are presented at times as if they gave a true picture of the overall trend, whilst in fact the transfer of livestock from individual to collective farms is withheld from the statistical reports.

Similar distortions occur when the increased production of manufactured foodstuffs, such as flour and bread, meat and dairy produce, are quoted as proof of a rising standard of living, whilst no mention is made of the decline in output of these products in farm households, arising from greater urbanization. If the necessary corrections are made, the increase in the area of the main agricultural crops hardly appears to have kept pace with the growth of population. The same is true of the output of foodstuffs. On the other hand mechanization has freed labour needed for the increased industrialization of the country, and has also made available pastures once grazed by horses for the food requirements of the ever growing urban population. The disappointment caused by the failure of agriculture to keep pace with industry may well have speeded up the big power and irrigation projects of the fourth and fifth Five-Year Plans.

As the progress of agricultural production has been slow, the food consumption of the Russian people is unlikely to have increased. Here the ground is particularly shaky. Budgets of workers'

[1] Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in* 1951, Geneva, 1952; *Economic Survey of Europe since the War*, Geneva, 1953.
[2] N. Jasny, *The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era*, Stanford, 1951.

families have not been published since the first Five-Year Plan was introduced, and only vague references have been made to the level of consumption of the main foodstuffs. Fairly accurate estimates can be made, however, if the technique of food balances is applied which was developed during the war in Britain, America, and Canada, and which after the war was adopted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Although the estimates made by British and American scholars differ to some extent, a sufficient measure of agreement does exist about the utilization of the main agricultural products and the order of magnitude of food consumption. From these estimates it seems clear that in the best of circumstances the pre-war level of food consumption was reached by 1950–1, but the quantity and quality of the diet consumed before the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan has not yet been regained.

Industrial statistics do not bear out the view that the Soviet economy rests on weak foundations or functions badly. It would be wrong to draw such a conclusion from what has been said so far. A gigantic programme of industrialization has been carried out in Soviet Russia, largely at the expense of agriculture, and a huge investment programme has been put into operation at the expense of the consumer in town and country.

As in agriculture, so in industry the official production indices should be treated with reserve. According to official Soviet figures, the output of the machine industry increased by 150 per cent between 1940 and 1950 but the production of textiles, shoes, and household goods increased by only 17 per cent. At the same time the non-agricultural population rose by almost 50 per cent. The instrument for shaping this pattern is the turnover tax, which constitutes the main source of Government income and provides the means for subsidizing heavy industry. Consumer goods supply almost 90 per cent of the turnover tax. Taxes on general consumer goods, such as salt and cotton goods, are highest, whilst those on luxury goods, such as silk and caviare, are lowest.

In its 1951 report the Economic Commission for Europe pointed out that the double counting of semi-manufactured goods and the use of allegedly constant prices had led to a steadily growing over-estimate of the net volume of production, and that the inclusion of the turnover tax had inflated the share of trade and industry in the national product. Official Soviet sources state that gross industrial production has been doubled during the last

decade. Against this, the Economic Commission for Europe recommends comparison with the level of production of the most important industrial raw materials. On this basis, it will be found that since 1940 Soviet industrial output has not been doubled, but has increased by one-third only.

According to official Soviet sources, industrial production during the last twenty-five years has risen to twelve times its original volume; but steel and power, on which the manufacture of investment goods, war materials, and consumer goods depends, have increased from five to six times only. Taking into account that the output of some finished goods has expanded more than others, it is reasonable to assume that since the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan total net industrial production has increased to four to five times its original volume.

COMPOSITE INDICES

While official Soviet data on the production of individual agricultural and industrial commodities can be adjusted without undue difficulties to their true levels, such correction becomes a major statistical operation when composite volume data are concerned. Most students of Soviet affairs accept official statements on the output of industrial goods in physical terms, but they distrust all composite data. The reason for their scepticism lies in the use of price data which are described officially as constant, but in fact are known to have been inflated in the course of the twenty years during which these so-called 1926–7 constant prices have been in use. Soviet writers[1] have admitted that, in the calculation of production and national income indices, 'adjusted' and unadjusted current prices have been used in place of constant prices wherever a new product or a new type of an existing product has come into production. This practice has led to grossly inflated data on Soviet trends and annual rates of increase in production and distribution, national income, and personal consumption levels.

The distortion reached such dimensions that the fourth Five-Year Plan became quite unmanageable, and in 1951 the planners reached the conclusion that the price basis of 1926/27 ought to be replaced by a price pattern less unreal than the old one. Whilst the latest Survey of the Economic Commission for Europe is right in

[1] S. Turetskii, *Inter-Industrial Accumulation in the U.S.S.R.*, Moscow 1948; Y. Joffe, *Planning of Industrial Production*, Moscow 1948; G. Drampyan and N. Fedotov, 'The Planning of Gross Output of Industry in Comparable Prices', in *Planned Economy*, No. 1, Moscow 1952. (Note: Russian titles translated).

stating that in the fifth Five-Year Plan there appears to be a greater consistency between index numbers for total output and for individual commodities, it is open to question whether in future the composite indices of industrial production and national income will be free from distortions, due to the use of 'adjusted' prices where new products or new types of existing products are involved. In any event, it will be difficult to apply previous practices in index calculations, since prices have now a downward trend in Soviet Russia. On the other hand, it will require considerable courage in future to show realistically annual increases of industrial production and national income that amount to less than half the increases shown during previous plan periods. It remains to be seen whether the new administration, under Malenkov, will risk the step from distortion to reality.

National income statistics exaggerate the volume of the national product approximately to the same extent as in the case of net industrial production. This means that, on average, during the last twenty-five years the national income increased by about 5 per cent per annum, compared with an annual increase of industrial net production by some 6 per cent.

According to official Soviet sources, approximately three-quarters of the national income is spent on private civilian consumption. This is far from true. In their 1951 report, after deducting the purchase tax, the Economic Commission for Europe estimated the share of civilian consumption in the national income at 35 to 40 per cent. The Soviet writer D. A. Allakhverdyan recently stated[1] that almost the entire national expenditure for defence and security was paid out of the so-called consumption fund.

Jasny,[2] making most cautious calculations, comes to the conclusion that before the most recent phase of rearmament started almost 20 per cent of the national income was spent on earmarked armament expenditure, 40 per cent on capital investment, civilian as well as military, and 40 per cent on private consumption, education, and social services. Other estimates put the share of consumption slightly higher. All in all, there can be no doubt that on balance about half the national income is withheld from the Russian people.

Living standard statistics are unknown in Soviet Russia. As neither average wage nor cost of living indices have been published

[1] D. A. Allakhverdyan, *The National Income of the U.S.S.R.*, Moscow 1952.
[2] *Op. cit.*

for the last twenty years or so, it is exceedingly difficult to form an accurate picture of the development of real wages and real incomes during the Plan era. However, incidental information found in the press on individual wages and wage rates, and the annual announcement of changes in retail prices, make rough estimates possible. Any international comparison is made suitably in terms of the purchasing power of workers' wages. Comparisons of this kind have to ignore such items of the workers' budget as social services and entertainment; but as three-fifths and three-quarters of the workers' budget are spent on foodstuffs alone and on foodstuffs and clothing respectively, the error caused by the neglect of other budget items is relatively small.

A statistical analysis of this kind shows that, as a result of recent price changes, the standard of living of the Russian worker has improved beyond the deplorably low level reached in 1947 after rationing had been abolished and savings eliminated. On the other hand, this improvement means no more than a return to the status the Russian worker had reached at the outbreak of war. If compared with the time before the first Five-Year Plan was set in motion, real wages are unlikely to amount to more than two-thirds of those reached in 1926–7.

A comparison of living standards in and outside Soviet Russia is equally illuminating. By comparison, the Russian worker would have to labour about three times as long as an English worker in order to reach the standard of living which the English worker enjoys. In Britain, the wages of about three hours are necessary to meet the daily food requirements of a worker's family. In the Soviet Union, a worker would have to spend more than a day's earnings to buy the same food for himself and his family. If the Russian standard of living is compared with that in the United States, the disparity is greater still. According to calculations by the U.S. Department of Labor, before the war the purchasing power of the American hourly wage for food was four times as great as in Russia, and in 1951 it was almost six times as great. If expenditure for rent, textiles, and household goods is taken into account the Russian worker's purchasing power improves slightly, but the discrepancy remains.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the greatest handicaps in assessing Soviet economic progress lies in the lack of much of the information needed for

economic analysis. The estimates which can be made of output in physical quantities are confined entirely to the basic industries. A still greater handicap is the publication of misleading statistics. The almost complete absence of any official information on the structure and movement of prices and wages makes it virtually impossible to estimate either the increase in total income or the share of consumption compared with other expenditure within the total. In computing the index of industrial production no deduction is made for inter-factory sales of materials and semi-manufactures, with the result that the relative contribution of the higher stages of fabrication tends to be overstated in relation to that of the basic industries. The use of the 1926–7 prices has resulted in a progressive overstatement of the net value added in manufacturing. The relative contribution of industry and trade to national income is greatly increased by the inclusion of turnover taxes levied on goods passing through these branches, while the share of agriculture is correspondingly diminished.

In the sphere of agricultural statistics, the greatest distortion of all arises through the use of biological yields. But there are also other distortions. As livestock held privately by peasants on the collective farms has been shifted into collective ownership, livestock increases reported on State farms and under collective ownership are frequently misleading. Similarly, the increases reported for the output of manufactured foodstuffs must be presumed to refer in part to shifts from home to factory production.

Although the Soviet Government goes to great lengths to withhold basic information about economic development in the Soviet Union, it is undeniable that her economic plans have been less successful than the official data on the gross value of industrial production and national income seem to show. Official gross production data suggest that industrial production has almost doubled during the last decade; but a check in terms of physical quantities indicates a rise of 30 rather than 100 per cent.

Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the output of heavy industry has increased at an exceptionally high rate. In fact, heavy industry has grown enormously during the post-war years, following the emphasis it had already received in the pre-war Five-Year Plans. According to official Soviet records, the output of the engineering industries between 1940 and 1951 increased by 150 per cent, or half as much again as total industrial gross production. Although this figure is inflated by the application of

dubious statistical practices, the preponderance of heavy industries and engineering in the Soviet economy cannot be doubted.

The production of such consumer goods as textiles, footwear, and household goods is stated to have risen by 17 per cent during the last decade, compared with almost 100 per cent for the total gross production of industry and 150 per cent for the engineering industry. Other consumer industries have also failed to keep pace with producer industries. Similarly farming has lagged badly behind the overall economic trend, the agricultural plan, and the domestic requirements. The area sown, the grain harvested, and the productive livestock held in 1950 provided somewhat less per head of the increased population than in 1940. The output of livestock produce during 1950 was no higher than before the war and, considering the further increases in population, somewhat smaller on a *per capita* basis.

Real wages are likely to have reached pre-war levels, but they are still below the standards of the years before the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan. The use of the turnover tax, the principal instrument for bringing consumer purchasing power into line with available retail supplies, may be taken as indicative of the Soviet official attitude towards consumer needs. While investment goods are taxed very lightly, consumer goods account for some 85 to 90 per cent of the total turnover tax.

It is exceedingly difficult to estimate even approximately how much of the national product is absorbed by armaments. In the statistical accounts the share assigned to consumption goods tends to be increased, in relation to that given to investment and defence goods, by the incidence of turnover taxes and, in comparison with pre-war years, by the relative increase in consumer prices. The Economic Commission for Europe calculates the volume of arms production during the period from 1948 to 1950 to have been approximately as high as in 1940, and in 1951 about 40 per cent above that level. Naum Jasny, in his analysis of the Soviet economy, found that before the latest armament drive started some 20 per cent of Soviet national income was spent on earmarked armament expenditure and some 40 per cent on civilian and military capital investment, leaving not more than 40 per cent to private consumption, including education and social services. A change in the distribution of the national income will show, more than any other individual economic phenomenon, to what extent the new rulers of Soviet Russia intend to change her internal and foreign policy.

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THE CORONATION OF QUEEN ELIZABETH THE SECOND

As this issue goes to press, the last details are being completed of the arrangements for Her Majesty's Coronation—an historic occasion which promises to be one of the greatest pageants in our history. But it is much more than this: it is the consecration and the dedication of a Queen to the service of her people, of a Sovereign and a Nation to the service of God. This ancient compact between Crown and people has today an even deeper significance. Elizabeth the Second is crowned Queen not of one nation alone: her sovereignty embraces nearly fifty lands scattered across the five Continents of the world. As Head of the Commonwealth of Nations, she embodies the spirit of a political community unique in construction as in size, a loosely knit partnership of eight independent sovereign States joined in an association with no bonds but their common interests and a loyalty freely given to the Crown.

Living evidence of this partnership is the presence today of representatives of all the Commonwealth countries, Her Majesty's guests at her Coronation. The Members of the Institute take this opportunity to welcome to London our Honorary Presidents, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and to offer to our Royal Patron the assurance of our loyal affection and service and the respectful wish that the years to come may bring Her Majesty continued happiness.

Notes of the Month

The Future of Gaullism

General de Gaulle's dramatic announcement on 6 May that the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (R.P.F.) would, in future, dissociate itself from parliamentary action was a logical consequence of the R.P.F.'s failure at the municipal elections and, perhaps, the only logical way of ending a situation that was becoming exceedingly difficult for the R.P.F. parliamentary group. If the new policy provides answers to some questions, it raises a number of fresh ones. First, can General de Gaulle win support, now, on the scale of 1947? There is at the moment no immediate Communist threat to serve as a rallying point. Again, while it was possible for the movement to exist primarily as a vehicle for protest while it was still young, once it had become a national movement, capable of attracting the votes of over 4 million electors and with a parliamentary group some 120 strong, its supporters were bound to begin to ask themselves how their objectives were to be realized.

There are really only two answers to the question. Either the R.P.F. would become the natural heir to power in a situation which had become revolutionary or anarchic; or the movement must seek power through the normal channels of parliamentary government. To judge by his speeches, General de Gaulle has always favoured the first road to power, which implies isolation—sitting on the side-lines crying 'Woe, Woe!' until the nation turns to him as its saviour. But *how* is the nation to turn to him? With a large R.P.F. group in the Assembly the constitutional road to power lay straight ahead, if and when the crisis came, but two things have now made this approach unrealistic. First, there is no sign that the break-up of the system is necessarily imminent—or, at least, there is no sign that enough French citizens are now prepared to give General de Gaulle the support he would need as the national leader. The waning electoral strength of the R.P.F. indicates clearly the public's rejection of what the General's opponents call *la politique du pire*, the policy of waiting for—if not working for—disaster. Secondly, the parliamentary leaders of

the movement have become increasingly dissatisfied with this policy, and for obvious reasons. As Deputies, they have obligations to their constituents as well as to their leader. A number of them are former Conservative politicians, elected with the support of Conservative votes. They are bound, therefore, in a democracy, to reflect the opinions of the electorate. And as politicians they are not unnaturally interested in their prospects of re-election. The result has been the break-away, during the past year or so, of a number of R.P.F. Deputies who supported M. Pinay, and of a number of municipal councillors who wanted to fight the municipal elections in alliance with Conservative groups. In the tug-of-war between parliamentary methods and Gaullist ideology, the first victory has gone to the former.

If, then, General de Gaulle is returning to his 1947 policy, he must expect a much smaller following, both inside and outside Parliament. For his supporters the question that was left unanswered in 1947 is still unanswered. What is the road to power? It is doubtful whether in 1953 so many Frenchmen will be prepared to leave it unanswered. They are likely to see the present road as one which leads to the *impasse* reached by the pre-war anti-parliamentary groups—who advocated revolutionary and anti-parliamentary attitudes while rejecting both revolutionary and parliamentary methods. General de Gaulle has never given any evidence of wishing to seize power unconstitutionally; but his movement now seems to have no clearly defined constitutional road to power.

Will the eighty-seven Deputies now try to adopt the constitutional road? If they remain united, try to consolidate their position, and hope to become strong enough after the next election to put their policy into effect through the ordinary processes of parliamentary government, what are their chances of success? A number of them are no doubt anxiously asking themselves that question. It would mean becoming *un parti comme les autres*—but that was surely the logical consequence of contesting the elections in 1951. It would mean the loss of some of the *mystique* which derives from General de Gaulle's personality, and from the group's isolation, irresponsibility, and apparent unity. There is considerable sympathy in the country with much of their criticism of the working of the Constitution and of the Government's European policy, though less for their policy of *association capital-travail*. But is it enough? Is there a future for a parliamentary

Gaullism without de Gaulle, if the constitutional road, which implies acceptance of the responsibilities and unpopularities of office, were to lead General de Gaulle to sever all relations with them? If not, is there a future for them? For they are faced with the likelihood of an end to their parliamentary careers, or alternatively, with the prospect of disintegration as a group and absorption into the other parliamentary formations. The choice before them is no easy one.

Concessions in the Korean Truce Talks

THE recent renewed discussions on a Korean truce suggest a review of the main concessions made by both sides since the opening of negotiations in the summer of 1951, at a time when the second assault on South Korea had been repelled and the U.N. forces held the initiative. The first major concessions were made in July 1951 in the discussions on the agenda, the Communists agreeing to drop their demand that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea must be included—the U.N. maintained that this was a political matter beyond the scope of purely military talks—and the U.N. agreeing to include a final item providing for recommendations to the Governments concerned. The Communists, no doubt, expected that these would include the withdrawal of foreign troops.) In October the Communists abandoned their insistence that the demilitarized zone should be based on the 38th parallel and later agreed that the demarcation line be based upon the battle-lines held at the time the armistice was signed. The U N. had meanwhile agreed to accept a demilitarized zone only 2½, instead of twenty, miles wide.

During the winter of 1951–2 important concessions were made by both sides. These included agreement by the U.N. to give up all islands held by their forces north of the demarcation line and within the three-mile territorial limit; an agreement by the U.N to allow a certain number of agreed airfields in North Korea to be repaired after an armistice to meet genuine civilian needs, and, perhaps most important of all, the surrender by the U.N. of their insistence on aerial inspection of North Korea during an armistice The Communists were at first unwilling to permit any rotation or replacement of troops or military equipment, but later agreed that each side should be allowed replacements of up to 35,000 men a month, while the U.N. reduced their figure from 70,000 to 35,000. The U.N. also agreed that the inspection teams which would be

responsible for supervising the armistice arrangements should be provided by neutral nations and not by representatives of the opposing military commands, although they insisted that the Joint Military Armistice Commission should be the supreme supervisory organization to whom the teams would report through a neutral Armistice Supervisory Committee. To this the Communists agreed. The U.N. also conceded a Communist demand that these inspection teams should be confined to certain ground, sea, and air ports of entry and to the main communications centres in Korea: this, in conjunction with the abandonment of aerial observation, involved a considerable concession by the U.N. as it meant that inspection would be strictly limited, and the possibility of either side using the armistice as an opportunity to strengthen its military potential increased. In March 1952 it was agreed that the inspection teams should be based at five ports of entry on each side, the Communists having at first suggested three and the U.N. ten ports. The Communists also agreed that secret equipment should not, as they had desired, be open to investigation by the teams.

At the end of April and the beginning of May 1952 the negotiators agreed on the two outstanding issues apart from the repatriation of prisoners, although both sides made their concession dependent on acceptance of their own view on this question; the U.N. offered to withdraw their demand for restriction of the repair and construction of military airfields after an armistice, and the Communists agreed to drop their nomination of the Soviet Union as one of the neutral inspectors. The Communists now appear to have accepted the principle that prisoners should not be repatriated against their will, and the present discussions turn on the method to be employed in carrying out this principle.

A New Locarno?

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL told the House of Commons on 11 May that the Locarno Treaty of 1925 had been in his mind. 'It was the highest point we reached between the wars. . . . It was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and with Germany if France attacked her.' He continued:

The scene today, its scale and its factors, is widely different, and yet I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the minds of those

whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind. Russia has a right to feel assured that as far as human arrangements can run the terrible events of the Hitler invasion will never be repeated, and that Poland will remain a friendly Power and a buffer, though not, I trust, a puppet State.

On 23 October 1925 the then British Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, one of the chief architects of the Locarno Pact, told the British press that the Pact was 'the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace'. Earlier in the same year, when explaining to the House of Commons that the German Government had made certain proposals, he said:

> If I understand them rightly, they amount to this: that Germany is prepared to guarantee voluntarily what hitherto she has accepted under the compulsion of the treaty, that is, the *status quo* in the West... She is prepared to say that she renounces the idea of recourse to war to change the frontiers in the East She is not prepared to say, in regard to the frontiers in the East, that she renounces the hope some day to modify some of their provisions by friendly negotiation, by diplomatic procedure, or it may be, for aught I know, by recourse to the good offices of the League of Nations. . . .

Briefly, the treaties initialled at Locarno on 16 October, and signed in London on 1 December 1925, consisted of a treaty of mutual guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy; arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium, Germany and France, Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia; and a final protocol. In the treaty, the High Contracting Parties mutually undertook that they would in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other except for legitimate defence against violations of the undertaking contained in it; but that they would settle by peaceful means all questions of every kind which might arise between them and which it might not be possible to settle by normal methods of diplomacy, and that they would settle all such disputes by arbitration or conciliation, as provided for in the separate conventions. In the case of any flagrant violations of the undertakings, the signatory Powers bound themselves immediately to go to the assistance of the party injured. The final protocol stated that, in order reciprocally to assure themselves of the benefit of the arbitration convention concluded at Locarno, France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia respectively had pledged themselves in treaties of guarantee to lend each other immediate aid and assistance should there be a failure to observe the undertakings arrived

at between them and Germany for the maintenance of general peace, if such a failure were accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms.

Two of the signatories of Locarno afterwards signed treaties with the U.S.S.R.: Germany in 1926 and France on 2 May 1935. Germany, of which Hitler was by then Chancellor, protested that the Franco-Soviet Pact was incompatible with the terms of Locarno. Hitler himself seemed to draw a distinction between Locarno, freely negotiated and signed by Germany—although it guaranteed her existing Western frontiers—and the Treaty of Versailles which had brought into existence the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Nevertheless, on 7 March 1936, nine days after the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact, German troops re-occupied the Rhineland thereby violating the Versailles and Locarno treaties. The other signatories of Locarno met and formally declared Germany guilty of a breach of the two treaties, but took no other action. Proposals were later made for new Rhineland and mutual assistance pacts, open to all signatories of Locarno and intended to reinforce their security, but in fact these never came into existence. The violation of Locarno by the re-militarization of the Rhineland was 'the watershed, after which events acquired a fatal downward momentum'[1] towards the Second World War.

[1]Survey of International Affairs 1939–46, *The World in March 1939*, p. 340.

The Soviet Zone of Germany Today

THE EAST-WEST EXODUS

AT the present moment more than a thousand people a day are leaving the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. They come as refugees, leaving behind all their goods and chattels and carrying nothing with them. What induces them to give up their homes and begin a new and uncertain existence? They are escaping from the pressure of a Soviet system which is constantly expanding and strengthening its hold. From 1941 onwards there has been a constant East-West movement between the zones of occupation. This movement has changed in character and degree, reflecting faithfully the situation in the Soviet zone. Just after the war it was a readjustment made necessary by war changes, principally a return of evacuees to their old homes. But during the same period, and in increasing numbers, the original inhabitants also streamed out. Among the first who sought to escape from the regime were prisoners of war who asked to be discharged, not to their homes in the Soviet zone, but to Western Germany, their relations following them there. That was particularly true of prisoners of war from the Soviet Union who had had immediate experience of the Soviet system, although those returning from Western countries were just as eager to avoid being made prisoner for a second time or being 'demilitarized' or 'de-Nazified' by methods which to begin with were particularly brutal, and included detention in concentration camps in Germany or the Soviet Union.

The political refugee, who finds himself in danger of losing his life or his freedom because he stands by a political conviction deviating from the party line, has from the first been an element in the picture, although in 1952 the great increase in the total number of refugees reduced his relative importance. The economic reforms have also been the cause of a general exodus: through them, independent farmers and entrepreneurs, members of the liberal professions, and latterly also peasants and artisans have first had their characters blackened and then the basis of their livelihood withdrawn. Direction to work in the uranium mines, to join the people's police or the 'service for Germany' (the Soviet zone *Arbeitsdienst*) continues to act as a spur, particularly to young people, forcing them to choose this hard way out. Since June 1952, when special measures have been taken to cordon off frontier

areas and make open flight through West Berlin more difficult, two new groups of refugees have been added: first, those who foresee that they themselves will be the next to be affected by the methods of compulsion in the zone and will no longer be able to escape unless they make determined efforts to get out before 'closing-time'; and, secondly, people living alone and old couples who do not want to be completely cut off from their relations in the West, without whose help many of them in any case cannot make both ends meet. Thus there has come about, especially since the beginning of 1953, a great increase in the stream of refugees who, in addition, realized that they might have to reckon with sealing-off measures within the already divided city of Berlin. One must also admit that there has been some panic; with so many people leaving, others became uncertain as to whether, left behind in even greater isolation, they would be in a position to protect themselves against the violent interference of the regime. From 1 January to 20 March 1953, 100,000 people left the Soviet zone; in February alone the number was 40,000, and in the first week of March 16,000. Since the worst fears that all loopholes would be closed have not yet been realized, the flood has somewhat receded, but still exceeds a thousand a day.

There are still about 18,850,000 people in the Soviet zone of Germany. But the departure of a total of 1,800,000 since 1945 has not been without effect on the population structure, already seriously distorted by the war and during the post-war period. The stream of refugees contains a relatively high percentage of men and youths. Thus the preponderance of the higher age groups is greater in the East of Germany than in the Federal Republic, the ratio between the sexes is still less favourable,[1] and the maintenance of the population therefore depends on a relatively small section of the whole (44·8 per cent in 1950). The flood of refugees from the regions east of the Oder-Neisse Line swept into the Soviet zone rather than into the other zones for the obvious reason that it adjoins these regions. Numbering over 4 million, the refugees constitute about 25 per cent of the population (in comparison with about 16 per cent of refugees from the same area in the Federal Republic). Although numerically an important factor, they are not permitted to play any political or economic role as

[1] In 1950 age groups over sixty-five constituted 10·4 per cent in the East, as against 9·4 per cent in the West, in October 1952 in the Soviet zone males constituted 44·5 per cent, as against 46·8 per cent in the West.

a distinct group because the Oder-Neisse Line has been recognized as final by the Government of the Soviet zone.

Until 1948 the rate of mortality outstripped the birth-rate in the Soviet zone, a state of affairs for which lack of food and of medicaments was largely to blame. Since then there has been an excess of births, but no increase in the total population, thanks to the outward movement of refugees. Inside the zone the population is once more moving into the towns as industry revives and concentrates in industrial centres, and as the centralization of the administration proceeds apace. During the war relative immunity from bombing and, in the immediate post-war period, availability of food made village life for the time being attractive. Even today, thanks to the land reform and to the absorption of refugees into the country districts where there is more accommodation, density of population is higher in the rural areas than before the war. In large towns the population remains about the same, but in the medium and small towns where new industrial centres have been created it exceeds the pre-war level.

ADMINISTRATION

What are the conditions in which the people in the Soviet zone now live? In 1945 the Soviet Union, like the other Occupying Powers in their zones, acquired supreme power, and so was able to recast political, economic, and cultural life in its own mould. Thus gradually a German Government of 'anti-fascist and democratic order', the German Democratic Republic, was built up in close imitation of the Soviet pattern. Whereas this process went on at first under cover, it has now been openly propagated for some time, especially since the party conference of the Socialist Unity Party in July 1952 when it was laid down that the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (D.D.R.) was in the process of a 'transition to socialism' (dictatorship of the proletariat). To this end, in the autumn of 1952 the power of the State was centralized by the breaking up of the five *Lander* into fourteen districts (*Bezirke*), administered directly by the central Government. No larger units are now tolerated since they might possibly become independent factors of power, and even the number of *Kreise*, the sub-divisions of the *Bezirke*, has been substantially increased under these new arrangements.

Although the written Constitution keeps fairly closely to that of Weimar, in actual fact the concentration of power is characteristic

of the 'democracy' of Eastern Europe. Five parties have a formal existence. Of these, two bourgeois parties (the Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Party) can be traced back to groups which organized themselves immediately after 1945, but have since undergone such changes that they can no longer in practice put forward their original programmes. The same thing is happening even to the National Democratic Party (N.D.P.), founded in 1948, and to the Democratic Peasants' Party (D.B.P.) which have kept in step with the Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.) from the first, however much they may have outwardly pretended to be independent organizations. The single decisive influence of the S.E.D. has also hidden itself behind the so-called mass organizations, which still appear from outside to be non-party, but are to an increasing degree and now even openly controlled by the S.E.D. These organizations are: the Free German Trade Union Council (F.D.G.B.), the National Front, the Free German Youth (F.D.J.), the Farmers' Union for Mutual Aid (*Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe*), the Democratic Women's League (D.F.D.), the Cultural League for the Democratic Rebirth of Germany (*Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands*), and the Society for German-Soviet Friendship. The organs of popular representation, the People's Chamber and the councils at the *Bezirk*, *Kreis*, and *Gemeinde* levels, are formally composed of representatives of these different parties or groups. But they were compelled on 15 October 1950 to agree to a unified list on the basis of which they were elected, and in practice the majority follow the party line of the S.E.D. The Ministers of the most important Departments, and in other Ministries officials at least down to the level of Under-Secretaries, are members of the S.E.D., and the office of the President of the Council of Ministers (since July 1952 the effective Legislature) stands personally in very close relationship with the politbureau of the central committee of the S.E.D.

ECONOMIC PLANNING

The central Authority exercises its maximum control in planning, and not only in economic planning—though naturally this takes first place since economics is regarded as the basic element in life. The Government's plan also includes in its twelve divisions research, culture, and health. Beginning with quarterly plans drawn up in 1946, passing on to a six-month plan in 1948 and a

two-year plan in 1949–50, the Soviet zone was finally attuned to the planning rhythm of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The point was now reached when not only was the economy made subservient to the aims of the East, but when a five-year plan for the years 1951–5 could be drawn up on the Russian pattern. This plan is split up into detailed annual plans which are legally binding on all subordinate executive organs. The final responsibility for the fulfilment of the plans rests with the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (previously with the State Planning Commission). Recently orders of the Soviet Control Commission (S.K.K.) have played a decisive role in linking up the Soviet zone with the planning aims of the Soviet Union and have resulted in the switching over of the economy to reparation and armaments through newly-formed organs of co-ordination and control. The State Planning Commission and the specialized Ministries, which are now subordinated to it, are in fact merely executive bodies. The essence of the planning is that the central office fixes the target, but places responsibility for reaching it as low as possible, that is, on the humblest worker who must 'voluntarily' undertake responsibility for fulfilling or exceeding the objective and must himself bear the consequences of failure, to the extent of undergoing material sacrifice, such as cuts in pay, extra work, or even dismissal or arrest. It is obvious that when crises arise of such proportions as the present one, involving shortage of consumer goods, the Minister himself will in fact be made responsible, even though he, in his turn, has little influence on the actual planning.

The watchwords for the economic plan of 1953, decreed on 17 December 1952, are 'the struggle for the maintenance of peace, the re-establishment of the national unity of Germany, and the fulfilment of the tasks set by the second party conference of the S.E.D. to create the economic foundations of socialism'.[1] These phrases have charted the course for the entire life of the zone until further notice. Private initiative, already made almost impossible by planning, and every kind of independent and responsible activity are to be stifled and all decisions left to the central office. The economic consequences of this are particularly noticeable.

AGRICULTURE AND LAND REFORM

In the sphere of agriculture larger estates, of over 100 hectares, were completely confiscated in 1948 in order to break the political

[1] Order paper of the D.D.R. 1952, p. 1319.

power of the Junkers and landowners; some were nationalized and the rest parcelled out. Small-holdings were created for 209,000 new farmers (*Neubauern*) with an average size of 8 hectares, and became the private property of refugees from the lands East of the Oder-Neisse, of farm labourers, and of other 'reliable' applicants. Freedom of sale, of cultivation, and of the disposal of produce were severely restricted by central planning and by compulsory deliveries, but the owners were several times given promises of independence in keeping with the stage of development then reached on the Soviet pattern. A machinery pool for common use was first administered by the Farmers' Union for Mutual Aid (V.d.g.B.) but was taken over in 1948 by State-owned machine-lending stations (M.A.S.), now known by the Soviet term 'machine tractor stations'. These stations are also responsible for the political and cultural education of the peasants, in other words, for preparing them for further development. In spite of all assurances, nothing more has been heard of the 'independent peasant' (however small the plot he calls his own) since the S.E.D. party conference in July 1952. The 'voluntary' pooling into production co-operatives where oxen, arable land, tractors, machinery and implements, or, in addition, working and breeding cattle, are used in common, is being pursued with energy. This is the preparation for the total collectivization of agricultural production. The struggle against the large- and medium-scale farmers (those who own from 20 to 100 hectares) is continuing. It has been seen since 1948–9 in the fact that farmers have to surrender quotas of produce which are excessive in relation to the size of their farms. Discrimination is shown against them personally; when fertilizers and other means of production are being distributed they are put at the end of the queue and also, in the case of loans of machinery, they have to pay higher charges. Often they cannot fulfil their delivery and tax obligations and consequently many have been arrested for sabotaging the five-year plan and many have fled. If one includes voluntary divisions of land, the percentage of farms of 20 to 100 hectares as a proportion of the total number of farms fell from 7·8 per cent in 1946 to 6·1 per cent in 1951 and, on the basis of area cultivated, from 31·7 per cent to 26 per cent. This downward trend is still continuing. Farms of under 20 hectares, which are the only ones permitted to join the production co-operatives and enjoy their privileges, rose to 93·8 per cent in 1951, as against 89 per cent in 1939, and on

an area basis to 69·6 per cent, as against 40·8 per cent in 1939.

The productivity of agriculture is impaired by lack of fertilizers, by failure to utilize fallow land, and by inferior cattle fodder. There are more cattle than in the pre-war period, but the total agricultural output is below the pre-war level owing to a switch-over to oleaginous plants, although the population to be maintained has been increased by the presence of occupation troops and refugees. Since sugar is exported, fats, meat, and even grain must be imported to maintain a bare standard of living.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

After various reorganizations there are now, in industry, three types of property owner: the Soviet shareholding companies (S.A.G.) with 15 per cent of industrial capacity, the nationalized firms (V.E.B.) with about 62 per cent, and the private firms with the remaining 23 per cent. The S.A.G. and V.E.B.—whose importance far exceeds their size since they hold the key positions in the economy—owe their existence to the dispossession of 'war and Nazi criminals' in 1945 and to the reprieve of firms due for demolition. These changes were carried out in one operation, but private firms still continue to be taken over after their owners have been condemned as 'offenders against the economy' (*Wirtschaftsverbrecher*) or have succeeded in escaping. Thanks to constant discrimination against private firms in matters of distribution and taxation this is a frequent occurrence. The S.A.G. hold the key positions in the basic material industries and in machine production, sometimes to the point of monopoly as in the mining of uranium[1] and in some branches of the chemical industry. Since the economy of the Soviet zone is particularly in need of these products, the U.S.S.R. can exercise a control over the internal economy of the zone by the deliveries they exact, and is thus enabled to support the activities of the Soviet Control Commission, the politbureau of the S.E.D., and the Government of the D.D.R. The production of the remaining basic and capital goods industries has been nationalized as have all the big firms. The most important factories are centrally controlled, whereas local industry remains under the supervision of the *Kreise* or of the towns. Every industrial undertaking is legally independent, does its own accounting, and is responsible for the fulfilment of the plan. This means in effect that leading executives and workers

[1] All uranium mined is at the disposal of the Soviet Union.

must accept responsibility but, once the basic statistics on output and capacity have been handed over to the planning authorities, they have no more say in the drawing up of the plan and are expected merely to fulfil the targets allotted to them.

Only in the production of consumer goods has private enterprise any part to play; private firms, which used to be an important element in the preparation and use of timber, were eliminated in 1952. They can no longer exercise any initiative since they are essentially dependent on the nationalized sector of the economy through contracts and the granting of credit (which, with finance, is a State monopoly). On 1 April 1953 private firms ceased to have the right of representation in the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, which has long been one of the organs of control.

Since the industrial structure was altered in favour of the production of basic materials (steel and rolling mills, mining, etc.) the 1936 level has on the average been reached and partly surpassed in industrial production, and this change has been supplemented by the development of the chemical and heavy engineering industries. In spite of all these achievements—from which, since it is primarily a question of investment, the population has benefited by employment rather than by an increased supply of consumer goods—there are repeated difficulties, especially in the procurement of raw materials, in transport, and in electric power supplies. That these difficulties are endangering the progress of the economy can be seen from the present crisis: faulty dovetailing of the separate plans is one of the causes, inferior quality of the products is another. Over-ambitious plans and all kinds of output competitions often lead to quantity being rated higher than quality; defects which may have begun to appear in the basic materials and in machinery result finally in making the end products unusable.

The structure of internal trade, which was at first neglected during the 'reforms' in other spheres of the zonal economy, was not drawn into the general reorganization until 1948 when the State trading organizations were launched. Wholesale trade is now effectively in the hands of the State-owned general distributing centres. It is their job to supply retailers, while transactions are carried out directly between one factory and another within the framework of production on a contract system adjusted to the planning programme. Alongside one another in the retail business are to be found the State trading shops (*Handelsorganisationen* or

H.O.s), the State-controlled co-operative societies, and private traders. The first two already account for 60 per cent of the turnover, and private retailers are likely soon to be completely eliminated. In Fürstenberg an der Oder, the home of workers in the *Eisenhüttenkombinat Ost* and the 'first socialist' town, private retailers are not permitted at all. The rapid progress of the H.O.s is due to the fact that they are the only shops allowed by law to sell rationed goods at higher prices. The explanation of this is that, in cases of short supply or urgency of demand, the legally fixed prices may be increased by two, three, or more times the normal level by means of so-called 'budget' duties (*Haushaltsaufschläge*—a new term) which go into the pocket of the State. In spite of progressive derationing, the H.O.s have maintained their position because, like the co-operatives, they receive better-quality goods and, indeed, in the present crisis, they alone get any supplies at all.

LABOUR AND WAGES

As is to be expected in a comprehensively planned economy, labour is directed. Men from fourteen to sixty-five and women from fourteen to sixty are obliged to work, and in theory can choose where; but in order to ensure that the pivotal industries recruit the labour they need, particularly technicians, the workers are often compelled to undertake a particular job either by the incentive of high reward or by direct pressure. One of the signs of the present crisis is the existence of unprecedented unemployment. At the end of March 1953 unemployment figures reached a million, or more than 10 per cent of the working population. Lack of raw materials together with the new economy drive to raise the productivity of industry have further led to mass dismissals.

In addition to interference by planning, the State arrogates to itself a large share of the national income—36·5 per cent as long ago as in 1949 of which, however, a high proportion, over DM-East 4,000 million a year, goes in reparations to the Soviet Union. Taxation is extraordinarily high. In 1951 it amounted to DM-East 761 per head of the population, half from taxes on consumer goods of which the 'budget' duties of the H.O. contributed three-quarters. To this should be added the profits of the nationalized sector of the economy, even though in 1952 these hardly came up to expectations.

That part of the national income not directly taken by the State

consists principally of salaries and wages.[1] The levelling out of 'capitalist' differences based on sex, length of service, and locality has been quickly followed by a new much greater differentiation ranging from a minimum monthly wage of about DM-East 100 to as much as DM-East 1,500 for the 'aces' of the technical and scientific intelligentsia. The quantity and quality of the work done and also its urgency from the standpoint of the national economy are taken into account in arriving at these rates of pay. This wide divergence of reward has the same object as the marked preference for piece-work (*Leistungslohn*) to increase productivity. This incentive to increase productivity has already become a whip, for output norms are continually being raised—the last occasion being as recent as 1 May 1953—at 'the wish' of the workers. As a background to this 'wish' there is, however, the fact that the wages paid out in 1952 exceeded the total figure allowed for in the plan, a mistake which will be avoided in 1953. Recent dismissals have been partly due to this cause.

The present wage structure is the result not of agreed contracts but of legislation. Nevertheless, every year new collective agreements are concluded according to a set formula between the F.D.G.B. 'representing' the workers, who are only allowed to acquiesce, and the technical Ministries or works managements concerned. Like their Soviet models, these agreements contain resolutions by the workers and the managements in favour of fulfilling or exceeding their allocated objectives and of raising standards. The value of an agreement is judged on the basis of the number of these resolutions attached to it. In each agreement, besides the various items of the plan presented as a minimal objective, the legal regulations governing wages and conditions of work are set out and adopted.

RATIONING

But what is the good of earnings if one cannot buy what one needs? By 1952 the supply position had improved considerably in all spheres after the first difficult post-war years, even though deliveries and quality left much to be desired and the general level was below that of Western Germany. The most important foodstuffs, such as fats, meat, milk, and sugar, are still rationed, and since the summer of 1952 there has been a noticeable shortage, especially in foodstuffs, which is not attributable to bad

[1] In 1950 80 per cent of the working population were wage-earners.

harvests alone. The shortage is also a consequence of a declin in imports (in its turn the result of reduced exports); of increase importation of material for armaments at the expense of consume goods; the building up of State reserves; and the increase in th ranks of the people's police and the 'service for Germany' whos members receive rations higher than those of the general public It should perhaps be mentioned in this connexion that rationin in the Soviet zone is graded according to the type of work done Specialists and intelligentsia get particularly high rations, whicl means that their general position is in glaring contrast with that o those not in employment. The latter, who receive very low ration (and pensions and insurance benefits are also very poor), ca hardly save enough to make purchases in the H.O.s, whereas th former can supplement their already high rations from this source

Free sale, particularly of fats, has ceased to exist on the lowest grade ration cards; butter is not included, and some fat coupon have been replaced by meat coupons. Instructors, on the othe hand, and students in the party schools, who already have highe rations, get two-thirds of their fat in the form of butter. The crisi is being used to consolidate socialism. It has already been an nounced that the self-employed, who have already been deprive of their textile coupons, will receive no food coupons after 1 May which means that they will have to buy their fats, sugar, and mea in the H.O.s at inflated prices if, indeed, these foods are obtain able there at all. The plight of the Soviet zone is now such that th special ration cards for the intelligentsia at a higher rate than th ordinary cards were withdrawn altogether on 1 May 'at their ow request' because, it was said, they could obtain their extras at th H.O. shops. They have been promised instead their own H.O.s on the lines of those already in existence for professors and others which will receive better supplies. The authorities have thu extricated themselves from the dilemma of being unable to honou cards already issued—and the onus has been passed down to th less fortunate members of the community.

In this sketch of conditions in the Soviet zone it has not bee possible to touch on more than a few features.[1] The situation i largely once again in flux. Constant administrative changes restlessness, and resulting insecurity are part of the daily life of th zone. Everyone, particularly when at work, must pay constant li

[1] For further information, see *Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschlan* (Bonn, All-German Ministry, 1951–3) passim.

service in various ways to the regime and all its activities. But however closely the outward ways of life are made to fit into the Soviet pattern, however unmistakable is the impress of the regime on the inhabitants—above all on young people who have known no other way of life—the present acute stage of the struggle by the Church against the attempt to remove youth from religious influences shows that the people of the Soviet zone, including the younger generation, realize, or at least surmise, what freedom of choice means. D. F.

Resettlement of Karelian Refugees

THE resettlement of refugees is the biggest and most memorable task undertaken by Finland since the war. In terms of money it has proved a burden approximately as heavy as that of paying reparations to the Soviet Union;[1] in terms of the tax on ingenuity and sympathy the burden has been incomparably greater. It is obviously too early now, less than nine years after the Armistice, to give a final verdict on the success or shortcomings of the resettlement—for that one must wait until the children of the refugees are grown up; but the main lines of resettlement have been unalterably laid down, and such a large proportion of the refugees has been permanently established in new homes that something rather more than an interim report may be given.

When the Russo-Finnish War ended in September 1944, Finland had to cede 4·3 million hectares of land to the Soviet Union. The population of this area, nearly half a million people, or 12 per cent of the total Finnish population, chose to leave their homes and to emigrate to parts of Finland that were still free, rather than live under Soviet rule. This faced the Finnish Government with appalling problems. One in nearly every eight citizens was a displaced person, usually penniless and propertyless and in need not only of immediate relief and accommodation but of permanent establishment in an occupation suited to his skill and experience. Even without this influx of population, there would have been a housing shortage in Finland, a shortage of arable land, and a short-

[1] See 'Finland's Reparations', in *The World Today*, July 1952.

age of capital. The refugees could not decently be sent where labour was most needed, only to places for which they were most apt: the 9,000 from Petsamo and Salla had to be resettled in the far north, the 9,000 from Porkkala on the south-west coast, and the 400,000 from Karelia in latitudes and climates roughly approximating to those of their Karelian homes. Of these Karelians some 200,000 were farmers and their families for whom new holdings had to be found.

It was in a way fortunate that the situation was not altogether new. When the Soviet Union annexed Karelia after the Winter War in March 1940, the Karelians had emigrated, and in June the Finnish Parliament had rushed through an Emergency Act for their resettlement. Nearly all the refugees returned to Karelia after the summer of 1941 when Finland recaptured the province during the second Russian war. The emergency scheme was therefore never fully applied, but its principles and machinery were to be useful for the crisis of 1944–5. The most important principles were these:

(1) The area for resettlement, except in the case of refugees from Petsamo and Salla, was to be the southern and western region of Finland, south of the Oulujoki. One serious difficulty here was that the resettlement area included all the Swedish-speaking parishes of Finland, whereas the refugees, except for those from Porkkala, were all Finnish-speaking.

(2) The refugee-farmers were to be settled on holdings of their own—not as hired labourers or even as tenant-farmers—and if possible on viable farms, not on uneconomical small-holdings such as had been common in Karelia. This would mean finding millions of hectares of land for them, including at least a quarter of a million hectares of cultivable land to take the place of the tilled Karelian fields they had lost. The new land was to be taken from estates owned by State, Church, municipalities, public companies, and 'private' landowners—first from neglectful and speculative landowners, then from owners of large farms.

(3) The refugees were entitled to compensation for the property they had lost. Under the emergency scheme compensation was paid to farmers on the basis of 1934–8 prices. The money was raised by a capital levy, which in fact was paid largely out of current income.

These emergency-scheme principles were incorporated in the legislation for final settlement which began with the great Land Procurement Act of May 1945. Never easy to apply, they were much more difficult now than in 1940. Finland had been defeated for a second time, was saddled with an overwhelming reparations bur-

den, and had undertaken to find land not only for refugees but for ex-service men and for war widows and orphans. Inflation had upset the financial basis of the compensation plan, and a new method of indemnity had to be found: losses resulting from the second evacuation were to be compensated on the basis of 1944 prices, half of the payment being made in inflation-proof bonds. Only in one respect was the resettlement problem simpler in 1945 than it had seemed in 1940: the Russian demand for industrial reparations meant that there was immediate work for many categories of labourers and skilled workers among the refugees.

THE FARMERS

The first and greatest task was to resettle the farmers. Roughly the method was this. The State bought the land by voluntary or forced sale and allotted it to refugee families in holdings proportionate to but generally larger than the size of their Karelian farms. The refugee made the first payments for his new holding out of his compensation money which had been withheld for the purpose, and loans were granted to help him in clearing land for cultivation, erecting the more important farm buildings, buying indispensable agricultural equipment, and paying for electrification. A new company, Pellonraivaus, had been set up in 1940, with the State as a large shareholder, to provide the latest machines—most of them American—for forest clearing, but a great deal of the clearing was done by the refugees' own labour. Many of the new farms were what the Finns call 'cold'—that is, farms without enough cultivated land to provide subsistence. Here the State would have a bath-hut built, where the family would live while the first clearing work was done and the first permanent buildings constructed; or, in areas where a number of refugee families were to be settled adjacently, a community centre would be built on a central farm to house first the clearing and building workers, then the refugee families as they moved in. The State was responsible for about a thousand new buildings of different types on these cold farms.

Clearing forest land and putting up new buildings was only one part of the necessary task A great deal of the new land needed draining before it could be brought under cultivation; by the end of 1952 an area of 170,000 hectares had been drained, to serve 30,000 holdings. It was necessary to build new roads; by the end of 1952 some 10,000 kilometres of roads, serving 43,000 farms, had been completed.

Looking statistically at the Finnish achievement in resettling refugees on the land, one could see that by last December 26,456 new farms and 9,748 dwelling sites had been created. The average size of the new holdings was 38 hectares, of which 11 hectares consisted of cultivable fields. But statistics are a poor way of measuring this type of achievement. It may be better to take a single example, even at the risk of its not being typical.

A CASE IN POINT

A certain stretch of forest near Hameenlinna, in south-central Finland, was purchased by the State from its private owners and set aside for Karelian farmers. The first clearing work was done under Government contract with the help of an International Students Camp. Clearing is a long business. It is not simply a matter of felling the trees and stripping, sawing, and hauling the trunks; the stumps have to be grubbed out and the roots left exposed for a season, till rain has washed the soil off and they are ready to be dragged away and burned. When 200 hectares were ready (leaving 100 still to be cleared) twenty-two Karelian families moved in. There was a rough bath-hut for each, and there they lived while they got the first fields under cultivation and built their byre and farmhouse. For this they had to buy tools and materials and in some cases hire help, drawing on their compensation credit. The byres had to conform to a pattern laid down by the State: two-story buildings, with stable, cow-house, and dairy below and granary and hay-loft above, approached by a sloping ramp up which carts could be driven. The contractors had built a rough road through the estate and laid an electric cable, though electricity has not yet been laid on to all the twenty-two farms.

Some of the farmers are already well settled, even prosperous. Väinö T., for example, has 12 hectares of cleared land, from which he has had a surprising oat crop and some satisfactory wheat, and 24 hectares of forest. He has an electric milker for his six cows, and his two little Finnish horses are bred from a champion sire. He is the type of man who will always succeed—one might call him a born kulak. His elder son has married the daughter of the Häme farmer from whose land the new holding was taken, and he has a younger son and a couple of healthy daughters to help him. Not all the Karelians on this settlement are so well placed. Antti P., for instance, has only 8 hectares of cleared land and 20 of forest. Two cows, two calves, a horse, a sheep, a young pig, and a few hens

are all his livestock. He is an old man, though tough as wire and lively as a cricket, with only one son to help him besides his wife. This wife is a remarkable woman. She got the men to make her a new loom and has woven not only rag rugs for the farmhouse floors but hanging rugs in thirty-seven shades of wool—work which had to be done in the short and busy summer months because the light is not good enough during the greater part of the year. Their farm has still no electricity.

The settlement has not yet been integrated into a village. A site is marked out for a school and a shop, but neither has been built. The children must walk a couple of miles to the main road, where a bus takes them to a school seven miles away. There are difficulties of every sort—the temperamental difficulties between the Karelians who are the Celts of Finland, vivacious, garrulous, artistic, and the Häme people who are as taciturn and unforthcoming as our East Anglians, and financial difficulties of a thousand kinds concerning rates of compensation and the like—but these are gradually being overcome, thanks largely to the official agents who act as liaison between the refugee settlers, the old inhabitants, and the authorities. These men know every metre of the land and every soul in the district. They lodge in the farms and are often accepted as guide, philosopher, and friend.

This settlement near Hämeenlinna can be counted as a success. It is in no way exceptional, but one should not imply that it is normal, for there is no norm where refugee settlement is concerned: refugees are human beings and infinitely various in the relationships they form and the reactions they make to schemes of agricultural reintegration.

THE FISHERMEN

If the settlement of the Karelian farmers can be counted as a success, that of the fishermen can not. The whole plan for resettling Karelian fishermen foundered on the rock of Swedo-Finn opposition. Although the Swedish-speaking minority constitutes only 9 per cent of Finland's population, it is concentrated in most of the seaboard areas suitable for the fishing industry, and its members were steadfast from the beginning in opposing the settlement of Finnish-speaking refugees among them. This minority attitude is castigated as selfish by the majority, but the Swedo-Finns have a strong case: an influx of Karelians would swamp the Swedish culture of their village; it might even mean giving the place a new

name, and it would certainly involve building and staffing a new Finnish-speaking school. Their opposition took some unconstitutional forms—some Swedish-speaking parishes actually appealed to Stockholm—but it was none the less successful. On the intervention of the Finnish President, Paasikivi, the maximum increase of population which immigrants might make in a Swedish-speaking parish was reduced from 4 per cent to 2 per cent. In most cases it was found that this 2 per cent was taken up by refugees from Swedish-speaking Porkkala and there was no room for Karelians.

This mattered less in the case of farmers than in that of fishermen. The farmer refugees could be settled in Finnish-speaking areas, and landowners in Swedish districts could be obliged to contribute to the purchase of land for them, but the fishermen could not be settled inland except on the lakes, and there they were to find their traditional skill, to say nothing of their accustomed equipment, altogether unadaptable. It might suffice for a Karelian fisherman from the shores of Lake Ladoga to be settled on Päijänne or Saimaa, but that would not do for the seafaring fishermen from the Karelian coast. A great loss in human terms and in produce has been suffered by the deracination of the fishermen from the villages south of Viipuri who were among the most famous in all the Baltic.

THE TOWNSPEOPLE

The resettlement of people from the Karelian towns presented quite a different problem. There were some 130,000 of them, or 40,000 families. In the case of unskilled and part-skilled workers transference was easy at first because of the demand for labour in reparations work, but with the fulfilment of the reparations quotas it became necessary to lay off hands, and naturally enough the newcomers from Karelia were the first to be dismissed. In the case of shopkeepers and traders of one sort and another, resettlement took place more smoothly than was expected. The Karelians have a gift for buying and selling—they have always been the itinerant vendors of Finland and their natural affability, even plausibility, makes them what other Finns would call born shopkeepers. It is astonishing how they have found their feet in Helsinki, Tampere, and Lahti—especially in Lahti, a town of 45,000 inhabitants where Karelians were unknown a few years ago but where today half the shops in the main street are in Karelian hands.

The case of the highly educated townspeople was bound to be

more difficult. A medical practitioner, for instance, cannot be compensated for losing a practice which took him half a lifetime to build up. A civil servant is unlikely to be fitted into a type of employment comparable with his accustomed work. For the professional class the disruption of their children's education is a serious blow. But we must not take the plight of the highly educated too seriously; they were a privileged class, and, though nothing hurts like the loss of privilege, it can be a salutary pain.

The hardship that applies to all urban refugees is the housing shortage. The problem of finding house-room in the towns weighs on many Finns besides the refugees, but for the refugees it seems insoluble. They are unable to build because they have no money. The Karelian towns were damaged during the Winter War and townsmen were compensated at the pre-war price level, unlike the farmers who were compensated for their losses in the second Russian war at the higher level of 1944. All that can be said at present is that new Acts of Parliament are projected for giving grants to enable Karelian townspeople to build and for finding extra compensation for Karelians who were indemnified at the 1938 levels (by this later Bill some 150,000 families stand to benefit and some 5,000 or 6,000 million Finnish marks are likely to be spent).

CONCLUSION

Most Finns are proud—and surely justifiably proud—of the achievement made in Karelian resettlement. They are still bearing an enormous burden of taxation for the cause, and the State is still spending a tenth of its Budget on resettlement charges. They have suffered, and are still gladly suffering, deprivations and inconveniences on the Karelians' behalf. Against all this they can set certain definite advantages to Finland. The most obvious is the revival of Finnish agriculture following the clearing and draining of so much land, the improved standard of construction of farm buildings, and the extension of expert services and technical help to areas where experts were formerly never seen, let alone resident. An advantage of a different type is to be found in the character and attitude of mind of the Karelian refugees themselves. As long as they live and retain the memory of the wars of 1939–44, Finland will have a body of men whose opposition to Communism is fundamental and whose determination to fight for Finland's independence against any odds is beyond compare.

On the refugees' own opinion of the resettling achievement it is dangerous to generalize. Roughly it may be stated that the farmers are well satisfied and the townspeople not ungrateful. There are still serious apprehensions, especially now that the High Court has recognized the right of appeal against grants of land made to refugees. About 1,300 cases have been lodged, most of them by Swedish-speaking landowners. Once an appeal against a Karelian settler is granted, alarm and despondency spread throughout the neighbourhood, where other Karelians dare not get on with their building work.

The outside world will judge the Karelian resettlement not by its advantages to Finland in general or to the Karelians in particular but in comparison with attempts made to solve refugee problems in other countries. How does the Finnish problem and achievement compare with the Graeco-Turkish exchange of population after the First World War, with the resettlement of Auslandsdeutsch and East Germans after the Second, with the treatment of Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan, or of Palestinian refugees in the Arab States? The most comforting answer, though not the most honest, might be that these cases are not in any way comparable.

J. H. J.

The Press in the Satellite Countries

The evolution of the press in the countries of Eastern Europe from the liberation up to the present time reflects the political history of these countries during those years. From the point of view of political development two distinct periods can be seen, of which the first, from 1944 to 1948, was characterized by a 'controlled liberalism', while the second, which still endures today, witnessed the progressive consolidation of the monopoly held by the Communist press.

In the course of 1948 the few opposition newspapers in Poland and Hungary which survived after the establishment of the Cominform disappeared, simultaneously with the political groups whose views they expressed. From then onwards newspapers took the Soviet press as their model. Fundamentally, this was a swift and

complete turnover, the expression of a 'cold' revolution carried out inexorably, if without dramatic incidents; but appearances were kept up. Most of the papers belonging to the various parties represented in the 'Popular Fronts' which emerged out of the old coalition Governments—the National Front in Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Popular Independence Front in Hungary, the Patriotic Front in Bulgaria, and the Popular Democratic Front in Rumania—continued to appear, as did also a certain number of independent, non-party newspapers which had acquired some influence during the preceding period. Thus in 1952 the following newspapers were still appearing: in Poland, *Dziennik Ludowy* (Peasant Party Daily), *Kurier Codzienny* (Democratic Party), *Slowo Powszechny* (Catholic Progressive, with a circulation of 40,000);[1] in Czechoslovakia, *Lidova Demokracie* (Popular Party led by Abbé Plojhar), *Svobodne Slovo* (formerly of Beneš's party), *Čas* (published in Bratislava, organ of the Slovak Renaissance Party); in Hungary, *Kiss Ujsag* (Smallholders' Party), *Magyar Nemzet* (independent); in Bulgaria, *Zemedelsko Zname* (organ of the Agrarian Union); and in Rumania *Universul* (independent).[2] Other political groups run weekly papers, such as, for example, *Szabad Szo*, organ of the National Peasant Party in Hungary, and *Frontul Plugarilor*, of M. Groza's Ploughmen's Front in Rumania.

But though still published under their old titles, the contents of these papers have undergone a considerable change since 1948, corresponding to the changed position of the non-Communist parties in the various coalition Governments. Successive purges have taken place among the leading personnel of these parties, while their actual leaders either escaped abroad—like Mikolajczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Imre Kovacs, Dimitrov—or were arrested and liquidated, as in the case, for example, of Maniu or Petkov. Since then the non-Communist parties have ceased to carry on any individual activity, their existence being limited to representation in a few Government posts and on the Directive Committee of the 'Front'. Thus, for example, Traikov, leader of the Agrarian Union in Bulgaria (formerly Nicolas Petkov's party), stated in June 1952 at a Patriotic Front meeting that his group 'accepted without reserve the Communist Party leadership'. This acceptance is now

[1] Of the same trend is the weekly *Dzis i Jutro*, organ of the Left-wing Catholics who support the present regime.

[2] The daily *Universul*, which at one time included Ana Pauker on its editorial board, was published only weekly after July 1952, and ceased publication altogether in the spring of 1953.

reflected in the non-Communist papers, which are just a polite echo of the Communist press.

The main function of these non-Communist papers appears to be to explain to their habitual readers the Party Directives which are passed on by the press section of the Ministry of Information (e.g. in Czechoslovakia) or its local equivalent. These directives, being generally couched in a hermetic jargon, are translated into a language more easily comprehensible for the uninitiate. It is a thankless task, as the loss of tone and vigour in the papers inevitably shows. Whenever important decisions are taken, they are generally later than the Communist press in reporting them; their financial resources have been considerably reduced; and the best members of their staffs have been gradually dismissed. Compared with the Communist papers they seem like poor relations, and the best they can do is to make up for the dreary monotony of their political items by the relative liveliness of their sport and drama sections. 'When we compare our paper with the Catholic dailies of other countries we can only reflect sadly on the difference,' said Abbé Dombrowski, one of the editors of *Slowo Powszechny*, a Polish Catholic paper of Communist tendency, in March 1952

A place apart is occupied by the weeklies which depend directly on the Catholic Church—*Tygodnik Powszechny*[1] in Poland, *Uj Ember* in Hungary. These papers, which are at pains to express the point of view of the higher clergy, are the object of frequent attacks in the official press and from the authorities, who wish to restrict them to a purely confessional plane. It appears, moreover, that the Communists, or at any rate the pro-Government Catholic elements, have managed to obtain control of *Tygodnik Powszechny* since the beginning of 1953.

By comparison with the non-Communist press, deprived of a *raison d'être* and destined to vanish sooner or later, the Communist press, which in 1948 absorbed the Social Democrat[2] press as well, appears as a powerful, dynamic, highly concentrated, and specialized concern. In spite of the disappearance of some pre-war papers, the number of dailies does not seem to have diminished, or their circulation either. In this connexion some statistics published on 10 May 1952 in Warsaw during the Polish Press and Book Week are of considerable significance: at that date there were

[1] The official weekly of the Archbishopric of Cracow.
[2] The Hungarian *Nepszava* is the only Social Democrat paper to have survived the fusion by becoming the trade union organ.

400 papers in Poland, with a total daily circulation of 16,230,000, as against a circulation of 8,300,000 before the war. According to an item from the Bulgarian official news agency on 5 May 1953 daily papers in Bulgaria reached, on that day, a circulation of 950,000, which represents a considerable advance from pre-war days. At present there are 67 daily papers in Bulgaria and 92 reviews.

The structure of the Communist press is modelled on that of the Soviet press. Each of the People's Democracies has its equivalent of *Pravda*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Party, with a large circulation. These correspond to *Trybuna Ludu* in Poland, *Rudé Právo* in Czechoslovakia, *Szabad Nep* in Hungary (circulation of 800,000 in February 1952), *Scânteia*[1] in Rumania (700,000 in April 1952), *Rabotnitchesko Delo* in Bulgaria (300,000 in 1949), and *Zeri i Populit* in Albania. All these papers have undergone several editorial changes during the last few years; at present they no longer publish the names of their editorial staff. The most spectacular episode in the purge of the Communist press was the expulsion from the Czechoslovak Communist Party of the editor of *Rudé Právo*, V. Novy, accused in 1950 of 'serious damage to Bolshevik vigilance'. Novy's name was subsequently mentioned in connexion with the Slansky affair.

Simultaneously with the change in their position, the spirit and level of the official organs have changed too. Before 1948 the official organ of each Communist Party was only a *primus inter pares*. It was subject to the competition of other party or independent papers, many of them often very good, and tried to outdo them in interest and in the standard of publication. After 1948 the various *Pravdas* of the People's Democracies no longer had any competitors to fear, and this allowed them to break with certain recognized conventions of 'Western' presentation and to copy with ever-increasing faithfulness the methods of the great Soviet journal which is their model.

Their aim, as formulated in the Cominform organ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (8 December 1950), which keeps a close watch on them, is to be 'an instrument in the struggle for socialism and for the education of the popular masses', to popularize 'the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. and its great successes in the

[1] The new printing works of *Scânteia*, which are one of the great achievements of the Rumanian Plan—they are named after Stalin—publish six daily papers and also print nine weeklies and six reviews, while publishing 92 per cent of Rumanian school textbooks.

building up of socialism', to 'denounce the manoeuvres of the Anglo-American warmongers', to make known the problems arising in the realization of the various countries' economic Plans, and to 'combat ideological errors'. Hence the pedagogic character, the serious tone, and the technicality of language which, combined with the lack of humour and absence of personal colour which characterize them, make the Communist papers pretty difficult reading.

The Moscow *Pravda* is widely quoted,[1] its current topics are taken up, its ideas developed, and its formulae faithfully applied. In this connexion it may be of some interest to quote a Soviet writer and journalist, Boris Polevoi, author of the best-seller *Povest o Nastoyashchem Cheloveke* which received a Stalin Prize a few years ago. Speaking on Moscow Radio (7 February 1952) he told how, when on a recent visit to Hungary, he had asked some young journalists belonging to the Party if a manual of journalism existed in Hungarian. One of the journalists left the room and returned bringing from the library a selection of back numbers of the Moscow *Pravda*. 'Here is our manual, we need no other', said the young enthusiast.

In fact, the main Communist papers of Eastern Europe follow the example of *Pravda* even down to the details of arrangements and make-up. Like *Pravda*, they consist of four or six pages; the two first columns of page 1 are consecrated to an editorial on a question of home or foreign policy, often with a title in the imperative, such as 'Increase the production of our coal-mines', or 'Improve the level of education'. The next three columns are devoted to news, grouped under such headings as 'Today in the Fatherland', or 'Information about the U.S.S.R.', or 'Life in the other People's Democracies'. Page 2 consists of articles on the life and problems of the Party; pages 3 and 4 are devoted to foreign affairs (comment and news); page 5 often contains theoretical or

[1] Soviet papers in general are increasingly widely read in the People's Democracies According to Prague Radio (19 May 1952), there were in Czechoslovakia at that time 18,000 subscribers to the Moscow *Pravda*, 13,000 to *Ogomok*, and about 8,000 to *Pionyr*. In Poland, according to *Zycie Warszawie* (10 May 1952), 220 Soviet papers were available at that time, with a total circulation of 700,000 A new campaign for subscriptions to Soviet newspapers was started on 'Soviet Press Day', which was celebrated on 5 May 1953, in the People's Democracies as in the Soviet Union. In Prague, on that date, the 'central committee of Russian language courses' launched an appeal to the workers to read Soviet papers, 'which constitute a solid and inexhaustible source of knowledge of the economic problems of socialism'. At the same time the Federation of the Slovak Press in Bratislava announced a competition for the best article on the subject: 'The Soviet press helps the workers of Czechoslovakia'.

scientific articles, or art criticism; and page 6 is divided between drama, cinema, and sport. The least regrettable feature is the absence of gossip and crime news. 'There are no murders, no divorces, no scandals, no Siamese twins or quintuplets in captive Europe, or if these events occur they are considered of negligible interest beside a quotation from Lenin or Marx. Criminal stories only appear if their inclusion contributes to some propaganda goal.'[1]

The comments of a writer in *The Economist* (14 June 1952) on the Soviet press may, by and large, be applied to the Communist press of the People's Democracies as a whole. The writer began by commending the practice of giving an important place to articles on politics, art, technical, and scientific subjects, and economics; but he went on to say that the spontaneity, the critical spirit, and the independence which characterized the press in the early years after the October Revolution had now disappeared, and that in the place of realistic analysis and accurate descriptions of facts the bureaucratized Soviet press only contains 'slogans and stereotyped formulae'.

Besides the official organ of the Central Committee, each country also possesses a paper corresponding to *Trud*, the organ of the Soviet trade unions: these papers are *Prace* in Bohemia, *Praca* in Slovakia, *Nepszava* in Hungary, *Trud* in Bulgaria, *Glos Pracy* in Poland, and *Viata Sindicala* in Rumania. The Party also publishes dailies or weeklies specially intended for the peasants (*Albina* and *Ogorul Nou* in Rumania, *Zemedelske Noviny* in Czechoslovakia, *Szabad Föld* in Hungary, and *Chlopska Droga* in Poland); for the army (in Poland *Zolnierz Wolnoscy*, in Rumania *Apararea Patriei*, in Czechoslovakia *Obrana Lidu*); and for youth (in Czechoslovakia *Mlada Fronta*, in Rumania *Scânteia Tineretului*, in Hungary *Szabad Ifjusag*). In Poland there are fourteen papers for young people, with a circulation of 2,300,000. The journal of the Polish Youth Association (Z.M.P.), *Standar Mlodyc*, has a circulation of 700,000, while that of the children's paper *Swierszczyk* (Cri-Cri) is 500,000. There are also other Government papers published by the various Party organizations, such

[1] From *Discipline to Diversion*, a study in News from behind the Iron Curtain, N.Y., April 1953. The Communist press carries a minimum of commercial advertisements In Rumania advertising was limited to one newspaper, *Universul*. In Poland *Trybuna Ludu* of Warsaw includes only radio, theatre, and cinema programmes. One of Warsaw's evening papers, *Express Wieczorny*, usually carries a half page of advertising out of a total of six pages. By and large, advertisements are not very lively.

as the journal of the People's Popular Council in Bucarest, *Romania Libera*, and *Otetchestven Front*, the organ of the Bulgarian Patriotic Front.

The provincial papers are closely modelled on those of the capital. An article published in *Rudé Právo* on 21 February 1953, under the title 'Raise the level of the provincial press', throws light on the control exercised over provincial papers by the Communist committees. The writer of the article refers to a recent inquiry by the organization secretariat of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which reproaches the majority of provincial newspapers with 'wishing to replace the central press instead of complementing it and reflecting in its pages the richness of provincial life'.

'The role of the provincial paper is to familiarize its readers with provincial life and to supply them with varied and concrete articles', writes *Rudé Právo*, stressing the fact that first place should be given to news dealing with the realization of the Plan. Provincial papers should, moreover: (1) give full weight to the activities of local Party organization, mass associations, and local national committees; (2) popularize innovations and pioneers of labour; (3) stress the problems of agricultural co-operatives; (4) give ample space to questions of food supplies and to crèches, clubs, theatres, libraries, and sports grounds.

The leader-writer of *Rudé Právo* also asks that each paper should set up a vast network of correspondents in commercial undertakings, co-operatives, and offices, 'so that there may be a close liaison between the editorial staff and the working masses'. (The organization of this network of unpaid correspondents is known to come up against great difficulties in all the People's Democracies; indeed, the workers or employers who take it on themselves to 'denounce publicly abuses and shortcomings' are looked on as 'narks' by employers and colleagues alike, and are often roughly treated.)

Finally—and this is perhaps the most striking point in the article—*Rudé Právo* is of the opinion that the direction of the provincial paper should not be the work solely of the Propaganda and Agitation section (Agitprop) of the Regional Committee. 'It is the business of the *secretary* of the Committee to direct each member of the paper. . . . The task of the Regional Committees is to meet several times a year to discuss the report on the paper's general activities and to give the necessary directives on fundamental

questions and to see that the bureaux of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party lay down a long-term plan for the editorials and for certain important press campaigns.'

The specialized weeklies or monthlies, aimed at a more scholarly or technical public, are often more interesting than the dailies; they sometimes deal circumspectly with problems about which it is thought wiser to remain silent before a wider public. The Moscow *Bolchevik* (its title was changed to *Kommunist* in December 1952) is the Party's main theoretical review; its satellite counterparts are *Nowe Drogi* (Poland), *Tvorba* (Czechoslovakia), *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Hungary), *Flacara* (Rumania), and *Novo Vreme* (Bulgaria).

Each of the People's Democracies has its equivalent of the Moscow literary papers, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (*Nova Kultura* in Poland, *Literaturen Front* in Bulgaria, *Csillag* in Hungary, *Literaturni Noviny* in Czechoslovakia, *Viata Romaneasca* in Rumania); its economic paper, *Voprossi Ekonomiki* (*Zycie Gospodarsze*, published by Minc in Poland, *Probleme Economice* in Rumania); and its *Planevoye Khozaistvo*, the journal of the Planning Committee (in Warsaw the *Gospodarska Planova*). Each, too, has its humorous paper on the lines of the Moscow *Krokodil*, its illustrated magazine, and a multiplicity of specialized technical journals. The Society of Friends of the U.S.S.R. and the Peace Movement also publish periodicals in each country. The journal of the Polish-Soviet Society, *Przyjazn* (Friendship), printed 356,000 copies in 1952, as against 162,000 in 1951.

To sum up, between 1948 and 1952 the press in the People's Democracies made definite progress in the direction of concentration, to the exclusive advantage of Communist publications. This is a natural result of the dominant position which the Communist Parties have gained in the political life of these countries. It has been facilitated by the complete nationalization, since 1948, of the printing and publishing firms. Although it is difficult to obtain precise circulation figures, it seems clear that, by comparison with the pre-war years, the total circulation of newspapers and periodicals has noticeably increased. As the main papers depend on the Party or on one of its mass organizations (trade unions, youth, army, etc.) their circulation has become the concern of the Party machine. Hence it has taken on a compulsory character. In the Communist world reading, or writing for, a paper has taken on a new and special significance.

As for the journalists, they are looked upon as high officials, ınd are paid accordingly. Even more than other Party officials, they re subject to a severe process of selection, coupled with constant nd strict supervision. In the press world each word has its weight, nd any mistake can have extremely serious consequences. Whether writer is dealing with labour discipline, or Titoism, or an author's itest novel, he must invoke, in discreetly calculated terms, the J.S.S.R. as model.[1] He must insist on the rightness of the Communist Party's policy, quote some of his chief's opinions, nd not forget the interests of peace and the complete identity of 'arty and nation; and he must anathematize the criminal activities f the enemy, both within and without. In consequence, all rticles, even sports articles or straight reporting, take on the emblance of a sermon. One doesn't just *write* any more—one arangues and preaches. In this way Party journalism tends to ecome invested with a pontifical dignity which it rarely possesses ı capitalist countries and whose only remote counterpart in the on-Communist world might be sought, perhaps, in the *Osservatore Romano* and the papers strongly influenced by it.

The twentieth anniversary of the founding of *Scânteia* (10 ugust 1951) and the tenth anniversary of *Szabad Nep* (February 952) were made the occasion for ceremonies whose solemnity ould hardly have been surpassed at the most important commemorations. 'Press Days', on the model of the 'Army Days', have een instituted in honour of these papers, and a whole network of orker and peasant correspondents has been organized, whose job is to strengthen the ties between the press and the masses, and o denounce publicly, in accordance with the Party line, the shortomings observed in various places and sections of society.

Finally, it must be mentioned that reading of the Communist 'arty newspaper is compulsory for members of the Party in the big ıctories, offices, and agricultural co-operatives, who meet each ay before they begin work to discuss the application of the irectives expounded in the editorial. These meetings have a tual character and provide the occasion for a daily manifestation f adherence and loyalty to the Party. In this atmosphere any

[1] Until the death of Stalin writers were, of course, bound to take him as their uide. Since his death it is interesting to note that the press in the People's emocracies has somewhat lagged behind the Soviet press in the progressive le-Stalinization' observable in the latter. But the papers have gradually adapted emselves to the new 'line'; quotations from Stalin have become fewer; the ymns of adoration to the Soviet Union have taken on a more impersonal, more echnical' note.

differentiation between information, in the strict sense of the word, and action appears artificial. The paramount function of the press becomes the communication—and explanation—of the intentions of the Government and the Party. Together with the radio, it serves to create that 'unanimity' which appears to be indispensable for the carrying on of revolutionary action.

F. F.

The Seventh Assembly of the United Nations

SINCE 1948 it has been customary for sources as widely separated as the Kremlin and the isolationists in the United States to say at some point during the annual session of the General Assembly that the United Nations is dead. This pronouncement has become so habitual as to be generally overlooked or even regarded as encouraging evidence of the continuing vitality of the Organization in the face of great difficulties. For, of course, the worse the international situation, as reflected in the General Assembly, becomes, the greater is the necessity for the United Nations. The strong representation and intensive activity of Governments, including those from behind the Iron Curtain, at the seventh session of the General Assembly is a comforting proof that this fact continues to be recognized by responsible people all over the world.

Certainly the problems facing the United Nations had not in any sense diminished when the seventh session of the General Assembly opened in October 1952. It was evidently over optimistic to think, as did some delegates at the beginning of the session, that the worst obstacle to be overcome was the United States presidential election. No political event in the world's history can have generated so much noise and wind and then have subsided, like the storm in the Pastoral Symphony, so suddenly, leaving things much as they had been before. As far as the Assembly was concerned, the presence, absence, or domestic distortion of United States policy before or after 4 November never competed seriously, as an obstacle to progress, with Soviet cynicism and intransigence on all major political issues. The ethics of the Soviet position in

international organizations were typified this year by their opening and closing gambits. The session had hardly begun in the new and splendid permanent headquarters of the United Nations when the Soviet delegation touched off the old anti-American propaganda set-piece about bacteriological warfare in Korea, coupled with an absolute refusal to allow a United Nations investigation on the spot, an attitude confirmed, though in much milder language, on the last day of the session six months later. Similarly, on the very last day before Christmas they injected a strong dose of poison into the last hours of the first part of the session with a sudden midnight accusation of the mass murder by the Americans of prisoners of war in Korea.

But miracles occur even in the United Nations, and the death of Stalin produced what seemed like a miracle to those who have listened for seven years to the conscientious abuse, disagreement, and obstruction of the Soviet delegates. No one before Christmas would have expected to hear Mr Vyshinsky pledging full support for the candidacy of a Swedish conservative, intellectual civil servant for the post of Secretary-General, supporting the withdrawal of the much-cherished Polish panacea for world peace, or blandly discussing Hegel with Sir Gladwyn Jebb. The period of daily peace offerings, the 'dove-a-day' period as it has been called, may so far have produced singularly little real progress on major issues, but its effect in relaxing tension and reviving the remnants of optimism has been remarkable, as can be seen by the contrast between the mood of pessimism in which the session convened and that of cautious optimism in which it adjourned.

The Korean war is by far the most pressing question before the United Nations, and inevitably it completely overshadows other political items on the Assembly's agenda. Resistance to aggression is, and must obviously remain, the United Nations' primary task, and that resistance must increasingly be based on the practical support of the majority, rather than on the efforts of the willing minority of States. It is perhaps here that this session of the General Assembly may eventually be seen to have made real progress, for it succeeded in evolving a position on the Korean war which was drawn up by India and is actively supported by all except the five Communist Members of the Organization. Moreover, it now seems possible, as it did not before Christmas, that the United Nations may be given a chance to use this position as a basis for the truce negotiations now in progress.

The credit for this closing of the ranks at a very difficult time must go to the imagination of the Indians themselves, to the indefatigable diplomacy of the Commonwealth countries led by Mr Eden and his colleagues in the British delegation, and perhaps not a little to the cynical vilifications made by Mr Vyshinsky himself. The latter's disenchantment with his mission to sow discord in the United Nations may have been reflected in his Christmas farewell remark that 'the United Nations has failed as an instrument of peace'.

In theory at any rate, the sole remaining obstacle to the conclusion of an armistice in Korea is the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war, and it was around this single problem that the whole six weeks' debate in the first part of the Assembly revolved. In fact, however, the United Nations, having succeeded in repelling aggression, was faced with the dilemma of trying to end by diplomacy a war which it could not win by fighting and which was seen by one of the Great Powers, at least before Stalin's death, as a profitable method of fighting its enemies by proxy and dividing and exhausting the non-Communist world. This fact lent a certain unreality to the interminable discussion of the meaning of the Geneva Convention, which, literally interpreted, does require the repatriation of all prisoners of war, but in a situation very different from the one which has developed in Korea.

Mr Acheson opened the debate with a masterly exposition of the history of the Korean situation, and was followed by a series of propaganda blasts from the Soviet bloc. Serious efforts were then made by many delegations to ascertain the real views of the Soviet Union and to bridge, by an infinite variety of diplomatic, procedural, and organizational devices, the gap between the Soviet (and Chinese) insistence on the repatriation of all prisoners and the moral objection of all other countries to forcible repatriation. Such devices were not easy even for the free world to agree on. For example, Mr Acheson was very naturally fearful of giving anything away just before handing over to his successors and thus sacrificing the historical fruits of his determined and far-sighted Korean policy—a policy which has perhaps been more bitterly criticized in the United States than anywhere else in the world except in the Soviet Union; but the boorishness of Soviet methods came to the help of the intensive diplomatic activity of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries. When American doubts about the Indian proposal seemed about to cause a

disastrous split in the ranks, a violent denunciation from Mr Vyshinsky in person and from Mr Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, by cable secured agreement by *fifty-four countries on the final text.*

The proposal adopted was designed to secure an immediate armistice while safeguarding prisoners of war from either forcible detention or forcible repatriation, but to postpone the issue of repatriation in detail until an armistice had come into effect. Its deliberate evasiveness and lack of clarity originally aroused the opposition of the United States to the Indian proposal, but precisely these qualities were considered by some to be, in the circumstances, its greatest merits. The resolution is certainly conciliatory, allowing, for example, Czechoslovakia and Poland to sit as 'neutrals' with Sweden and Switzerland on the Four-Power Repatriation Committee, and referring remaining prisoner-of-war problems to a political conference after ninety days. Its complete rejection, without any serious discussion of its merits, by the Russians and Chinese confirmed the suspicion that a conclusion of the Korean war must, unless the new Soviet tactics are more conciliatory than at present seems likely, be sought in the larger sphere of an over-all Far Eastern settlement, embracing some recognition of the Chinese People's Republic and the status of the Government in Formosa. It remains to be seen if the new United States Administration will be able, in the face of great domestic obstacles, to set this course. For the moment, the United Nations has gone as far as it can and has established an agreed position on the particular point in dispute. This may prove, in the light of the new talks at Panmunjom, to be a more useful achievement than its immediate rejection indicated at the time.

As far as the political situation was concerned, the second part of the session in February could hardly have opened under gloomier conditions. If the first part had been dogged by difficulties foreseen and unforeseen, the American election, the flat refusal of the Indian proposal on Korea, the resignation of the Secretary-General, and the sniping activities of Senators McCarthy and McCarran against the Secretariat, to name only a few, the second part inherited a feeling of gloom, frustration, and deadlock which had only been heightened by the interval and by indications that it was outside the power even of the new United States Administration to make any real change in the basic political deadlock.

Thus the second part of the debates on Korea and the discussion

of disarmament proceeded to their unprofitable close, while behind the debates of the Assembly, private meetings of the Security Council and of the Great Powers on the problem of the Secretary-Generalship produced nothing but disappointment and an ever-growing list of ever less suitable candidates. Mr Lester Pearson, the Foreign Minister of Canada, was, despite rumours to the contrary, firmly vetoed by the Soviet Union, and another deadlock seemed inevitable.

The death of Stalin produced in the United Nations, as elsewhere, a wave of speculation, most of it apprehensive, dramatized by the mysterious comings and goings of Messrs Vyshinsky and Gromyko, and the embarrassment of fitting official statements and gestures of condolence into the rigid pattern of incivility which has become standard procedure in the relations of East and West. The effect of Stalin's death on the Korean situation was reflected quickly in the agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and in the evident eagerness of the Chinese and North Koreans to resume the Panmunjom armistice talks. Thus the Assembly, having concluded the Korean item in despair, found itself, to almost everyone's amazement, adopting unanimously under the item reserved for the discussion of the old Polish peace plan, a new Western resolution on Korea which had been substituted with full Soviet consent for the original well-worn Polish portmanteau peace resolution. This was perhaps the most conciliatory gesture ever made in the United Nations by the Russians and their allies. It is also the first time they have foregone the opportunity of displaying to the unwary masses the righteousness of the Soviet minority by organizing the spectacle of a rejection by the General Assembly of a Soviet peace plan, embellished with such alluringly simple proposals as the abolition of atomic weapons and an immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea.

The resolution itself, after noting the favourable developments in Korea, and the comminication of Mr Chou En-lai to the President of the General Assembly, expressed hope for a speedy armistice in Korea and decided to resume consideration of the Korean question upon the conclusion of an armistice agreement in Korea or when a majority of Members considered other developments in Korea might require discussion. Whether the General Assembly's optimism is to prove well-founded depends upon the search at Panmunjom for a practical arrangement by which the prisoner-of-war question can be dealt with in general

accordance both with the Indian proposal and the new Chinese proposal that prisoners of war not wishing to be repatriated be handed over to a neutral State pending a just solution of the problem. The practical difficulties of such an arrangement should not be underestimated in the enthusiasm of political agreement.

Other important political items peculiarly sensitive to East-West tension made little progress at this session, but for most of them Mr Vyshinsky has belatedly promised better things for the future. Only time will show whether the Disarmament Commission can make any practical progress or whether the perennial deadlock over new membership, which is now to be considered by a special committee, can be broken. On the Austrian peace treaty too the General Assembly once again appealed to the Great Powers concerned to agree on the terms of the treaty and to restore to Austria her full sovereignty, an appeal which may now fall on ears less deaf than in the past.

One political question, the Burmese complaint of the presence, hostile activities, and depredations of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma, came on the agenda late enough to benefit from the full glow of the new unanimity. Despite the Chinese delegate's comparison of General Li Mi, the leader of the marauders, to Garibaldi, the Burmese charge of 'aggression' was not pressed against Nationalist China, which disclaimed any control over the offenders. Instead the General Assembly unanimously condemned these activities, called on all States to refrain from assisting them, and looked forward to a rapid withdrawal or internment of the Chinese Nationalist troops.

Second only in the Assembly's tribulations to the East-West deadlock is what is now generally, though inaccurately, known as 'the colonial problem'. This problem, which has so far remained outside the glow of the new Soviet tactics, is of course far more than 'colonial', embracing as it does in its ever-increasing manifestations all the emotional, racial, economic, and social elements of the struggle between 'haves' and 'have-nots', and including in the ranks of the under-privileged the under-developed countries of Latin America and Asia, as well as colonial and ex-colonial territories. That this state of mind is a justifiable reaction to centuries of inferiority, missed opportunity, misunderstanding, and exploitation cannot be denied, but the propaganda use of old injustices, many of which have now been remedied, can only be extremely unfortunate for the United Nations, which is specifically

precluded from dealing with the domestic affairs of Member States. Moreover, demagoguery and attempted rabble-rousing in the United Nations make it extremely difficult for the so-called 'colonial' Powers to proceed steadily along their chosen path of giving self-government and promoting economic development in the less fortunate areas of the world. This problem shows signs of remaining the United Nations' besetting difficulty longer even than Communist imperialism, which now exploits it on every possible occasion.

As far as the United Nations is concerned, the main problem is to reconcile the principle of the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign States and the responsibility of some of them for the administration of dependent peoples in their progress towards self-government, with the legitimate interest of the United Nations in human rights and in eventual freedom and self-government for all peoples. There were at this session no less than four main items on the agenda of the General Assembly which derived directly from the 'colonial' problem, namely those on Tunis, Morocco, *apartheid* in South Africa, and the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. The problem is also latent in all discussions of Arab-Israeli relations, in all matters of economic and social development, and dominates the discussion of the great range of problems of trust and non-self-governing territories in the Assembly's Fourth Committee. While the Arab and Asian States are the most vocal protagonists of the 'anti-colonial' point of view, they can count on a considerable degree of support from the Latin-American countries and from the countries of the Soviet bloc. The fact that conditions in many of these countries are inferior to the conditions in many non-self-governing territories, and that many of them are dependent for their own advancement on financial and technical help from the countries which they accuse, in no way tempers the violence of their tactics and oratory, which is reinforced by the possession of a block of votes which can on occasion command a majority in the General Assembly. Their position is, in fact, a classic example of the inebriating quality of influence without responsibility.

It is not yet possible to foresee just how much good or harm the airing in the United Nations of violently controversial matters within the domestic jurisdiction of Member States, such as the question of Tunis and Morocco, or the racial question in South Africa, can do. A strong argument can be made that such an airing

before a world body increases violence and unreason in the area concerned while breeding hostility and obstinacy in the Government accused. For example, Franco is thought to have gained rather than lost strength in Spain through the efforts of the United Nations, which were represented to the Spanish people as a threat of foreign interference. The United Nations annual treatment of various problems in the Union of South Africa has certainly not softened the hearts of Dr Malan's Government, and this year France took the unprecedented step, against the advice of many friends, of refusing to participate in the debates on Tunis and Morocco. On the other hand, it may also be argued that an airing of such problems as Arab nationalist aspirations in the elegant air-conditioned halls of the United Nations takes some of the poison and mystery out of them, and that world opinion, especially in this particular instance, may in the long run act as a moderating force in securing a lasting solution.

In the case of Tunis and Morocco a number of important delegations, including those of the U.K., the Netherlands, South Africa, Belgium, and Australia, considered the General Assembly incompetent to make recommendations, while the Asian-Arab sponsors of the item wanted, among other things, to recommend negotiations assisted by a Commission of Good Offices on the right of self-determination and the fulfilment of the political aspirations of the Tunisian people. The Latin-American group produced a successful compromise, which merely expressed the hope that in both cases France would further the effective development of free institutions and that both sides would negotiate in accordance with the principles of the Charter and refrain from violent or inflammatory action.

Such a mild resolution may seem to be no solution after so much blowing-off of steam, but its very moderation shows another kind of progress and a surprising and creditable degree of responsibility, which has not always been characteristic of the United Nations' handling of such matters. In the words of Mr Pearson, the President, 'we have come to see that our differences rest more on questions of means than of ends, more on the pace of progress than on our destination, about which we are in general agreement'. The establishment of such an atmosphere for the discussion of racial and colonial problems is clearly an essential condition of their ultimate solution.

On the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa

and of the racial conflict arising out of the *apartheid* policy of the South African Government, the Assembly, with a great number of abstentions and over the protests of South Africa that the debate was an infringement of her domestic jurisdiction, called upon all parties to act in conformity with the Charter and in both cases appointed Good Offices Commissions, neither of which seem likely, in the present frame of mind of the South African Government, to get much nearer than New York to the seat of the problem.

Violent language in the General Assembly, which was once confined to East-West differences, has now spread to other topics, and nowhere are voices raised higher than in the Arab-Israeli debates over the aftermath in Palestine. This year the Arab States asked the Assembly to consider appropriate measures to give effect to the original partition plan and resolutions connected with it, including compensation and repatriation of Arab refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem, and a territorial settlement. A committee resolution urging the Arab States and Israel to hold direct discussions of their differences failed to command a two-thirds majority in the Assembly and the situation, therefore, remains substantially unchanged. A measure of the appalling human problem involved is the necessity under which the Assembly has found itself to authorize $23 million as a relief budget for the coming year for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, an appropriation made necessary by the failure to repatriate or resettle in countries of refuge the vast and increasing bulk of the Palestine refugees, the purpose for which the funds of the Agency are primarily intended.

It is pleasant to be able to report one colonial problem in which all the parties concerned, the United Nations, the Administering Authority (Great Britain), the Government of Ethiopia, and the governmental authorities of Eritrea could be warmly congratulated by the Assembly. The Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia was formally established on 11 September 1952, and Eritrea, with its own Constitution (drafted with the aid of the United Nations High Commissioner), thus becomes an autonomous unit under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown. This event was hailed in the Assembly as a significant landmark in the United Nations' efforts for dependent peoples, and shows what the international organization can do when it is not distracted by the noisy disagreements of the Great Powers or the self-interest of the smaller ones.

On the economic side the main emphasis was again upon

economic development and especially on problems of financing. In this connexion the United Nations awaits a report by experts on a special fund to help under-developed countries with grants and long-term low-interest loans and a report from the International Bank on the setting up of an international finance corporation. Many threads are now woven into the general theme of economic development, such as efforts to stimulate the flow of private capital into under-developed countries, the fixing of fair and equitable world prices for primary commodities to help finance economic development, the promotion of multilateral and bilateral commodity arrangements, land reform, increased production of food, etc. Several of these measures are highly controversial, as for example, the fixing of commodity prices, but none are more so than a resolution introduced this year by the Latin-American countries on the right of countries to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources freely. While no one disputes this right, the wisdom of such a resolution, at a time when highly developed countries and private investors are being asked to contribute more and more both to technical assistance programmes and to programmes of investment in under-developed countries, is highly questionable. Apart from constituting a sort of invitation to under-developed countries to nationalize foreign enterprises, the resolution recognizes no responsibility of Governments towards expropriated foreign investors, nor the obligation to compensate foreign investors in the event of nationalization. Such an omission is hardly tactful at a time when a further economic development in many countries depends upon soothing the not unjustifiable apprehensions of foreign investors, and it has not failed to arouse responsible organizations outside the United Nations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce.

For once, two items on the administrative side were of considerable public interest. The first of these was the election of a new Secretary-General, which became necessary when Mr Trygve Lie resigned in November, giving as his reason his wish to help the United Nations save the peace and serve better the cause of freedom and progress for all mankind. The change in the Soviet approach allowed, at the last minute, the election of Mr Dag Hammarskjöld, after a long list of highly unsuitable candidates had been disconsolately paraded before the Security Council following the veto of Mr Pearson. From first appearances it would seem that the Security Council could hardly have made a better

choice, even if it had based its choice strictly on the consideration of the qualifications of the various candidates for the job.

The second item, the report of the Secretary-General on personnel policy, arose out of the continued investigation, by various bodies of the United States Congress, of United States nationals in the United Nations Secretariat, and the persistent attacks upon their loyalty to their own country in the less responsible sections of the American press and in the extreme Right, sensationalist fringe of the United States Congress. The policy of the old Secretary-General in this matter had aroused some official and much private criticism both from national delegations and in the Secretariat, whose morale as a result of these attacks and of the timid reaction to them of the United Nations administration had sunk to a seriously low level. The debate on the Secretary-General's report was studiedly moderate and gentlemanly, due both to the wish of delegations not to appear to be interfering in matters of United States internal jurisdiction and to the knowledge that the Secretary-General who had made the report was about to leave. The final resolution of the Assembly, which expressed its confidence in the Secretary-General's future handling of the problem, merely asked him to report again and did not reflect the very acute concern felt by most Member Nations about the necessity of maintaining the independent and international character of the Secretariat as a principal organ of the United Nations. It is much to be hoped that the new Secretary-General will have more success in this task both with the United States authorities and with other Member Nations than his predecessor has done, and that he will be able to secure the confidence and respect both of Governments and of his own staff.

Whatever the motives of the change in Soviet behaviour, whether it expresses a genuine desire for settlement or only a realization of the failure of a former policy and a desire to relax internal tensions by relaxing international ones, it now seems possible that a period of less frustration may lie ahead for the United Nations and that all the patience and hard work of the last few years, much of it apparently futile at the time, may bear some fruit. At the least, international machinery, almost atrophied by the cold war, may now begin to be used again, although the West will need great skill and determination in using it. Perhaps with this trend, the United Nations may slowly begin to assume the position in world affairs, foreseen for it so hopefully by its founders

at San Francisco, of 'a centre for the harmonizing of the actions of nations in attaining . . . common ends'. As Mr Eden pointed out, the United Nations is not merely a simple instrument in the cold war, nor is a third world war inevitable. 'I am convinced,' he said, 'that with the growing strength and authority of the West and with common prudence on the part of both the free and the Communist worlds, there is no reason why it ever should break out. . . . Here lies our task, to preserve the United Nations . . . as a world meeting place where we can yet resolve our problems and build the peace.' E. B.

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Notes of the Month

Italy's General Election

THE result of the Italian General Election of 7 June has caused many people both inside and outside Italy to pause and take stock of a new and perhaps unexpected situation. The Government of the Christian Democrat and allied parties, which since 1948 has controlled never less than 311 seats in a Chamber of 584, must now face the new Parliament with a majority of only sixteen. It failed—by only 57,000 votes—to obtain the quota of 50 per cent plus one of the total votes which would have set in motion the new electoral law[1] and its bonus, granting 65 per cent of the total seats in the Chamber. In the Senate, for which voting took place under the old method of proportional representation, the Government parties succeeded in obtaining a small majority—50·2 per cent of the total votes, as compared with their vote of 49·8 per cent for the Chamber.

In broad lines, this result means a falling-away from the Centre to the extremes of both Left and Right. The Communists and Left-wing (Nenni) Socialists together now have 35·4 per cent of the total votes, as against 31 per cent in 1948 and 33 per cent in the municipal elections of 1951–2, since when, incidentally, the Communists have gained some votes from the Socialists. The rise of the two Right-wing parties, which was very marked in the Southern local elections of 1952, has been maintained as far as the Monarchists are concerned—they will have forty deputies in the new Chamber, as against fourteen in the old—but the neo-Fascist M.S.I., though its seats in the Chamber will rise from five to twenty-nine, has polled less than in 1951–2 (5·9 per cent now, as against 6·3 per cent then). The Christian Democrats themselves, despite the great reduction in their 1948 vote, have increased their

[1] See *The World Today*, May 1953, pp. 190–2.

poll by nearly 4 per cent since 1951–2; they obtained over 10,850,000 votes, or 40·08 per cent of the total. It is among their allies, the smaller lay centre parties, that the holocaust is most apparent: all three, Liberals, Social Democrats, and Republicans, have lost heavily, especially the last-named.

Outside considerations, notably the feeling of détente with regard to Russia, backed up by Mr Churchill's speech of 11 May and combined with a certain weariness of American tutelage, undoubtedly played a considerable part in the results. At the same time, this was the first post-war General Election in Italy to be fought on largely internal issues. Now, in contrast to the situation in April 1948, there was no great sense of urgency related to a threat from outside the country. Two general ideas prevailed: that the Communist advance had been held at bay, and that the Centre parties were pretty safe to pass the needed 50·01 per cent majority. This feeling produced a widespread, and, as it proved, mistaken, sense of security, bringing as its corollary the impression that it was perhaps no longer essential for the ordinary citizen of no extreme views to vote for the Centre. He might instead allow himself the luxury of 'un' affermazione'—a vote, perhaps, for the Monarchists (for many an Italian, outside the avowed Monarchist Party, is still nostalgically monarchist at heart), or for one of the splinter parties which broke away from the Centre in protest against the electoral law—a vote, in any case, which would satisfy his vague feeling of dissatisfaction with the predominantly Christian Democrat Government which seemed to him to have been in power quite long enough, to have shown itself too 'prepotente', to have too strong a tinge of clericalism—or merely to have failed to give him the job he hoped for. These are all nebulous things, but they did build up to a state of mind which made these elections, as polling day grew nearer, highly unpredictable, and which certainly influenced the results.

Among the more tangible and immediate reasons for the swing-over, dislike of the new electoral law, and misunderstanding of its purpose, must rank fairly high. Besides being directly responsible for the formation of two splinter groups headed by prominent figures—Senator Parri and ex-Treasury Minister Corbino—which together polled more than five times the 57,000 votes by which the Centre missed its majority, it also alienated, or caused serious doubts among, a good many thoughtful and conscientious people. The very high number of spoilt or contested papers in the voting

for the Chamber (1,300,000, as compared with 500,000 in the 1948 election) also suggests that some of the more uneducated voters failed to grasp how the new method operated. Communist propaganda christened this law the 'legge truffa'—the swindle law—and a slogan of this kind is effective, irrespective of its truth.

The difference between the Senate and Chamber results suggests that the younger age-groups on the whole tended to vote for the more extreme parties rather than for the Centre (eligibility to vote begins at twenty-one for the Chamber, at twenty-five for the Senate). An analysis by the Communist youth leader Enrico Berlinguer (*Unità*, 13 June 1953) bears out this view as far as the Left-wing parties are concerned; but the widespread theory that the neo-Fascist M.S.I. had an outstanding following among young people is not entirely borne out by the polling figures, for that party gained more votes in the Senate elections than in those for the Chamber.

Since the election there has been a notable tendency in the independent press to rally round Signor De Gasperi. He is spoken of as the obvious leader of the Centre which, in much reduced circumstances, will still have the task of forming a Government. It seems likely that the Christian Democrats can still rely, if they wish, on the help of the Liberals and Republicans; that of the Social Democrats is less certain, and their leader, Signor Saragat, may make this the occasion for a renewed attempt to reunite the scattered Socialist forces by insisting on overtures to Signor Nenni's Left-wing Socialists. The Socialists' co-operation in the Government could, however, only be contemplated if they were to abandon their long-standing 'Unity of Action' pact with the Communists and to withdraw their opposition to the Atlantic Pact policy. While the other alternative, that of an alliance with the Monarchists, would undoubtedly be more palatable to the Right-wing elements in Signor De Gasperi's party, it seems unlikely that he himself would sponsor such a move. In his post-election statements he has specifically blamed the irresponsible behaviour of some Southern groups who had 'put the nation in danger' through their efforts to save the monarchy, and has proclaimed himself undeviatingly still a 'man of the Centre'.

The Soviet Zone of Germany

THE change of policy, 'to correct grave errors committed in the past', announced by the S.E.D. on 10 June might well seem, in

the light of conditions in the zone described in the article published in this Review last month,[1] to be no more than a long overdue, prudent, and indeed essential move. The recommendations made by the S.E.D. and accepted by the East German Government are as follows: ration cards are to be restored to those from whom they were withdrawn on 1 May; farmers will no longer be turned out of their holdings when they fail to deliver their correct quotas; refugees who return home will not be punished and will have their houses and property restored; private firms will no longer be forcibly nationalized; no new collective farms or State co-operatives will be organized; prices of various foodstuffs raised last month will be reduced to the old level; there will be an amnesty for some three thousand political prisoners; measures will be taken to make movement between the zones easier. There have also been rumours, not yet confirmed, that the People's Police is to be reduced in size from its present figure of about 120,000. If all these new decrees are carried out the conditions in Eastern Germany will be materially improved and the refugee exodus, food shortage, and deterioration in output checked.

But the announcement of 10 June did not refer to the earlier and bitterly unpopular decision to raise production norms compulsorily and uniformly, without granting any extra pay, by 10 per cent before the end of May and by 50 per cent before 1 January 1954. A strike against the new norms was reported to have taken place at a factory in Henningsdorf near Berlin on 9 June (before the S.E.D. proposals were made known) and to have affected 2,000 workers who refused to return to work until the new regulation was withdrawn. On the 16th East German building workers also struck in Berlin; ironically enough they were engaged in building blocks of flats in the Stalinallee intended to show the world how well the East German Government cares for its workers. Despite a Government announcement that the new norms had been cancelled, demonstrators gathered in the Stalinallee early next morning and marched on the Government offices in the Leipzigerstrasse. The subsequent riots, declaration of martial law, and the use of Russian armoured cars and tanks when the People's Police proved unreliable were widely reported in the daily press. According to reliable evidence strikes also took place in industrial cities such as Magdeburg, Halle, Erfurt, and Jena.

During the last week in May Moscow Radio had announced the

[1] 'The Soviet Zone of Germany Today', in *The World Today*, June 1953.

re-organization of the political and military administration of the Soviet zone and the creation of the office of Soviet High Commissioner, to be entrusted with the task of representing Soviet interests in Germany and controlling the authorities of the East German Republic within the framework of the obligations arising from the Potsdam Agreement. It is difficult not to see in this re-organization, and in the reversal of policy announced on 10 June, part of an overall Russian change of tactics towards the Western Powers, directed in the first instance towards influencing the Federal elections in September. Before this note is published there is reason to suppose that order will have been restored in East Berlin and throughout Eastern Germany. Nevertheless it seems likely that neither the Soviet nor the East German authorities will be able to continue unchanged the new policies of the last few weeks; greater relaxation or renewed repression will probably be inevitable. The Soviet Government might perhaps be inclined to draw the inference that a small dose of 'relaxation' in Eastern Germany has not paid dividends, and that a bolder bid might yet compel the West Germans and the Federal Government, against their will, to consider reunification as a short-term issue capable of exerting a direct influence on the forthcoming elections. On the other hand it is hard not to believe that Soviet and East German authorities alike were taken by surprise by the actual consequences of their recent experiment in controlled and partial lifting of restrictions. The Soviet Government may therefore be compelled to consider the effects which a continuation, or further development, of this policy might have in the Satellite States and perhaps even on the internal situation in the Soviet Union.

The Franco-Saar Agreements of 20 *May* 1953

NEGOTIATIONS for the revision of the Conventions imposed upon the Saar by France in March 1950 began in Paris on 9 February. After an Easter recess they were concluded on 20 May when a new series of Franco-Saar Agreements was signed by M. Georges Bidault and the Saar Premier, Herr Johannes Hoffman. As it happened, the Government headed by M. René Mayer fell from power the next day.

The end of the potential French veto on Saarland legislation, the end of French juridical predominance in the Saar, and the extension of Saar diplomatic representation were agreed before Easter (see *The World Today*, May 1953, p. 196) when agreement

on the economic issues still appeared remote. Thanks largely, it appears, to the insistence of the French Premier, M. René Mayer, and in particular to that of Monsieur Gilbert Grandval, hitherto the head of the French Mission in the Saar, remarkable concessions were made by the French negotiators after Easter. It had been much resented in the Saar that since 1947 the banks had been wholly under French control, but now they will be run by the Saarlanders who in future will have their representatives on the *Conseil National du Crédit*; the Saar will now issue its own coins. The Saarlanders had also complained bitterly that they paid up to 7½ per cent of their ordinary Budget to France as the Saar contribution to the cost of diplomatic representation and defence. In future their contribution is reduced to 5 per cent of rather less than their ordinary Budget, as for this purpose many social benefits it provides are not to be reckoned as part of it. Another striking economic concession made by the French, in spite of the restriction of their imports and the jealousy of Alsatian and Lorraine importers, gives the Saar Government the right to distribute its own import licences within a total figure agreed upon with Paris.

In the early stages of the negotiations, the whole problem of the Saar mines leased to France for fifty years in 1950 induced pessimistic speculations. According to Convention IV of 1950, although a mixed mines council and mines committee were set up, in the management of the mines a French director always had the final word, and major decisions on policy were made in the last instance by the French Minister of Mines, who required the Saar to conform to price levels and other circumstances prevailing in France. The Saar representatives in Paris pressed persistently for the Saar mines to be placed in the hands of a mixed Franco-Saar *Vorstand*, a Board of Management of the German type. At first the French regarded this proposal with suspicion as one which would encourage unnecessary intrigue. But in the end they agreed to abolish the *Régie des Mines de la Sarre* and to set up instead, together with the Saarlanders, a public corporation to be responsible for the organization of the whole Saar mining enterprise and to be called the *Saarbergwerke*. This is in future to be managed by a *Vorstand* consisting of five people of whom at least two are to be Frenchmen and at least two Saarlanders, and all jointly nominated by the French and Saar Governments. The *Vorstand* will be supervised by a Mines Council responsible for the decisions on policy hitherto made by the French Minister of Mines. The Mines

Council will include ten Frenchmen and ten Saarlanders; of the latter four are to be working miners who will be enjoying a restricted *Mitbestimmungsrecht*. When the Mines Council chooses a French chairman, the chairman of the *Vorstand* must be a Saarlander and vice versa.

Within the discussion of the question of the Saar mines as a whole, the dispute over the Warndt coalfields, which lie under Saar territory but have been mined from Lorraine as long as anyone can remember, several times threatened to wreck the whole Franco-Saar negotiation. Feeling ran very high in the Saar about the Warndt, whose coal is of the best quality the Saarland produces; the Saarlanders believed, not only that the *Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine*, to whom the Warndt coalfields had been leased, were paying too little at 90 fr. per ton mined, but that they were encroaching upon coalfields to which they were not entitled. Although it has not proved possible to untie so complicated a knot as that of the Warndt at the conference table in Paris, a protocol to the mines agreement described above has provided for an arbitration commission of five members; of the latter the French are to nominate two, of whom one cannot be French, and the Saarlanders two, of whom one cannot be a Saarlander; the two Governments together are to choose the chairman, who must be neither a Frenchman nor a Saarlander. This commission is to redraw the frontier of the Warndt mines leased until 1980 to the *Houillères de Lorraine* so as to leave the major part of the Warndt production in the hands of the *Saarbergwerke*, and to reconsider the charge of 90 fr. per ton. The French have further undertaken that Saarlanders are to be preferred for employment in the Warndt and that they shall enjoy the higher Saarland social insurances although their employers are French. These concessions are all the more striking in view of the indignant protests which have come from Lorraine against any concessions at all. It is conceivable, though improbable, that the French Parliament will reject the new agreements, which are, however, expected to operate shortly; the superseded Conventions came into operation without ever being fully ratified.

The Franco-Saar Agreements of 20 May rest upon Herr Hoffmann's favourite axioms that the final German Peace Treaty may entail their modification, and that the Franco-Saar economic union is to be regarded as an essential link in the Coal and Steel Community chain.

Laos, Siam, and South-East Asia

THE RECENT threat to Laos by the insurgents in Indo-China, though now temporarily in abeyance, compels attention to the importance of Siam in South and East Asia. A number of explanations have been put forward for the advance into Laos: these include the suggestion that, as with their earlier operations in the Black Thai country, from which the insurgents approached Laos, the advance is merely designed to gain prestige, to confuse the French command into drawing off troops to a front of little real importance, to dispirit the supporters of Bao Dai's Government, and to encourage a 'peace at any price' movement in France; it is also suggested that the insurgents may wish to have a more secure hinterland for their revolutionary base in northern Annam. The most obvious importance of Laos, however, is that it provides an avenue of approach to the north-eastern provinces of Siam. These provinces contain a large Indo-Chinese minority which is known to be sympathetic towards the insurgents, and they are said to be disaffected towards, or at least ill-controlled by, the Siamese Government.

Before the Japanese invasion in 1941 the Siamese Government, led then, as now, by Field-Marshal Pibul Songgram, expressed their determination to oppose any foreign aggression. In the event Siam hastily concluded an alliance with the Japanese, thereby avoiding, unlike other countries in South-East Asia, any real damage from the Pacific war. The present Government equally expresses their intention of opposing any Communist advance, but it cannot be regarded as certain that Siam will be able to maintain sustained opposition if strong Communist pressure is exerted.

If Siam were to collapse the position in the rest of South-East Asia, and indeed in South Asia as well, would become extremely difficult. Cambodia, already uneasy, and beyond it southern Viet-nam, would be outflanked, the long Burmese frontier with Siam would be an invitation to the movement of opponents of the Government of Burma and to the passage of arms, and the Communists in Malaya, who use the southern peninsular provinces of Siam as a base for rest, retraining, and re-equipment, would be immensely strengthened and heartened.

But perhaps just as important would be the loss of the Siamese rice exports and the threat to the exports from southern Indo-China and Burma. Since the war Siam has become the largest exporter of rice in the world, followed by Burma, which was the

largest before the war and is potentially so again; Indo-China, though now only about fifth, almost tied with Siam for second place before the war. The rice export figures in 1951 were 1,529,800 tons for Siam, 1,265,000 tons for Burma, and 301,000 tons for Indo-China, out of a total world export of 4,720,300 tons. The bargaining power which the control of this rice would place in the hands of the Communists in dealings with India, Japan, Malaya, and other countries which need to import rice can hardly be overestimated.

ERRATA AND ADDENDA

In the article on 'The Soviet Zone of Germany Today' (*The World Today*, June 1953) the following corrections should be made:

p. 238, line 7. 'From 1941' should read 'From 1945'.

p. 242, last line. '1948' should be '1945'.

p. 247, line 5. For 'as much as DM-East 1,500' read 'several thousand DM-East'.

p. 248, lines 15–16 should read: 'Free sale, particularly of fats, has ceased to exist; on the lowest-grade ration cards butter is not included. . .'

In the article on 'The Press in the Satellite Countries' (*ibid*), p. 262, line 5, the reference to *Rudé Právo* should read '31 January 1953' (*not* 21 February). *Tvorba* (Czechoslovakia), mentioned on p. 263, line 10, was suppressed early in 1952. *Literarturni Noviny* (p. 263, line 16) should read *Literarni Noviny;* it replaced *Lidove Noviny* after the latter ceased publication in February 1952.

Athens, Ankara, and Belgrade

Implications of the Balkan Pact

THE history of international agreements in South-Eastern Europe is long and, it must be admitted, not altogether encouraging. The reason is not far to seek. Any attempt at international collaboration between the smaller Powers has generally been frustrated by conflicts between larger Powers. There was, for instance, the Pact of Mutual Understanding, signed in Athens on 9 January 1934 between Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. By this instrument each of the signatories guaranteed the Balkan frontiers of the other three, and undertook to consult together should any threat to their common interest arise. In the event, the *Drang nach Osten* of the Nazi regime rendered the Pact of 1934 of little avail, lacking as it did the guarantee of any of the other great Powers. The frontiers of Greece and Yugoslavia were violated by the greatest military machine of the century, and the Rumanians and the Turks were somewhat naturally reluctant to do anything about their guarantee, even if there had been anything effective for them to do. Any consultations which may have taken place between the signatories in the nineteen-thirties could clearly have been of academic importance only.

Nevertheless, the fact that agreement was reached in 1934 certainly cannot have made it more difficult to reach agreement in 1953. Not that this can have been altogether easy. For in the present honeymoon of relations between Yugoslavia and the West it is often forgotten that little more than five years ago Yugoslavia was giving active help to the guerrillas waging war on Greek soil against the Greek Government. With Marshal Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in the summer of 1948, however, Greco-Yugoslav relations rapidly improved. This improvement, it is important to note, was accelerated by the declared intention of Soviet policy to create an independent Macedonian State, a plan which, if it were ever to be realized, would mean the loss to both Greece and Yugoslavia of important territories now in their possession. Simultaneously with this improvement in Greco-Yugoslav relations, pressure was being exerted upon the North Atlantic Treaty Powers by both Greece and Turkey with the object of inducing them to expand the Organization so as to include their two countries. Since the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in

March 1947 the U.S. Government had taken over from the United Kingdom the primary responsibility for economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey, and American military aid to both countries was soon thereafter forthcoming on a scale to which Britain could scarcely have aspired. Quite apart from the strategic advantages of including Greece and Turkey in N.A.T.O., the American stake in the two countries in terms of dollars and *matériel* alone was great enough for the Greek and Turkish request to receive careful hearing. In the autumn of 1951 both countries were duly admitted to membership of N.A.T.O.

Within a few months of this development meetings were taking place in Athens, Ankara, and elsewhere between official representatives of the Greeks and the Turks on the one hand and the Yugoslavs on the other. The negotiations continued throughout 1952. They ended in the initialling at Ankara on 28 February 1953 of a 'Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration' between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. What has been published of this agreement can be briefly summarized. A preamble reaffirms the loyalty of the three signatories to the United Nations in accordance with article 51 of the Charter. This is followed by ten clauses. Of these the most important contain provisions that the three countries will consult together in matters of common interest, that their Foreign Secretaries will meet at least once a year with this aim in view, and above all that the three General Staffs will examine in common questions affecting the security of their countries, submitting recommendations thereon to their Governments. A clause lays down that the provisions of the three-Power treaty shall not conflict with the obligations of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Provision is made that the treaty shall be open to the adherence of any party wishing to participate in it on an equal footing with the three signatories. Finally it is agreed that any party may withdraw from the obligations it has assumed in the treaty on giving one year's notice, but not before the expiry of four years from the ratification of the treaty. The conclusion of the treaty has been followed by a succession of meetings between the parties, of which the latest, held in Athens in the middle of June, clearly indicates that all three countries are hopeful of making good progress on these lines.

Consultation between General Staffs does not necessarily mean that the forces they individually command will ever be deployed together in execution of a common plan. But it may be useful to try

to estimate the strength and the manpower of which the three countries dispose. Obviously this is a closely guarded secret, but enough is known publicly to make such an estimate possible. The population of Greece is 7·6 million, that of Turkey 20·9 million, and that of Yugoslavia 15·7 million—a total of 44·2 million. In the guerrilla war of 1946–9 Greece put into the field ten divisions, which fought well; and the record of the Greek contingent in Korea is impressive. The land army received much of its training from British instructors. It is well supplied with American ordnance and equipment, and the General Staff is advised by a large American military mission known as J.A.M.M.A.G. (Joint Military Mission for Aid to Greece). The Turkish army has been in a state of mobilization for more than ten years. The Turkish soldier is exceedingly tough, and the small party sent to Korea has done well also, though naturally the Turkish army as a whole has little battle experience when compared with the Greek. The total strength is said to be in the region of thirty divisions, of which six are described as armoured, though the strength of the armour can hardly be up to Western standards. Like Greece, Turkey has been advised since 1947 by an American military mission, J.A.M.M.A.T. (Joint American Mission for Military Aid to Turkey), and it is believed that there are over 1,400 American instructors in the country.

The Yugoslav army, on the other hand, is still something of an unknown quantity to the West. It is by now perfectly clear that a large part in the Yugoslav collapse of April 1941 was played by poor morale in the army, and that this was due mainly to the national division between Serbs and Croats. This is still a factor to be reckoned with, and the morale of the army may be influenced also by the attitude which the present regime may adopt to the religious question and to collectivization. On the other hand those who knew the toughness of Tito's partisans (and partizankas) in the recent war have nothing but respect for the fighting qualities of the Yugoslav peasant. Since 1948 the country has received financial aid from the U.S.A., from the U.K., and from France, but it is not known how much has been spent on military equipment from the West. Reliable works of reference state that the army musters some thirty divisions. Thus the combined combat land forces of the three countries might amount to seventy divisions. Taking a division as 10,000 men, the three Powers could thus put into the field about 700,000 men.

Being poor countries, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia are naturally far less strong in the air and on sea than on land. Their battle fleets contain several useful units, but no capital ships. They all possess a few modern aircraft, but nothing that can be described as a serviceable air force by British or American standards. Their real importance to the West on the sea and in the air lies of course in the bases they can make available. There are, for instance, the harbours of Sušak, Split, Dubrovnik, Kotor, and Argostoli in the Adriatic, Suda Bay, Piraeus, Salonica, Rhodes, Leros, and Izmir in the Aegean, Ismit in the Sea of Marmara, and Istanbul, and the Black Sea ports of Northern Anatolia. As for the air, all three countries contain areas which could be developed into important airfields and satellite landing grounds—the Danube valley in Yugoslavia, the Thessalian plain, and the plain of Adana in South-East Anatolia for instance. In 1940–1 the Greeks would not allow the British to improve the landing grounds in the north for fear that this would provoke the Germans into action against them; but in the guerrilla war of 1946–9 the Americans carried out important extensions and improvements with the result that Greece now enjoys better air communications than most European countries. In Turkey much was done to create new airfields by the British during and after the recent war. Since 1947 there is good reason to think that a substantial proportion of the dollars spent by J.A.M.M.A.T. has been devoted to the same purpose. All in all, the contribution these countries could make to the West in terms of manpower and facilities is highly important. But the value of that contribution will depend not only on the extent to which financial and technical assistance continues to be supplied by the West—improvement of Yugoslav communications between the Adriatic ports and her Eastern frontier, for instance, is a crying need—but also on the degree to which the West succeeds in organizing the three forces concerned and in solving several important strategic problems.

Organization presents serious difficulties. It has taken something like two years to obtain agreement on the machinery which N.A.T.O. needs to operate in the Mediterranean area, and few would suggest that the degree of agreement that has been reached represents much more than a compromise. A formula must now be devised for meeting the difficulty that whereas Greece and Turkey are members of N.A.T.O., Yugoslavia is not. It is easy to imagine the kind of problem this is likely to create for the General

Staffs of Greece and Turkey. May they, for example—and if so t what extent—discuss with their Yugoslav opposite numbers plan agreed by N.A.T.O.? Will the Yugoslavs permit them to dis cuss with N.A.T.O. a plan approved by the three of them? An how are the Greeks and the Turks to allot their forces to mee their commitments under N.A.T.O. and under the new agree ment? Similar problems are created for the N.A.T.O. plannin staff as well. How, for instance, is N.A.T.O. to assess the additiona commitment the organization has indirectly assumed through th new agreement reached by two of its members? Logically suc difficulties can be met by one solution only—by the inclusion o Yugoslavia in N.A.T.O. It is of interest to note that on 12 Jun Admiral Carney, the retiring Commander-in-Chief of Allie Forces Southern Europe, said that he 'hoped to see the day whe Yugoslavia would be associated with N.A.T.O.' But, as will b shown, serious political difficulties will have to be overcome befor this can be realized. Progress is bound to be slow until the proble is satisfactorily solved.

The strategic weaknesses of the three Powers are manifold. Th Eastern end of the bloc is covered, it is true, by the almost im penetrable *massif* of the Caucasus; but in the diplomatic sense it i surrounded by a vacuum until and unless a Middle East Defenc Organization comes into being which can co-ordinate with N.A.T.O the plans of Iraq, the Levant States, and—perhaps—of Persia an Israel. At its Western end there is Trieste and the unresolved dis pute between Italy and Yugoslavia over the future of that unhapp city. That weakness should exist at this point is singularly un fortunate, for Trieste is the gateway to the Ljubljana gap, th historic point of entry from the south into the great plains o Central Europe. In the centre there is the long and tenuou frontier between Greece and Bulgaria along the Rhodope moun tains, a frontier which, at the Paris conference of 1946 and since the Greeks have maintained, with some force, is difficult to defend. Again, the situation of Albania, easily supplied by the air as she is from Soviet territory, will be a constant threat to the rear of the group. Nor does the configuration of the mountains of Southern Serbia afford much help against an enemy coming from the north or the east. In the present century two wars have shown that it is difficult to prevent a southward thrust down the Vardar valley towards Salonica, and still more difficult to regroup west of the river and drive east. The Dalmatian littoral may, with the Adriatic,

provide an excellent protection to Italy, and Yugoslavia will not, as in 1941, have a hostile Italy on her flank. But the rest of the country is a corridor, not a barrier, between north and south. The same may be said of the Bosphorus. It is easier to make plans for a drive to the Aegean through these three countries than to think of plans for stopping it.

In an article in *Le Monde* last December, M. Jean-Marie de Moreuil recounts how the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, after watching an impressive parade of Turkish troops armed with American tanks, turned to his American colleague and with a smile described them as 'twenty-four hours' fighting'. It would be unwise to forget that in April 1941 the Panzer divisions of Generals von Weichs and von List rolled up the Yugoslav and Greek armies, to say nothing of the Commonwealth forces, in almost exactly three weeks. It is true that the impossibility of co-ordinating the plans of Belgrade and Athens and Cairo contributed very largely to the German victory, and that on top of this the British weakness in the air was exceptional, even at that stage of the war. Another time, no doubt, the particular mistakes made in 1941 could be avoided. What it is important to remember is that Hitler's triumph in the Balkans was exceedingly costly. For the guerrilla war of 1942–4 in Greece and Yugoslavia laid a heavy commitment upon the Axis, and at one point immobilized in the mountains of Croatia and Serbia and the Pindus well over thirty of their divisions at a time when these troops were urgently needed elsewhere. The Greeks and the Yugoslavs have unrivalled experience in this type of warfare; and though the potentialities of the Anatolian peasant as a guerrilla fighter are unknown, it seems virtually certain that if ever the regular military forces of these countries were to be overwhelmed, the problems of their enemies would by no means come to an end with the occupation of the principal towns. There is every reason to think that the Greek, the Turkish, and the Yugoslav armies would give a good account of themselves if attacked. But the contribution of these three countries to the defence of the West would not necessarily cease if they were to suffer defeat in the field, though the thoroughness of Soviet methods of repression might well have more success in discouraging guerrilla activity than did the tactics of the Axis in the Balkans during 1942, 1943, and 1944.

From the purely economic point of view it must be admitted that the accession of these three nations to the defensive system of

the West has created certain problems. The Greek economy never at the best remarkable for its strength, has been weakened b a decade of war. It has for years been a truism that somethin like economic collapse would occur if foreign aid ceased. valiant effort is now being made by the Government of Marsha Papagos, under the leadership of M. Markezinis, the presen Minister of Co-ordination, to ensure that the country pays its way but it will be some time before these efforts produce results. Un like Greece, which is basically a mercantile economy, Turkey an Yugoslavia are primarily agricultural. Since 1947 Turkey has bee receiving large sums in dollars from the United States, first unde the Truman Doctrine, then under E.C.A., and latterly unde M.S.A. With this money work has been started on ambitious plan for industrialization and other forms of capital development, an confusion would be caused, to say the least, if the flow of America aid were to diminish substantially or to come to an end. Similarly as mentioned above, the Yugoslav economy has received financia assistance during the past two or three years from the West Unfortunately the secession of Yugoslavia from the Cominforn has not helped to solve any of the major economic problems o Greece and Turkey, for the economies of the three countrie compete with rather than complement each other. It is true tha Turkey generally has a surplus of cereals, whereas Greece, an since the war Yugoslavia also, must import a large proportion o the grain they consume, and this is a situation which might b exploited to strengthen the economic position of the area as whole. But in other important respects there is bitter competitio in export markets—between Greek and Turkish raisins an sultanas, for instance, and between Greek and Turkish, and t some extent even Yugoslav, tobacco. It is plain that if the Genera Staffs of the West wish to make the best use of this new combina tion, they will have to ensure that it continues to receive economi support from the West.

It remains to glance at some of the political consequences of th Balkan Pact. By far the most serious difficulty has already bee mentioned—Trieste. It seems hard to believe that military co operation between Yugoslavia and N.A.T.O., in whatever form will be complete so long as this question remains unsettled, and i the interests of Western defence its solution must therefore assum high priority. On the other hand, the Pact is the first formal post war agreement of its kind to have been concluded by Yugoslavia

outside the Iron Curtain. It is perhaps not altogether fanciful to suppose that the Pact marks the end—for the time being at least—of Panslavism in the Balkans. This has always been a powerful weapon in Russian hands, notably in 1944 when it was exploited to the full by the Soviet armies advancing westwards to Belgrade and Budapest. The Pact has thus created a formal break with the South Slav tradition of looking to Russia as their protector from aggression. As for the Greeks and the Turks, no such tradition has ever existed, at any rate in the course of the last 130 years. On the contrary, the emotion which the average Greek or Turk feels when he thinks of a Russian has for generations been fear. There are therefore powerful psychological reasons why such a combination of nations ought to be successful.

It is of course only too simple to draw a parallel between the new Pact and the last desperate efforts of the Byzantine Empire to withstand assault from the north and the east. But to do so would surely be to overlook the real importance of the step which these countries have taken. Basil the Bulgar-Slayer stood alone. But behind Tito and Papagos and Celal Bayar there is the moral and material support of the greatest combination of forces which has ever existed, even if N.A.T.O. has not yet formally committed itself on the Yugoslav issue, and even if technical difficulties may delay and impede complete co-ordination of plans, and problems such as the question of Trieste may lead to friction. Nor is it entirely without significance that to reach agreement these three countries have had to sink and forget real causes of cleavage. The signing of a piece of paper by three men in 1953 may not mean that the citizens of Belgrade and Athens and Istanbul can sleep any easier at night, but it should satisfy them that their rulers are on the right lines. And from it—with patience and with wisdom—N.A.T.O. may have much to gain.

B. S.-E.

Pitfalls in Hungarian Planning

THE POLITICAL SCENE

In contrast with the political crises and Cabinet reshuffles which have taken place in other satellite countries, the leading team in Hungary has shown a remarkable persistency in remaining in office. Today virtually the same group of men wields power in Budapest as that which headed the Communist Party in the days when they first made their appearance in Hungary in the wake of the Russian armies.[1]

Some changes, however, have taken place in the Government, together with a reshaping of the Cabinet structure. In August 1952 Rákosi, who till then had held the reins as a Vice-Premier, was elected Prime Minister, while his predecessor, the Communist stooge Dobi, formerly a member of the Smallholders' party, was 'promoted' State-President. There has been much speculation as to why it was necessary or expedient for Rákosi to take over the office of Prime Minister, a step which was followed by the appointment of five Vice-Premiers. It is possible that the whole move may have been intended as a demonstration with a view to strengthening the grip of the Communist leadership on the Government apparatus in face of increasing difficulties.

Among the five Vice-Premiers Gerö is the outstanding figure. Prior to this appointment he was a super-Minister responsible for the whole range of economic affairs, the uncontested number two in the Party. The other four members of that supreme body, formally constituting an inner cabinet, are men of lesser prominence, hardly exceeding the level of departmental chiefs. Simultaneously with the reshaping of the Cabinet structure the People's Economic Council, headed by Gerö, was abolished with the proviso that the Council of Ministers should deal with matters previously decided upon under the authority of the Economic Council.

Taken in relation to the Stransky trial and the launching of the anti-Semitic campaign in Moscow, the appointment of the Vice-Premiers (apart from that of Gerö) was widely interpreted as a measure for strengthening the non-Jewish element in the Cabinet. Whatever considerations may in fact have prompted their appoint-

[1] Lazslo Rajk, the former Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior who was executed in October 1949, though important in many respects, never counted as one of the top-rank policy-making Hungarian Communist leaders.

ment, there is in any case sufficient evidence that the Communist leaders were apprehensive of Moscow's anti-Semitic line. They made efforts to prove that they themselves were free from any trace of leniency towards Jewish aims. Several leading personalities of the Jewish community, including some doctors from the Jewish hospital, were arrested following the announcement concerning the plot of the Kremlin doctors.

A clue to the change in the Cabinet structure might be found in the administrative field. As a somewhat belated homage to Stalinite methods of government, the Hungarian Communists have multiplied the number of departments labelled as ministries. They have split up the former Ministry for Industry into eight separate offices, all of them headed by a 'Minister'. Agricultural affairs are handled by several Government departments, and so are the problems of trade. In fact, the Government of this small country is now composed of twenty-five ministries. As a consequence of this splitting up some co-ordination is required, and this task is to be assigned to the Vice-Premiers.

Though a major political crisis was avoided, purges nevertheless took place which, if not affecting the very top, still appeared disquieting enough to the regime. The Office of State Security (i.e. the political police) was the department most strikingly affected by these purges; the powerful head of the political police Gábor Péter, the architect of many a political show-trial, seems to have fallen into disgrace and disappeared, together with a number of high-ranking police officers. The Minister of Justice, Décsi, a politically insignificant figure with a police background, also suffered the same fate.

Tension appears to have been widespread, and the purges were not confined to one important office. It is probably a relief to Rákosi and his team that the anti-Semitic wave has now subsided. But there is another danger looming, for the undecided situation in Moscow keeps continually alive the problem of who should be relied on there, an uneasiness which is shared, of course, by all the satellite Governments.

GROWING ECONOMIC TENSION

In his capacity as economic dictator Gerö submitted his yearly report on the progress of the Five-Year Plan to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in November of last year. After paying lip service to the results achieved he embarked on some

very stern criticism, directed against the Planning Office, against several of the departments, notably the Ministry of Agriculture and that of Heavy Industry, and against factory managements in general. In fact hardly any relevant organization escaped unscathed. Trade unions, party officials, and rural councils were accused of having failed to foster production by securing greater efficiency and discipline. Following this speech the head of the Planning Office, Zoltán Vas, was deposed. A trained Moscovite and efficient economic administrator, Vas was an important figure, though not in the first line, where political decisions were concerned. In pre-war Hungary he was sentenced for subversive activities and after fifteen years in prison was released together with Rákosi by agreement with the Soviet Union in 1940.

Last January Hungary entered on the fourth year of her Five-Year Plan. Developments in the course of the past three years may be summed up under following heads: (1) Rapid industrial growth; (2) General shortage of labour; (3) Productivity lagging behind schedule; (4) Shortcomings in food supplies and crisis in agriculture; (5) Decline in real wages and in living standards.

1. *Industrial Growth*

The main objective of the Five-Year Plan was to treble overall industrial output and to quadruple heavy industrial production[1] within the general expansion of industry as a whole. The latest report on plan achievement, covering the first quarter of 1953, stated that, as compared with the corresponding period of 1950, overall industrial production had been almost doubled, while heavy industry had increased its output by about 120 per cent. These indices of industrial production should be treated with caution. Their methods of computation have never been disclosed, and it may be taken for granted that they overstate developments. Yet there is no doubt that industrial capacity has been extended and output stepped up. In 1952 18 million tons of coal were turned out, as compared with 11½ million tons in 1949, the closing year of the previous economic plan. Steel production has been doubled by enlarging and re-equipping the old steel works in northern Hungary. The steel combine now under construction on the Danube site some thirty miles south of Budapest should further add to the steel supplies when it comes into operation in 1954.

[1] Heavy industry comprises the production of capital goods including coal and steel, electrical power, engineering, building materials, and heavy chemicals.

Side by side with the increase in coal and steel production, the engineering industry has expanded rapidly; large-scale thermal power plants have been erected, chemical industries developed, and, last but not least, production of building materials has been stepped up to match increasing requirements for the construction of factories and of extensive military establishments.

But in spite of these achievements, a closer scrutiny of results shows that all is not going well, and the criticism voiced by the economic dictator was more than empty words. According to official statements, overall industrial production was raised by 35 per cent during the first year of the plan, by 30 per cent during the second year, and by only 8·2 per cent during the twelve-month period ending in March 1953. The respective rates of increase of heavy industrial production during those years were 36, 37·7, and 21·6 per cent. Light industry was said to have increased its output by 34 per cent in the first year and 27 per cent in the second; the official report covering the last twelve-month period keeps silence on developments in light industry. But the statement that heavy industrial output was raised by 21·6 per cent, while industrial output as a whole increased by only 8·2 per cent, speaks for itself. Expansion in capital goods industries was maintained by cutting consumer goods production; and to increase heavy industry by actually curtailing consumer goods output is, even when measured by Communist standards of austerity, not a desirable result.

2. *Labour Shortage*

The Five-Year Plan envisaged increasing the number of persons employed in mining, manufacturing, and the building industry by 650,000. This provision implied doubling the labour force during the plan period. In the first year the actual increase was 183,000, in the second 109,000, and latterly, in the twelve-month period ending in March 1953 (exclusive of the building industry), only 56,000. The rural districts with their formerly chronic underemployment were to serve as the main source for recruiting additional labour. Agricultural labour reserves have by now been absorbed. They may even have been tapped too drastically by the enforced pace of industrialization. In fact, the labour surplus which was till lately a normal feature of the rural districts appears now to have given way to a shortage of manpower.

Female work, hitherto utilized only to a moderate extent in

Hungarian industry (chiefly in textiles), is now being regarded as a reserve only second in importance. Under the label of equal rights for women a vigorous propaganda has been launched. 'Equality' means that under the Communist regime women qualify for all kinds of work in mining and metallurgy or for heavy tractor driving. Creches have been established in ever-increasing numbers to induce mothers to keep on working. The most effective lever for forcing women into industry, however, lies in the low level of wages. The average earning of one person is not sufficient for the sustenance of a family.

The recruitment of female work scored an initial success. According to official records, in 1951 the share of female workers in the increase of the industrial labour force amounted to 70 per cent. Figures for the recruitment of women workers in the succeeding period were not disclosed. The slowing down of the increase indicates, however, that, as with the rural labour reserves, the sources of additional female work are also nearing exhaustion. It is difficult to judge whether the limits are nearly reached by now or whether lapses in organization are responsible for poorer results of recruitment. Possibly both factors are at work. Whatever the cause, the Communist planners are faced with a grave problem. If they do not succeed in raising the rate of increase above last year's level the build-up of the industrial labour force will fall considerably behind the plan.

3. *The Issue of Productivity*

The Hungarian Five-Year Plan set very high standards for productivity. In the course of the plan period industrial output per head was to be almost doubled. In none of the Soviet-influenced economic plans, including that of the U.S.S.R., is such a steep rise provided for. Manipulation of working norms and all the other devices borrowed from Russia are being applied in order to enforce higher achievement. The interesting question from the point of view of the progress of the plan is how the workers react to these exacting claims. Open resistance would, of course, be ruthlessly crushed. The mere venting of discontent provides reason enough for transfer into a compulsory labour camp. Among the different groups of workers, the handling of the miners proved to be the most difficult. At the turn of the year 1951-2 an outbreak occurred in one of the important mining districts. It was quickly suppressed and was followed by an uneasy truce between the authorities and

the miners under which the latter were granted some concession. Since then absenteeism in the pits appears to have diminished but it has not ceased.

The attitude of the workers may be gauged by their response to the incessant propaganda and pressure towards higher achievement. Official records claim that during the first plan year output per head in industry was raised by about 17·5 per cent, and again at the same rate in the second year of the plan. In the last report covering developments in the third year, the issue of productivity was not mentioned. Industrial output was stated to have increased by roughly 8 per cent. As the labour force has risen at an almost equal rate the inference is easily to be drawn that no improvement in productivity has taken place. This lack of improvement is the more conspicuous as the growth of equipment should raise output per head. It is perhaps not too rash to conclude that the failure to increase productivity is due at least in part to passive resistance on the part of the grudging workers. For the planners the lag in productivity is the more ominous as the increase of the labour force is not in step with the schedule. Shortage of labour might to a certain extent be outweighed by higher productivity. But the production plan is doomed if anticipations concerning the recruiting of labour as well as the output per head fail to materialize.

4. *Crisis in Agriculture and Food Supplies*

An agricultural development programme is included in the Five-Year Plan. The programme, much less ambitious than its industrial counterpart, aims at raising farm production by 50 per cent. In the event, agricultural investment proved to be insufficient for attaining the production targets set by the plan. Livestock has recuperated steadily during recent years, filling up the gaps made by heavy wartime losses. The agricultural plan provided for a sizable extension of the area devoted to industrial crops at the expense of fodder crops, while a more intensive cultivation of the latter would, according to the plan, make up for the reduction in sown area. But so far the improvement has not come up to expectations, and last year's poor crop has caused serious difficulties.

The position has been aggravated by the general rural policies of the Communist regime. From the outset a prime objective was to change over from private to collective economy. The conversion was to proceed, as officially proclaimed, gradually and without

compulsion. Land collectivization has in fact made rapid strides. At the inception of the Five-Year Plan the collective sector included less than 10 per cent of the arable land. Its share rose to almost 30 per cent early in 1952, and has now reached 40 per cent. The process of transformation, described as 'voluntary', was engineered by ruthless administrative pressure, depriving the owners of individual holdings of the possibility to carry on. The main instrument of pressure is the compulsory delivery system. This system hits the collective economies as well. It is, however, discriminative in that it heavily overtaxes the individual farmers. The quantity of produce to be surrendered is fixed, not according to yields, but to the size of the holdings. Backed by this regulation a merciless process of collection took from many a farmer even the seed for the new sowing. As a result the autumn sowing lagged alarmingly behind. Hasty measures taken early in the spring were designed to make up for previous omissions. It is doubtful whether they had full effect.

In a number of cases the harassed farmers left their holdings in an attempt to evade pressure and responsibility. Communist policy thus succeeded in driving individual farming to the brink of ruin while failing to organize collective farming successfully. Communist leaders repeatedly voiced warnings against the further extension of the collective farms' area, stressing the consolidation of the existing kolkhozes as the most urgent task. But economic considerations were overruled by the propaganda machine, regardless of the fact that a number of collective economies are in a state bordering on chaos.

Compared with the pre-war situation the surplus produced by Hungarian agriculture has shrunk substantially. Yet exports of farm products were expected to give support to the implementation of the Five-Year Plan. In exchange for agricultural products raw materials and industrial equipment were to be acquired on Western markets. Trade relations with Great Britain were broken off as a consequence of the Sanders affair. Within the framework of commercial agreements with Western Germany, Switzerland, France, and other Western countries an extensive list of food items was scheduled for export. But as a result of poor crops exports have dwindled this year, though deliveries of food to the U.S.S.R. have been maintained. Whatever the size of these exports, food supplies are deficient in Hungary. In contrast to the preceding year, when the harvest was satisfactory, a genuine shortage now

prevails in bread, flour, milk, and milk products, and food prices in general are rising.

5. *Decline in Real Wages and Living Standards*

The rising tendency of prices for consumer goods is a permanent feature of Hungary's economy. If not on account of a bad harvest, prices are forced up by inflationary pressure caused by the over-straining of resources. To conceal the adverse trend the publication of index figures has been suppressed since 1949. A tentative cost of living calculation made according to the methods applied by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 1948, and based on fairly reliable current price records, arrives at a figure of about 240 by the end of 1952, compared with 100 in January 1949. The average increase of nominal wages during the period in question hardly exceeded 40 per cent. The position is not quite as bad as the figures quoted above would seem to indicate, as family allowances were raised at the end of 1951 and social services have also been improved in the course of recent years. But the fact remains that living conditions have deteriorated since the inception of the Five-Year Plan. Average earnings, even of skilled workers, do not cover the needs of a family; as has already been mentioned, insufficient real wages are a decisive element in forcing women into the factories.

PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Undeterred by the reluctance of the workers to raise output per head, the Communist leaders have set new high targets for production and productivity. In the current year coal output is to be raised by another 25 per cent, steel production by 18 per cent, and so forth. All this implies that the struggle for higher efficiency will reach a new pitch. Acrimonious criticism has already been levelled against the management and workers of the coal mines, who are accused of being hostile to mechanization and unwilling to make use of the equipment imported from Russia. There is plenty of evidence that Russian-made mining equipment is not adapted to conditions in the Hungarian coal-pits. It may prove possible to raise output per head by more careful adaptations; but even then a substantial addition to the labour force is required in order to carry out the over-ambitious programmes in mining and heavy industry. There is a danger that in the search for labour reserves

coercive measures of an even more stringent nature than hitherto will be introduced.

More and more difficulties are being encountered in fulfilling the targets provided for in the plan. It is not only the reluctance of the workers that has to be overcome. The rift between the top and medium-level executives is becoming increasingly perceptible. Almost desperate appeals are frequently addressed to the officials and local leaders who have to face the rank and file and who through direct contact might be able to influence achievements in the workshops. Such functionaries are reminded of their duty to translate the decisions of the Central Party Committee into practice. But factory managers and local party and trade union secretaries, as well as chairmen of rural councils, react sluggishly to pressure from above. They almost seem to have lost confidence in the possibility of carrying out orders whose aim is to exact increased efforts from the workers.

Against this host of obstacles stands the fierce determination of the leadership to realize the plan objectives. Sticking with fanatical obstinacy to their overstrained programme, the Hungarian Communist leaders seem to be prepared to face the growing discontent of the workers and to fight the reluctance of their own bureaucracy. Obviously Rákosi and his team are haunted more by the anxiety that they might fail to discharge their obligations towards Moscow than by the apprehension of any internal resistance. Deliveries to Moscow have so far been unaffected and heavy industrial expansion has been maintained, cuts in production being confined to light industry. The issue at stake for the Hungarian Communists is whether or not they will be able to carry out the Five-Year Plan in its most decisive part. The fulfilment of obligations undertaken towards Moscow is a great asset for a satellite Government. There is reason to believe that Rákosi's and Gerö's success in administering the economic plan so as to enable deliveries to Russia to be maintained has up till now contributed to the permanency of their rule. Conversely, any serious deterioration in the fulfilment of the plan's targets might undermine their position. And, as events elsewhere have already shown, a crisis in the operation of the economic plan can easily be followed by a political crisis in the Russian-dominated countries.

G. K.

Austria after the Elections

At a time when the Western world is once more raising the question of a Treaty for Austria as a token of the Russians' new intentions, that country has only just emerged from a serious political crisis, the consequences of which might have been far-reaching. The economic conditions and political tensions analysed in this journal in 1951[1] made the past year the most difficult in the history of the Second Republic, leading to the premature dissolution of Parliament and to new elections, held on 22 February 1953; and although now, after protracted negotiations, a Conservative-Socialist coalition is once more governing the country, the passions aroused—not by the electoral campaign, which was conducted quietly and with dignity, but by the political horse-trading which followed it—will only gradually subside as the new administration restores confidence and tackles the urgent tasks that confront it.

The root cause of the crisis was undoubtedly economic, arising mainly from a considerable cut in American aid and the drop in world prices, which together resulted in a serious increase of unemployment to a total of almost 300,000 out of just under 2 million employed persons. To this must be added the reaction of industrial and commercial circles to seven years of economic planning, and their spirited demand for a more 'liberal' economy, a demand with which Herr Kamitz, the Minister of Finance, was wholly in sympathy. The Socialists had never been happy about his disinflationary policies, and as they had staked their reputation on full employment, as against the People's Party's 'sound money' policy, an overdose of liberal economics in the Budget proposals led to the resignation of the Government on 23 October 1952.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF 1952

Yet, on the face of it, 1952 was the most successful year in Austria's economy since the end of the war. For the first time in history employment figures almost reached the 2 million mark (1,985,457 in August); the wholesale price index showed a steady though unspectacular decline, and the cost of living came down by 2·9 per cent; the volume of industrial production had risen by 75 per cent since 1948, and productivity had at last reached its pre-war level. In the sphere of foreign trade, the adverse balance of trade, which had stood at nearly 50 per cent in 1948 and 1949,

[1] 'Austria: A Year of Discontent', in *The World Today*, December 1951.

and at about 30 per cent in 1950 and 1951, was reduced to 22· per cent, the value of exports reaching the record figure of abou eleven thousand million schillings (£1 = 72 S.). Clearly thi achievement, in a war-shattered and occupied country, would hav been impossible without foreign aid, and it is not too much to sa that Austria owes her survival to the United States, which through the European Recovery Programme, not only kept Austri going but laid the foundations for what stability and prosperity sh possesses.

In the five years of American aid Austria received a total c $900 million in direct and indirect aid, which amounts to abou 94 per cent of the total foreign trade deficit of the period; thus i can be said that America's chief contribution was the balancing c Austria's accounts. To this must be added the use to which th counterpart funds were put: approximately one-fifth of the tot investments in the various branches of the Austrian economy wer financed from this source, and with the loyal backing of the trad unions the American Economic Mission successfully insisted o the need for investments in the basic industries, such as hydro electric schemes, coal, and steel, as against the various othe requests that promised a quicker return to private enterprise.[1]

However, though everyone knew that American aid could no go on for ever, when the first cuts were imposed on the Government's investment policy and building workers were laid off pressure from the rank and file on the Socialist leadership increased and led to the kind of tension which no coalition Government ca survive for long. Not without cause, the People's Party complaine that the Socialists wanted to be both Government and Opposition An interesting pointer to the temper of the working classes i contained in the strike statistics, which show that in 1952 twice a many working hours were lost as in the previous year, and nearl four times as many workers were involved. This increase, howeve was due to a 'warning strike' conducted by the building trades an directed against the cut in public works. If that strike is omitte from the total, it will be seen that no more men struck in 1952 tha in the previous year, and that 13 per cent less time was lost.[2] I other words, the negotiating machinery showed no signs of deterioration, union discipline was as high as ever, but the strik weapon was used more for political ends.

[1] All the above figures are taken from *Gewerkschaftliche Rundschau*, April 1953
[2] *Gewerkschaftliche Rundschau*, April 1953.

The Austrian Institute for Economic Research stated that th pre-seasonal increase in unemployment was in part due to th premature stoppage of building construction, which also affecte production in the metallurgical and engineering industries.[1] I this atmosphere of warning strikes and growing fear of mass unemployment the Minister of Finance presented his Budget proposals which contained further cuts in investments and in the mean made available for the housing programme, as well as a reductio from 30 to 25 per cent of the Government grant towards all socia insurance benefits. Whether this would have led to a cut in benefits, as the Socialists claimed and the People's Party denied, o whether the various insurance funds could have met the deficit ou of their reserves, is immaterial now; it was made the ostensibl reason for the coalition's falling to pieces. Other issues involve the choice between long-term investments, such as the electrification of railways or hydro-electric schemes, and short-tern *konsumnahe* investments, and the question of a revision of th tenants' protection laws, which date back to the first world war an fix the majority of rents for houses at an entirely uneconomic level

The first consequence of the resignation of the Government wa that the original Budget had to be scrapped, and a provisional on was agreed upon to last for five months; the election date was fixe for 22 February. In the meantime unemployment assume alarming proportions, rising to 285,000 in January, which wa 70,000 more than the maximum during the previous winter; bu the American Mission for Economic Co-operation still insisted o a balanced Budget, a demand which had brought about the downfall of the Government.

On 23 December Mr Thibodeaux, acting chief of the M.E.C. announced that AS500 million would be made available out o counterpart funds as from January to combat unemployment, bu the total allocation for 1953 would depend on the progress Austri was making towards the stabilization of its financial position an especially its Budget.[2] Against this view, the Austrian Federatio of Trade Unions, on behalf of its 1·3 million members, entere the electoral struggle by putting forward its demands for an elasti Budget and credit policy. One of its posters pictured a workin man steering a small vessel on a precarious course between tw dangerous rocks inscribed 'Inflation' and 'Unemployment'; th caption read: 'To combat unemployment we demand the follow

[1] *Monatsbericht*, November 1952. [2] *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 24 December 195

ing measures: (i) no further lay-offs; (ii) 250 million for job-creating projects; (iii) release of 140 million from counterpart funds for housing construction; (iv) reduction of the cost of bank credits; (v) moderation of credit restrictions.'[1]

It is not too much to say that thus the General Election was fought on a very narrow front, on purely internal issues of an economic nature. The three principal parties—the Socialists, the (Catholic) People's Party, and the Independents—are, of course, agreed on foreign policy, which to them means primarily a State Treaty for Austria and the departure of the four occupation armies; and the fourth, the Communists, who for a short while entertained hopes that the Socialists might join them in opposition to an anti-Socialist Government, do not in any case count as a genuinely Austrian party.

THE ELECTIONS AND AFTER

Altogether eleven parties and organizations participated in the elections, though only five of them nominated candidates in all the twenty-five electoral districts, others, such as the Slovene Christian Democrats and the Monarchists, who fought in Carinthia, or the Patriotic Union which contested two districts in Vienna, admitting their purely local or insufficient strength. However, only four parties succeeded in gaining parliamentary representation, the same as in the last general election of 1949, except that this time the Union of Independents had formed a *Wahlpartei* together with several small splinter groups (W.D.U.), while the Communist Party even went beyond the 'Left Bloc' camouflage of the 1949 election and formed an electoral alliance called the People's Opposition (V.O.) together with Professor Dobretzberger, a Catholic fellow-traveller and former Schuschnigg Minister, and a sect of dissident Socialists. Compared with 1949 the electorate was larger by almost 200,000, so that to hold its own each party had to show an increase of 4½ per cent. The results as compared with those of 1949 can be seen from the following table.

AUSTRIAN GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, 1953

Party	*Votes obtained* 1953	*Compared with* 1949	*Percentage of total vote* 1953	1949	*Seats in Parliament*
Socialists	1,819,000	+195,000	42·1	38·7	73 (+6)
People's Party	1,780,000	−64,000	41·3	44	74 (−3)
W.D.U.	473,000	−16,000	11	11·7	14 (−2)
V.O.	228,000	+3,000	5·3	5·4	4 (−1)

[1] M.E.C. Monthly Labour Report, No. 37, February 1953.

The Socialists thus increased their vote by about 12 per cent, as against a loss of 3½ per cent each for the People's Party and the Independents, and became the strongest party in the country, if not in Parliament, where the Conservatives still maintained their lead. As for the Communists, the acquisition of Dobretzberger did not yield the 12,000 votes his 'Democratic Union' polled in 1949; their increase was under 1½ per cent—though this appeared in the Cominform journal as a gain of 'approximately seven per cent'.[1] The real nature of this 'alliance' was shown when both Dobretzberger and Scharf, the dissident Socialist member of the previous parliament, stood down to allow the People's Opposition to be represented in the new Parliament by the chairman and the secretary of the Communist Party. Lastly, the seven splinter groups between them polled some 15,000 votes. Approximately 96 per cent of the electorate voted.

If figures have any meaning at all, these results could only be interpreted as a clear mandate for the coalition parties to continue along the path of compromise and collaboration. As the Conservative *Neue Wiener Tageszeitung* (24 February 1953) put it, 'The parties that had no share in the work of (Austrian) reconstruction, the W.D.U. and the V.O., were ostentatiously ignored by the electorate and dismissed with the contempt which those ridiculous splinter groups deserve . . .' Five days later, however, the People's Party had had second thoughts and declared that 'Figl's negotiations will show which parliamentary group will wish to share the responsibility to partake in the further construction of Austria'; and before long the country was staggered to learn that the People's Party was negotiating with the W.D.U. with a view to including it in the coalition in order to secure an 'anti-Marxist' majority in the Cabinet. Conservative and neo-Nazi votes were lumped together and found to exceed the combined Socialist-Communist vote by a quarter of a million, and this was to justify a united anti-Socialist front. Although the Federal President had only asked Dr Figl to re-form the coalition with the Socialists, it appears that the People's Party instructed him to attempt a coalition of three—a task he is known to have disliked and considered impossible in view of the Socialists' declared refusal to co-operate with the W.D.U. A 'pre-coalition' pact between the People's Party and the W.D.U. was arranged, according to which the latter was to be given one Cabinet seat, was to provide the third

[1] *For a Lasting Peace*, 27 Feburary 1953.

speaker in the House, and was to have a greater share in parliamentary committees and on international bodies. A permanent contact committee was to have met at least fortnightly to consider bills, and its decision was to have been binding on both parties.

As was to be expected, such an attempt to correct the electoral fortunes aroused considerable opposition even within the People's Party, and the veteran Catholic publicist Dr Funder invoked the memory of the fateful anti-Socialist policies of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg when he warned against 'the creation of a mentality that would divide people and State into two hostile camps of roughly equal strength facing each other for a fight to the finish'.[1] The Vatican, too, was held to be trying to strengthen Dr Figl's hand when the Papal Nuncio on 28 February conferred the Order of Saint Gregory on the Chancellor-designate, but all to no avail, and when Dr Figl on 22 March handed over the task of forming a government to Herr Raab, Chairman of the People's Party and leader of its industrial and commercial section, the decline of influence on the part of its agrarian wing—which in the present Parliament provides only twenty-seven out of the party's seventy-four deputies—was manifest.

But still there was no prospect of a Government, and the Federal President, Dr Körner, on the occasion of the opening of a Unesco exhibition took the unusual step of advising against making coalition too difficult by the addition of a partner whose democratic professions were not above suspicion. He is also said to have warned party leaders of the consequences should the Russian element in the Allied Council for Austria refuse to recognize a Government containing neo-Nazi leaders. At last, on 2 April, the new Government, consisting of Conservatives and Socialists, was chosen, five and a half weeks after the elections, but although the Socialist Vice-Chancellor Dr Schärf proclaimed that the new coalition pact was more satisfactory and likely to be more 'durable', the People's Party's General Secretary opined that his party's coalition with the Socialists did not preclude loyal co-operation with the W.D.U.—in other words with the principal opposition party! Should that spirit prevail, it is difficult to see how the new Government is going to survive the first serious crisis.

Fortunately for Austria, the W.D.U. is no more united than are some of its opponents, and on the same day the public was treated

[1] *Die Furche*, 6 March 1953.

to the spectacle of a neo-Nazi M.P., elected in Vienna and elated by the relative victory of his organization, declaring that the wrong people had led the W.D.U. in the provinces and were now angling for Government posts to compensate for their defeat. As for a coalition with the People's Party, he and his friends would have none of it, though they would take up the People's Party's pledge to work for the complete rehabilitation of former Nazis.

As for the Communists, their obvious dependence on the Russians not only cost them dear in the elections, but a gratuitous Russian attempt to explain away their failure covered them with ridicule. A certain N. Polianow informed the readers of *Izvestia* that the Austrian elections had been characterized by the greatest 'falsifications' ever known and in that way the reactionaries had succeeded in maintaining themselves in power, while Mihailov, Vienna correspondent of *Pravda*, reported that the whole weight of the State was brought into action against the progressive elements, every conceivable pressure, bribe, calumny, and swindle being employed to further the 'accelerated fascistization and militarization of the country'.[1]

Significantly, very little was made of these accusations, which over four million Austrians knew to be untrue, in the great inquest held by the Communist Party Central Committee when the Party Chairman Koplenig consoled himself that the alleged desire of their opponents to see the Communists lose their representation in Parliament had been frustrated. But this crumb of comfort was followed by the admission of their disappointment with the election results; though they had won votes in some areas, thousands of others who had given them their vote in 1949 had been lost because of the lack of initiative, courage, aggressiveness, and contact with the people. The isolation of many of their organizations, their failure to counteract anti-Soviet propaganda and, in particular, the reaction of the public to the Slansky trial, and the existence of alien, defeatist, and even hostile (Trotzkyist) elements in the Party were the cause of their failure; but the worsening of the economic situation would enable the Communists to overcome their shortcomings.[2]

As a face-saving device, the 'People's Opposition' is to remain in being, presumably to be superseded by a 'national opposition' at the next election.

[1] Quoted in *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 1 March 1953.
[2] *Volksstimme*, 2 April 1953.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS TASKS

When the new Government presented itself to Parliament on 15 April it did not appear to be vastly different from its predecessor, except that Dr Figl had been replaced as Chancellor by Herr Julius Raab, Chairman of the People's Party and a former member of the *Heimwehr*. As their price for serving with him, and to give expression to their electoral success, the Socialists have obtained two new under-secretaryships, in the Foreign and Trade Ministries, both under Conservative chiefs, while the People's Party had to agree to apply the coalition pact in Parliament, which will prevent it from calling on the aid of the Independents to vote the Socialists down. There can be no doubt that, given the forthright and outspoken manner of the new Chancellor, coupled with his political past, and also the retention of the controversial Dr Kamitz as Minister of Finance, the utmost political skill will be required on the part of the Socialists if they are not to precipitate either another dissolution or great disaffection in the working class which would play into the hands of the Communists.

The programme outlined by the new administration was certainly of a kind that all parties were able to accept; the real difficulties will arise when the Chancellor's pledges come to be translated into terms of actual expenditure, priorities, and fiscal policy. In the forefront of his economic policy was the need to combat unemployment by means of public works and housing projects, to be assisted by a great internal loan devoted to the further development of Austria's hydro-electric potential, and by a reform of the taxation system which has hitherto proved detrimental to full productivity and efficiency. All branches of social insurances were to be adequately subsidized, and the provision of old-age pensions for the self-employed was envisaged. In short, the principal demands of the wage-earners and the countless self-employed in commerce and industry—whose living standards are often far below those of the organized manual worker—are to be satisfied if the Government can find the necessary means and if American aid continues to meet any deficiency.

It is certainly not going to be an easy task to maintain the 1952 level of exports; economists have already pointed out increasing difficulties in retaining existing markets and in finding new ones. The chief danger lies in iron and steel, where Austria, as a non-member of the European Coal and Steel Community, may find herself unable to compete with member States, while the levelling-

up of coal prices may make Ruhr coal more expensive for her. The Government have therefore decided to open negotiations with the High Authority with a view to obtaining permission to send an observer and to being granted equality of treatment with member States. This request is based on the claim that Austria should not be penalized for the failure of the Powers to conclude a Treaty which would restore her sovereignty and give her freedom to join this or any other international body with whose aims she is in agreement.

The refusal of the Soviet Union to attend the meeting, on 27 May, of the Foreign Ministers' deputies charged with the preparation of a State Treaty for Austria has caused great disappointment in that country and elsewhere; and little confidence is felt in the Russian suggestion that discussions could more profitably be continued through normal diplomatic channels. The conviction is growing that Russia considers Austria a pawn in her relations with the West and that the Treaty is a card which she is not prepared to play until serious negotiations have started on Germany.

In the meantime, however, as a sop to Austrian opinion, the Russians have made a number of concessions which are startling in their suddenness. On 7 June Moscow announced that the functions of Commander of the Soviet occupation troops in Austria had been separated from those of High Commissioner, and three days later the holder of that post was appointed Ambassador as well; this decision brings the Russians into line with the Western Powers. On 8 June all major controls on the movement of people and goods across the Soviet zonal boundaries were abolished, a step which the Western Powers had taken in 1947. For a while, smaller concessions were announced almost daily: the return of more houses and schools to the Austrians; Russian agreement to the establishment of inter-zonal telephone connections between the British and Soviet zones; permission to resume air-mail services with Germany and Japan; the sale of the assets of a proposed hydro-electric station at Ybbs-Persenbeug on the Danube; and Soviet consent to the removal of two district chiefs of police in Vienna who had been dismissed for their part in Communist riots two years ago but had continued in office under Russian orders.

These concessions were welcome enough, but their practical importance should not be exaggerated. They are certainly no substitute for freedom; and the continued censorship of the mails, the Russians' stranglehold on Radio Vienna, their interference in the

ordinary processes of the law and in the internal political affairs of the country are at least as irksome as is their economic exploitation of the zone they occupy. The most fitting gesture the Russians could make—and one that would increase their popularity overnight—would be to facilitate the conclusion of a State Treaty in time to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Moscow Declaration on the restoration of an independent Austria, which will fall in November.

K. R. S.

Raw Materials: Scarcity or Plenty?

IMMEDIATELY after the second World War the raw material producers feared the danger of over-production, and today uncertainties as to market prospects are beginning to reappear. The intervening years, however, have witnessed the invasion of Korea in July 1950 and the ensuing commodity boom, which reached a peak during 1951. Acute scarcity of raw materials is not at the moment a problem, with the result that all but two of the allocation committees of the International Materials Conference have been wound up. But the question remains relevant whether sufficient is being done today to ensure that in the more distant future the supply of raw materials will keep pace with the expansion in manufacturing. This 'new Malthus ghost', which was first seen during the war and which reappeared with the Korean armaments boom, is discussed in a recently published Chatham House Information Paper on the world production of raw materials.[1] In view of the possibility in the future of continuous pressure on world raw material resources, it may be helpful to summarize some salient facts given in the Information Paper on post-war developments both in the production of raw materials and in the use that has been made of them.

NEW USES

The discovery of new uses for the world's natural resources is characteristic of modern times. For instanee, an increasing variety

[1] *World Production of Raw Materials*. [Information Papers No. 18]. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. viii, 104 pp. 7s. 6d.) The book includes forty-eight statistical tables showing production of raw materials.

of uses is being found for both natural and synthetic rubber, although nearly two-thirds of all the rubber produced still goes into tyres and inner-tubes. Apart from the various traditional uses for zinc, this metal has been increasingly employed for alloy die-castings, particularly in the motor and general engineering industries. Lead also has important new uses, such as the sheathing of electric cables. The growing importance of iron and steel, both in war and peace, need not be emphasized; for the steel industry a great variety of alloying elements such as nickel, chrome, manganese, molybdenum, tungsten, and vanadium are now more essential than ever before. Another important development, not only in steel production but also in the case of other metals such as copper, lead, and tin, has been the striking increase in the use of secondary metal, or scrap. The extent to which aluminium has lately risen in importance is phenomenal; in 1936 world production was about 360,000 tons, whereas in 1950 it was 1½ million tons. The world production of bauxite, from which aluminium is derived, increased during the same period from 2¾ million to 7½ million tons, reaching about 10 million tons in 1951. In its pure form aluminium is used mainly for pots and pans etc., but it is as an alloy with copper, zinc, silicon, and magnesium that this lightest of metals after magnesium has gained its predominant position, in particular in the aircraft industry. A development worth mentioning is the exploitation and use of natural gas, which has increased by leaps and bounds. One of the vital needs of today is an ample reserve of oil: not only has petroleum assumed an ever-growing importance as a source of energy, but together with coal it is one of the two basic natural raw materials from which the new synthetic materials are derived. The advent of synthetic materials, which have been developed at such a very rapid rate in the last two or three decades, may indeed herald the beginning of a new industrial revolution. The many different existing types may be roughly divided into plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibres, dye-stuffs, and detergents. The use of plastics in many forms is daily growing wider. The level of production by the United States of synthetic rubber is a question of outstanding importance, not only to the actual natural rubber producers, but also, owing to the dollar position, to the sterling area as a whole. The striking expansion in the output of artificial fibres, such as rayon, nylon, Orlon, and Terylene, is now a major factor in the textile industries, and the implications in the growing use of detergents was emphasized by

Sir Geoffrey Heyworth in his recent speech before the Annua Meeting of Unilever.[1] He pointed out their influence, not only o the world market for oils and fats, but also on the world supply o glycerine, a by-product of soap-making.

TRENDS IN POST-WAR PRODUCTION

Raw material production responded to war-time demand anc increased rapidly, in some cases phenomenally, reaching a peal some time during the earlier war years—the peak year for metals for instance, was 1943. Thereafter, world production fell slightly until it began to drop sharply at the end of the war, reaching a low point in 1946 when output had generally sunk to between one-half and three-quarters of the pre-war level. After that production once more recovered, increasing steeply in 1951. But even so, in that year only nine commodities (i.e. petroleum, iron ore, manganese, chrome, antimony, pyrites, sulphur, and both synthetic and natural rubber) recorded a larger output than the peak reached during the war. Since the war, as indeed in any other period the volume of production tended to be influenced by commodity prices, which in turn were determined by demand rather than supply. This generalization did not, of course, apply to all commodities individually, but broadly speaking it held true to a surprising degree. It meant that the United States, the major consumer, played a determining role in raw material production. Moreover, the fluctuations in commercial demand tended to be reinforced by the U.S. Government's stockpiling programme.

In September 1946 commodity prices began to rise. During 1949 a sharp drop in prices occurred which was followed by a slow upward movement. Then came the invasion of Korea and the scramble for commodities, and prices reached a fantastic peak, generally in the first quarter of 1951. The inevitable reaction followed, a protracted decline in prices, but at that time not on the whole a sharp one. Metals and minerals were the most directly influenced by these swings in commodity prices (their output could be controlled fairly easily); agricultural raw materials were not affected to the same extent and generally reached their peak production in 1949 or 1950. Synthetic materials recorded their highest output in 1950 or 1951; synthetic rubber was an exception, with an output controlled by the U.S. Government and governed by political considerations.

[1] *The Times*, 11 June 1953.

Apart from price movements, there were other important factors influencing the output of raw materials, particularly during the immediate post-war years: the setback in 1945–6 was a natural reaction to the war effort when normal maintenance and development had to be neglected. It was a time when raw material requirements were temporarily reduced because industry had to be converted from a war-time to a peace-time footing. 'Slump psychology' played an important part, but almost equally significant were the rising costs due to inflation and the lack of the capital equipment which was needed, above all, for the provision of adequate transport facilities in continents such as Africa or Australia.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

The location of raw material sources has been of special signicance since the war, not only for strategic reasons, but also because of the 'dollar gap'. The absence of convertibility and the consequent division of the world into separate currency areas has meant that the soft currency countries have tried to become more self-sufficient and that a distinction between 'dollar' and 'sterling' commodities has assumed special significance. The dollar area, including Canada, is a net exporter of aluminium, molybdenum nickel, copper (electrolytically refined), zinc, coal, crude sulphur, synthetic rubber, soft wood, cotton, woodpulp, and petroleum. The 'sterling commodities' are tin, rubber, jute, wool, rayon, hard hemp, manganese, and chrome. Of these, the United States is already a large importer of tin, rubber, wool, and jute manufactures, but not of raw jute. The currency situation has other facets. For instance, refining capacity, especially in the sterling area, has at times restricted the supply of raw materials available for industries in the sterling countries. In this connection mention must be made of the efforts of recent years to increase the refining capacity in proximity to the mining areas. A good example is the erection of the new electrolytic refineries in the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia. But oil refineries, for instance, have lately tended to move in the opposite direction, from the producing to the consuming area, an illustration of the important effect of unsettled political conditions and of strategic and currency considerations. The enormous increase in the production of oil in the Middle East is so well known as to need no special comment.

The Information Paper contains an interesting table which

shows estimates of the proportional distribution of the principal raw materials in 1950 by area of production. The area groupings used include not only the sterling and dollar areas, and the Commonwealth, but also the N.A.T.O. countries, the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet bloc. Although the available information is known to be scanty, a few broad conclusions may be drawn from the point of view of strategy. It is clear that the Communist bloc possesses a smaller share of the world's raw materials than the 'free world'. The principal commodities of which the Communist countries are known to have a preponderance are flax, true hemp, and possibly silk, none of them strategic materials. However, the availability of a given material must be related to civilian consumption so as to get an idea of prospective war supplies.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Temporary maladjustments in raw material supplies and the consequent instability of commodity prices can seriously hinder investment in primary production, quite apart from their other ill effects. This problem is, of course, not new, and in fact various attempts to exercise some sort of international control were made as long ago as the time of the Great Depression. Two well-known examples were the pre-war rubber and tin restriction schemes. The first real step towards international co-operation, however, came after the war. International study groups were established under the United Nations for rubber, tin, and wool, and the International Cotton Advisory Committee was formed. When the study groups were negotiated, account was taken of the unratified draft charter of the International Trade Organization (the Havana Charter), which specified that all countries substantially interested should be represented in any given commodity control scheme and that the nations which are mainly importers of the commodity should together have equal voting power with the countries which are mainly exporters. Yet post-war experiments in international co-operation for the stabilization of commodity markets have by and large proved a failure. The international study groups have up to the present proved ineffective in so far as suggested measures to deal with prospective surpluses or shortages have never actually been adopted for lack of agreement between producers and consumers. The F.A.O. had two failures with the abortive 'buffer stock' scheme immediately after the war, and the 1949 proposal to set up an International Commodity Clearing

House. Another failure was the international scheme for tin which was attempted both in 1949 and 1950.

The International Wheat Agreement was virtually the only commodity scheme to become effective after the war. It amounted to a four-year multilateral contract. But even here disagreements in negotiating its prolongation after July 1953 have culminated in its probable future implementation without the participation of Great Britain, the largest single consumer. Though regional co-operation as such was not the subject of the Information Paper, mention is made of the Commonwealth wool disposal scheme as a successful venture. This was controlled entirely by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, although other countries were represented on the consultative committee. The scheme allowed accumulated war-time stocks to be liquidated within five years. This task, however, was greatly facilitated by 'an almost insatiable world demand for wool'.

The shortage of raw materials caused by the rearmament drive was needed to stir the 'free world' into initiating a vital experiment in international co-operation, the International Materials Conference. Under the I.M.C., which was launched in Washington in January 1951, a central group and a number of commodity committees were set up to consider raw materials in short supply. International allocation schemes were introduced which were, in fact, modelled on the procedure evolved by the Coal Division of the Economic Commission for Europe which had allocated European coal since 1946. It is worth noting that the success of I.M.C. depended on the willingness of countries to co-operate as there was no formal authority, no written constitution, but in general only a reliance on the working of normal export and import control. Twenty-eight countries joined the I.M.C. and there were seven commodity committees: for copper, lead, and zinc; sulphur; cotton and cotton linters; wool; pulp and paper; tungsten and molybdenum; manganese, nickel, and cobalt. Only the two last-named committees remain in existence: with the disappearance of acute shortage, three were wound up in September 1952 and another two in March 1953; only nickel and molybdenum are still being allocated.

SCARCITY OR PLENTY?

The Information Paper makes the point that production of raw materials in 1950 was only some 10 per cent larger than in the five

years immediately preceding the war, whereas manufacturing had increased by about 40 per cent. Although the period selected was not altogether normal, the figures remain suggestive. Is there, the Paper asks, a likelihood that world manufacturing may in the long run outstrip the supply of raw materials? It is pointed out that history cannot supply an answer because large-scale industrialization dates back only some 150 years. In the nineteenth century the discovery of the steam-engine not only helped the development of manufacturing but it also opened up new continents, making available new resources. In the present century, industrial expansion is based not only on technological advance but also on the advantages of large-scale production and on improvements in organization and management. What is more, there has been no innovation comparable with the steam-engine to provide new cheap transport facilities for the under-developed countries, although this may still come when atomic energy is harnessed for industrial use.

Industrialization is moving apace in many under-developed countries, as for instance in Latin America. The United States is expected to continue expanding at the compound rate of 3 per cent per annum. This would mean, according to an estimate presented by the United States President's Materials Policy Commission (the Paley Report)[1], which was concerned with materials supplies for the long-term economic expansion of the United States, that by 1975 the United States would be using 60 per cent more raw materials than in 1950. But that country is already the world's largest consumer of practically all raw materials—a pre-war trend which was translated into fact after the war when Great Britain was overtaken as the largest consumer of one commodity after another. Broadly speaking, the United States already consumes as much as one-third or one-half of any particular raw material. It is true that only 11 per cent of the United States' land surface has so far been adequately surveyed, so that unsuspected mineral reserves may well be concealed in the thin mantle of young rock which covers half the country. But on the other hand some of her mineral deposits, for instance the high-grade iron ore of the Mesabi Range, are nearing exhaustion and the probability is that any further increase in American demand for basic material will largely have to be met by a greater dependence on imports. If world production expands sufficiently to meet the additional

[1] Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.

lemand, this trend might provide a long-term solution to the dol-ar problem. But the industrial capacity in other countries is also xpanding, sometimes at an even higher annual rate than that of the Jnited States.

There is one post-war trend which may tend to reduce the future lemand for raw materials at any given stage of industrial activity. t is the fact that, prompted by the threatened raw materials short-ge of 1950–1, industry has learnt to economize in the use of carce materials. What is more important, manufacturers are dopting the more economic methods as part of their normal pro-luction process. There have been roughly three lines of attack: he use of substitute materials; the saving of scrap and swarf; astly, but more fundamental, a statistical approach to stock con-rol. The latter involves the cutting-out of waste through the daptation of standard specifications and by adjusting blue-prints o that a maximum number of items could be obtained from a iven sheet of metal. The Information Paper points out the con-iderable scope that exists in this field and the profound effect conomy in the use of materials may have in the future. It may reate serious problems for primary producers in the immediate uture, if the world returns to a more peaceful setting. But it does iot necessarily mean that the world demand for raw materials vould decline if the rate of expansion in industrial output is ufficiently high. In any case, future world-wide expansion in eace-time requirements for consumer goods would have to be nticipated by large-scale investment in primary production.

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

In agricultural production there has been an endeavour in recent ears to obtain a larger output from a given area of cultivated land y means of improved methods. Cotton production, for example, as been increased in East Africa, Nigeria, India, and Pakistan. But serious efforts to develop natural resources took place only fter the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in July 1950 and were oncentrated on the production of strategic material. The pre-onderant part was naturally played by American capital. nside the United States, newly discovered deposits of copper, ead, zinc, and tungsten are now being worked in Alaska, new leposits of manganese in Arkansas, of tungsten in Oregon, and a iew large elemental sulphur dome was discovered in Louisiana at a ime when concern was felt over the exhaustion of known sulphur

reserves. The production from known deposits of minerals such as uranium, zinc, magnesium, and petroleum was also intensified. Foreign investment of American capital is still relatively small, except in Canada and, in the case of oil development, also in Venezuela and the Middle East.

In the Commonwealth the lead has been taken by Canada with her wealth of untapped resources and with the American market so near at hand. That country is now believed to be virtually 'floating on a sea of oil' and before long it might well become one of the most important petroleum producers of the world. Vast new iron ore deposits have been discovered and are being exploited in Labrador and Quebec. Aluminium production is being expanded and the output of bauxite in British Guiana and Jamaica is being increased to meet the larger Canadian requirements. Canadian nickel production is also being further developed and mines are replacing the surface deposits. There are other Canadian projects, not mentioned in the Information Paper, such as the development of natural gas in the prairies and uranium in the north.

Other parts of the Commonwealth also have large untapped resources of most raw materials; exceptions are nickel, natural sulphur, and molybdenum. Their development is proceeding, though not at such a rapid rate as in the United States and Canada. Copper and cobalt are being developed in Northern Rhodesia and Uganda. Large-scale zinc and lead mining is to be started in Nigeria and the production of these two metals is to be increased in Australia. Aluminium is to be produced in the Gold Coast from indigenous bauxite. Manganese production is expected to increase in India and South Africa; tungsten in Britain, Nigeria, and Uganda; beryllium in India; iron ore in Sierra Leone and Malaya; chrome in Southern Rhodesia; pyrites for sulphur in Cyprus; and uranium in South Africa. Outside the Commonwealth output is also increasing. To take some examples, iron ore is being developed in French Guinea and elsewhere, manganese in the Belgian Congo and Brazil, nickel in Cuba and New Caledonia.

It is almost impossible to assess precisely the ultimate importance of all these new schemes. Some will doubtless have a considerable effect on future raw materials supplies but many of them were started for reasons of strategy and costs may therefore prove too high for some of them to be maintained in competitive conditions. This is perhaps more particularly true of the United States itself, where most of the high-grade materials have already been

won. If, however, the world's population continues to grow at the present rate and if the standard of living in the backward areas is to be raised, the 'new Malthus ghost' discussed in the Information Paper might one day be found to have substance. But adequate expansion of the international schemes for financing long-term developments, and the stabilization of commodity markets through effective international co-operation, would go a long way towards averting any such danger.

M. G.

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Notes of the Month

Beria: Leader or Traitor?

ON Friday, 10 July, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet announced the removal of Lavrenti P. Beria from his posts as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs. He was accused of 'criminal anti-Party and anti-State actions' in a bid to 'subvert the Soviet State in the interest of foreign capital'. To these stereotyped and familiar accusations was added the charge that he had attempted to 'place the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union'.

It was Beria who, in 1938, took over the Ministry of Internal Affairs from N. I. Yezhov, who in his turn had taken over from G. G. Yagoda. Both of the latter had been the technical organizers of the Moscow Trials of 1936–8, in the last of which Yagoda himself ultimately figured as one of the accused. Yezhov simply vanished into oblivion without trial. Thus for some fourteen years Beria remained Stalin's right-hand man in control of the secret police. It is true that in 1946, with the formation of two security ministries, he was nominally no longer in control of these bodies, but it appears highly probable that he in fact retained supervisory power, or was in control of another, even more secret, parallel organ. Up to the moment of Stalin's death, therefore, Beria's position in the Soviet governmental apparatus remained secure. There is no reason to question the sincerity of the *Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopedia* in describing him as 'one of the most outstanding leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet State, loyal pupil and comrade-in-arms of I. V. Stalin'. He had been a member of the Political Bureau, a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, and a Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Born in 1899 in the village of Merkeuli, near Sukhum in the

Caucasus, he joined the Bolsheviks in March 1917. He first entered the Cheka in 1921. From 1921 to 1931 he was in charge of the entire network in the Caucasus. In 1931 he was appointed Secretary-General of the Georgian Communist Party; in 1932 he became Secretary-General of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee. The work of the Party in these areas, hitherto found unsatisfactory, 'soon improved under his leadership'. At the 17th Party Congress in 1934 he was elevated to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. During the war he became a member of the Committee of State Defence; in August 1943 he was appointed a member of the Committee for the Economic Rehabilitation of the Liberated Areas in the U.S.S.R., and in September of that year he was entrusted with special work in connection with armaments. In June 1945 he received the title of Marshal of the U.S.S.R. 'For outstanding services to the Party and the Soviet people' he was awarded in all five Lenin Orders, the Order of Suvorov First Class, two orders of the Red Banner, and seven medals of the Soviet Union.

This, then, is the man now accused of attempting to overthrow the Soviet State and restore capitalism in the interests of international imperialism. The absurdity of the charge does not require demonstrating, and it is clear that behind it lies something of a more credible nature.

The signs since Stalin's death have indicated, as was pointed out in the May issue of *The World Today*,[1] that the new Soviet Government is now endeavouring to break away from the Stalin era of one-man dictatorship and substitute for it a 'collective leadership'. The dismissal and disgrace of Beria must be regarded as a further, and major, move to this end. It is now apparent that the so-called Doctors' Plot was not, as was suggested in some quarters, directed against Beria; but its denunciation as a frame-up, on the other hand, was directed against him. This is not the first time that the political police have been accused of extorting false confessions. Such accusations were made in August and September 1938, and they signalled the end of the Great Purge. Then the police agents involved were minor figures in provincial areas; now they are from the top ranks of the hierarchy, and it is possible that Beria himself may be indicted on this score. Moreover, it is not now a question of ending a purge whose purpose was to consolidate finally the overriding personal power of one man,

[1] pp. 185–8

but of preventing such a purge from taking place. Whatever secondary considerations may have contributed to Beria's downfall, the primary one was the fear of the Soviet bureaucracy that the secret police might be used, as in the past, to ensure the supremacy of one particular man. The key to Beria's downfall thus lies, not in the absurd charges about 'restoring capitalism' and so forth, but in the charge that he tried to place his Ministry above the Party and the Government. Because this is precisely what, under Stalin, was actually accomplished.

Even if Beria had not really fabricated the Doctors' Plot as part of a bid for absolute power, either for himself or for someone else, it is clear that he was regarded as at least potentially dangerous from this point of view. His reference to Malenkov, at Stalin's funeral on the Red Square on 9 March, as the 'talented pupil of Lenin and the loyal colleague of Stalin' could not have been made without the most careful reflection. Certainly Malenkov's position during Stalin's lifetime made him the most likely heir apparent. Fear of a Malenkov-Beria combination, supported by the military personnel referred to as the prospective victims of the Doctor's Plot, is as reasonable an explanation of Beria's disgrace as any so far advanced. The fact that Malenkov was not permitted to step into Stalin's shoes as Secretary-General of the Party strengthens this view. It is also worth noting that on the platform of the Stalin memorial meeting Molotov stood at the very centre, with Bulganin and Voroshilov on either side in military uniform. Order of precedence is never left to chance in the Soviet Union. Such matters take on a vital importance in a country where no political leader can depend on popular mass support and the 'hero' of yesterday can be branded traitor overnight without a word of protest from a single one of the millions who, according to the Soviet legend, formerly acclaimed him.

There is no evidence to indicate that Beria's downfall marks a reversal of the general trend of policy apparent since Stalin's death. On the contrary, it represents a victory for 'collective leadership', for those who are determined to prevent the emergence of a new dictator *à la* Stalin, and who seek a relaxation of tensions at home and abroad in order to extricate themselves from the dead-end into which Stalin's policy has led them. It would, however, be an error to see in all that has happened since Stalin's death a fundamental change in the Soviet system or in Soviet aims. We may well be witnessing the first stirrings of such a change, but it is hard

to believe that any of the present leaders will bring it about, or that it will not be a process of long duration.

The Present Government in North Korea

In view of the prospect of a truce in Korea, the nature of the Government in the North becomes of some interest. It was based on the local 'people's committees' which set themselves up both north and south of the 38th parallel in the three or four weeks after the Japanese surrender. These committees were not elected, but their authority rested on public consent; in some cases they were composed of the obvious local leaders, school-teachers, priests, and the like, and in others of political prisoners, including Communists who were released at the end of the war and immediately resumed political activity; their formation was encouraged by the Japanese to maintain order. In the North, they were used by the Russians, although the more moderate ones were apparently eliminated and it was those committees whose views agreed with Russian views which survived, reinforced by Korean Communists from Russia and China. By these means the Russians were able discreetly to keep a close control on the administration without establishing a direct military government, inevitably unpopular, as was done in the South.

In February 1946, some six months after the Japanese surrender, representatives of these people's committees in North Korea met and elected an 'Interim People's Committee' led by Kim Il-sung, a Communist of whose past little is certainly known, which acted as the temporary central government. During the summer the Korean National Democratic Front, which included the Labour (formerly Communist) Party, the Democratic Party, the Chondo Kyo Friends Party, and four social organizations representing workers, farmers, young men, and young women, was established; when the first elections to the provincial, municipal, and county people's committees were held in November 1946, 97 per cent of the votes cast were recorded as being in favour of this Front. There followed elections for the people's committees on the village level in early 1947, and, according to Kim Il-sung, 70,217 committee members in all were elected at the various levels, including 'those representing peasants, workers, clerks, intelligentsias, business men, industrialists, religionists, and all walks of life and strata'.

These committees selected a proportion of their number to

represent them at a congress of people's committees held in Pyongyang in February 1947. The congress, half the delegates to which were Labour Party members, approved all the legislation enacted by the Interim Committee, adopted a national economic plan put forward by Kim Il-sung, and elected a People's Assembly of 237 members. The Assembly met at once and elected a Presidium of eleven members—with the chairman of the Labour Party, Kim Du-bong, as chairman—and a supreme court, and approved the composition of the new People's Committee of North Korea, which was composed of a chairman, Kim Il-sung, two vice-chairmen, a secretary, fourteen department heads (the equivalent of ministers), and four bureau chiefs; sixteen of these twenty-two men were Labour Party members. There was no doubt that the Labour Party was in complete control of the National Democratic Front and, as Kim Il-sung said in May 1948, 'all the political and social organizations in Northern Korea are holding identical views and opinions regarding the political issues'.

In August 1948 the North Korean regime organized elections, it was claimed in South as well as in North Korea, for a Supreme People's Assembly for all Korea, with 212 seats for North Koreans and 360 seats for the much more numerous South Koreans. In North Korea the elections, held on 25 August, were by the normal Communist method of single list voting, while the South Korean delegates were elected from amongst themselves by the thousand or so representatives at a conference at Haeju in North Korea on 22–24 August who were said to have been chosen by the South Koreans for this purpose. The first session of this Supreme People's Assembly was held from 2–10 September 1948 with Kim Du-bong as chairman. It approved the Constitution of the Korean People's Democratic Republic which reaffirmed the principle of government at all levels by people's committees and established the Supreme People's Assembly as the highest legislative organ. It also approved a new Government, which consisted of a premier, Kim Il-sung, who is also Supreme Commander, three vice-premiers, and twelve ministers of whom eight were said to represent South Korea. The great majority of the ministers were members of the Labour Party.

The People's Democratic Republic of Korea was recognized by the U.S.S.R. in October 1948 and the last Russian troops were withdrawn in December 1948. Since its formal establishment the structure of the administration appears to have remained largely

unchanged in spite of the upheavals caused by the war, though decrees of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly have authorized occasional minor reorganizations, such as the addition of a Ministry of Light Industry in December 1951, and the merging of the Ministry of Public Security with the Ministry of the Interior in March 1953.

Constitutional Reform in the Gold Coast

THE Gold Coast Government, led by the Prime Minister, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, on 10 July initiated a new phase in the development of British Colonial policy by announcing its intention of making a definite claim for independence within the British Commonwealth. This is an event which should be of prime interest to Great Britain, to the peoples of Africa, and to all nations associated with that Continent.

The present Constitution of the Gold Coast, introduced by Order-in-Council in January 1951, provides for a unicameral legislature of eighty-four members, a majority of whom are elected by adult suffrage, and an Executive Council or Cabinet comprising eight representative Ministers and three ex-officio Ministers presided over by the Governor, who has certain prescribed powers regarding the appointment or removal of Ministers and the assignment of Ministers' portfolios. The control of the Public Service is vested in the Governor, acting in his discretion, and in this he is advised by an independent Public Service Commission. The important portfolios of defence and external affairs, justice, and finance are at present held by ex-officio Ministers, who are members of the Colonial Service.

The present Secretary of State for the Colonies visited the Gold Coast in 1952 and then discussed with Dr Nkrumah and other representative Ministers their desire for self-government within the Commonwealth. It was agreed that when proposals had been formulated by the Gold Coast Government, after consulting the Chiefs and people, they would be examined and discussed between her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Gold Coast.

In October 1952 the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast made a statement in the House of Assembly inviting the Regional Councils, the Chiefs, and all political parties or groups to submit their views on specific questions regarding the form of constitution which they desired. Copies of this statement were distributed throughout the country, and subsequently written views were sub-

mitted by 131 councils, political parties, and other groups. Consultations and meetings followed between the Prime Minister and both the Regional Councils, also with the opposition parties, and there can be no doubt that articulate opinion throughout the country was thoroughly sounded.

Last month, just two weeks before the Assembly met, the Gold Coast Government's White Paper appeared. It is a concise document which in twelve pages explains the measures taken to consult the people, summarizes the views expressed without neglecting those in opposition, and finally details the Government's proposals for attaining the avowed goal of independence. Early in the Paper it is made clear that the proposals would only take their final form for communication to the British Government *after* the Assembly debate. It is emphasized that they are to provide for the limited transitional period necessary to make the requisite constitutional and administrative arrangements for independence. The British Government is to be asked 'to make a declaration regarding the grant of independent status within the Commonwealth, and, without prejudice to that question and as a matter of urgency, to consider the amendment of the present Order-in-Council'. No time limits are mentioned.

The most vital amendments suggested to the present Constitution are, first, the abolition of the ex-officio Ministers, leaving a Cabinet entirely composed of representative (i.e. African) Ministers; next in importance is the proposal for a single chamber legislature composed entirely of elected members, apparently made contrary to the majority of written representations. Only scant mention is made of the position of Special Members (Commercial and Mining) who have made a valuable contribution to the debates of the present Assembly.

The early removal of the ex-officio Ministers necessitates the re-allocation of the subjects for which the Minister of Defence and External Affairs has been responsible. Those which concern relations with other countries and with the United Nations, and all matters regarding defence and internal security, are to become the direct responsibility of the Governor, assisted both by an Advisory Committee of three Ministers and by a Deputy Governor. The Governor's Reserved Powers are to remain and he will continue to be responsible for the ultimate control of the Public Service until full self-government is achieved.

Reference is made *inter alia* to amendment of the Trusteeship

Agreement for Togoland, to Cabinet procedure and the allocation of portfolios, to the independence of the Judiciary, to safeguards for the Public Service, and to the settlement of local constitutional affairs concerning Chiefs. The document concludes with a statement that the British Government will be asked to transfer Gold Coast affairs from the Colonial Office to the Commonwealth Relations Office following the precedent of Southern Rhodesia.

There are frequent references throughout the Paper to the requests and reservations of the Northern Territories Council, and it is apparent that considerable effort has been made to prevent any deep divergence between Northern and Southern aims and interests, which sometimes differ considerably.

The Prime Minister's motion, which was in two parts, appears to have followed the White Paper's proposals in calling on Parliament to introduce an Act of Independence 'when the time comes', and in asking for an urgent amendment of the 1951 Constitution. It was seconded by Mr Braimah, the only Cabinet Minister from the Northern Territories, who emphasized the need, recognized by the White Paper, for an interim period of responsible government short of complete independence, during which the Northern peoples could overcome their handicaps of illiteracy, a low level of education, and the lack of trained public servants. He issued a strong warning against prescribing a target date for full independence, probably directed against the Opposition's amending motion, and he welcomed the assurance contained in the White Paper that the Northern Territories would be represented in the new Assembly according to their population and 'adequately' in the new Cabinet.

The first condensed reports of the motion and the debate in the House of Assembly have evoked favourable comment in the British press, and it seems probable that the general impression of moderation and responsibility has been enhanced by the reassuring statement made on 8 July by Dr Nkrumah regarding the future of the Gold Coast Public Service, which recognized the continuing need for overseas officers. This was repeated in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. An early approach to the British Government may now be anticipated.

The Italian General Election and its Consequences

A PANORAMIC view of the new Parliament which assembled after Italy's General Election of 7 June 1953 would show considerable differences from the Chamber and Senate which sat in Montecitorio and Palazza Madama during the past five years. In the centre, the Christian Democrats, though still the largest party in either House, have shrunk perceptibly; so too have their smaller allies, the Social Democrats, the Liberals, and the Republicans. On the left, the Communists and Socialists have expanded and now occupy well over a third of each House, while on the right the Monarchists and neo-Fascist M.S.I., formerly quite small parties, have more than trebled their strength. The following table shows the situation of the parties in the Chamber and the Senate today as compared with the results of the previous election in 1948.

THE VOTING ANALYSED

It will be recalled that while voting for the Senate took place under the old method of proportional representation, that for the Chamber was governed by the new electoral law, passed by Parliament last winter and spring. Under that law any party or group of associated parties which won 50 per cent plus one of the total votes was to obtain a premium entitling the successful party or group to 65 per cent of the total seats in the Chamber. In the event, while the Centre parties obtained 50·2 per cent of the votes for the Senate, in the elections for the Chamber they failed by 57,000 votes to reach the required majority, receiving only 49·85 per cent of the total; and thus the premium did not come into operation.

This result came about through a loss of strength from the Centre to both Right and Left. This loss, as far as the Christian Democrats were concerned, was already foreshadowed in the local elections of 1951–2; and in fact the Christian Democrats regained a good deal of the support they then lost, obtaining this year over 40 per cent of the total votes, as against 36·3 per cent in 1951–2. Their allies, on the other hand, the Social Democrat, Republican, and Liberal parties, who in 1951–2 had actually improved on their 1948 percentages, suffered severe losses this year. The Republican Party, in particular, latterly the Christian Democrats' solitary ally in the Government, has now only five seats in the Chamber.

ITALIAN ELECTIONS 1953 and 1948[1]

CHAMBER

7 JUNE 1953

Parties	Votes	Seats	Per cent of Total
CENTRE PARTIES			
Christian Democrats	10,834,466	261	40·08
Social Democrats (PSDI)	1,222,957	19	4·52
Liberal Party (PLI)	815,929	14	3·14
Republican Party (PRI)	438,149	5	1·61
Sard Action Party	27,231	—	0·1
South Tyrol Christian Democrats	122,474	3	0·3
Val d'Aosta Christian Democrats	27,607	1	0·1
CENTRE TOTAL	13,488,813	303	49·85
LEFT			
Communist Party (PCI)	6,120,709	143	22·7
Socialist Party (PSI)	3,441,014	75	12·7
Unione, Socialisti Indipendenti (Cucchi-Magnani)	225,409	—	0·8
Unità popolare (Parri)	171,099	—	0·6
Alleanza Democratica Nazionale (Corbino)	120,685	—	0·4
RIGHT			
Monarchist Party (PNM)	1,854,850	40	6·85
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)	1,579,880	29	5·83
Others	85,142	—	0·27
OPPOSITION TOTAL	13,598,788	287	50·15
TOTAL SEATS		590	

18 APRIL 1948

Parties	Votes	Seats	Per cent of Total
CENTRE PARTIES			
Christian Democrats	12,712,762	305	48·5
Social Democrats (Unità Socialista)	1,858,346	33	7·1
Liberal Party (Blocco Nazionale)	1,004,889	19	3·8
Republican Party	652,477	9	2·5
Sard Action Party	64,201	1	0·3
South Tyrol Christian Democrats	122,781	3	0·5
CENTRE TOTAL	16,415,456	370	62·7
LEFT			
Democratic Popular Front (Communist and Socialist)	8,137,047	183 (131+52)	31·0
RIGHT			
Monarchist Party (PNM)	729,174	14	2·8
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)	526,670	6	2·1
Others	383,947	1	1·4
OPPOSITION TOTAL	9,776,838	204	37·3
TOTAL SEATS		574	

Parties	Votes	Seats	Per cent of Total
CENTRE PARTIES			
Christian Democrats	9,894,754	116	40·7
Social Democrats (PSDI)	988,778	4	4·1
Liberal Party (PLI)	720,698	3	3·0
Republican Party (PRI)	225,611	—	0·9
Others (S. Tyrol C.D.s, Sard Action Party, etc.)	366,317	2	1·5
CENTRE TOTAL	12,196,158	125	50·2
LEFT			
Communist Party (PCI)	5,080,143	54	20·9
Socialist Party (PSI)	2,929,906	28	12·1
Socialist-Communist joint lists	418,940	4	1·7
Alleanza democratica nazionale	197,482	1	0·8
Unità popolare	230,370	—	1·0
RIGHT			
Monarchist Party (PNM)	1,734,275	16	7·1
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)	1,482,101	9	6·1
Others (right-wing independents)	30,171	—	0·1
OPPOSITION TOTAL	12,103,388	112	49·8
TOTAL SEATS		237	

1948

Parties	Votes	Total Seats	Seats Elected	Seats By Right[2]	Per cent of Total
CENTRE PARTIES					
Christian Democrats	10,740,131	149	131	18	48·1
Social Democrats (Unità socialista)	1,580,722	22	10	12	6·2
Liberal Party (Blocco nazionale)	1,364,741	31	9	22	5·4
Republican Party	637,433	10	5	5	2·6
S Tyrol C D s / Trentino independents	278,351	3	3	—	1·6
Sard Action Party	65,242	1	1	—	0·2
CENTRE TOTAL	14,666,620	216	159	57	64·1
LEFT					
Democratic Popular Front (Com. & Soc.)	6,955,229	117	72	45	30·8
RIGHT					
Monarchist Party (PNM)	436,597	6	3	3	2·0
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)	244,646	1	1	—	1·6
Others		4	2	2	1·5
OPPOSITION TOTAL	7,636,472	128	78	50	35·9
TOTAL SEATS		344	237	107	

[1] Taken from *Relazioni Internationazionali*, 20 June 1953.
[2] The appointment of Senators 'by right' on a basis of pre-Fascist parliamentary service or anti-Fascist record, operated in the 1948 Parliament. Its continuance in the new Parliament has not yet been decided on.

The rise of the Right—the Monarchists and the neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (M.S.I.)—had been the most striking feature of the 1952 local elections in Southern Italy; but it was then discounted to some extent in relation to the country as a whole, in view of the traditional strength of monarchist opinion in that region. Now, however, though its main stronghold is still in the South, the Monarchist Party has increased its strength throughout the whole country, at the expense of the Christian Democrats and Liberals. The M.S.I. vote, on the other hand, shows a slight decline, especially in the South, since 1951–2. The party then presented related lists with the Monarchists, whereas this year it stood separately. In the meantime the constitutional provision which forbade former prominent Fascists from voting or standing for election had lapsed, and it seems likely that some of these former Fascists, now voting for the first time since the war, gave their vote to the Monarchists rather than to the more extreme and controversial M.S.I. Some former well-known Fascists in fact stood and were elected as Monarchists in Southern constituencies. The M.S.I., moreover, is known to be sharply divided within itself. Its mainly northern faction traces its origin direct to the Salò Republic of 1943–5 and adheres rigidly to the republican and social policy laid down in the Verona fourteen-point programme of Mussolini's latter days; it thus has little in common with the type of neo-Fascist opinion which last year found it possible to stand jointly with the Monarchists in the South.

Before the recent election there had been a widespread idea that the advance of the Left was being held in check. The 1951–2 local elections showed some increase in the total votes for the Left parties over their 1948 strength, but this was discounted by Christian Democrat gains in many of the northern communes. This year, however, the Communists and Socialists added over 1,400,000 votes to their 1948 poll, increasing it by 4·4 per cent. The Left-wing vote seems to have moved further to the left, the Communists making some gains from the Socialists, while the Socialists won votes from the Social Democrats and Republicans. The Communists and Socialists stood together in 1948 and 1951–2, whereas this year they presented separate lists, and this probably enabled the Socialist partner to attract some of the less extreme votes. Nevertheless, while the Communist vote shows a steady increase, amounting to 1¾ million more votes than in 1946 when they last stood alone, the Socialist vote has declined slightly, from

13·1 per cent of the total in 1951–2, to 12·7 per cent today.

The three main splinter groups which had detached themselves from the larger parties since 1948 must all be reckoned as in Left-wing opposition to the Centre. Of these, the most long-standing is the Unione Socialisti Indipendenti group of Signori Cucchi and Magnani, who left the Communist Party early in 1951. The other two groups are of much more recent growth, having arisen as a direct result of opposition to the electoral law. They are the Unità Popolare party consisting of former Left-wing Social Democrats and Republicans headed by Senator Parri; and the Alleanza Democratica Nazionale, whose leader is the former Liberal Finance Minister Epicarmo Corbino. None of these parties polled sufficient votes to give them a seat in the Chamber, and only one, the A.D.N., obtained a single seat in the Senate; and in consequence Parliament loses some well-known and dynamic figures. But their effectiveness in acting as 'disturbatori' and detracting votes from the Centre, notably from the small lay parties, may be seen from the fact that any single one of them polled far more than the 57,000 votes by which the Centre failed to obtain a majority.

THE REASONS

The 1953 election took place in very different circumstances from that of April 1948, when the memory of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia was fresh in men's minds. The election of 1948, the first to be held under the new Constitution, was fought largely on issues of foreign policy and, first and foremost, on the major question of whether or not Italy was to remain within the Western orbit (thus qualifying for Marshall aid) and to stand firm against Communism. Looking back, if one can point to one other particular factor which at that time played a crucial part in the election, it was the tripartite declaration of the three Western Powers advocating the return of Trieste to Italy. The tremendous majority which the Christian Democrats then obtained was an expression of the country's need for a bulwark against Communism and of its belief in a Western orientation. Now, five years after, both external and internal conditions contributed to focus interest on domestic rather than foreign issues. The danger from without seemed less pressing, and left room for a critical appraisal of the Government's achievements and shortcomings during its term of office.

That is not to say that external considerations played no part. Indeed, two factors in the foreign sphere undoubtedly exercised

a considerable influence on the results. Of these, one was of a long-term character and might be summed up as a weariness of American omnipotence. In the five years since 1948 Italy had received tremendous benefits from American aid which through E.R.P., M.S.A., and the use of counterpart funds had contributed to post-war reconstruction, to the revival and re-equipment of industry, and to the undertaking of an ambitious long-term scheme for the development of the South. But this close association with the United States had also brought with it obligations in the form of Italian commitments under N.A.T.O. Left-wing propaganda could criticize the extent of State expenditure on rearmament, while the Right, though paying lip-service to the Atlantic alliance, was not slow to suggest that Italy was getting the worst of the bargain and was becoming much too subservient to the U.S.A. On economic grounds, too, the association with America provided some loopholes for criticism: American aid to industry was said to favour the big firms at the expense of the small; Italy's share of offshore orders should, it was said, have been greater, and these too were unfairly distributed; American tariff restrictions hampered Italy's export trade; and so on. In fact, the undoubted benefits of the alliance tended, after five years of obligatory gratitude, to be glossed over in irritation at its disadvantages and at the subservience it entailed—a situation which the U.S. Ambassador's speech of 28 May, mentioning the 'grave consequences' to Italo-American co-operation which might result should the Italians fall victim to 'totalitarians of Right or Left', merely served to emphasize. And for this disillusionment the Government, the channel through which American benefits flowed—'America's lackeys' to the sceptics—,bore the blame.

The other influential factor in the foreign sphere was provided by the hopes of an international détente emanating from Moscow. Italians, by nature a people strongly averse from war, began to argue that if a change in Russian intentions had really come about, then there was no need for all this intensive rearmament, for the too-close association with the U.S.A. and the other Western Powers, for the ratification of the E.D.C. treaty for which the Government was pressing so strongly. The Left politicians were quick to make the most of this mood; and at that point Sir Winston Churchill's speech of 11 May, with its proposal of a second Locarno, in effect played into their hands.

In contrast with 1948, the question of Trieste was not an out-

standing issue in this election. But the mere fact that this problem, five years after, was still to all intents and purposes no nearer solution undoubtedly counted against the Government, who were accused of failure to assert Italy's claims more effectively.

Finally, in considering outside influences one cannot wholly leave out of count the effect of the Coronation in Britain, which took place just five days before the election itself, and which chanced to fall on the very day—2 June—on which the foundation of the Italian Republic is annually celebrated.[1] An emotional consideration of this kind might appear almost frivolous, but one has to remember that the panoply and ceremonial attaching to monarchy, as well as its personal aspect, have always made a strong appeal to large sections of the Italian populace—an appeal for which the more arid and impersonal attributes of a Republic provide little substitute. Thus it so happened that, at a most inopportune moment for the Centre parties which were so closely associated with the Republic in the popular mind, Italians' imaginations were caught by the flood of Coronation news and photographs appearing in their illustrated papers, reminding them of ceremonies from which they now feel excluded, and of a State institution which seems to many of them to represent a stability and a rallying point beyond the reach of party strife.

To turn to the more immediate domestic issues which formed the main points of controversy in this election. Perhaps one of the most cogent of these was the simple fact that the predominantly Christian Democrat coalition had been in power for five years, and had thus become the scapegoat for all the disillusionments associated with a regime grown too familiar. It is often said that Italians are more ready to vote against something than for it, and this innately critical attitude certainly came into play on 7 June. Among the more specific reproaches against the Government were its slowness in initiating social reforms and in implementing the legislation required by the Constitution; its swollen bureaucracy; its alleged tendency to plant Government supporters in all the best jobs; its too strongly marked clerical associations; the repressive methods of Signor Scelba's police; and the general feeling that the Government was becoming too high-handed, too 'prepotente'. Even the administration's most outstanding effort a tsocial reform,

[1] By a referendum on 2 June 1946, Italy voted by a majority of two million votes in favour of a Republic. Ardent Monarchists at the time contested the validity of this vote, which is still sometimes questioned in Monarchist circles.

its policy of land reform and Southern development, did not escape criticism, for its application had proved highly controversial.

But probably the most important single factor in alienating opinion from the Centre was the new electoral law. This law, framed last year when the Government's position seemed a good deal more secure, was designed, as Signor De Gasperi repeatedly explained throughout the winter, not to alter the actual results of the voting, but merely to consolidate the position of any party or group of parties which might obtain over half the total votes, and by the award of a premium of seats to provide it with a stable working majority. The reason behind this measure was largely to be sought in past experience of the Left Opposition's obstructive tactics, which at intervals throughout the recent Parliament's life had delayed and threatened to hold up entirely the conduct of normal business. The most recent example of these tactics was to be seen in the obstruction of the electoral law itself, which took five months to get through Parliament and only passed the Senate after three weeks' discussion culminating in a 77-hour debate so stormy that the Senate subsequently had to be dissolved.[1]

In putting forward this proposal for a premium which should bring the seats of the winning party or group up to 65 per cent of the total, the Government was not in fact asking for much more than it already had, for the coalition parties then commanded 62·7 per cent of the total seats in the Chamber. But public opinion felt suspicious of the law: the Left was quick to christen it the 'legge truffa'—the swindle law—and in this country, where popular catchwords so often hit off a current situation, the name stuck irrespective of its validity. In vain Signor Gonella, the Christian Democrat Party secretary, explained the—admittedly complicated—technicalities of the law, assuring electors that it in no way resembled the ill-famed Acerbo law of Fascist days,[2] that it was open to any party—or none—to win the premium, that the system of related lists enabled the elector to vote for the party of his choice within an associated group, and also to indicate his preference for a particular candidate: the electorate remained unconvinced. To many this law, plainly, as they argued, designed to perpetuate

[1] Under the Constitution the normal term of office for the Senate is six years, for the Chamber five But the dissolution of the Senate on 31 March 1953 made necessary the election of a new Senate, as well as of the Chamber, last June

[2] The Acerbo law of 1923 was in fact much more extreme; besides differing in other ways, it gave an absolute majority (two-thirds of the total seats) to a party obtaining only 25 per cent of the votes.

Christian Democrat supremacy, seemed the last straw; and besides the two specific splinter groups under Parri and Corbino who withdrew their support because of it, it undoubtedly alienated many thousands of conscientious anonymous voters and helped to bring about the very situation which it was designed to avoid—that of a minority party compelled to form a Government without adequate Parliamentary support.

Another outcome of the law which was not anticipated by its framers was its effect on the smaller parties allied with Christian Democracy. It was intended, at least in theory, that the law should benefit the smaller parties, who it was thought would be given more votes under the wing of their much more powerful ally than if left to stand by themselves—this had in fact proved the case in the local elections of 1951–2 under the system of related lists. Signor De Gasperi, in particular, has always strongly favoured this alliance and on several occasions defended it against criticism from his own party. But whether owing to misunderstandings or to faulty propaganda on the part of Christian Democrat supporters (especially of the Right and of the Catholic Action trend), the electorate failed to grasp this nuance. There was a widespread feeling that a vote for one of the smaller lay parties would merely be swallowed up among the mass of Christian Democrat votes: thus a strong anti-clerical of Liberal or Social Democrat convictions would feel that his vote would be wasted on his own party, and might be tempted to vote Monarchist or Socialist instead, as the case might be. The result was a draining-away of strength from these small Centre parties, who, from being an appreciable support to the Christian Democrats in the earlier coalitions, now together account for only thirty-eight seats in the Chamber.

From this situation both Left and Right reaped the benefit The Left undoubtedly profited by the calculated mildness of its tactics, which were in tune with the policy of détente emanating from Moscow. In this atmosphere Signor Nenni's party, standing alone and putting forward its 'Socialist alternative', certainly offered attractions to Socialist-minded voters who, while weary of the perpetual dissensions within Signor Saragat's Social Democrat Party and deploring its failure to appeal in any large measure to the working classes, might yet have hesitated to vote for a Socialist Party still ostentatiously tied to the Communists. At the same time Christian Democrat propaganda in general seems to have displayed more leniency to the Monarchists than to the Left, and by leaving

that door slightly ajar probably lost a good many votes to Sign Lauro's party, which in its turn did not fail to stress its equal rig to be regarded as a Catholic Party.

Finally, a word must be said about Southern Italy, where t attack upon the Centre from both Left and Right can be seen acute form. This was the scene of the Government's most seric attempt to improve conditions in a hitherto neglected region, a they might therefore have been expected to win successes the but in fact it was here that the Centre suffered most severe Except for the Liberals, the smaller Centre parties had never h much following in the South, so their eclipse there is not so su prising. But in 1948 the Christian Democrats and Liberals h received considerable support from Southern Right-wing opini which saw in them, and in Christian Democracy in particular, t only grouping strong enough to resist the advance of Communis In the intervening years, however, the Christian Democrats, w their policy of land reform and of schemes for improving the livi conditions of the Southern peasant, had introduced measu which struck at the very basis of the Southern landowners' qua feudal position of privilege. Moreover the Partito Nazion Monarchico, backed by the millions of the Neapolitan shipowr Achille Lauro, now provided a channel whereby not only Mo archist but conservative opinion as a whole might make itself f with some reasonable hope of influencing the political balance forces.

On the other hand, the Left ever since the end of the war h discerned in the South a field which, from its very isolation a previous neglect, offered great opportunities for proselitizatic There could be no two opinions about the need for improvement the peasants' conditions there. Thus, by pointing to abuses a shortcomings which were only too apparent, by holding out swee ing promises of improvement, and by perpetual criticism of t Government's efforts, the Left succeeded in convincing conside able sections of an electorate only recently awakened to sor degree of political consciousness that a fundamental change cou only come about under Communist auspices. In fact Commun gains in the South since 1946 now total 1½ million votes.

From the Government's point of view the timing of the electio was particularly unfortunate as far as the South was concerne Long-term plans to counter centuries of neglect (the plans for t South introduced in 1950 cover twelve years' intensive inves

ment) cannot be expected to show clinching results after two or three years. Besides the land reform itself, the development schemes include the improvement of communications, irrigation, land reclamation, reafforestation, and the creation of new villages to relieve urban congestion. Moreover, the very fact that these experiments are being carried out in the South—a remote *terra incognita* to most non-Southern Italians—means that few outsiders are able to see for themselves and report on the progress made—which is in fact already most impressive to anyone at all familiar with the conditions of only three or four years ago. Thus it is easy for the critics in Rome and the North to maintain that vast sums are going into the coffers of the special Caisse for Southern Italy without producing any tangible result.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

Given the balance of party forces that emerged, it was obvious that the Christian Democrats would be the backbone of the new Government. Despite their reverses they are still easily the strongest party in the country, with the vote of 40 per cent of the electorate behind them. Moreover Signor De Gasperi's personal prestige and parliamentary acumen singled him out as the obvious leader for a Government in the new and difficult circumstances arising out of the election. He was faced with four possible choices: a single-party Christian Democrat Government; a renewal of the coalition with the now much reduced lay democratic parties; an alliance with the Monarchists; or an acceptance of the 'Socialist alternative'—the support of Signor Nenni's Socialists.

His earlier avowed unwillingness to contemplate a move either to Left or Right made it unlikely that a Government could be formed to include either the Socialists or the Monarchists under the leadership of Signor De Gasperi himself. And in fact in the course of conversations early in July between himself and the various party leaders it soon became apparent that there was insufficient common ground with either Signor Nenni or Signor Lauro to warrant an attempt to form a Government with the collaboration of either. Signor Nenni, in a cloud of verbiage from which, as one paper expressed it, little but 'a state of mind' emerged, yet made it apparent that that state of mind did not include a readiness to renounce definitely the long-standing 'Unity of Action' pact with the Communists, or to modify materially his anti-Atlantic Pact policy. The Monarchist leaders, while

even less specific, made it plain that they held in reserve thei intention to revive the whole question of the monarchy when the thought the moment suitable.

There remained only the small Centre parties as possible allie Here the strongest opposition came from the Social Democrat still the largest of the three parties. After an unsuccessful attemp to form a bridge between the Christian Democrats and the Social ists, Signor Saragat, the party leader, stated that the P.S.D.I could not join the Government 'in order not to compromise swing to the Left on the part of democracy'. Doubts and hesita tions were also felt among the Liberals and Republicans.

Thus the Government which Signor De Gasperi, heading a administration for the eighth time, presented to Parliament o 21 July is formed exclusively of Christian Democrats. Its members drawn from the party's various trends of the left, centre, and right include several members of the previous Government and seve newcomers. Some key posts remain unchanged: Signor D Gasperi himself is still Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister and the Treasury and Finance Ministers, Signori Pella and Vanoni also continue in office. Signor Fanfani, the former Minister o Agriculture, known as a progressive man of the party's left-win trend, replaces Signor Scelba at the Ministry of the Interior. Th criticism has been made that the Government's composition doe not sufficiently correspond to the general post-election demand fo 'new men and new methods'.

As to the 'new methods', Signor De Gasperi in his speech t Parliament outlining the Government's programme stressed th intention of pursuing a more positive policy of social reforms aime at combating the abiding problem of unemployment. In foreig policy, he emphasized Italy's intention to fulfil her commitment under the Atlantic Pact and the various treaties for European co operation, and included a strongly worded reference to Italy' claims regarding Trieste which won wide approval from hi audience, and not from his own party alone. But otherwise th programme was received cautiously, and it might appear that i striving to reflect too many shades of opinion Signor De Gasper had contented none of his critics. In the debate on the speech Signor Nenni opened the attack by stating that the Governmen must choose between broadening its base to the Left or dis-appearing; and the Monarchists took the corresponding line in the opposite direction.


In seeking a vote of confidence the Government's problem was to secure at least the abstention, if not the positive adherence, of sufficient votes from the intermediary parties—the Social Democrats, Liberals, and Republicans—to counterbalance the opposition which was certain to come from the Communists and M.S.I. and from which only reasons of tactical expediency would withhold the Socialists and, to a lesser degree, the Monarchists. By the time this article appears the outcome will be known, and it will be apparent whether the Government can hope for at least a reasonable modicum of support, or whether the country must embark on a period of uncertainty.

M. K. G.

The Fall in Commodity Prices

If we are to visualize the recent fall in world commodity prices in its true perspective, analyse the reasons for it, and make some attempt to project the curve of world prices into the future, it will be necessary to cast our eyes back at least as far as the end of the second World War. That period is covered in the appended diagram showing the movements in wholesale prices in the United States and the United Kingdom. For the purpose of this chart the most sensitive indices have been chosen, Moody's Index Number for American Commodities and Reuter's Index Number for British Commodities. Each is calculated on a selective array of commodities, with particularly heavy weighting for those materials that enter widely into international trade. In comparing the movements of the two indices it will be well to remember that in the autumn of 1949 sterling was devalued by some 40 per cent in terms of gold and the dollar. That fact provides the main explanation of the divergence in the movements of the two curves which became violently apparent at about that time.

The economy of the free world emerged from the war with the not unfamiliar problem of having too much money and too few goods on which to spend it. War is a champion begetter of purchasing power. Particularly in total war, Governments spend without counting the cost and always spend well beyond their means of



raising revenue. This is another way of saying that war creates inflation. It is an unusually suppressed form of inflation because Governments at war find it possible to defy economic laws as well as their enemies; they fix prices and wages, they ration commodities, they allocate scarce materials, they organize nation-wide savings drives which for a time at least neutralize a great deal of the inflation which Governments create. But at the end of hostilities the day of retribution comes. The disciplines of a war economy weaken and the inflated volume of currency and credit confronts a flow of current production which has inevitably been distorted and in most cases reduced as the result of the war and its damage.

In the United States, soon after victory had been secured over Japan, it was decided that the return to normality would be most effectively achieved by allowing prices to respond to the inflation that had taken place but had been successfully suppressed during the war. Controls were removed from a large segment of the price structure. The resulting rise in dollar wholesale prices is significantly reflected in the chart, and it will be seen that though the movement was followed by sterling prices, it was only followed with a considerable lag. In the United States, however, the economy reacted quickly to the stimulus of the free price system. The goods

began to pour out of that phenomenally productive machine, and by 1948 and 1949 much of the exaggerated rise in wholesale prices that had occurred in 1946 and 1947 had been corrected. The voids created by the war economy were being filled, and it will be recalled that in 1949 the United States did, in fact, show some signs of undergoing one of those corrective recessions which are the mark of health, elasticity, and vitality in any so-called free economy. It was a minor recession for the United States but, given the new dominance of the U.S.A. in the world markets, it became a major problem for much of the rest of the world, and particularly for the sterling world.

In Britain and the rest of the sterling countries, it will be seen that the rise in prices, though more gradual than in the United States in the early post-war period, was also much more persistent. In these countries some attempt was made to continue to suppress inflation by price and other physical controls, while at the same time pursuing a policy of cheap money and credit expansion which made the suppression more and more difficult to achieve and more and more certain of ultimate defeat. Those were the months and years in which the two worlds of low prices and convertible currencies on the one hand, and high prices and inconvertible or soft currencies on the other, were being created. Their reconciliation was attempted in 1949 by the surgical operation of devaluation of sterling and a large number of other currencies in terms of the United States dollar.

There was no indication of the American recession of 1949 or the accompanying movement in American prices leading to a major recession. In fact, the United States political and monetary authorities had taken reflationary measures in that year which had led to a sizable recovery both in business and in dollar prices, when the economic situation, not only in the United States but throughout the world, was swept into the vortex of events in Korea. The importance of these events is graphically reflected in the curve of wholesale prices. Just at the moment when the vacuum in supplies of commodities due to the war was being filled and when the price situation was reverting to something like normal, a world-wide hoarding of commodities was unloosed. In the expectation that World War Three might be round the corner and that it would bring back all the shortages that had been experienced in World War Two, every trader, industrialist, and Government department took the precaution of laying in additional stores of materials.

Helped by strategic stockpiling, this demand for commodities caused prices to bound to absurd levels—absurd at least when viewed with the wisdom of hindsight. World War Three did not come and, though the rearmament drive unquestionably stimulated the consumption of certain commodities, it was not a stimulation that bore any relation to the ominous expectations on which the commodity boom of 1950 and early 1951 was built.

The post-Korean boom reached its peak in the early spring of 1951. Thereafter, with the dissipation of fears of a more general conflagration, commodity prices began to fall both in the United States and the United Kingdom. The movement was gradual at first but gathered momentum towards the close of 1951 and provided the basis for the modest economic recession which made its appearance over large segments of world industry towards the end of 1951 and in the early months of 1952. The trend continued almost uninterruptedly downward throughout 1952 and has made further progress during the current year, though there are signs that the price movement is levelling off. As will be seen from the accompanying chart, the fall in the index of sensitive commodity prices, both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, has been severe, but it should be noted that it has done no more than correct what in retrospect can now be judged as the wholly unjustified post-Korean inflationary boom. We are in fact back approximately to the point from which that boom began and to the level from which, other things being equal, we might have expected the prices to move from midsummer 1950 had it not been for the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Other things, however, have not been altogether equal. The Korean affair has given a stimulus to rearmament which, despite the recent elongation or retardation in the defence programme of the free world, has left the scale of military expenditures appreciably above the level at which they stood in June 1950. In visualizing the recent sharp fall in prices we should, therefore, beware of exaggerating its economic significance. It is not the herald or the reflection of a major recession in world prices; rather should it be seen as the correction of the gross misjudgements that led to the unhealthy boom of 1950–1.

In explaining the recent fall in world prices appropriate importance should be given to the increase in supplies of most of the world's primary commodities. Interruptions in production due to labour disputes or, in some instances, to bottlenecks in scarce commodities such as coal have generally been of short duration.

Although the rate of increase in industrial production slowed down in 1952, both agricultural and industrial output in the world reached all-time record levels in that year. The accompanying table showing estimates of world production of basic commodities reveals an almost uninterrupted expansion of output in 1952. One particularly interesting fact which emerges from this table is the ease with which the loss of oil supplies caused by the cessation of shipments from Persia was made good. A significant indication of the improved availability of previously scarce materials is the fact that one after the other the commodities that were made subject to allocation by the International Materials Conference in Washington were freed from this control. Of all the commodities that came under control of the Conference nickel and molybdenum are now the only survivors in the list.

ESTIMATES OF WORLD PRODUCTION OF BASIC COMMODITIES

Commodities	*Unit*	1937	1946	1950	1951	1952	*Percentage increase* (+) *or decrease* (—) 1952 *over* 1937
Aluminium	1,000 tons	493	775	1,510	1,810	2,030	+312
Crude oil	million tons	285	380	525	595	620	+117
Synthetic fibres	1,000 tons	830	775	1,675	1,915	1,700	+105
Cement	million tons	81	75	135	145	155	+92
Steel	million tons	135	110	190	210	210	+56
Brown coal	million tons	254	240	350	380	380	+50
Soya beans	million tons	12[1]	14	18	17	18	+50
Rubber, natural	1,000 tons	1,225	850	1,890	1,905	1,790	+46
Rubber, synthetic	1,000 tons	5	820	545	925	895	—
Nickel	1,000 tons	115	125	150	160	165	+44
Pig iron	million tons	105	80	130	150	150	+42
Zinc[2]	1,000 tons	1,636	1,405	2,050	2,160	2,270	+39
Tungsten	1,000 tons	40	19	39	50	55	+38
Manganese ore	1,000 tons	6,064	3,700	5,800	7,000	7,700	+27
Copper[2]	1,000 tons	2,564	2,060	3,090	3,170	3,150	+23
Mercury	tons	4,251	5,260	4,940	5,070	5,200	+22
Wheat[3]	million bushels	5,980	5,700	6,320	6,480	7,235	+21
Sugar[3]	million tons	30	26	36	38	36	+20
Coal	million tons	1,297	1,220	1,450	1,520	1,500	+16
Maize[3]	million bushels	4,980	5,265	5,160	5,295	5,610	+13
Lead[2]	1,000 tons	1,697	1,150	1,825	1,770	1,900	+12
Wool (greasy)	million lb	3,850	3,790	3,925	3,945	4,100	+6
Cotton[3]	million bales	37	22	28	36	35	—5
Tin[2]	1,000 tons	207	110	195	190	190	—8
Coffee[3]	million bags	39	27	30	30	31	—21

[1] Average 1934–8 [2] Smelter production [3] Crop years

The other and fundamentally, perhaps, most important of the factors responsible for the recent fall in commodity prices has been the revival over the greater part of the world, and particularly in the sterling world, of the technique of credit discipline. Soon after the last General Election in Britain the structure of money rates which had been held in a rigid clasp of official controls since 1939 was freed. In the following March the Bank Rate was increased from 2½ to 4 per cent and the banks were encouraged to apply far more testing criteria in measuring the credit-worthiness of borrowers. Cheap money was abandoned and the economy once again

began to feel the impact of credit discipline. This disinflationary policy was also applied in many other sterling countries. It had already been anticipated over large parts of Europe.

Dearer money and more restricted credit made itself felt on the commodity situation in a number of ways. Its most direct impact was achieved through the policy of banks in restricting credit facilities used by their industrial and commercial customers for maintaining inflated stocks of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. In some cases this credit restriction meant actual liquidation of such inflated inventories; in others a considerable retardation of purchases, while excessive stocks were gradually used up. In this way restriction of credit had a very direct effect on commodity prices. A more severe credit policy also had the effect of forcing producers to sell more quickly in order to maintain adequate liquid resources. As a result, prices have become increasingly subject to the free play of market forces.

The dependence on free market forces has been given added momentum by the fact that during this period there has been a marked contraction in the volume of State trading and an increasing transfer of such operations to private markets. This in itself changed the complexion of the problem of financing commodities, divorcing it from the ever-easy channels of Government finance and making it much more dependent on the credit facilities available to private traders. Moreover, private traders are normally much more sensitive to prospective changes in commodity prices, whether upward or downward, than are Governments and their organizations. As soon as it became evident that world prices were trending downward again, that is from about the middle of 1951, industry and commerce throughout the world began to postpone purchases, confident that by waiting they would buy cheaper. The policy of hand-to-mouth buying which has been so apparent in industry in the United States, Britain, and other important countries has been a most potent direct factor explaining the continued slide in commodity prices.

Another powerful factor in the fall in commodity prices during the past eighteen months has been the advance made by a number of countries, and particularly by the United Kingdom, in the direction of greater transferability and convertibility of their currencies. As gold and dollar reserves have strengthened, Britain in particular has taken steps to exercise less discrimination than formerly in her purchases of commodities. She now buys grain,

cotton, sugar, copper, and other materials in the cheapest markets, irrespective of the currencies in which payment has to be made. This has also been one of the facets of the transition from State to private trading and of the reopening of free markets in which international commodity arbitrage has become possible. Through the existence of these markets in Britain it has become increasingly possible for countries outside the dollar area to secure dollar commodities by payment in sterling. The scope for such arbitrage is still strictly limited, but it is gradually extending, and one of the consequences has been to remove the price differentials between hard and soft currency areas which were such a marked feature of the commodity scene between 1946 and 1952. The removal of these differentials has taken place, not by a rise in the hard currency prices, but by a fall in the soft currency prices. The higher have come down to the level of the lower and this has given a considerable impetus to the fall in primary commodity prices since the middle of 1951. To give one specific example, there used to be one price for Canadian (hard currency) newsprint and another, and higher, price for Scandinavian (soft currency) newsprint. But since Britain has granted import licences allowing consumers here to buy their newsprint in the cheapest market the disparity has disappeared.

The fall in prices has also been helped by the policy of the new Administration in the United States in removing all remaining controls over prices and wages in the early part of 1953. This was done in conformity with President Eisenhower's State of the Union message early this year in which he said, 'I am convinced that now, as well as in the long run, free and competitive prices will best serve the interests of all the people and best meet the changing, growing needs of our economy.'

One of the key commodities to which more detailed reference is justified in a general review of this kind is wheat. From time immemorial the price of wheat has been the standard by which the general level of commodity prices and the purchasing power of money have been measured. Since 1949, however, the effective world price of wheat has been largely dominated by two somewhat artificial factors, the first the International Wheat Agreement, and the second the Agricultural Price Support programme of the United States Administration. Over the four years of its initial period, the International Wheat Agreement provided that the exporting countries should make certain tonnages of wheat avail-

able at not more than the maximum price fixed at $1.80 a bushel in 1949 but subsequently raised by unilateral action on the part of the exporters to $1.86 to allow for certain carrying charges. On the other hand, the importing countries undertook to take certain tonnages at not less than minimum prices, falling in descending steps from an initial level of $1·50 a bushel.

These minima were never effective, largely because of the second of the above-mentioned factors, namely, the U.S. Price Support programme. By virtue of this United States farmers were guaranteed a parity price for their wheat which varied slightly in accordance with movements in the prices of commodities which American farmers have to buy, but which kept their guaranteed wheat price throughout this period between about $2.00 and $2.30 per bushel. In other words, the International Wheat Agreement maximum became the effective price. When, therefore, negotiations began early this year for a renewal of the International Wheat Agreement, it was widely assumed that, since the United States Government were again committed to giving support to their agriculture, it was probable that the maximum price fixed in the proposed three-year extension of the agreement would again be the effective price. The exporting countries, led by the United States, insisted on raising the maximum price to $2.05 per bushel. This was accepted by all the countries represented with the exception of Great Britain. The British Government decided to stand out of the agreement, and the exclusion of the largest of all the importing countries must throw serious doubts on the continued efficacy of the agreement. What is beyond all doubt is that the action of the British Government in thus expressing their confidence in a fall in the price of wheat and, therefore, refusing to sign on the $2.05 dotted line has had a powerful effect in bringing the world price of wheat below the I.W.A. maximum. At the time of writing Chicago is quoting $1.92 a bushel for early delivery wheat. What is even more significant is the fact that the British Ministry of Food has been able to buy a sizable quantity—80,000 tons—of Argentine wheat at the equivalent of about $1.84 a bushel. Britain's defiance of the International Wheat Agreement is beginning to pay dividends.

It must, however, be asked whether this serious fall in commodity prices is a matter for congratulation or apprehension when viewed from the angle of Great Britain. If the fall in commodity prices were a self-propagating movement, as it has so often been

in the past, it might readily bring in its train a general impoverishment of the primary producing countries, a contraction of the demand for the produce of industrial countries, and, therefore, widespread economic recession. So far there is no basis for such fears. As has already been pointed out, the fall in commodity prices has done no more than cut off the artificial post-Korean bulge in the curve of world prices. From the point of view of the British balance of payments, a fall in commodity prices has brought considerable relief. It has moved the terms of trade in favour of Britain by more than 10 points per cent, as compared with what they were twelve months ago.

If, however, the movement is viewed not from the exclusively British angle, but from that of the sterling area as a whole, a somewhat different verdict may be called for. The fall in certain commodity prices, notably of rubber, tin, tea, and edible oils, has adversely affected some of the primary producing countries in the sterling area. The evidence of the gold and dollar reserve of the sterling area does not, however, suggest that the balance of payments of this group of countries, *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world, has been seriously damaged by the fall in commodity prices. In fact it is significant that some of the more recent and notable price recessions in the commodity markets have referred to what are essentially dollar commodities, namely, sugar, cotton, wheat, and aluminium. On that score it can be claimed that the more recent phase of the commodity price fall has been positively helpful in reducing the dollar gap. On balance of payments grounds, therefore, there is as little reason to fear the consequences of the fall in commodity prices as there is on the wider ground of their extension into a major world economic depression.

Above all, the recent decline in commodity prices can be welcomed as refreshing if somewhat belated evidence that it is still possible in this world of social security, agricultural protection, and inconvertible money for commodity prices to move downward as well as upward. An impression was being created that the world had condemned itself to a prospect of indefinite inflation, of perpetual erosion of the purchasing power of money. It is more than reassuring to have this evidence that prices can still fall, that the value of money can on occasion still increase. It may not be more than a flash in the pan. There is certainly no evidence of serious deflation in the world of today or even of a willingness to hold in check the rising tendency of costs of production, of which demands

for higher wages are the most striking evidence on both sides of the Atlantic. But this is all the greater reason to believe that the current fall in commodity prices does not hold within itself the germs of a world-wide deflationary movement. It is all the more welcome for that.

P. B.

The Soviet Union and Finland

As seen by a Norwegian

In the flood of speculation surrounding the change of power in the Kremlin, Finland's name has cropped up several times. Among other things, an old theory was brought up again, the theory that it was because of his long-standing affection for the Finns that Stalin allowed them to retain their democratic self-government after the Russian victories in 1940 and 1944 and later during the cold war. The theory is attractive because it gives a plausible answer to the question as to why the Finnish Republic has had such a different fate from all the other States south of the Gulf of Finland which have frontiers with Russia. But such a theory has nevertheless little foundation. In the first place it is hardly likely that anyone in the Western world could correctly interpret the feelings of the late Soviet leader. And secondly we can be pretty sure that the Moscow Government has not allowed sentimental considerations to govern their foreign policy in Northern Europe any more than in other areas. If we are to understand the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland, we must therefore get down to the hard political facts[1]. This will apply under Malenkov, just as much as under Stalin.

STALIN AND FINLAND

There need be no doubt as to Stalin's aspirations in regard to the Finnish Republic. On a number of occasions he has himself, or through Molotov, openly expressed them. The first time this

[1] Sources used in this article include the former Finnish Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner's book on the Finnish Winter War, *Nazi-Soviet Relations* 1939–1941 (Department of State Publication 3,023), Churchill's work on the second World War, Cordell Hull's Memoirs, and two articles on strategy in Scandinavia and Finland in the Swedish *Ny Militär Tidskrift* for 1947 and 1952.

happened was during the Finnish-Russian negotiations in Moscow before the Winter War in the autumn of 1939. Stalin then presented a number of territorial demands which were all of purely strategic significance, namely, the shifting of the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus, the handing over of a number of islands west of Kronstadt in order to strengthen the defence of Leningrad, and the leasing of Hanko in order to close the Gulf of Finland. It was not until it proved to be impossible to reach an agreement, in spite of compromise proposals from both parties, that Stalin took action. The establishment of the quisling Government in Terijoki clearly showed that the aim was now to turn Finland into a Communist satellite State under the Soviet Union.

The fact that Stalin gave up this plan, apparently quite readily, towards the end of the Winter War was undoubtedly due to a number of new considerations, among them being the Finns' heroic fight and the Russians' fear of the results of intervention by the Western Powers. But we must also assume that at the peace of March 1940 Stalin secured all the strategic advantages which, after the experiences of the Winter War, he considered essential for the Soviet Union, namely, an important extension of his territory on the Karelian Isthmus, north of Ladoga, and in the Salla area, as well as the domination of Hanko. But the Russians also made an important political demand. Stalin required a formal guarantee that the Helsinki Government would never adopt a foreign policy which might constitute a threat to Russia. In Article III of the peace treaty Finland was therefore obliged to promise not only to refrain from any future attack on the Soviet Union, but also to keep out of any union or coalition which was directed against Russia.

These two demands, strategic frontiers and political guarantees, became later, in spite of all the changing circumstances, the leading principles for Stalin's Finnish policy during the whole of the second World War. He defended them stubbornly during the alliance with Germany. At the conference in Berlin in the autumn of 1940, he made Molotov demand of Hitler and Ribbentrop that the German transit traffic over Finnish territory to Kirkenes in Norway should cease, and that the Germans should use their influence in Finland to put a stop to what he called the Finnish Government's anti-Soviet policy. If these conditions were fulfilled, he considered that the Finnish-Russian problem could be solved without a new war.

He maintained these principles uncompromisingly during Russia's worst periods of adversity. When Molotov visited London and Washington in May and June 1942 to build up the grand alliance, he was met with the argument that the Moscow Government must give up their territorial gains in Finland and their territorial claims along other parts of Russia's western frontier, because they were contrary to the Atlantic Charter. Even though the negotiations very nearly ended in a deadlock owing to the difference of opinion on this point, Stalin stood his ground. The result was an agreement which omitted any mention of the problem of the delineation of frontiers after the war, including the problem of Finland's frontiers.

He took these same principles for granted during the Tehran Conference between the Big Three in November-December 1943 when the policy of victory was to be worked out after the fortunes of war had turned definitely in favour of the Allies. According to Churchill's report, Stalin stated at the conference table that the Soviet Government 'had no desire to make Finland a Russian province, unless the Finns forced them to do so'. Translated into less dramatic language this naturally meant that the Soviet Union had no need to replace the democratic Finnish Republic with a satellite State, provided the strategic and political interests of Russia were safeguarded.

And he realized his principles finally in practice in the Finnish-Russian armistice agreement on 19 September 1944. In this agreement Porkkala was in fact substituted for Hanko, and Petsamo was added to the earlier acquisitions. But this did not in any way change the purely strategic character of the new drawing up of frontiers. And the political clause from Article III of the peace treaty of 1940 was included unaltered in the armistice agreement of 1944.

Many attempts have been made to explain the consistency of Stalin's aspirations in Finland since March 1940. It has been pointed out, for instance, that as long as the alliance with Hitler was in force Stalin could not openly aim at a complete annexation of Finland without provoking a break. It has also been said that when in September 1944 it became possible for the Red Army to occupy the whole of Finland, Stalin had other things on his mind. At that time he had to concentrate all his energies on his part in the Allied race towards Berlin. But however correct these views may be in themselves, they apply only to individual situations. The

problem is to find an explanation which covers the whole period from 1940 to 1944. The fear of pushing Sweden over into the enemy camp if a Communist regime was established in Helsinki may perhaps have been a factor at one time, but not after Stalingrad. Respect for the views of the Allied great Powers of the West may at that time have been an argument against the annihilation of the democratic Finnish Republic, but it cannot have been decisive, as witness, for example, the post-war evolution in Poland.

The conclusion must therefore be that as Stalin in general retained the same aims in Finland during practically all phases of the second World War, the reason must have been that, in his opinion, the interests of the Soviet Union did not go further. In other words, he had come to the conclusion, reached against the background of the strategic situation created by the conflict with Hitler's Germany, that the remote Russian north-west flank was sufficiently protected by the principle of strategic frontiers with and political guarantees from Finland.

THE NEW SITUATION

There is little reason to doubt that this attitude of Stalin towards the Finnish Republic reveals a fundamental principle in the Soviet Union's policy towards the Finns. But this is not to say that the practical extent of this principle is the same today as during the second World War. In the eight years which have passed since the victory over Hitler tremendous technical progress has been made in the air and submarine arms, and this, together with the development of the atom bomb and the establishment of an increasingly stronger Atlantic Pact union, has deep significance for the military position of the Finnish territory. This significance is so deep that Finland must now in fact be considered as having acquired a completely new strategic position. To appreciate this we must review the altered politico-military situation in the whole of Scandinavia.

There appears to be general agreement among military commentators that, in the event of a third world war, the Soviet Union will be vitally interested in securing domination over the most northerly part of Europe both in connexion with attack and with defence. It is not so much field operations that are considered in this connexion, although during any advance into Western Europe the Red Army would have an exposed northern flank if the Scandinavian countries wholly or in part were in the hands of

its opponents. A major invasion into Russia through Scandinavia is scarcely practicable owing to the difficult nature of the ground and the distance from main bases. In other words it is the submarine and air arms with which we are here concerned.

It is generally estimated that in an armed conflict with the Western world one of the Soviet Union's best weapons of attack would be her large and technically highly-advanced submarine fleet. Its task would be to carry out harassing operations against the Western Powers' lines of communication in the North Sea and the northern Atlantic. Apart from the Kiel Canal, the Russian submarines would have two routes to their field of operations, the one in the north between Spitsbergen and North Norway, and the other in the south through the Belts, the Kattegat, and the Skagerrak. In this situation the Soviet naval leaders must necessarily regard it as vitally important that the Russians should hold the positions which dominate these two channels. In addition it would improve the operational possibilities of the Soviet submarines if they could obtain bases in western Norway—not only on account of the increased sphere of action, but also because the air force would have more favourable bases for their escort service.

In this connexion the independent operations of the air force would be less concerned. The Soviet leaders would certainly be interested in being able to carry out air raids, for example, against Britain or Iceland and Greenland from Scandinavian bases. But experts consider that such bases would be useful mainly for escorting bomber expeditions which would start out from points inside Russia's present frontiers. Remote-controlled weapons and guided missiles are still regarded as too little developed to come into this picture.

The Soviet Union must therefore be regarded as having a considerable strategic interest in dominating Scandinavia and Finland should she ever decide to attack the West. But this interest is infinitely greater in the sphere of defence. This is at once apparent when one considers the operational possibilities of the Western fleets. Only by holding a line between Kristiansand in South Norway to Skagen in Denmark, or a little further in, by closing the Belts, could the Soviet command effectively block any Western attempt to penetrate into the Baltic, and a similar, if considerably less important, situation exists in the North, where only a solid defence line between Finnmark and Spitsbergen could hope to prevent raids from the West against Petsamo, Murmansk, and

the White Sea. But all this is of little importance compared with the Soviet Union's interest in building defence positions in Scandinavia against Western air raids from Iceland and Greenland.

One of the most serious military dangers the Soviet Union would face the moment a third world war broke out would be the threat of comprehensive annihilating bomber operations based on Keflavik, Julianehaab, and Thule. From these bases the latest types of American flying fortresses would be able to carry heavy bomb loads into every place of industrial or military significance between the Yenesei River and the Baltic, and between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea. In theory the Kuznetsk area would be just as exposed as Magnitogorsk, Kharkov, or Moscow. But in all these cases the path of the bombers would necessarily have to go over Scandinavian territory. As one Swedish military writer has put it, 'the Northern countries lie under the path of the projectiles'. In these circumstances, it must inevitably be of the greatest importance for the Soviet Union to advance her defence lines into Finland and the Scandinavian Peninsula. This applies both for radar stations and for bases for fighter planes. In this way it would be possible for the Russians to detect the attacking bombers over Norway's west and northern coasts and engage them with fighters before they reached the Baltic. As the situation is at present, the warning could only be obtained when the bombers were over the Baltic's eastern shores south of the Gulf of Finland and at the Finnish frontier further north.

FINLAND UNDER THE PATH OF THE PROJECTILES

If we look at the new strategic situation from the point of view of the Soviet Union's traditional desire for security on her north-west flank, Stalin's Finnish policy of the second World War no longer holds water. His principles of strategic frontiers and political guarantees must, during the cold war, have turned into much more comprehensive aspirations as the military perspectives were extended. The whole of Scandinavia and Finland will have been brought into the picture. But after April 1949, when the Norwegian and Danish Governments signed the Atlantic Pact, it became impossible for the leaders in the Kremlin to obtain strategic advantages in either Norway or Denmark without precipitating a third world war. The same would undoubtedly also apply to Sweden in spite of her alliance-free policy. Therefore Finland's position must have become more exposed.

It would undoubtedly be of significant advantage for the R sian military leaders if they had some degree of military con over the Finnish area, for example by means of bases with right of transit. They would then be able to advance their ra network and their fighter bases at significant points, and in way strengthen their defence against any bomber attacks fr Iceland or Greenland. They would also obtain considerably proved starting points for an action against the Scandinav peninsula, and particularly against North Norway, in the even the outbreak of war.

In spite of this the Moscow Government, during the cold w have done practically nothing to increase their military and polit power in Finland. The only step of any importance was Finnish-Russian friendship and assistance pact, and even t dates back as far as April 1948. Nor did it alter much in Finnish Republic's relations with the Soviet Union, as they w laid down in the peace treaty of 1940 and reiterated in the armis agreement of 1944 and in the final peace treaty of 1947. The a of the assistance pact was certainly to make Finland an active a not merely a passive factor in the Russian defence system, bu contains only one clause which could be of importance to Moscow Government should they ever desire to take steps extend their military domination in the North. This is Article in which it is stated that the two Governments shall start nego tions on any precautionary measures which might be necessar a threat of attack should exist against one of them. But the Sov Union would presumably not require the help of any spec agreement if she should wish to discuss any problems with Government in Helsinki, whether they were of a military or a other nature.

The reason why the Russians held their hand during a per when the strategic position of Scandinavia and Finland had beco steadily more exposed is presumably to be found primarily in relations with Sweden. The leaders in the Kremlin may in last few years have experienced some of the same anxiety that Czar had before 1914 lest the Swedish Government should pushed over into the opponents' camp, which after 1949 wou mean the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In these circu stances the Russians had to reject any wish they may have had carrying out a direct occupation of Finland with the introduct of a people's democracy there. Even a demand for bases in Finn

Lappland, not to mention on the Finnish west coast or on the Aaland Islands, would in this connexion be a risky step. The same would apply to an exchange of the Finnish districts in Lappland with parts of the already ceded area in Karelia about which rumours appeared in the Western press last March. The possibility that the Norwegian Government might in that case consider opening bases in North Norway to N.A.T.O. forces in peace time may also have influenced Russian policy, even if this was necessarily a secondary consideration.

However, the development does not end here, and we must expect Finland's strategic position to become more and more difficult as the technique of the new weapons advance. This will not be apparent as long as the Russians maintain their present policy of détente. But the day may still come when Malenkov and his advisers decide that military aspects on the north-west frontier must be given priority over political considerations. The decisive factor here must be the Russian leaders' estimates as to how far the Soviet Union may be regarded as weakened by the future strategic changes in the North Atlantic area and in the Arctic Ocean. The situation outside Scandinavia, that is, the establishment of airfields in Iceland and Greenland, must naturally play an important role in these estimates. But the Scandinavian countries are also involved, and as Sweden's alliance-free policy will undoubtedly be maintained unless conditions change radically, we are here primarily concerned with Norway's bases policy, that is to say, with the Norwegian Government's declaration that she will not permit foreign military bases on Norwegian soil in peace-time unless she is threatened.

As the military significance of the Finnish territory is primarily dependent upon the capacity of the new Arctic airfields, it might be supposed that an opening of Allied bases in North Norway would not play any vital part in the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. Such bases could in any case only be used for local defence and escort services. But even if this reasoning is correct in principle, any alteration in the Norwegian bases policy, publicly advocated by responsible N.A.T.O. leaders as recently as May, would inevitably result in a certain increase in the strategic pressure on the Finnish area. And if conditions otherwise were suitable, the Norwegian Government might thus start the ball rolling so that Moscow found it opportune to realize in part or wholly her interests on the north-west flank, by improving her

military positions and tightening her political grasp on the democratic Finnish Republic. In such a situation the Russians would also have the propaganda advantage that, in their explanations to the Finns and Swedes, they could put the blame on Norway, particularly if they left southern Finland in peace and confined themselves to advancing their strategic frontier as far as the Tana River and the three-State mark where the Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian frontiers meet.

The general lessening of political tension which has followed Malenkov's accession to the premiership in Moscow has also made the international position of Scandinavia and Finland considerably easier. But whether eventually there is to be real peace, or a new cold war, the strategic aspects of the situation remain unchanged. They may fall into the background for a time, but in the last resort they will always be decisive for the Soviet Union's policy towards Finland.

H. G.

The European Cultural Centre and its Activities

THERE are today at work in Europe agencies little known in Great Britain which are attempting to foster a European spirit and encourage European studies. They are of increasing importance and deserve attention. The most important of the unofficial cultural agencies established in Europe since the second World War, with a specifically European end in view, is the European Cultural Centre at Geneva with its offices in the Palais Wilson. This Centre had its origin in the Cultural Resolution passed by the Hague Congress in May 1948. A research office was established at Geneva in February 1949 to undertake the preparatory work. In December 1949 a European cultural conference held at Lausanne gave the final direction to the programme and resolved that the research office should be transformed into a Cultural Centre without delay. This resolution was later adopted by the European

Movement, and the European Cultural Centre took over from the research office on 7 October 1950.

The aim of the European Cultural Centre is to contribute towards a united Europe by rallying the cultural forces in all European countries. The Centre provides a meeting-place for the representatives of its member-organizations and affords them the opportunity to co-ordinate their programmes. The Centre has also initiated its own projects and studies. It is not attached to any official international organization nor to any Government agency. It enjoys a juridical personality under Swiss law and is a self-governing and independent institution. Its funds are derived from private benefactions and public subventions. Its financial resources are comparatively small and its expenditure is kept to a minimum. It seeks to provide the ideas and the practical help which are needed by many of the local and regional associations that are working in the interests of European culture and unity. It helps them to plan their programmes and to learn about each other's work. The Centre believes in the principle of decentralization. It restricts its activities to the following three heads:

1. The co-ordination of the programmes of its members.
2. The encouragement and co-ordination of all the forces which tend to promote a European consciousness and the initiation of new projects —documentary films, publications, conferences, broadcasts.
3. The preparation of a kind of cultural inventory of Europe, including documentation of the problems under consideration by the working groups set up by the Centre, the preparation of records relating to European institutions, and a bibliography covering European questions.

The European Cultural Centre thus confines its efforts within the sphere of the practically useful; it also limits the number of its collaborators and employees in order to avoid that administrative expansion which is a characteristic feature of international institutions. It works as far as possible through existing institutions and does not seek to impose upon them any uniform pattern of organization. It is not a centre of political propaganda, though it maintains close contact with the European Movement. It believes that cultural activities should not be administered and organized like a vast business corporation.

The President of the Executive Council of the European Cultural Centre is Don Salvador de Madariaga and its Director is M. Denis de Rougemont. The Centre publishes a Bulletin of modest

size which appears ten times a year. This Bulletin is distributed along with the *Federal Courier*, the organ of the Group of Twenty, which is a newly formed study group of European experts meeting every two months or so to discuss problems of European federation. The articles published in the *Federal Courier* will be critical and constructive in character. The Group will base its work on the draft treaty presented by the Constitutional Commission to the Ad Hoc Assembly at Strasbourg and adopted on 10 March 1953. Members of the group hope that the *Federal Courier* will be *The Federalist* of the new Europe.

The European Cultural Centre includes among its founders the following institutions: the College of Europe, the College of Austria, Europa-Archiv, and the Catholic Secretariat for European Problems. Of these the most remarkable is the College of Europe, situated in the town of Bruges. It has now completed the third year of its existence under its Rector, Dr Hendrik Brugmans. Its students, some forty in number, are drawn from most of the countries of Europe. In 1953 Great Britain had six representatives, France, Germany, and Italy each five, Belgium four, and Austria and Holland two. Other countries have a single representative each, and from outside Europe observers have come from the United States of America, Egypt, and Indonesia. The College is an institution for post-graduate study and provides a broadly-based one-year course intended to equip young Europeans for an international, and more especially, European career. The College is self-governing and not affiliated to any university, although it works in friendly collaboration with the professors of many universities. The Professeurs Conseilleurs of the College are: Professor Guggenheim, of Geneva (International Law), Professor Le Lannou, of the University of Lyon (Social Geography), Professor Tinbergen, of Rotterdam (Political Economy), Professor Janne, of Brussels (Sociology), Mr John Bowle, of Oxford (Political Theory), Mr Molitov, of Louvain (Public Administration), and Mr de Vreese, of Ghent (Comparative Law). Visiting professors have included: from Great Britain, Mr Roy Harrod, Dr Glyn Daniel, Mr Harrison Church of the London School of Economics, and Dr Lionel Butler of All Souls College, Oxford; and from the United States, Dr Holcombe of Harvard and Professor Halecki of Fordham University, New York. The College was established at Bruges as the result of local initiative, the town having a long history and a convenient geographical situation to recommend it

as the home of a college which draws its students and professors from most of the countries of Europe.

The European Cultural Centre has itself founded a number of institutions with specific work to perform. One of the most important is the Association of Institutes of European Studies, founded under an instrument known as the Bruges Protocol on 10 June 1951. Membership is open to institutions of approved academic standing specializing in European studies. M. de Rougemont prefaces the text of the Protocol with these words: 'The question is to create a "European Pool" of our intellectual resources, a cultural Schuman Plan. The aim of the Association is to promote among European peoples a feeling of their common affinity in European civilization.'

The governing body of the Association is the General Assembly, which meets two or three times a year at different places where its members take it in turn to act as host. Meetings have been held at Alpbach, Nancy, Tours, Offenbourg, and Saarbrücken. Dr Hendrik Brugmans was elected President of the Association at Tours, and in October 1952 delivered his presidential address at Offenbourg. In the course of this address he defined the aims and methods of the Association, laying particular stress on the organization of study groups comprising a limited number of students, carefully selected in order to ensure at once the homogeneity and diversity of the group. 'The whole evolution of adult education tends towards methods of this nature, the great public lecture giving place to more restricted meetings in which human contact plays an important role.' By this means the sense of European solidarity may best be enhanced.

Membership of the Association is of two kinds—affiliated or full membership, and associate membership. Full membership is confined to those institutions which concentrate exclusively on European studies *stricto sensu*. Associate membership is open to those institutions which are interested in general European problems but whose first concern is with a more specialized field. There is a period of one year during which a candidate for full membership remains an associate member.

The following is the full list of members of the Association:

Affiliated Members

Bruges:	College of Europe.
Frankfort:	Institut fur Europäische Politik und Wirtschaft (formerly Europa-Archiv).

Nancy:	European University Centre.
Offenbourg:	Society for Supra-National Collaboration.
Strasbourg:	Catholic Secretariat for European Problems.
Tours:	International Institute.
Vienna:	College of Austria and Research Institute for the Knowledge of Present-day Europe.

Present Associate Members

Berlin:	Institute for Political Science.
Mainz:	Institute for European History.
Paris:	European College of Social and Economic Science.
Paris:	Institute of Ancient Civilization.
Saarbrücken:	Institute for European Studies of the University of the Saar.

The Association of Institutions of European Studies affords its members the opportunity to meet from time to time to discuss their common problems and to arrange for the diffusion of information concerning their activities, and for the co-ordination of their programmes in those fields where co-ordination is desirable.

It has undertaken to publish in 1954 a series of European Studies by distinguished writers. It has also set itself to encourage greater specialization among different institutions for European studies, in order that more detailed consideration may be given to particular problems than would be possible if all these institutions were pursuing the same general lines of inquiry. The Centre of European Studies at Tours, for example, is devoting special attention to the European education of primary school teachers.

Among other institutions founded by the European Cultural Centre is the European Community of Book Clubs. These undertake to publish a work recommended annually to their notice by an international jury. The author of this work receives the European Literary Prize. The prize was first awarded on 26 March 1953, when it was divided equally between the exiled Polish writer Czelaw Milosz, for his novel *The Seizure of Power*, written in Polish and presented to the jury in a French translation, and a German writer, Werner Warsinsky, for his novel *Cimmerian Journey*. In addition the jury also recommended that the member Book Clubs should publish the work submitted by an exiled Spanish writer, Mme Maria Zambrano, entitled *Delirium and Destiny*.

Three hundred and fifty-six manuscripts were submitted to the first scrutiny. Eight of these were selected for submission to the International Jury. Salvador de Madariaga is the President of the

selection committee, whose seven members include Dr Hans Oprecht, Director of the Gutenberg-Büchergilde, Ignazio Silone, and Denis de Rougemont. The prize-winning works will be published simultaneously in six languages and there will be a first printing of at least 100,000 copies. It is hoped that the books will be published before November of the current year. Of the manuscripts submitted 181 were in German, eighty-three in French, fifty-five in Italian, fourteen in Spanish, and nine in English. The prize is valued at 10,000 Swiss francs, but the author's receipts will be very much greater. He is assured of receiving some £5,000 within a year of publication.

The European Association of Music Festivals was founded by the Centre to afford publicity for the great musical festivals of Europe and to help to co-ordinate their enterprises. It publishes each year a brochure on the subject of the Music Festivals of Europe. The Association is preparing a Festival Film, and in the United States it plans to assist with publicity and the sale of tickets. This year the distribution of the Festival brochure will be in the hands of the European Travel Commission.

The European Community of Cultural Clubs (the term *Foyer* is perhaps best rendered by Club) was also founded by the European Cultural Centre. These Clubs are similar in their aims and organization to such institutions as the People's High Schools of the Scandinavian countries, and they work in association with them. The first meeting of this Community was held at Rheims, where the French type of *foyer* was introduced to the methods of the People's High School. Courses for students may last for a week-end or a week or longer. *Foyers* may be sponsored by churches or political parties or literary societies. The Community of *Foyers* is a loose association of existing institutions for liberal adult education, brought into contact with each other by the secretariat at Geneva.

The European Youth Campaign received its impetus from the Council of Europe and is now organized within the framework of the European Movement. The Consultative Assembly on 28 August 1950 recommended that a great conference of European youth be held in Strasbourg to which representatives of all the youth movements of European countries should be invited. This resolution was accepted unanimously by the Committee of Ministers. The conference was held at Strasbourg in June 1951, some delegates being nominated by international organizations and

some by national co-ordinating committees. This campaign has two aims: 'To inform the young people of Europe of the urgency and necessity of creating a European political structure, and to associate them with the work of peace and progress.' It works through existing youth organizations, conferences, and exhibitions, and publishes its own bulletin and reports.

The European Cultural Centre rejects the idea that it is necessary always to engage a distinguished speaker in order to ensure the success of a meeting or a week-end school. It is much more important to encourage members of the local study groups to speak for themselves than to sponsor a tour of the continent by professional orators. It often happens, however, that a local speaker is glad of the assistance of notes prepared by the Cultural Centre on the topic of his address. This is especially useful where the resources of the local library are inadequate. Thus several pamphlets have been published by the Centre for the Youth Campaign on a variety of topics concerned with international affairs to assist non-expert speakers.

Another interesting organization sponsored by the European Cultural Centre is known as the Associated European Press Agencies. This is an association of press agencies interested in distributing for publication articles on subjects of particularly European moment. The central association engages a distinguished panel of experts to write for it. Thus a local newspaper may carry an article by a writer who enjoys a European reputation. The Association was founded in September 1952, and at that time it numbered among its adherents press agencies representing some hundreds of newspapers in France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Holland. Belgium and Switzerland have since been added to this list and soon Italy will be included. The agency Europress in Germany, for example, represents 380 daily newspapers, 150 professional and technical journals, and sixty bulletins of Chambers of Commerce. In this way the articles distributed by the central association reach an enormous number of readers, and a writer opening the local newspaper in Dijon, for example, may find that it features him on the front page. In organizing this association the European Cultural Centre followed its usual method—that of working through existing institutions instead of setting up an entirely new organization. Writers who have contributed articles include the following: M. André Philip, Don Salvador de Madariaga, M. Robert Schuman, Dr Hendrik Brugmans, and M. Denis

de Rougemont. Newspapers which have published articles include *Phare Dimanche*, *Le Soir*, *La Nouvelle République*, *Junges Europa*, *Die Welt*, *Kieler Nachrichten*, *Europa Union*, *Mannheimer Morgen*, and *Die Weltwoche* (Zürich).

In the field of scientific co-operation the Centre has one considerable achievement to its credit. The first commission to function within the framework of the Centre was the Commission for Scientific Co-operation. Its first President and moving spirit was the late M. Raoul Dautry. It was within the offices of the Centre that the plan was worked out for the construction at Geneva of the European Laboratory for Nuclear Research. This plan was later taken up by Unesco and submitted to the different Governments. So far ten European countries have agreed to assist in this project. The Laboratory will be concerned with theoretical research on the structure of the atom and all the results of its work will receive immediate publication. The Scientific Commission has also in view the study of European power equipment.

The criticism is often made that the European Movement is not a popular movement, but rather an idea imposed upon the ordinary people by politicians and intellectuals. It is doubtful, however, if there is much substance in this criticism. There is an increasing impatience among the ordinary public, in particular among business men and those whose administrative and educational work takes them about Europe, of the national divisions which still restrict the development of the continent. The freedoms taken for granted in the nineteenth century have been slowly whittled away, but there is a growing demand for their restoration. Modern means of communication, the interdependence of modern learning and science, all make for a new sense of European integration. What is being done on the military and economic level is bound to reinforce the movement of ideas. Meanwhile, if the integration of Europe is to succeed, it is essential that there should go along with it the development of a broadening European consciousness. This is the work which these at present limited organizations have set themselves. They are likely to develop more widely in the future.

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Notes of the Month

The Forthcoming Election in Western Germany

THE German Bundestag Election to be held on 6 September will be fought under an electoral law which has itself been a cause of much conflict. The form in which it was finally passed by the outgoing Bundestag is a compromise between the majority, or personal, system of representation favoured by the Christian Democratic Union and the old system of proportional representation, with a heavy leaning towards the latter.

Under the new law every voter has two votes: a first, or 'constituency', vote, and a second or 'list' vote. The Bundestag is planned to consist of 484 members, half of them returned by direct, personal election in the 242 constituencies, the other half depending on the 'list' vote. For the voter the procedure is less complicated than it might appear. He makes one cross against the name of the candidate he wishes to elect in his constituency and another against the party of his choice. The abolition of the automatic coupling of the personal and the party vote means that parties can make local arrangements for a joint candidature—if their several prospects are bad, but joint prospects good—without thereby foregoing their local 'list' votes. These are added together by Länder and the 'list' seats allocated in proportion, but only such of them as are in excess of the seats won in the constituencies. In a Land with, say, eighty seats, a party may get half the 'list' votes and is thus entitled to forty seats. It may have won twenty-five seats by direct vote in the constituency; these are deducted from the total; the other fifteen members will be taken from the party list. If forty seats have been won in the constituencies, no additional members come from the list; if, however, more than forty of the party's candidates have been returned in the constituencies, the party keeps the extra seats despite the fact that it

thereby exceeds its 50 per cent share. The Bundestag will, i necessary, be enlarged to accommodate such extra members.

This incentive to the formation of local coalition for the 'con stituency' vote should lead to a greater concentration of power i fewer parties. And there is another provision in the new law tha should reduce the incidence and weight of splinter parties: a claus denying seats to any party which fails to get a candidate elected in constituency and gets less than 5 per cent of the valid votes in th whole of the Federal territory. The 1949 law only stipulated minimum of 5 per cent in one Land.

The chief victims of this change will be the small parties of th extreme right and left. The Communist Party polled just over per cent in the 1949 election and has since declined steadily Among the likely casualties at the other end of the scale is th German Reich Party, which put up Werner Naumann among it candidates in a constituency which was a stronghold of the nov suppressed neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party, for whose numericall quite small following there has been an alarming amount of com petition among other right-wing parties.

Apart from these extreme parties that are likely to fall by th wayside, there are the newer neutralist groups: the All-Germa People's Party, founded by Dr Heinemann after he had secede from Dr Adenauer's Government and party; and the 'League o Germans', led by a former Reich Chancellor, Dr Wirth, who en joys the support of the Communists in East and West. An electio alliance has just been concluded by these two groups; it is likel to do Dr Heinemann more harm than good.

What, then, is likely to be the composition of the next Bundes tag? It is possible that it will comprise no more than four parties improbable that there will be more than six (or five and seve respectively, if the Centre Party, to which the C.D.U. has jus conceded one seat, is counted).[1] The largest parties will be th Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party The Free Democratic Party, a partner in the present coalition, i certain to be represented in the next Bundestag, but majo differences within the party were glossed over for the electio campaign, so that its future character is uncertain. The All German Block (the former Refugee Party) is putting up candidate for the first time in a Federal election. It is certain to be represented

[1] See 'The West German Political Parties and Rearmament,' in *The Worl Today*, February 1953.

and probably with a sufficient number of seats to make it a factor to be reckoned with. Another member of the present coalition, the German Party, had only about 4 per cent of the total votes in 1949, but should be able to capture constituency seats in its local strongholds in Lower Saxony. The Bavarian Party is in the same position.

According to a recent public opinion poll the two largest parties, the C.D.U. and the S.P.D., enjoy slightly more support than in 1949; in relation to each other their strength is nearly the same as before. Of those interrogated during the poll, 38 per cent were in favour of the C.D.U., 35 per cent in favour of the S.P.D. Taken in conjunction with the results of last year's provincial and municipal elections these figures seem to show that neither can get an absolute majority. There will therefore again have to be a coalition.

The problem of German reunification has assumed greater urgency as an election issue since the riots in Berlin and the Russian Zone. The Socialists have for some time accused Dr Adenauer of indifference to the fate of the 18 million Germans in that Zone. They argue that he is so determined to pursue his European policy of 'rigid integration' with the West that he will not admit the obvious fact that were it to succeed the chances of German reunification would be nil, since it is the one thing on which the Russians will not make a concession. Dr Adenauer argues that, on the contrary, it is quite useless to negotiate from a position of weakness, and that membership of the E.D.C. is Germany's best chance of achieving unity and freedom. The recent Russian Note on Germany was obviously aimed at the German voter, but it is unlikely to have much effect because its proposals would seem to be unacceptable even to the Social Democrat Opposition, which has always stressed the need for compromise.

Both sides pay much attention to economic arguments in their election propaganda. The S.P.D. points to hardships, inequalities, and open and concealed unemployment. Nevertheless, the official figure of unemployed has just fallen below 1 million, an impressive achievement by a country disorganized by war and defeat and forced to absorb millions of refugees, and the Government goes to the country with a record of spectacular economic recovery which it of course attributes to its policy of 'free market economy' (*Marktwirtschaft*). It also points to the fact that without this recovery Western Germany would not have enjoyed four years of political stability.

The Soviet Budget for 1953

The Budget statement made by Mr Zverev, the Soviet Minister of Finance, to the Supreme Soviet on 5 August (it was due in March) leaves the usual wide gaps in our knowledge of Soviet public finance. It filled one and a half pages of *Pravda*, and that is virtually all there is to go on (balanced accounts, as we understand them, are not published).

Total estimated revenue, at 543·3 milliard rubles, shows an increase of 45 milliard over the previous year. This represents more per head of the population, but to what degree this is attributable to an increase in the total national income is not disclosed. Turnover tax accounts for 240·4 milliard, compared with 260·7 in 1952. This decrease has already been largely passed on to the consumer in the price reductions decreed in April, and is compensated in the Budget by an increase in the profits tax from 58·4 to 80·6 milliard. State loans, at 16·7 milliard, are 19·6 milliard less than in 1952. The term loan is a misnomer. It is in fact a compulsory deduction from wages, made at source, for the purchase of lottery bonds, and for the current year 9·8 milliard is to be paid back to the investor on prize-winning and expiring bonds. Savings are estimated at 10 milliard, and direct taxation at 46·1 milliard as against 47·4 in 1952.

In his speech on 8 August the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Malenkov, stated that 86 per cent of revenue, or 467 milliard, is derived from industry, agriculture, and other branches of the national economy. Stated revenues from these sources amount to 321 milliard, leaving 146 milliard unaccounted for. Loans, savings, and direct taxation, totalling 72·8 milliard, leave a further 3 milliard unaccounted for out of the remaining 14 per cent, or 76 milliard. There is therefore a total of 150 milliard, or 28 per cent of all revenues, about which no information is given (in 1952 this obscure figure stood at 88 milliard). No questions were, or ever have been, asked by the Soviet deputies about the source of this vast sum. It may represent in part the gross income from railways, industries working on forced labour, and other nationally operated enterprises. This is one of the larger blanks in the Soviet Budget statement which make it an uninteresting as well as unilluminating document. What is clear from the figures given is that the burden of direct taxation on the individual has been reduced.

On the expenditure side the total of 530·5 milliard, an increase of 15·3 per cent over 1952, yields an estimated Budget surplus of

12·8 milliard. The allocation of expenditure is, as usual, given only in the broadest categories. The national economy, with 192·5 milliard (an increase of 13·7 milliard or 7·7 per cent over 1952), accounts for 36·3 per cent of the total. Of this sum, 82·6 milliard are earmarked for the financing of industry, primarily heavy industry; and 53·5 milliard for agriculture. This leaves 56·4 milliard, presumably for investment in transport, trade, and other economic projects.

Expenditure classified as social and cultural (education, health, and other social services) accounts for 129·8 milliard, an increase of 7 milliard or 5·7 per cent over 1952.

Defence, at 110·2 milliard, accounts for 20·8 per cent of total expenditure, as against 23·6 per cent in the previous year. It is highly improbable that the Soviet Government is in fact reducing the strength or equipment of its armed forces—nor, apart from the bald figure, was there any suggestion of this in either Mr Zverev's or Mr Malenkov's speech. Price reductions may in part account for the lower estimate.

Administration is to cost 14·3 milliard. This leaves a balance of 83·7 milliard, or more than 15 per cent of total expenditure, unaccounted for. The remarkable expansion of this enigma is bound to give rise to speculation, however idle. Is it for loans to China? For atomic weapons? Or partly for housing, expenditure on which is to increase by 25 per cent over last year, though it is impossible to establish to which heading this sum should be attributed? Here, again, the gap is too wide to permit of intelligent conjecture.

It is noteworthy that, in contrast with previous years, no new 'grandiose projects' were announced, for afforestation, irrigation, canal construction, or the transformation of nature.

As far as can be judged from the published figures, the Budget as a whole shows some inclination in favour of the consumer, and the expenditure on national economy a slight shift of emphasis from industry to agriculture. This is borne out by the changes in agricultural taxation, on which so much stress was laid. The draft of the new agricultural tax law, submitted at the same time as the Budget, is a tribute to the persistence of that peasant mentality which the Soviet authorities have for twenty-five years done their utmost (if not their best) to eradicate. It is designed, as Mr Zverev and Mr Malenkov emphasized, to increase the peasant's material interest in securing a higher agricultural yield.

The tax refers to the private holdings of collective farmers an individual peasants, which average 0·5 of a hectare and accoun for no more than approximately 3 per cent of the total farm are The system now to be discarded is described as cumbersom complex, expensive, and discouraging. It varied according to th crop grown, and the use to which the land was put. The new ta will be assessed according to the amount of land held, regardles of the use to which it is put, but it has geographical variation ranging from 2 rubles to 25 rubles per 100 square metres. Th primary aim is to encourage the development of livestock. Th number of privately-owned cattle, particularly cows, has decrease and both speakers were emphatic on the need to provide the popu lation with greater supplies of livestock and dairy produce an vegetables. Tax rebates serve the same purpose, and the wiping o of arrears of agricultural taxes will undoubtedly have its appea But it is difficult to see how the peasants are to keep more cattl unless they are given more land. The average holding of littl more than an acre per family sets a fairly low limit on expansion i this direction.

Collective farms are also to benefit from a more sensible ta system. In future their compulsory deliveries are to be based o actual yields, not on the standing crop estimates (the so-calle 'biological' yield). The change also seems to imply the abandon ment of an important safeguard against evasion. Direct agri cultural taxation has never been a considerable source of revenu The new law will reduce its yield by 4 milliard, or 43 per cent, i the current year.

The speeches of the two Ministers were clearly intended t encourage the population, notwithstanding their emphasis on th deficiencies in food supplies, the housing shortage, and the losse on unprofitable enterprises. But the changes shown in the Budge do not add up to a significant change of policy. The undisclose items are, however, so large, and provide such an ample field fo manœuvre, that even this criticism can be advanced only witl diffidence. Perhaps the most welcome feature of the two state ments, at least to foreign readers, was their sober, unadorned, an unpropagandist manner of presentation.

Korea and North-East Asia

An American View

THE neutral zone established by the truce agreement of 27 July 1953 so divides the Korean peninsula that, politically, the *status quo ante* 25 June 1950 is virtually restored. In fact, there has also been something like a restoration of the military situation which existed immediately after the second World War, when the 38th Parallel divided the Soviet and American forces. Different nationalities are involved, but the respective political complexions remain constant, with the Communists north of the line and the non-Communists to the south. The basic feature of the Korean situation remains unchanged.

Korea's present prominence is due far less to the indigenous aspects of the civil war than to the temporary concentration of contending forces in the country and to its permanent strategic significance as a bridge between great Powers. Struggle is not new to Korea. Its ancient past saw much bloodshed from invasions. The end of the nineteenth century saw new contention for domination of the 'Hermit Kingdom', and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 resulted. Japan won, and Korea's 'independence' (of China) was recognized, but Japan's newly-gained position of influence in the peninsula was immediately challenged by another Asiatic Power, Imperialist Russia. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 led directly to her annexation of Korea in 1910. It was from the bridge-head of Korea that Japan finally went on, in 1931, to the conquest of Manchuria and the quest for a mainland empire. The sum total of Korea's history from the time of Kublai Khan to the present lends emphasis to the peninsula's political and military importance for China, Japan, and Russia—as a battleground, or a causeway to conquest.

The nominal independence which Korea gained as a result of the implementation of the Cairo Declaration was admittedly less than pure gold. The first and second World Wars left the Far East with the balance of power upset and revolutionary movements gathering momentum. It was under such conditions that the post-war struggle in East Asia developed between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. One oblique manifestation of that contest was apparent in the Chinese civil war, where Soviet sympathies were with the Chinese Communists, while the United States based its policy on

the assumption that the National Government would continue to exercise dominant power in the country. In Korea the ardent support given by the U.S.S.R. to the 'People's Republic', and the United States' equally warm championing of the 'Republic of Korea', were in the same pattern. The basic issue was what political course post-war developments in Asia should take, and the major forces in the tug-of-war were the Soviet Union and the United States. The American policy of 'containment of Communism' was therefore applied in Asia even as in Europe, leading to the early establishment of a 'first line of defence' stretching from the Aleutians through Japan and the Ryukyus to the Philippines.

In perspective, it can readily be perceived that the aggression of 25 June 1950 did not reflect North Korean ambitions alone, or the strong desire for unity of all Koreans. It can also now be seen that any explanation that the Chinese intervention in October of the same year resulted simply from the fear of Peking that the U.N. forces advancing toward the Yalu River would go on to invade Manchuria would be an over-simplification of the complex reality. That first military action led to the sharp American realization that this was more than just an advance of a simple revolutionary force—it constituted as well a strategic threat to the American position in the West Pacific. Therefore self-interest joined with a sense of international justice to impel the United States, despite the dangers involved, to play the leading role in the United Nations action to thwart aggression against South Korea. But when the U.N. forces advanced northward over the 38th Parallel, the Communist side was threatened with a turning of its flank, and by the injection of the 'Chinese volunteers' sought to deny at least North Korea to a potential enemy.

During the three years' military action, the effective rear base for the United Nations forces was the United States, east of the Pacific. The forward base was the Ryukyus, and Japan proper. The strategic role of the United States in the peninsula, as main material support for the U.N. operation, was thus that of a sea-air power. The Peking-Moscow Axis, comprising much of Eurasia, functioned as a land power. And Manchuria is China's power-house. The most elementary strategic considerations would lead the Communists to try to bar a potential enemy from the Korean peninsula, and the most definitive way of accomplishing such an end was to conquer the weak neighbour. Their rear base

was the continent itself. Their forward base was Manchuria, to which Korea is but an exposed appendage.

Thus, given the strength of the conflicting forces, and the factors qualifying and limiting the actions of the two main protagonists in Korea, the best that the sea-air power could achieve in the Korean fighting was an uneasy draw, a truce on a compromise battle-line. So the dispute is now being transferred to the conference table. The burning questions of the moment are those of agenda and participation. Certain general remarks are pertinent to this survey: (1) the conference will bear an importance in direct ratio to the scope of its agenda; (2) if one party to the dispute desires the inclusion of some item of special concern to it, it must logically expect that the opposing side will find this a reason to ask for the inclusion of the outstanding problems closest to its own heart; and (3) only active participants can be expected to be bound by the conference's final agreements. The situation is not unlike that confronting the statesmen who formulated the Washington Conference of 1921–2.

But the agenda of the conference and participation in it will not be discussed in detail here. The probable maximum and minimum for each are known, and both will presumably be settled in the U.N. General Assembly. It is in any event more important to judge of the possibilities for success attending any conference. Here reference to historical precedents might be profitable. Notably, this armistice is unlike that of 11 November 1918 with Germany, for Germany had been effectively defeated and was compelled by the armistice terms to submit to military restrictions that prevented her from taking up arms again no matter how the peace conference went. Likewise, there is no near resemblance to V-E and V-J Days, marking the 'unconditional surrender' of Germany and Japan respectively. One may surmise that the history of the German-Bolshevik negotiations deriving from the armistice of 5 December 1917 could offer its lessons. There, Trotsky's tactics aimed at the indefinite prolongation of an undecided state of affairs in order to facilitate the attainment of wider Bolshevik aims. Signature of the peace treaty was brought about only by the invasion of Estonia eight days after Trotsky walked out of the conference.

But the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk were still the weaker party, both militarily and politically. Much more closely reminiscent of the existing situation in Korea is the truce of 10 January 1946

between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists. At that time an Executive Headquarters was set up, comprising Nationalist, Communist, and American representatives, charged with implementing the truce, to pave the way for giving effect to a projected peace settlement (actually brought close by agreements reached in February). But neither belligerent trusted the other; neither had been defeated, both were strong; each played to win advantage through American mediation and prepared itself for an ultimate struggle which both felt to be 'inevitable'. The truce expired, the fighting was resumed, and the Communists won the ensuing struggle.

True, there are differences in the present situation. Now the organized moral and political strength of the United Nations is committed to the rehabilitation of the situation, where before it was a one-Power mediation; and in the present instance the contending sides are separated by a well-defined demilitarized zone dividing the whole peninsula, whereas in China practically all of North China and Manchuria was in dispute, with no agreement defining the respective political jurisdictions of the parties to the civil strife. But there is a basic similarity in that American sympathies are again definitely committed to one side, and Soviet sympathies to the other. Both sides, even with the signing of the armistice, have warned their peoples to beware of the bad faith of the other. Both sides are ambitious to have their way—one might even say *determined* to have their way in major degree. Here General Marshall's analysis, given on 7 January 1947, of the reason for the failure of his China mission is suggestive:

> . . . the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.
>
> . . . On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government.
>
> . . . The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people.
>
> . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides.[1]

[1] U.S. Department of State Publication 3373, *United States Relations with China*, Washington 1949, pp. 686-9.

The willingness of the parties to the present dispute to stop fighting, and to negotiate instead, must be accepted at the truce's face value (with an obvious qualification for the position of Syngman Rhee). This plainly does not mean that the agenda will be approached without preconceptions, widely differing, on the 'just and proper' solution to the problems at issue. Nevertheless negotiation—if the word has meaning—envisages a settlement by agreement. And agreement commonly mirrors in a rough way the relative strengths of the contending parties, that is, their respective relative needs for a peace settlement to replace a state of war. The strength and weaknesses of the United Nations are fairly well known, while the condition of the Pyongyang-Peking-Moscow coalition is less familiar. None would deny that North Korea has lost in the present game, but some would say that even Peking and Moscow have found the risks too great, and the cost too heavy, to continue. That there is a grain of truth in this is perhaps confirmed in the Communist side's willingness to accept the present armistice, but it is not also necessarily to be concluded that the pressure on China and the U.S.S.R. is such that they will be prepared to accept any face-saving proposals in order to be rid of the matter.

Actually, the risks for the Communist coalition of an extension of the war, other than through their own choosing, have been distinctly limited by the circumstance that the United Nations operation was a joint enterprise based on a low maximum of common agreement. The war matériel used up by the Communist armies consisted chiefly of light-weight supplies left over from the second World War. The Communist countries, and China in particular, have a wealth of man-power, and could easily sustain the personnel losses. The Korean operation has pinned down the U.N. partners in an Asiatic theatre, at a cost to the N.A.T.O.-E.D.C. project which may still be for the future to assess. It has moreover had the direct effect of contributing to the Communist programme of dividing the democratic allies (especially in Asia) and of fomenting discord within the United States, while giving the U.S.S.R. time to develop its global strategy and deploy its political forces accordingly.

China herself, by her intervention in Korea, has undoubtedly won increased respect in Asia for her military prowess. She has incidentally developed a battle-hardened army, equipped during the three years of warfare with modern weapons. Manchuria has

been strengthened as a military base, and China's influence in Korea seems in large degree to have superseded the former Soviet authority. Incidentally, the exigencies of warfare have facilitated the tightening of Communist control over the Chinese nation. Finally, it is not to be disregarded that certain Asiatic nations have tended to look upon the U.N. action in Korea as essentially an Occidental enterprise. This point of view has made easier some alienation of Asiatic sympathy from the West. Naturally, neither China nor the U.S.S.R. would feel that it has lost by that particular development. In the final analysis, therefore, the Communist side must be expected to enter the conference confident that, in an absolute sense, they are both politically and militarily stronger than when the war began.

The aim of the United Nations is by definition the democratic unification of Korea. The Communist aim, as is apparent, is the Communistic unification of Korea. The situation is therefore not unlike that existing in Germany. Three years' warfare has established incontrovertibly that the Communists will not surrender their present political position in Korea except before superior force. To effect the 'democratic' unification of the peninsula, in sum, major warfare would have to be employed, and any victory achieved would probably have to be preserved by Occidental troops stationed in the peninsula. It is nevertheless an open question whether any major Oriental nation, whether China, India, or Japan, would be reconciled to a long-term prospect of having Occidental authority established in Korea.

It is easy to forget, now that Japan has been defeated and disarmed and for the immediate present is in the position of a protected State, what are the ultimate issues in Asia. The Japanese slogan 'Asia for the Asiatics' is valid throughout Asia today, and the compelling question for Asiatics is what *Asian* nation or nations will ultimately gain ascendency. The will of the Asian peoples will finally govern, and Korea's salvation can come only from the Asia of which she is a part. If the United Nations Organization fails to heed popular sentiment in Asia, it cannot solve the problem of 'peace or war?' posed by Korea: it is an Asiatic problem, and only the maximum reliance on the authority of Asiatic U.N. membership can give satisfaction in Asia. Furthermore, if the political conference that is yet to come were doggedly to persist in efforts to achieve by force of argument what force of arms could not do—to extend either Pyongyang's control to the

southern tip of the peninsula, or Seoul's authority to the Yalu River—it could hardly succeed. The balance of forces suggests that neither side would feel compelled to concede so much.

The United Nations side has its own strength. In particular, it commands the authority of organized world opinion, a moral force without parallel. It is moreover undeniable that the U.N. military action in Korea checked at least temporarily the Communist advance in North-East Asia. General recognition of that fact has added to the strength of the United Nations Organization, and to its world prestige. Moreover, the U.N., for so long as it remains united, has influence in Asia, and can make its voice heard in the negotiations ahead. It achieved its first mission in Korea—the repulse of armed aggression. It will desire to work toward a reconciliation of the two halves of the peninsula. But it has the immediate power to contribute, through the exercise of its joint political wisdom at the conference, to the secondary task of integrating and strengthening the structure of peace in Asia. This would be in line with the concept, common to certain Asiatic nations, that the extension of democratic processes, and an expansion of economic well-being, if undertaken in a manner and at a tempo which Asiatic nations could appreciate as being superior to the capacities of Communism, would be the best insurance against revolutions and wars.

Such U.N. goals are possible of achievement. The way is certainly tortuous and long. Various parties to the dispute are committed to positions that they would maintain for reasons of prestige. The United States Government is compelled by domestic political factors to offer vis-à-vis Communism only the least common denominator in concessions, and finds it as difficult to cede to a 'Communist' point of view as Moscow finds it to accept an 'imperialist' proposition. The crusading spirit is present in both camps, and less than complete victory is viewed as a 'compromise with evil'. Some of the onerous responsibility of the United States for an 'unpopular' decision (by definition, an agreement based on 'compromise with Communism') will be shifted at the political conference to the shoulders of other U.N. members. This gain is offset by the action of President Syngman Rhee in freeing the North Korean prisoners and taking the stand that the war must go on if victory is not achieved at the conference table. That move has weakened somewhat the U.N.'s moral—and bargaining—position, and saddled it with an initial disadvantage. There will be

more sympathy for the Peking-Pyongyang-Moscow authorities in the United Nations than if Syngman Rhee had not committed his act of bad faith and then gone on to threaten the fragile peace by arbitrary unilateral action if the general conference fails to serve his announced ends. There will be a tendency to blame Rhee in good measure for any failure to achieve a peaceful settlement, even in circumstances now where he may choose not to 'go it alone'.

Given all the circumstances, no optimistic conclusions are warranted. Certain features of the situation must plainly be accepted: (1) the unhappy Korean peninsula, viewed by the three giants China, Japan, and the Soviet Union as a mere stepping-stone to empire, will remain a focal point of international conflict for some time to come; (2) a 'definitive' pacific settlement in East Asia is not feasible without a wider agreement between the antipodally-opposed, nearly-equivalent world forces of international Communism and of parliamentary democracy; and (3) the effects in Asia of the disposition of the Korean problem will be profound. Nevertheless, if the Communist side is, as it appears, now prepared to accept a détente in North-East Asia instead of pressing the affair to the ultimate issue, the occasion should be exploited at the conference table to the furthest possible limits of statesmanship. If the ideal, as variously conceived by different participants in the conference, must in the nature of things remain at this time unattainable, some progress can yet, with good will, be made towards broader solutions. It should be possible for the political conference to find a means of crystallizing the truce into an agreement to consider the war terminated, given the respective interests of the major parties concerned. In any case, the effort must be made to do the utmost towards widening the area of agreement, and narrowing that of conflict, in an effort to contribute to the solution of some of the pressing problems of Occidental-Oriental relations. Matters in Asia wear an urgent aspect, and its peoples are no longer tolerant of evasion of the issues of the new era they see opening up before them.

A. B. C.

Turkey under the Democratic Party

It is just over three years since the Turkish Democratic Party was swept into power by a landslide popular vote. Apprehensions expressed at the time concerning the prospects of a new, untried party assuming office at such a critical stage of the country's development have proved groundless. Supporters of the Government can look back on its record with satisfaction, and anticipate with some confidence the results of the next General Election, due in May 1954. Their confidence would appear justified by continued signs of general popular support, despite an increasingly critical press. It was, in any case, wrong to stigmatize the Democrats as newcomers to the Turkish political scene. Their leader, Celal Bayar, had a political career behind him scarcely less distinguished than that of Ismet Inönü himself. His devotion to the principles of the Turkish Revolution was unquestionable. Below him, the Democratic Party was formed by, and grouped around, a hard core of experienced politicians to whom high position was nothing new. Under the guidance of such men, Turkey's recent experiments in liberal procedures have revealed a political maturity that her best friends hardly suspected.

Internationally, Turkey's position has grown steadily stronger throughout the last three years. The receipt of aid under the European Recovery Programme (starting in 1948) and membership of the Council of Europe in 1949 were followed by full membership of N.A.T.O. in 1952. Turkey's contribution to the war in Korea (Turkish casualties exceeded those of the British Commonwealth Division) and the manner in which she has taken advantage of U.S. aid have won recognition from the most grudging Congressional critics. Internally, boom conditions have developed, and, as will be shown later, the boom is an investment boom which promises a permanent raising of economic levels. Already there has been a steady rise in the annual rate of national production and *per capita* income.

Though the Democrats naturally claim credit for this marked improvement in Turkey's external and internal position, it must be conceded that the foundations on which they built were well and truly laid by previous administrations drawn from the People's Party. The steadiness with which they faced the Soviet threat, in a period of great danger and difficulty, showed the West that Turkey was a stable and sturdy ally worthy of support, and it

is to wise exploitation of Western moral and material suppor particularly from the United States, that the country owes i recent remarkable progress. Whether specifically Democrati policies, such as the encouragement of private enterprise a opposed to *étatisme*, have made a significant contribution t economic advance is a debateable point. By and large, howeve the change of regime has redounded to Turkey's benefit. In th first place, it has demonstrated in convincing fashion that there i no fundamental difference of principle between the two mai streams of Turkish political opinion. In the second place, it ha shaken up a complacent bureaucracy which, after nearly thre decades of undisturbed power, was showing unmistakable sign of ossification. The writer, while travelling in Central Anatoli shortly before the last elections, asked a peasant why he intende to vote Democrat. The peasant laid his index-fingers together an said: 'The landlord and the gendarme'. When authority become too publicly identified with the 'haves', it is clearly time for a change

One anxiety, namely that the Democratic Government woul prejudice the stability of the country through administrative in experience or reckless liberalization, has been effectively scotched The changes introduced by the new regime have been consider ably less radical than might have been anticipated in view of th polemics of the last few years of People's Party rule. The ad ministrative structure of the country is largely unchanged, thoug there has been a considerable shift of personnel, partly with a view to fostering the more liberal spirit on which Democratic electora promises laid much stress, partly with a view to rewarding th faithful. But few Turks have reason to regret the amnesty, th more genial attitude of authority, or the cautious gestures in th direction of trade unionism. There is all the less regret as Adnan Menderes has proved a strong, even masterful, Prime Minister who, together with his Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, ha maintained his position throughout the period of Democratic rule. That they are capable of decisive action to preserve order th Democrats showed when they banned the ultra-Conservative National Party on evidence of subversive activity in the provinces. In considering the internal stability of Turkey, due tribute must also be paid to the defeated People's Party and its leader, Ismet Inönü, for the loyalty with which they accepted the decision of the electorate and relinquished power after nearly thirty years of monopolistic rule.

THE ECONOMIC SCENE

Even in the economic field, where the issue of private enterprise versus State control had been the subject of vigorous controversy, the new regime has adopted a moderate course. The liquor and match Monopolies have been returned to private enterprise, and the important State Maritime Administration, which controlled Turkey's merchant navy, has yielded place to the Maritime Bank, a semi-public corporation, in which 51 per cent of the shares are held by the Government. Otherwise, the Government has called in private enterprise to supplement rather than take over the undertakings of the State. Private capitalists have been encouraged to increase the tempo of factory-building, prospecting, and mining. An attempt has been made, with somewhat disappointing results, to attract foreign capital by relaxing the currency laws in its favour. In general, the policies pursued have aimed at giving private enterprise a larger share of an expanding economy, rather than at transferring into its orbit undertakings already run by the State.

The Democrats were fortunate in the timing of their successful bid for power. By the middle of 1950, the 'shot in the arm' administered to Turkish economy by the inclusion of the country in the European Recovery Programme was beginning to take vigorous effect in the shape of boom conditions that have prevailed without serious setback until today. In addition to direct financial aid, the Americans also provided a fund of much-needed technical advice in many fields, such as stock-breeding, fruit-raising, coal-mining, fisheries, and so on. By the time the Democrats assumed office the E.R.P. funds earmarked for Turkey had already reached a figure of nearly $100 million. At this early stage about one-third of the total had been authorized for the purchase of machinery and equipment, together with ancillary items such as motor vehicles, engines, and oil products; but a high proportion was also allocated for bread grains, a disquieting symptom of the low level of cereal production in a predominantly agricultural country. This situation took on a more healthy aspect as the tempo of aid quickened. By the middle of 1951 machinery and equipment already accounted for more than half the total; together with vehicles, accessories, and oil products, it accounted for more than two-thirds. Early this year total aid from the United States passed the $400 million mark. The allocation of E.R.P. funds, with its emphasis on machinery, equipment, and vehicles, reveals the pat-

tern of the present boom, which is largely an investment boon deliberately fostered by the Government. In addition to encourag ing private capital to bolder enterprise, the Government has itse stepped up its investment programme. The sum of TL 67 million set aside for investment in this year's Budget is more tha double the corresponding figure for 1950.

The primary effort has been devoted to agriculture. For country in which some 80 per cent of the population lives by agri culture, the standard of life in the villages has been distressingl low and dangerously stagnant. It is true that extremist tendencie have made remarkably little headway in the countryside, but th force and weight of peasant discontent was displayed in tellin fashion when the People's Party was decisively rejected at th polls. It was clear that unless the Democrats could do more fo the peasantry than their predecessors, remedies might be sough elsewhere. In fact, the success of the agricultural programmes ha been striking. The area under cereal cultivation, which had risei slowly from 6·3 million hectares in the period 1934–8 to 7·. million hectares in 1946–50, jumped steeply to about 10 millioi hectares in 1952. More remarkable still was the increased yield From 1934 to 1950 the annual yield had fluctuated, more or les sharply according to the weather, round an average figure o about 7·5 million tons. In 1952 it was over 12 million tons, and th estimate for the current year is about the same. From being a habitual importer of cereals, Turkey has now entered the expor field, this year's export surplus being estimated at about 2 millior tons. The increased yield is a natural result of better equipmen and more careful husbandry. In the two years after 1950 th number of tractors in the country rose from 5,000 to over 30,000 better methods of seed-selection, fertilizing, irrigation, and com munication have done the rest. Industrial crops present a simila picture. The area under cultivation is now about a million hectare as against a three-quarter-million average in 1946–50, whil production, now nearing the 3 million tons mark, is nearly doubl the average of the previous period. Among the industrial crops cotton is emerging as a factor of great economic importance. In addition to feeding the Turkish mills at Kayseri and elsewhere, it is now rivalling tobacco as Turkey's principal article of export.

Clearly, Turkey's agricultural problems have not yet been solved; the import of modern equipment is not in itself enough. There is undoubtedly a high rate of wastage of equipment, due to rough

treatment and indifferent maintenance. But a useful start has been made, and the technical training programmes, together with the passing of a large number of peasant conscripts through an increasingly mechanized army, are already breeding a generation of Turks accustomed to handling machinery and adept at exploiting it.

Investment activity in agriculture has been paralleled on a slightly lesser scale by investment in industry and public utilities. Several hydro-electric stations are under construction and several more are projected. These are designed to augment Turkey's relatively poor existing sources of power, and to assist agriculture by providing additional reserves of water. It is expected, for instance, that the new Seyhan dam will contribute materially to the irrigation of the Çukurova, the extensive plain south of the Taurus mountains where the bulk of Turkish cotton is produced. A new oil refinery planned for erection in the neighbourhood of Batman, destined to process the crude oil of Raman Dagh, will reduce Turkey's need for imported oil products, thus preserving her foreign exchange. Turkey's other sources of power, coal and lignite, are being exploited to better effect, thanks largely to American technical assistance. Coal production has risen every year since 1944, at a gradually quickening tempo. It now stands at the respectable figure of about 5 million tons. Production of lignite, after a recession in 1946, has improved again, now reaching a figure of about 1·25 million tons. The persistent coal problem, however, is the long haul from the main centre of production in the Zonguldak area, which materially increases costs. Other branches of mining have also registered significant advances, the most spectacular being in the case of chrome, antimony, copper, and iron. Of the industries other than mining, textiles have increased their output of both wool and cotton yarn and piece-goods, a considerable expansion is under way in sugar-refining, an increased production of cement to the tune of 1 million tons, as against 395,000 tons in 1950, has been officially forecast for this year, and a young steel industry is approaching an annual rate of production of 150,000 tons of crude steel. The general picture is one of expanding industrial activity, without sacrifice of any of the prior claims of agriculture.

The upward curve of economic activity is reflected not only in the figures for national production and *per capita* income, but also in the Budget. Estimates for the current year announced by Hasan

Polatkan, the Minister of Finance, put expenditure at TL 2,123 million and revenue at TL 1,960 million—increases of 40 per cent and 47 per cent respectively over the figures for 1950. The Administration claims that the gap between expenditure and revenue will continue to close, and that a balanced Budget should be possible by 1954. Budgetary allocation of increased funds for investment have been responsible for a respectable proportion of the rise on the side of expenditure. Now standing at a figure of TL 670 million, these figures are more than double the corresponding allocation for 1950, and there is no sign of slackening tempo. Indeed, Hasan Polatkan referred with some satisfaction to the 'hectic rate of investment' now prevailing. But for obvious if distressing reasons, national defence remains the biggest single item in the Turkish Budget. Including an aid of TL 145 million from the United States, this year's appropriations for the Ministry of National Defence total TL 723 million, an increase of TL 132 million over last year. And this is by no means the end of the story. Turkey is also to receive extra-budgetary military aid of about TL 700 million; about TL 165 million in respect of the 'infrastructure' programme; and, in addition to this, military expenditure allocated to departments other than the Ministry of National Defence amounts to about TL 250 million. In all, it is expected that the cost of Turkish defence this year will be about TL 1800 million, more than the total Turkish revenue in 1950. The value of U.S. aid to Turkey needs no further comment.

Beside this huge military programme, the figures for public education, public health, and social security appear insignificant, though in these departments, too, growing prosperity has left its mark. From 1950 to 1953, the appropriations have increased as follows: public education: TL 182 million to TL 226 million; public health: TL 59 million to TL 93 million; social security: TL 123 million to TL 166 million. Finally, no consideration of the Turkish Government's expenditure should overlook the strenuous efforts being made to modernize the communications system, for which TL 241 million have been allocated this year, as against TL 105 million in 1950. Outlay on the railways is being confined to the completion of work already under construction; the bulk of the funds is being devoted to extending and improving the road system, which is prejudiced by long distances and extremes of climate. Activity has been intensified in the matter of harbour facilities at a number of Black Sea and Mediterranean ports.

The indications of increasing prosperity to be found in the production indices and the Budget figures are supported by data on private and commercial transactions. There has been a sharp rise in bank credits (1950: TL 1,564 million; 1953: TL 2,781 million), in the volume of bank deposits (1950: TL 1,083 million; 1953: TL 1,801 million), and in foreign trade. Between 1950 and 1952 imports rose from TL 849 million to TL 1,137 million, while exports increased from TL 503 million to TL 871 million. The export list now includes a number of comparatively new items, such as cereals and cotton, and a more healthy proportion of minerals and metals. The prospect for exports in these new lines will doubtless improve as Turkish exporters accustom themselves to the procedures of the world market, and it is to be hoped that they will provide a significant supplement to the old seasonal exports, such as tobacco, raisins, figs, and hazel nuts, and thus spread the income from exports more evenly through the year. The problem cannot be ignored for long, since the adverse balance, though shrinking, is still considerable. The Government has repeatedly disavowed any intention of redressing the balance by restricting imports, a policy which it regards as incompatible with an expanding economy. Nevertheless, in view of the very adverse state of the balance *vis-à-vis* the U.K., it has found itself compelled to take just this step in respect of British goods, and, unless the competitive quality of Turkish exports improves materially, similar restrictions may well have to be imposed on goods from other sources.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

It is in the international field that the change of regime has made least difference. There was little, if any, controversy about foreign policy issues during the General Election, and the course pursued by Fuat Köprulü might well have emanated from his predecessor Necmettin Sadak. Though some Turks are tempted to claim credit for this continuity of policy, and to suggest that they have much to teach older democracies in the matter of bi-partisanship, the fact of the matter is that Turkey's problem since the end of the second World War has been essentially simple. When, in 1945, the Russians denounced the Treaty of Paris, which had regulated Russo-Turkish relations for the previous twenty years, and advanced their claims to bases in the Straits and to the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan, the choice before Turkey became

brutally clear. The situation was both difficult and dangerous, for at that period Turkey stood virtually alone. The Balkan Pact had been ripped to shreds, the Saadabad Pact was an empty gesture. Even the Turkish alliances with Britain and France had small practical value, since Britain was fully committed elsewhere and France, herself impregnated with Communism, was in the early stages of convalescence after the German occupation. Indeed, the Russian armies, grouped in a semi-circle from Bulgaria to Persia, had Turkey at their mercy.

The firm stand taken by the Turks in such circumstances was characteristic of their stubborn courage. They maintained their armed forces at a level that they could ill afford, they strove, in the face of many discouragements, to tighten the links binding them to the Western Powers, and they presented a steady front to Russian pretensions. In answer to the Soviet claims, they expressed willingness to enter into any discussions provided always that these did not touch Turkey's sovereignty or territorial integrity. As to the regime of the Straits, they insisted that this was not a matter for bilateral discussion, since it was regulated by the provisions of the Montreux Convention, and any revision must issue from a conference of all the signatory Powers. Illogically, though wisely, the Turks added the stipulation that such a conference should also settle all questions outstanding between Russia and Turkey. In other words, the Turks were not prepared to accept settlement of the Straits question by multilateral agreement, only to be left to face the Russians alone in the matter of the eastern frontier. In taking this firm line, the Government was undoubtedly in tune with the Turkish people. There was scarcely a dissentient voice in the whole country when Ismet Inönü declared, at the opening of the Grand National Assembly in November 1945: 'No part of Turkish territory can be claimed by anyone. We live with honour and we are determined to die with honour.'

This solid national front soon showed its value. With the Turks standing firm on their rebuttal of Russian claims, there was little, short of force, that the Russians could do. Therefore, they turned to exploit the more promising fields of internal dissension in Greece and Persia, and, fortunately for Turkey, it was just those manifestations of the 'dynamic' policies of the Stalinist era that provoked a strong and lasting reaction from the West. With the intensification of the struggle in Greece, American interest in the Eastern Mediterranean became fully aroused, and early in 1947

the proclamation of the Truman doctrine brought unequivocal American support to both Greece and Turkey. That proclamation ended the dangerous period of Turkish isolation. A joint services American mission was despatched to Turkey, and its efforts, backed by Marshall Aid, led to a steady strengthening of Turkey's military and economic position.

Parallel to this steady strengthening went a growing recognition of the importance of Greece and Turkey to the defence of the Middle East as a whole, particularly at a time when the position of the Western Powers in the Middle East had become seriously prejudiced by the clash between Israel and the Arab States. In 1949 Turkey was admitted to the Council of Europe. A year later, she accepted an invitation from the North Atlantic Council to associate herself with the planning work of N.A.T.O. with regard to Mediterranean defence. A year later still, in September 1951, the North Atlantic Council recommended the North Atlantic Governments to invite Turkey to accede to N.A.T.O. The necessary agreements were obtained and in February 1952 Turkey, overriding a Soviet protest, became a full member of the North Atlantic community. It was a remarkable triumph for national unity and steadiness of purpose. The developments initiated by successive Governments of the People's Party were carried to a successful conclusion by the Democrats. It is now a question of consolidating and strengthening the positions reached, within the framework of N.A.T.O.

At the time of writing, Russian-Turkish relations must be considered in the light of changing Soviet policies. There is no evidence to suggest that there has been a change in Russia's ultimate aims *vis-à-vis* Turkey. The minimum aim is the denial of Turkish territory, in particular the Turkish heartland of Anatolia, to the potential enemies of Russia. The maximum aim is the control of that territory by Russia herself. These aims, which are nearly as old as the existence of Russia as a great Power, have acquired fresh urgency with the dawn of the atomic age. Bombers operating from Turkish airfields are within easy reach of the Baku oilfields, the industrial centres of the Ukraine, the Soviet Black Sea ports and naval bases, and the mouths of the Danube. In addition, with the developing modernization of the Turkish armed forces under American supervision, the overrunning of Turkey at the outset of a war is no longer the easy proposition it appeared to be in 1945.

But even if there has been no change in the ultimate objective,

the recent exchange of notes between the two Governments, initiated by the Soviet Government on 30 May, leaves little doubt that there is to be a change of procedure. Hitherto the notes have been formal in the extreme, but although few words have been wasted in their composition they permit us to draw certain conclusions. The Russians have seen the sterility of their attempts to browbeat Turkey into accepting the claims advanced in 1945, and wish to abandon the overt threat of force in favour of diplomatic discussion. They have formally renounced their claims to Kars and Ardahan, and, by implication, to bases in the Straits. They wish to discuss, bilaterally with Turkey, revision of the present regime in the Straits, presumably with a view to modifying, in favour of the Soviet Union, the provisions under which the warships of non-Black Sea Powers may pass the Straits into the Black Sea. Under the terms of the Montreux Convention, the non-Black Sea Powers may send into the Black Sea naval units totalling not more than 40,000 tons at any one time. The Russians may well consider such a figure excessive. But behind their fear on the score of naval security in the Black Sea is doubtless the tactical consideration that the Straits question is an easier nut to crack than Turkey's membership of N.A.T.O., and that it is therefore wise to take it first.

In face of these manœuvres the Turks have adopted their usual attitude of stolid caution. The Soviet gestures of renunciation have been acknowledged with dry courtesy. The suggestion that the time is ripe for re-opening the Straits question has been met with a terse reference to the Montreux Convention. In other words, the Turks invited the Russians to address their observations, not to Turkey alone, but to all the signatory Powers. In short, the Turkish attitude remains the same as in 1945; and it is extremely unlikely that it will prove less stubborn now, at a time of growing strength and confidence, than it was formerly, in a period of almost desperate peril.

H. A. R. P.

The Kashmir Problem

End of a Stalemate?

THE origins of the dismissal on 8 August of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah from his position as Prime Minister of the State of Kashmir, and of the agreement announced on 20 August between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on a provisional timetable for the appointment of a plebiscite administrator in Kashmir, go back some way.

When on 22 August 1950 the U.N. mediator Sir Owen Dixon reported that he was unable to foresee any immediate prospect of agreement in Kashmir, it appeared that a stalemate had been reached which Pakistan could not resolve unless she was to break the cease-fire agreement, with all the risk of a general war with India that that would involve. India, on the other hand, had no reason to end the deadlock since she herself held the chief bone of contention in the State, Srinagar and the Valley of Kashmir, and might hope that the passage of time would enable Sheikh Abdullah, the Indian-supported Prime Minister of the State, by his programme of land reform and in other ways to gain sufficient support amongst the Moslem Kashmiris to win a plebiscite if it was eventually held. Sir Owen Dixon appears to have been convinced that India would not at that time agree to the demilitarization and other arrangements which would guarantee a plebiscite free of the possibility of intimidation of the people. He did, however, put forward a proposal which, though it made no progress at the time, has recently been increasingly discussed. This was that the State should be partitioned on cultural and religious lines and that a plebiscite should be held in the Valley of Kashmir alone. If this solution were to be carried out, the area around Leh, which has a Buddhist majority, and the southern and eastern parts at least of Jammu province, which have Hindu majorities, would go to India, while the northern part of the State and its western fringes, including Poonch, would go to Pakistan. At the time, while the Pakistan Prime Minister agreed to discuss this proposal, Mr Nehru refused to do so. The subsequent period of fruitless discussion tended to confirm Sir Owen Dixon's view. The Security Council passed resolutions and Dr Frank Graham, the new U.N. representative, repeatedly organized discussions, but to every proposal Mr Nehru returned a negative answer, and it looked as if

the passage of time, in default of some violent action by Pakistan, would slowly cement the State to the Republic of India.

But at the beginning of 1952 difficulties began to emerge in the Indian-held part of Kashmir itself. The land reform which Sheikh Abdullah had initiated, partly no doubt from conviction but also in the hope of gaining the support of the impoverished Moslem peasantry of the State, had inevitably to be carried out at the expense of the local landlords, and most of these were Hindus. A Report of the Kashmir Land Compensation Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Revenue Minister, Mirza Afzal Beg, issued at the beginning of 1952, stated that 'as a state with limited resources, we are too poor to pay compensation out of state revenues. . . We have therefore recommended that . . . payment of compensation to expropriated proprietors is not desirable.' Under the Indian Constitution the payment of compensation is obligatory, and the Government's decision not to pay was based on the claim that Kashmir had acceded to India only in regard to defence, external relations, and communications and that she was not bound by the fundamental rights clauses in the Indian Constitution which provided for the payment of compensation. The Hindu landowners, among whose many thousands not more than about 400 are thought to own more than about 125 acres, seem to have regarded this failure to pay compensation as an attack on them because they were Hindus, and a communal agitation arose. On 10 April 1952 in a speech at Ranbirsinghpura Sheikh Abdullah said that Kashmir was prepared to join India without any reservations 'once we are satisfied that the grave of communalism has been finally dug in India. Of this we are not yet clear.'

This speech caused consternation in India. Mr Nehru himself has consistently opposed communalism and has always insisted that India must be a secular State. Indeed the Indian claim to Kashmir itself can only be based on a rejection of the 'two-nation' theory, and hitherto the attachment of Sheikh Abdullah, a Moslem, and his Government to India has been one of the more striking evidences of the non-communal nature of the Indian Republic. Mr Nehru attributed the fears revealed in this speech to the provocative attitude of the Jammu Praja Parishad, a Hindu body supported by the Hindu landowners, which had begun to demand either the secession of Jammu to India or the complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir State into India, with all the consequences in terms of fundamental rights which would follow from

his. This demand provoked a claim from the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, which had been summoned in the previous ear to the bitter annoyance of Pakistan, that Kashmir should have special status including a State flag, and should be allowed to bolish hereditary rule, replacing the Maharajah by an elected Iead of State, a concession which no state in India has been permitted. This outburst was followed by discussions between Mr Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, and an agreement was signed in Delhi in July 1952 which was ratified on 24 July by the Indian Parliament and on 11 August by the Kashmir Assembly. Under his the Kashmir Assembly was to elect the Head of State but his ppointment was to be confirmed by the Indian President; and Kashmir was to have a State flag but the Indian flag was to fly n Kashmir as the flag of the Union. The agreement also provided or the financial integration of Kashmir into the Republic of ndia, for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court o Kashmir, and for some extension—Mr Nehru on 10 April 1953 uggested that compensation rights might be excluded—of the ndian constitutional fundamental rights to Kashmir. Mr Nehru lefended this agreement in the Indian Parliament on the grounds hat Kashmir was, for obvious reasons, a special case.

The Kashmir Government lost little time in amending the Contitution of the State to provide for an elected Head of State with a term of five years, and the Maharajah abdicated and his son the Yuvaraj Karan Singh was elected as Head of State, or Sardar-i-Riyasat, on 17 November 1952. On 23 November 1952 the Praja Parishad started a widespread agitation in Jammu province which ncluded passive resistance and refusal to pay taxes. Besides the complaint about the operation of land reform, the Hindus of Jammu complained about the customs barriers between Jammu and Kashmir State and India, which it was difficult for the State o lift since they provided about a third of its revenue; and they also claimed that discrimination was being exercised against Hindus in appointments to posts in the State services. The passive resistance movement, which was supported from India by a number of right-wing communal organizations, soon became violent, despite the appointment by the Kashmir Government in February of a committee to inquire into the working of land reform and of price and other controls (another grievance in Jammu), and into the progress of the rehabilitation of displaced persons (many Hindu refugees had come into Jammu to replace

Moslems who had fled to Pakistan), and of the rehabilitation of State ex-servicemen (mostly Dogra Rajputs from Jammu). Riots and disorders on a serious scale continued throughout the first six months of 1953. Riots and disorders also took place in the Punjab and in Delhi, promoted by the communal organizations which were supporting the Praja Parishad.

On 17 April Sheikh Abdullah announced that the Constitution of Kashmir, which was then under discussion, would grant more autonomy to the various cultural units of the State, but, as with the earlier appointment of the commission of inquiry, this concession to communal feeling failed to abate the Praja Parishad agitation. On 8 May Mr Syama Prasad Mookherjee, who was leading the campaign in India in support of the Praja Parishad and was perhaps the leading right-wing opponent of the Congress in the Indian Parliament, announced that he would visit Jammu without seeking a permit, claiming that as the State was part of India a permit was not necessary. He was arrested on 11 May just across the Jammu state border, and was housed in a bungalow near Srinagar.

The Praja Parishad agitation seems to have made Sheikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues, in particular Mirza Afzal Beg, most uneasy about the future of the Kashmiri Moslems if Kashmir was to be closely integrated into India, and a split began to develop in the Kashmir National Conference, with Sheikh Abdullah appearing to drift in the direction of belief in a more or less autonomous republic, for the Valley of Kashmir at least, and with a group led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the Deputy Prime Minister, in favour of the implementation of the remainder of the clauses of the Delhi agreement of July 1952.

Meanwhile, with the appointment of Mr Mohammad Ali as Prime Minister of Pakistan, relations between India and Pakistan appeared to become much more friendly. Mr Nehru and Mr Mohammad Ali met informally in London at the time of the Coronation and it was agreed that they should hold talks during the summer on Indian-Pakistani differences, of which Kashmir was by far the most fundamental.

During June Sheikh Abdullah made a number of speeches in the course of which he said that only an agreement between India and Pakistan could solve the problems facing Kashmir and reiterated his statement of September 1947 that 'freedom before accession' was the only democratic solution. On 23 June Mr S. P. Mookherjee died suddenly of a heart attack while still under detention in

Srinagar, and this produced a strong outburst of Hindu communal feeling against Sheikh Abdullah in India. In a speech on 26 June he said that 'if interested people try to exploit his death (Mr Mookerjee's) and under this pretext threaten to merge Kashmir with India we cannot be cowed down.' By this time the split in the Kashmir National Conference had become quite open, and it was clear that Sheikh Abdullah was thinking of more independence from India rather than closer integration. On 1 July Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and Mirza Afzal Beg left for talks with Mr Nehru in Delhi, who remarked on 2 July that the Praja Parishad agitation for full integration had produced a 'contrary reaction on other people in the State'. Earlier, in a speech in Delhi on 26 May, he had said that the agitation would not increase the love of the people of Kashmir for India but would make them look to the other side. On 3 July Sheikh Abdullah said in a speech in Srinagar that 'Kashmir has acceded to India on three subjects only, and has been allowed to retain complete autonomy in all other matters. Added to the Instrument of Accession is the Delhi Agreement. We stand by each word of these agreements, but if communal organizations in India want to merge Kashmir with India, responsibility for breaking these agreements will be theirs and not ours.' On 7 July in response to an appeal by Mr Nehru the Praja Parishad agitation was called off, but the damage had already been done.

On 14 July there was a meeting of the India-Pakistan Steering Committee in Karachi and on 25 July Mr Nehru and Mr Mohammad Ali themselves met in Karachi. Mr Nehru's visit was the occasion for demonstrations of goodwill in the Pakistani capital, and the discussions appear to have been conducted in an excellent atmosphere, though nothing was decided about Kashmir. Meanwhile both Mr Nehru and Mr Mohammad Ali had denied reports that they had agreed to divide Kashmir. These reports were in part based on the belief that Mr Dulles, when visiting the subcontinent, had suggested that partition might be a solution and that Mr Stevenson, who had visited Srinagar and had talks with Sheikh Abdullah, had held a similar view. It was thought that the United States had always supported an independent status for the Valley of Kashmir.

During July the split in the Kashmir National Conference became a yawning gulf. On 26 July Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed reaffirmed his belief in accession to India, though he did not believe that Kashmir should surrender its special position or its internal

autonomy. Sheikh Abdullah began to place more and more emphasis on the need for the goodwill of both India and Pakistan and meanwhile a number of groups in the Valley favouring Pakistan began to come into the open and to hold meetings. On 31 July Sheikh Abdullah made a speech at Ganderbal. He said that Kashmir must steer between the two extreme views of merger with India and merger with Pakistan, and that the State was placed in such a position geographically that it needed the goodwill of both India and Pakistan. He complained that he had signed the Delhi agreement and was just about to implement it,[1] when the Praja Parishad agitation, obviously supported by many people in India, aroused Moslem fears that once the agreement was fully carried out and Kashmir was more completely integrated into India, Hindu dominance would be re-asserted. He also complained of the inadequacy of Moslem recruitment into the State forces and the postal services, which, coming under the headings of defence and communications, are under Indian Government control, and, going back into history, in effect claimed that accession had been forced on Kashmir by India who would not help her against the armed raiders from Pakistan unless she acceded. It could not be expected that such an open demonstration of dissatisfaction would not cause extreme irritation in Delhi.

On 8 August Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed by the Head of the State (the downfall of whose father he had himself brought about) and on 9 August Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was made Prime Minister. Sheikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg, and a number of other leading Kashmiris were arrested. The Indian Government on 9 August disclaimed any prior knowledge of these events or that Indian troops had taken any part in them. There were demonstrations, strikes, and other minor disorders in Kashmir following Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal and a number of people were killed—according to Indian reports by the police and armed militia and not by the Indian Army, which is of course present in the State in considerable strength. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed himself claimed that Sheikh Abdullah had created a position in which interested foreign Powers might exploit the situation to their own advantage. The foreign Power particularly mentioned was the United States. He also, in passing, accused the United Nations military observers of inciting demonstrators.

[1] There have been complaints in India that he only implemented those parts of the agreement which suited him.

These events in Kashmir aroused great agitation in Pakistan and Mr Mohammad Ali immediately proposed a meeting with Mr Nehru to discuss Kashmir. He arrived in Delhi on 16 August and his visit, as with that of Mr Nehru to Karachi, was the occasion of a display of remarkable friendliness by the people. The announcement on 20 August that it had been agreed that a plebiscite administrator would be appointed by the end of April 1954 does not of course solve the Kashmir problem. The question of demilitarization which defeated Dr Graham remains, so far as is known, unresolved, but though, in view of previous history, the belief that a solution in Kashmir may at last be in sight can only be a very feeble growth, nevertheless a step towards a solution does appear to have been taken. A final solution in the end depends on the willingness of Mr Nehru to permit an expression of opinion as to their own future by the people of at least the Valley of Kashmir under conditions that Pakistan will not find too unacceptable. It may be that the difficulties in recent months with Sheikh Abdullah have made a solution easier rather than more difficult.

S. O.

President Eisenhower's First Six Months

THE Eighty-third Congress ended its first session in Washington at the beginning of August, a little over six months after Mr Eisenhower took office as the first Republican President for twenty years, and a little over a year after he, the candidate of the international and progressive wing of the Republican Party, had been chosen to represent that party in the presidential election campaign. It was in contrast to the high hopes of a year ago that the disappointment felt in Washington as Congress adjourned was most marked. For by last January it had become clear that Mr Eisenhower was very far from being the dynamic liberal leader at home that those who admired his record abroad had hoped he would be. And it had also become clear that in Congress the Republican Party was still dominated by its nationalist conservatives.

That these conservatives were not the type of Republican who

appeals to the average voter was apparent from the fact that Mr Eisenhower's huge majority over his Democratic opponent was not repeated in Congress. There the Republicans only won control by the barest margin in both Houses. In practice this has meant that the President has had to rely on Democratic votes for the passage of all important legislation, since he could never count on the backing of all the members of his own party. The Democrats, noted for their disagreements when in power, have been drawn together (although this can only be a temporary phenomenon) by their defeat and have shown far more unity, and indeed far more responsibility, than have the Republicans.

The difficulty of getting action on any Bill that was not approved by at least some Democrats, combined with the President's own reluctance to apply pressure to Republican Congressmen, largely explains the ineffectiveness of this session of Congress. It not only failed to implement more than a few of the Republican election pledges, but even to act on many of the more modest list of measures which the President put before it last January.

One election promise, the one which did most to ensure Mr Eisenhower's victory, has at least been fulfilled: a truce has been signed in Korea. But even this has not brought the triumphant satisfaction that might have been expected, for the truce seems just as likely to be followed by an extended war as by a peace treaty. Nor will peace in Korea mean peace at home, for the differences of opinion, among Republicans and among Americans in general, on the future policy to be adopted in the Far East show indications of developing into a controversy which may well dominate the next session of Congress when it meets in January.

The end of hostilities will not even mean any great saving of money, for lower expenditure on ammunition, equipment, and even soldiers' pay will be counterbalanced by the need for substantial dollar aid to help to rehabilitate Korea. Certainly there is no hope of balancing the United States Budget in the current fiscal year, which ends on 30 June, and little of doing so even in the next. This is perhaps the greatest disappointment of the Eisenhower Administration; it affects almost everyone, for it means that there is little chance of any general tax reduction before the congressional elections in 1954. Congress did its best to economize by appropriating only $61 billion, compared with the $64·4 billion asked for by President Eisenhower and $73·3 billion forecast by Mr Truman before he left office. The main cuts

were made in foreign aid and in defence, going too deep for safety, according to many experts, especially where the Air Force was concerned.

But these appropriations are to a great extent for future, not current, spending. The Truman Administration left a legacy of $81 billion in contracts let but not paid for, mainly for armaments. These bills are now falling due, and for this reason it has been impossible for the new Administration to reduce Mr Truman's prospective deficit in actual spending by more than $4 billion; the short-fall in revenue is now calculated at $5·6 billion for the current fiscal year. It is easy to blame President Truman for this deficit, but to do so would be unjustifiable; it was the world situation, as President Eisenhower is the first to admit, that necessitated rearmament.

Congress showed its resentment at this inescapable fact of international life, first by trying to refuse to extend the excess profits tax, without which the deficit would be still greater, and, when this attempt was frustrated, by refusing to raise the limit on the national debt from $275 billion to $290 billion, as the President had requested. This, his only really serious rebuff from Congress, came at the last moment of the session and it may mean that Congress will have to be recalled during the autumn. For that is the period during which revenue collections lag behind spending and when the Government must borrow heavily to pay its bills. The $2·5 billion in borrowing authority, which is all there is in hand, may not, in the President's view, be enough, although he and the Secretary of the Treasury have promised to do their best to manage with this amount.

Nothing would better please the Democrats, who were responsible for the rejection of this measure, than to see an Administration which had promised to balance the Budget being forced to recall Congress in order to ask permission to go deeper into debt. It would be even better, from the Democratic point of view, if the ceiling on the national debt had to be raised just before next year's election, which may well happen. Next year is also the time when the long-postponed economic recession is now supposed to be going to materialize—perhaps. If it does, the Democrats will have another election issue, for they will blame this recession on the Eisenhower Administration's 'hard money' policy of raising interest rates and restricting credit.

In fact, the financial authorities have recently shown that they

are quite aware of the economic danger inherent in this policy and have been administering it with more flexibility, now that it has achieved its primary purpose of checking inflation. Partly because of these indirect controls and partly because inflationary tendencies were in any case abating, the new Administration has been able to remove almost all the direct controls, on prices, raw materials, and so on, which were imposed after the outbreak of the Korean war. This is the most immediate example of 'getting the Government out of business', in order to free private enterprise, but there are many others and will be more. The ownership of off-shore oil has been returned to the states, which is where oil producers wanted it to be; a scheme for selling the synthetic rubber industry to private interests has been worked out; the Government is allowing private companies to generate and distribute electricity wherever possible, instead of encouraging public power projects.

But one group of private businessmen, the farmers, are refusing to be free from Government interference. Wheat farmers have just voted for regulations on their output, rather than for lower prices, and cotton farmers are expected to do the same. The political implications of falling farm prices to a Republican Party that depends on the agricultural vote are such that the Administration is forced to use all its legal powers to keep these prices as high as it can, even though this means that burdensome surpluses are piling up and that the basic Republican principles of free enterprise and economy are being defied. It is a dilemma which Congress too will have to face next year, when the agricultural legislation must be reconsidered.

In other fields, however, progress has been made toward cheaper and more efficient government, and even the Department of Agriculture has been reorganized. This is one of ten schemes which Congress has allowed the President to put into effect, and more are expected. One of them established a new Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and others affected the Department of Defence and the administration of the foreign aid and overseas information programmes. These reorganizations were certainly needed and they will eventually provide better government for less money. It is doubtful whether on balance any benefit is being gained from other Republican attempts to alter the civil service system, to replace the appointees of the Democratic Administration, and to reduce the total number of bureaucrats. A number of Republicans have, of course, been given jobs, to the comfort

of their political patrons, and a number of allegedly corrupt and unqualified employees have been dismissed, but it will take a long time to overcome the resultant uncertainty and disruption which has spread through the whole civil service. This is especially true of the State Department, which has also suffered from constant accusations of disloyalty from Senator McCarthy, in spite of the new and fairly satisfactory system of civil service loyalty boards that has been set up.

Congress refused to put another Government department, the Post Office, on a sounder financial footing by raising postal charges, and it made no attempt to improve either the old-age insurance system or the government of the District of Columbia, both of which President Eisenhower had asked it to do. The Territory of Hawaii nearly, but not quite, achieved statehood, but no one either in the Administration or in Congress could decide what ought to be done about the Taft-Hartley Labour Act. When it became obvious that any amendments to the Act passed by Congress would be likely to make it still more restrictive, and thus to alienate the trade unions still further, the attempt to deal with this legislation was abandoned for the session; it may now be postponed until after the 1954 election.

But on foreign trade policy, another field of legislation in which no final decision was reached at this session, action cannot be postponed until after the election. For Congress only renewed the Trade Agreements Act, under which tariff reductions are negotiated, for a year, to give the President time to decide, with the help of yet another advisory committee, what he would like to do about the whole question. Congress, or at least some Republican members of it, knew very well what it wanted to do—to pass a series of amendments to the Act that would have made it almost entirely ineffective. To get the Act renewed without these amendments, the President had apparently to agree to give a protectionist bias to the Tariff Commission, which administers some of the provisions of the Act, when he appointed new members. There is also an ominously protectionist colouring about a high proportion of the members of his new advisory committee. On the other hand Congress did pass a Customs Simplification Bill; this, although not as far-reaching as had been hoped, will make it a little easier for imports to get through the red tape of the American tariff regulations.

It took all the President's influence, and all the Democratic sup-

port he could muster, to get even $4·5 billion appropriated for foreign aid, $3 billion less than Mr Truman had asked; and Congress gave notice that it was authorizing money for this purpose for the last time. The new scheme which Mr Eisenhower has promised will have to be very prepossessing to win acceptance. The President also had to work hard to force through the treaty dealing with the legal status of American servicemen in N.A.T.O. countries and the Bill permitting special quotas of immigrants to come into the United States from over-populated countries and from behind the Iron Curtain. Nothing was done about his plea for reconsideration of the basic restrictions on immigration, but at least he succeeded in preventing any final action being taken on Senator Bricker's dangerous constitutional amendment which would limit the treaty-making power of the President and which had wide support in the Senate.

All of this is the record of an inexperienced President, unaware of his own strength, an inexperienced Administration, and indeed of an inexperienced party. Nothing else could perhaps have been expected of a President whose previous career had been in the army, of a Cabinet composed mainly of men whose experience was of business, not of politics, and of a party which had been without responsibility for twenty years. The President found himself faced with problems which he did not understand; he made mistakes and then wisely postponed decisions, on such matters as trade policy, for example, until he had studied them further. The Cabinet was entangled in the complexities of government and of congressional relations; certain of its members, notably the Secretaries of Defence and of Commerce, have not yet succeeded in re-establishing their reputations. And in Congress the Republicans found it difficult to lose the habit of opposing the White House for opposition's sake. Here the situation would have been far worse had it not been for the constructive work done by the late Senator Taft, both in holding the Republicans together in Congress and in linking them with the White House.

Nevertheless, it has been argued that Mr Eisenhower relied too much on the Senator, that the President had a theory that the Executive and the Legislature were equal partners, whereas in fact under the American system it is essential that the Executive should take the lead. If this argument were well founded, there were signs even before Mr Taft's death that the President had realized his mistake; in the closing weeks of session he was frequently

asserting his authority over Congress and appealing directly to public opinion in support of his views. In the future he will hardly be able to avoid doing this, for there is no one else who can succeed Mr Taft as the co-ordinating influence in the Republican Party.

There have been signs, too, that the President's slow start may be paying dividends; for instance, Senator McCarthy, who seemed to have been tolerated for over long, is beginning to hang himself with the rope he has been given. But the slow start means that some of the most controversial issues have been postponed until an election year, when Congress always has difficulty in producing satisfactory legislation. It means also that the President has dissipated much of the prestige of his victory and has given the Republicans time to forget that it was he, not they, for whom the public voted at the last election. N. B.

Purges in the Albanian Communist Party

THE recent session of the People's Assembly at Tirana, and the news of the ministerial changes which preceded it, provided an occasion for important pronouncements by the Albanian Prime Minister, E. Hoxha, and his collaborators. The July Conference in Athens of the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was bitterly attacked and loyalty to Russia proclaimed. To emphasize the friendship between the Soviet Union and Albania the two Governments decided to raise their respective legations to the rank of embassies. Great stress was laid on the need to increase production in both industry and agriculture, a problem all the more difficult since Albania is hampered by a grave shortage of modern equipment which, under present circumstances, can only be obtained from the U.S.S.R. or the satellites by sea, and also by the lack of trained technicians and skilled workers. Following the latest Moscow pattern of strengthening the structure of the Communist régime, the number of seats in the Cabinet was nearly halved, E. Hoxha remaining Prime Minister while the Minister of the Interior, M. Shehu, became Deputy Premier.

Between them they provide the top leadership of the youngest

Communist Party in Europe. It was founded under the Italian occupation in November 1941 and was recognized by the Comintern just before the dissolution of the latter organization in 1943. Its late development in a country where the industrial proletariat was almost non-existent did not prevent the Party from becoming the master of Albania before the end of the war. This rapid progress was achieved without the entry of the Red Army, and today Albania is the only Communist State which is detached geographically from the Soviet bloc.

Though the Party was formed in the midst of the struggle against Fascism and its first manifesto called on the people to insurrection against the occupying Power, it lost most of its leaders as a result of purges. Only one—K. Stafo—was killed by the Fascists, as compared with two dozen who were executed, committed suicide, were expelled, or just disappeared during the past twelve years.

Among the first to lose their lives was L. Fundo, one of the Communist pioneers in Albania, who had established contact with the Comintern in the 'twenties. Suspected of Right-wing deviation during the Moscow purges, he lost favour and was not allowed to join the Communist Party after its foundation. In 1943 he was declared a traitor and was executed when he fell into the hands of his former colleagues.

Until the Tito-Cominform dispute the two most important posts in the Albanian Communist Party or the Labour Party of Albania, as its official title is, were held by E. Hoxha and K. Xoxe. The former was and still is its secretary-general, while the latter was the organizational secretary of the central committee and head of the secret police. In 1946 he became Minister of the Interior. During the war he had entered into close contact with the delegates of the Yugoslav Communist Party whose influence was paramount in the Albanian partisan movement. Their support allowed him to play an important role after the war and to carry out a thorough party purge.

Among his first victims was L. Guegua, a Communist leader in North Albania, who held several important posts in the Party hierarchy. She was in charge of the Party school in 1942, belonged to the first central committee, and was member of the Supreme Council of National Liberation. In 1944, as president of the Anti-Fascist Women's Front, she quarrelled with Xoxe, who suspected her of trying to take his post and obtained her removal from the central committee on the charge of devationism.

The next to be removed was S. Maleshova, a Communist intellectual educated in France. He returned to Albania in 1943, was co-opted on to the central committee, and later on joined the Politbureau. In 1946 he was found guilty of advocating 'a liberal, completely opportunist policy in the relations which our country should have with the countries of Anglo-American imperialism', and also of wishing to place relations with the West on the same footing with those which Albania 'cultivates with the really democratic countries, our faithful allies and friends of our people: the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia'. He was removed from all his posts and later expelled from the Party. Since then nothing has been heard of him.

More dramatic was the end of N. Spiro, a war-time secretary of the Communist youth, who became a member of the Politbureau and Minister of National Economy. Towards the end of 1947 an official communiqué announced that Spiro was killed accidently while cleaning his revolver. A few months later a resolution of the central committee was more explicit: 'conscious of his treason, Spiro preferred suicide to avoid appearing before the Party'. The same meeting of the central committee expelled from its ranks and from the Party Dr Y. Dyshitsa, who was for a time member of the Politbureau and then Minister of Health. This was done at the instigation of his personal enemy K. Xoxe, whose own career was sealed soon afterwards by the repercussions of the Tito-Cominform dispute in Albania.

The Albanian Communist Party was, apart from the East German one, the only party from a satellite country in Europe which was not invited to the founding of the Cominform in September 1947. The condemnation of Marshal Tito offered an explanation for the absence of the Albanians. They were much under the influence of the Yugoslav Communists and it was thought wiser not to include them in the Cominform in order to isolate Tito better and thus settle his case more easily. When the Yugoslav Communist leaders were excommunicated, Xoxe, in spite of his pro-Titoist past, tried to save himself by carrying out in the name of the Cominform a purge of 'Yugoslav agents'. But this move was unsuccessful, and his opponents managed to obtain his transfer from the Ministry of the Interior to that of Industry before sentencing him to death in 1949. Xoxe's elimination was followed by arrests of his followers within the party machine and the State administration. They include, among others, two

members of the Politbureau, P. Christo and N. Kerendzi, and a deputy Minister of the Interior.

The purge continued unabated throughout 1950. Among its more prominent victims was the Minister of Transport, N. Islami, who at a meeting of the central committee criticized the poor quality of lorries from the U.S.S.R. Immediately afterwards he was accused of anti-Soviet tendencies and ordered to appear before a Party commission of inquiry. Realizing his fate, he killed himself. His suicide was followed by the expulsion of two members of the central committee, for 'Right-wing deviation and lack of understanding of Soviet policy towards Albania'. They were A. Chehu, Minister of Industry, who at the first Party congress received the largest number of votes at the election for the central committee, and the partisan leader N. Vinchani who completed his military training at the Moscow academy 'Voroshilov' and had even been awarded a medal from the Soviet Government.

After all these purges the only remaining members of the original central committee were E. Hoxha, T. Yakova, R. Chitaku, and B. Spahiu, who were elected to the Politbureau at the first Party congress in November 1950. But even they did not survive until today, for at the second Party congress in March 1952 Hoxha alone of the four was re-elected to the Politbureau.

Nevertheless Hoxha's chief claim to distinction in the Communist world does not lie in his undoubted ruthlessness towards his erstwhile colleagues. It is due, rather, to two specific features which distinguish Albania from the other East European States and which render his task more difficult. It is the only Communist regime which is completely surrounded by its avowed enemies, and the only satellite without a pact of mutual aid with the U.S.S.R. These two factors, and the internal strains of which the purge is a visible sign, make Albania today the most vulnerable Soviet satellite in Europe.

I. A.

Some Aspects of Lebanese Trade Unionism

THE Lebanese Republic, with a population approaching 1¼ nillion, has about 150,000 wage-earners who are potentially nembers of trade unions; but of these only 28,300 had been so organized at the beginning of 1952. Organization had naturally begun in the more skilled occupations, especially where large numbers were employed together, as on the railways or at the Iraq Petroleum Co.'s Mediterranean terminal at Tripoli; but a nass of lower-paid workers remained outside, or on the fringe of, he trade union organization. One of the first effective unions, that of the printers, was the creation of a well-known and active Comnunist, Mustafā al-ᶜArīs; and in the course of the second World War trade unionism had made rapid advances, with a markedly Communist trend. After the end of the war, however, the Lebanese Government—over which Shaikh Bishāra al-Khūrī, a symbol of he predominance of the Beirut plutocracy, presided from the *de facto* achievement of independence in 1943 until the *coup d'état* of September 1952—had set to work to counteract the Communist nfluence over the unions. Twenty-one out of the thirty-eight ecognized and active unions had been federated into an Association of Trades Unions (Jamᶜīyatu'n-Niqābāt), with a membership of 16,800 out of the total of 28,300; 5,900 belonged to the Communist-controlled Federation of Trade Unions (*Ittihādu'n-Niqābāt*) and 5,600 to the independent 'United Trades Unions' *an-Niqābātu'l-Muttahida*) about which more will be said later.

The official Association of Trade Unions is affiliated to the .C.F.T.U., but can be styled 'free' only by courtesy. This is argely due to the superficiality of democratic institutions in a country traditionally amenable to sectarian and 'feudal' leadership, supplemented since 1919 by the influence of a new and expanding urban plutocracy. A recent observer[1] who was enabled in the course of his studies to attend trade union meetings noted the apathy of the rank-and-file membership[2] whose only function

[1] Edward W. Samuell, Jr , on whose unpublished M A. thesis, 'A Contribution o the Study of Lebanese Labor Syndicates' (1952), this article is largely based, y permission of the Department of Arab Studies in the American University of Beirut

[2] Cf. Joseph Goldstein· *The Government of British Trades Unions, a Study of Apathy and the Democratic Process in the Transport and General Workers Union* London, Allen & Unwin, 1952).

seemed to be the election of the executive. Moreover, even on the Council of a union most of the elected members appeared to function only as advisers on some special topic within their competence, and to answer only those questions put to them as individuals; they took no part in debate on controversial matters, these being left either to the decision of the president or to a compromise reached between him and the other executive officials—vice-president, secretary, and treasurer.

It was relatively simple for this bureaucratic structure to be effectively dominated by the Bishāra al-Khūrī regime,[1] with the President's son, Shaikh Khalīl al-Khūrī, assuming the role of honorary president of the Association of Trade Unions and controlling it through a former secretary of his father who was nominated chief of the trade union department of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Members of the executive council of the Association were financed by Shaikh Khalīl, either directly or indirectly by his influencing the Government to subsidize a given union to ensure its allegiance; conversely, a recalcitrant union official could be disciplined by hints of dismissal or police action.

An even more striking example of external political influence over the unions was the position of Henri Firᶜawn (Pharaon), a wealthy Beirut deputy and pillar of the Bishāra al-Khūrī regime, as honorary president of the Motor-Drivers' Union. The most immediately impressive feature of Beirut is the immense number of new American cars circulating irresponsibly through the narrow, hilly streets of the capital—within ten minutes of his arrival the writer was told by his taxi-driver: 'Our city has become one big garage'—and the Drivers' Union, with its 1,500 members, thus became an important political factor. If a driver was liable to pay damages as the result of a traffic accident, *khwāja* ('boss') Firᶜawn would often intervene and defray the debt, afterwards extracting his political *quid pro quo.*[2] The election of the council of the Drivers' Union in December 1950 resembled the notorious General Election of 1947, in that one list of candidates was returned with 2,800 votes against only nine votes for the rival list! The protests were so violent that on the intervention of the then Prime Minister, Riyād as-Sulh, and of Henri Firᶜawn it was proposed to hold

[1] On this regime and its fall, see 'Peaceful Change in the Lebanon', in *The World Today*, April 1953.

[2] A leading article criticized his protection of '*les fiers à bras et les hommes de paille qui gravitaient autour de lui*' (*L'Orient*, 17 November 1952, quoting *ad-Diyār*).

a fresh election at a later date. Thereupon, however, the supporters of the victorious list drove their cars to busy traffic centres of Beirut and completely blocked them for a period of two hours. The police were intimidated and helpless, and further Government interventions were necessary to end this novel sit-down strike and persuade the rival groups to compromise on a joint list which was duly elected.

The Drivers' Union and the Union of Private-Car Drivers continued to press for such concessions as the postponement for four years of the collection of the tax on licence-plates, the stopping of the import of new cars, and an effective ban on private cars plying as taxis, the cancellation of the tax on car radios, the removal of legal responsibility from car owners or drivers in whose vehicles were found smuggled goods of which they ostensibly were unaware, an amnesty on outstanding prosecutions for infringements of traffic regulations, the enforcement of traffic discipline on pedestrians, etc. In January 1952 a spectacular merger was effected between these two drivers' unions and two owners' associations, the Union of Garage and Vehicle Owners and the Union of Lorry Owners, to form a grandiosely named Federation of Road Transport and Communications (*Ittihādu'n-Naql wa'l-Muwāsalāti'l-Barrīya*). This combination continued to press its interests at the expense of the general public; and when the Government of ᶜAbdullāh al-Yāfī, which had been resisting its demands, fell in the spring of 1952, they received substantial satisfaction from the more complacent Government of Sāmī as-Sulh which was to share the downfall of Bishāra al-Khūrī in September.

The most favourably placed trade unionists seem to be those employed by the Iraq Petroleum Co., which has both the means and the experience to have assisted them to organize a medical insurance fund, operated jointly by the company and the union, and a savings fund: the individual employee decides how much he wishes to be withheld from his pay-packet, and this is invested at interest on the Company's security and is repayable on notice given. The I.P.C. employees' union has also made proposals for the establishment of a night school, a co-operative stores, a club-house, and a large sports-ground. The railway workers also have a provident fund jointly managed by themselves and the company; but this union has twice, in January 1949 and December 1950, made demands for an extra month's salary at the end of the year.

Appeased on the first occasion by the granting of half its demand as a bonus, it rejected the same offer on the second occasion, on the ground that the Company's annual operating deficit had been reduced from several million Lebanese pounds to a mere 200,000 (*c.* £20,000 sterling). Most unions are stated to be more interested in pressing the Government to concede material demands than in organizing their own welfare in conjunction with their employers. They have the justification that most private employers, both large and small, are still opposed to trade unionism in principle, and are therefore unlikely to be co-operative; but union officials seem to feel that they are justifying their existence *vis-à-vis* the rank-and-file if they produce for publication a steady stream of verbal memoranda, petitions, and demands.

Although the labour situation cannot be said to be among the most urgent of the multifarious problems facing the Government in this deeply divided little country, the situation is itself a deteriorating one. There were indications during 1952 that the Government-controlled Association of Trades Unions was losing ground among the workers, since it was making no visible effort to help those most poorly paid and harassed by the continually rising cost of living. Five unions had recently broken away from the Association to form the independent 'United Trade Unions'; but greater influence lay with the Communist-controlled Federation of Trade Unions (*Ittihādu'n-Niqābāt*) presided over by Mustafā al-ᶜArīs. The official membership figures for this Federation are relatively small, but its concealed influence probably extends considerably more widely; it comprises such important groups as the building workers' and carpenters' unions, while the 250 members of al-ᶜArīs's own printers' union occupy a key position. These Communist-controlled unions are constantly obtaining press publicity for their memoranda coupling the 'monopolizers and speculators on the people's food' with the 'criminal propaganda for a third world war', while the Iraq Petroleum Co. is attacked as a 'tyrannical company backed by the criminal imperialists, sucking the blood of the workers and people'.[1] The president of the printers' union, al-ᶜArīs's henchman Sa'du'd-Dīn Mumnā, was among those arrested in February 1950 for distributing Communist leaflets attacking General Sir Brian Robertson, the British C.-in-C. Middle East, who was then making a tour of the Arab States;

[1] Memoranda of the builders' and printers' unions: *Bairūt al-Masā*, 16 January 1951, *al-Ahrār*, 2 February 1951, *at-Tilighrāf*, 9 May 1951.

and when General Robertson revisited Beirut on 13 November 1952 the Communists again evaded the vigilance of the security authorities, to demonstrate and throw stones outside the British Embassy. A well-placed source estimated at the end of 1952 that in a free election in which the Communist Party was free to campaign as such, the widespread popular discontent, combined with the traditional pro-Russian attitude of the Armenian and Orthodox communities, would probably secure for it three of the seven seats allocated to Beirut city.[1] Communism certainly had a favourable ground in which to sow its seed among the ignorant and frustrated, when the leading article of a responsible Beirut newspaper could comment that 'the Lebanese State, which has remained unorganized for nine long years, has become so cheapened that the urgent task is to wash it clean of the kind of infamy which its own rulers have admitted, and yet continue to tolerate. Corruption and anarchy, and all their manifestations in the daily life of the street and the public services, remain. . .'[2] Nine months after the 'rosewater' revolution of September 1952, the Lebanese political scene continued to be dominated by the ephemeral combinations effected by self-interested 'bosses', and effective power remained in the hands of the plutocracy in town and countryside.

G. E. K.

[1] Besides the Soviet Union, the diplomatic mission most active in Lebanese trade union circles is that of the Argentine, its interest being both to make propaganda for the workers' State of General Perón and to attract Lebanese emigrant labour.

[2] *L'Orient*, 15 November 1952.

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Notes of the Month

The Nigeria Constitution Conference

THE manner of their making has perhaps diverted attention from the importance of the decisions made by the Nigeria Constitution Conference which finished in London on 22 August. The Conference met after months of dispute in Nigeria between the southern alliance of the Action Group with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), and the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.): between this alliance and the National Independence Party, which had broken away from the N.C.N.C.: and between the Action Group and the Governor; and after 'British imperialism' had for many Nigerians assumed a sinister 'divide-and-rule' guise. It finished with praise for Mr Lyttelton from all Nigerian delegates at the Conference: with the Action Group-N.C.N.C. alliance sadly shaken and with signs of an N.C.N.C.-N.P.C. rapprochement: and, except for the position of Lagos, with agreement on all major matters, including the two which had been in the forefront of Nigerian political discussion since the crisis—self-government in 1956 and the return to the Central Council of Ministers of the Action Ministers whose resignation marked the beginning of the crisis.

Mr Lyttelton certainly handled the Conference well, and he and his advisers were obviously determined not to impose any solution, but only to assist Nigerians to reach agreement. But nobody could have been a successful chairman if the three main Nigerian leaders, the Sardauna of Sokoto (N.P.C.), Mr Awolowo (Action Group), and Dr Azikiwe (N.C.N.C.), had not come to the Conference all determined on the same thing—greater autonomy for Nigeria's three Regions. This they have certainly got: the new Constitution will change Nigeria from a country with three regional governments with limited powers subordinated to the central Govern-

ment, into a country with three regional governments autonomous in 'regional' subjects and exercising 'residual' powers, leaving to the centre a limited list of functions. The central Government, particularly because the new House of Representatives, unlike the present one, will be elected in elections held separately from those for the Regional Houses and will have a membership separate from theirs, is much more than the 'non-political' agency originally suggested by the Northern People's Congress. But both the N.P.C. and the Action Group (to whose view Dr Azikiwe is a recent convert) get from the Conference the regional autonomy they wanted, symbolized by the decision that each Region will have a Prime Minister.

The decision about the new status of the Regions also makes possible agreement about 'self-government in 1956'. The Conference accepted a declaration of policy that 'in 1956 her Majesty's Government would grant to those Regions which desired it full self-government in respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments, with the proviso that there should be safeguards to ensure that the Regional Governments did not act so as to impede or prejudice the exercise by the Federal Government of the functions assigned to it now, or as amended by agreement in the future, or in any way make the continuance of federation impossible'.

Whether a federation with a 'colonial' Northern Region and 'self-governing' Eastern and Western Regions can work nobody can say. But Mr Awolowo has pointed to the precedent of the Central African Federation.

The situation is complicated by Mr Lyttelton's decisions on Lagos and the Cameroons—he was called on to make the first by the Conference, which failed to reach agreement itself, and to make the second by Dr Endeley and the Cameroons delegates, who maintained that as a Trust Territory the Cameroons is the responsibility of the British, not the Nigerian Government, so that the Conference could make no decision about its future. The decisions mean that Nigeria will have in addition to its three Regions two 'federal territories'; though while the Cameroons delegation welcomed the decision that their people could decide in the forthcoming elections whether to stay in the Eastern Region or not, Mr Awolowo and the Yoruba Action Group are bitterly opposed to the decision that Lagos, a largely Yoruba city, in spite of being Nigeria's capital, should be separated from the Western Region.

The published report of Mr Lyttelton's speech on this decision does not seem to give adequate reason for a change so momentous to the West.

The Conference resumes in Lagos in January, to dot the i's and cross the t's, and to receive the report of the Fiscal Commissioner who is now considering the financial implications of the decisions taken in London. Whether the atmosphere of Lagos will be as conducive to compromise and objectivity as that of Carlton House Terrace cannot yet be said. But these are the two qualities whose absence caused the present Constitution to break down and without which no new one can work.

A New Leaf in Morocco

HAD there been a stable Government in France during the last nine or ten months the deposition of the Sultan of Morocco and the elevation to the throne of Mohamed ben Arafa, a prince of the same dynasty, would almost certainly not have been allowed to happen. What Marshal Juin was forbidden to do in February 1951, the Pasha of Marrakesh achieved in August 1953, thus proving that the insecure and undecided Government of an empire is no match for the determination of an intelligent and powerful provincial chieftain who knows precisely what he wants. There had been no secrecy about the 'conspirators'' plans—at least, ever since the Casablanca troubles and the total defeat of the Moroccan nationalists of last December loud voices had been proclaiming all over the country that the Sultan must go.

Sidi Mohamed V had identified himself with the nationalist movement to such an extent that he remained friendless when the leaders of this movement were eclipsed. With their support he had consistently opposed French proposals of administrative and political reforms because, so he said, he wished to introduce democratic reforms himself once the independence of his throne had been restored and the protectorate regime ended. This was understood, not only by the Pasha but by the tribes all over the country, to mean that they would one day be ruled by schoolmasters, lawyers, journalists, and business men from the cities and by trade union leaders with Communist leanings. Far better, in their eyes, to be ruled by an enlightened French bureaucracy which had always shown understanding and respect for tradition, custom, and privilege. The immemorial division of 'bled el makhzen', the loyal part, and 'bled es siba', the much larger dissident part of

the country, raised its head once again. In the history of Morocco very few Sultans ever succeeded in asserting more than a superficial and temporary suzerainty over the dissident portion of their realm, and only French power and firm administration have succeeded in knitting the country together gradually over the last forty years.

It would be a curious paradox if the recent *coup* brought off by the conservative and reactionary elements resulted in opening the way for the progressive reforms which the French have been urging unsuccessfully on the late ruler of Morocco. Mohamed VI, the new Sultan, appears so far to be ready to co-operate willingly in this respect with the French authorities of the Protectorate.

These reforms may be summed up under three heads: the separation of judicial from administrative powers; the creation of elected responsible assemblies; and the organization of trade unions. Reforms in these directions could not but diminish the influence and the revenues of the tribal and provincial chiefs and governors; for the pashas and caïds who command the towns and the tribes of Morocco also administer the criminal law, and their offices are therefore lucrative ones and rated as such by the *makhzen*, the Sultan's personal government, who claim payment for every appointment made as well as annual 'refreshers' on the occasion of the anniversary of the Sultan's accession. The Sultan himself is supreme judge of appeal in criminal cases as well as in cases of Koranic law which governs contracts and property, an important source of revenue for his privy purse. The reform proposals envisage independent law courts, modelled on French practice, but applying Koranic law and a new code of criminal justice already agreed upon.

As in Tunisia, the most controversial question in Morocco is undoubtedly the plan to replace the appointed consultative municipal councils by elected responsible ones and to extend the franchise to French residents with certain qualifications. The indirectly elected and purely consultative central Council of Government, which is concerned only with social and economic questions, does indeed already contain French representative members. It is now proposed as a first step to set up Franco-Moroccan assemblies, elected by direct vote, in the municipalities, with administrative responsibility and the power to exercise authority. But it would be another matter if a similar system were extended, as is apparently planned, to wider sub-divisions of the country, to be known as

'regions'. If the intention is then to join these regional assemblies into a kind of federal parliament with linked constitutional powers, this would be tantamount to an attempt to restrict in advance the competence of any national assembly which might then be elected. It was against the principle of 'co-sovereignty' that the Tunisian nationalists protested so vehemently, and the Moroccan nationalists with the late Sultan at their head adopted the same hostile attitude to any kind of vote being given to residents in Morocco who were nationals of another country.

In the matter of the trade unions, too, the French want to build up small local units before attempting to create a central organization, whereas the nationalists wished to create a strong trade union movement that could serve as a political weapon in the way it does in Tunisia. Experiments are being made with shop-unions in enterprises employing more than fifty workers; but it is too early to say whether this scheme is likely to develop satisfactorily.

When considering any questions regarding French North Africa it is well to remember that in the two protectorates and Algeria there lie the homes of one million seven or eight hundred thousand Frenchmen the majority of whom, and many of whose parents, were born there. Those who speak of the independence or self-determination of these territories must take full account of this basic fact.

G.A.T.T. at Geneva

THE eighth session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) opened in Geneva on 17 September. A new general round of tariff negotiations was not anticipated—partly because all the participants are marking time until the Randall Committee draws up its recommendations on American trade policy, and partly because a fundamental review of G.A.T.T. itself is needed. Under its present procedures, for example, multilateral tariff reductions cannot go much further since the low tariff countries have by now used up their margins for bargaining.

Nevertheless the meeting was expected to be a lively and an important one. The agenda contained at least two very controversial issues. The first was Britain's proposal to seek a waiver which would enable the United Kingdom to raise duties on imports of certain fruits and vegetables without extending the new rates to imports from the Commonwealth. A waiver is needed

of the rule—one of the cornerstones of G.A.T.T.—that forbids the widening of existing margins of Imperial Preference. In defence of its proposal, Britain maintains that most of the products affected are not normally imported from the Commonwealth countries and therefore the increased margin of Imperial Preference would give them only a theoretical advantage. It is also pointed out that as these tariffs are raised, the more arbitrary form of protection—quantitative restrictions—will be withdrawn.

These arguments are not likely to carry much weight with Western Europe's agricultural exporters, such as Holland, Denmark, and Italy, who can be expected to oppose the British initiative both on grounds of principle and because of the harm it will do to their trading interests.

A second topic on the agenda is Japan's request for provisional membership of G.A.T.T.; none of the countries, including Japan, is prepared for the new round of tariff negotiations that would have to precede Japan's accession to full membership. There is still a good deal of resistance to giving Japan the status even of a semi-member, particularly among those nations who have suffered in the past from the competition of low-cost Japanese labour and from such unfair business practices as the copying of patents. The most probable outcome is a loose arrangement under which Japan pledges herself to abide by the G.A.T.T. rules, leaving any member free, if it so desires, to extend reciprocal treatment to Japan.

The third main item on the agenda, to be proposed by the United States, is fairly straightforward. It is that the concessions made so far as a result of three earlier rounds of multilateral negotiations should be renewed for a period of eighteen months to two years. These concessions are due to expire at the end of this year, and it is important that they be renewed for the sake of stability in international trade and the maintenance of liberal trading principles.

Dr Musaddiq and After

THE struggle in Persia which resulted in the fall of Dr Musaddiq is unusual in that a hereditary ruler and the Army have maintained the Constitution, while a Prime Minister who began with a reputation as a democrat tried to subordinate the institutions of the country to his personal will. The evolution of a professed democrat into a tyrant has many precedents; there are fewer for constitutional strictness in the son of an arbitrary ruler. Everything, however, commended this role to the present Shah, who succeeded on the abdication of his father, Riza Shah, in 1941. A more constitutional regime was expected by the Allies and, above all, by the Persian people, who had forgotten Riza Shah's early services to his country in their indignation at the tyranny of his later years; but in any case the young Shah's temperament inclined him to a wise moderation, while his education in Switzerland, and his knowledge of the French and English languages, opened to him windows on the West which had been closed to his father.

At the time of his accession the Shah enjoyed very narrow powers. He was commander-in-chief, it is true, and had the right to declare war and make peace. But beyond that he had only the power to dismiss Ministers subject to the vote of Parliament; he could replace the Prime Minister by another, but the new incumbent could not continue in office if he failed to secure a vote of confidence from the Parliament—at that time the Chamber of Deputies, for the Senate envisaged by the Constitution had never been formed. A Constituent Assembly which was summoned in 1949 established a Senate of sixty members, half elected, half nominated by the Shah, and provided for the dismissal of Parliament by the Shah on condition that elections should be held and the new Parliament should meet within three months of the dissolution.

In mid-August the Shah dismissed Dr Musaddiq and appointed General Zahedi Prime Minister. An attempt to replace Dr Musaddiq by Qavam al Saltana in 1952 had failed because the Parliament which at first gave him a vote of confidence was persuaded by the mob to change its mind. This time there was no Parliament to which Dr Musaddiq could appeal against the Shah's order. He had got rid of the Senate in 1952, and recently he had conducted an absurd 'referendum' to justify him in getting rid of the Chamber of Deputies, which had shown signs of revolt

and had been unable to make a quorum. He refused to hand over to General Zahedi, who thereupon assumed by force his constitutional position as Prime Minister.

Dr Musaddiq was highly popular when he came into power in 1951. He was respected for having been opposed to Riza Shah. His reputation for financial honesty, though a reflection on Persian public life, was an asset. His hysterical oratory pleased local taste. Finally, his attack on foreign influence struck a chord in the Persian heart; and when he carried through the nationalization of the Persian oil industry his popularity and prestige rose very high. His supporters ranged from right-wing nationalists to extremists of the left, and included the mass of the people, neglected and sunk in poverty, who were easily persuaded that they were poor because the British oil company had robbed them, and that under Musaddiq the oil revenue would increase.

Dr Musaddiq relied largely on the support of the Tudeh Party, with its Communist nucleus, and its fringe of non-Communist Persians, many of them of the student and professional classes, whose experience of a series of conventional Governments had led them with some reason to believe that no change was to be hoped for from them and their like. The Communists, to whom as a large landowner he could hardly appeal, found him useful in that he was anti-British, opposed to the Shah, and likely to be a disruptive influence. Their non-Communist supporters and the general public may have believed that Dr Musaddiq really would produce more money from oil and introduce much-needed reforms; and Parliament showed sufficient faith in him, or fear of him, to grant him full powers for six months and then to extend the period, so that he might act expeditiously. He secured several political successes which helped to buttress his position. The International Court decided that it had no competence in the oil dispute. The lower courts in Italy and Japan rejected the claim of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to ownership of certain cargoes of Persian oil which had reached those countries. The expulsion of the A.I.O.C. enabled the Persian Government to refuse to renew the Caspian Fisheries Agreement with Russia.

For the rest his regime was a failure, though it falsified the prophecies of immediate financial collapse uttered by those who forgot the mainly agricultural character of the country and the patience and powers of endurance of the Persian people. Far from increasing, oil revenue fell almost to nothing, and the replacement

of Persian oil in the world markets by supplies from other Middle East countries deprived Dr Musaddiq of his hope of at least winning in the long run; yet all he did was to call upon the population to tighten their belts. The promise of reforms came to nothing. The judicial system and the army were to be regenerated, but the one was merely turned upside down, and all that happened to the other was that Dr Musaddiq's friends were substituted for other members of the higher personnel. Rural reform was made ridiculous, perhaps intentionally, by Dr Musaddiq's decrees.[1] The public bodies envisaged, if ever formed, would be under the thumb of the landlords or the officials, their funds would be uncertain, and the duties imposed upon these small, untried, and probably penniless bodies would tax the experience, the energy, and the well-trained officials of an English county council. Dr Musaddiq seems to have been bankrupt of any positive policy. In one respect he even took a step backwards: he stopped the scheme which the Shah had begun to carry out, whereby the estates of Riza Shah were to be sold to the peasants on easy terms. He is known to have been opposed to such schemes in principle, and to have declared that there was nothing wrong with the land system: the increased revenue to be expected from nationalized oil would make it possible to do something for the peasants.

The Zahedi Government has inherited chaos condensing here and there into major problems. Not only is the Treasury empty, but every possible reserve has been used up. The oil dispute cannot be settled off-hand, for although more than one of the various schemes submitted to the Persian Government offers complete satisfaction on the question of nationalization, the public mind has been so deeply poisoned on the subject that General Zahedi will have to walk carefully. He has already announced that it is not reasonable that the Persian people should be deprived of revenue from oil, and that is much. Even if the dispute is settled, however, it will be difficult at first to integrate Persian oil again into world markets which have been getting on quite well without it.

Although her interests in Persia have been greatly prejudiced, Britain remains, because she must, among the foremost supporters of Persian integrity and independence. It was probably because they counted on this that the Persian Government, not content with the nationalization of the oil industry, for which a case can be made, conducted a nuisance campaign against the British

[1]See 'The New Land Decrees in Persia', in *The World Today*, December 1952.

Government and people. Finding at first no serious ill effects from his oil policy, Dr Musaddiq, possibly trying to conciliate men even more fanatical than himself, inflicted one annoyance after another upon Britain. Reputable journalists were expelled; British consulates were closed at the request of the Persian Government, based on the charge of interference in Persia's internal affairs; English nurses training Persian girls in a Tehran hospital were threatened until they had to leave the country; and finally diplomatic relations, upon which the despatch of current business between nations depends, were broken off. British diplomats and consuls and oil company employees having all left the country, it became more difficult to find a scapegoat for such ills as Court opposition to Dr Musaddiq or unrest among the tribes. As to the latter, there still remained the Church Missionary Society. It is true that when the Bishop in Iran was expelled no reason was given; but when the Archdeacon was ordered to leave, it was on the baseless charge of intriguing among the tribes. The valuable educational work of the Mission came to an end in 1940, when Riza Shah expropriated its school, as well as those of the American Presbyterian Mission; but it was hoped that its other work, especially the medical side, would be allowed to continue. Yet even the Isfahan hospital, which has benefited thousands of Persians, especially of the poorer classes, was being threatened at the time of Dr Musaddiq's fall. The persecution was encouraged from Tehran, and that encouragement may now be expected to cease, just as it is now reasonable to hope for the resumption of diplomatic relations before very long.

One of the chief critics of Britain at the beginning of Dr Musaddiq's regime, Mullah Kashani, transferred his support to General Zahedi, but he is reported to have said, after Musaddiq's fall, that he was still against payment of compensation to the oil company. Mullah Kashani has a double grievance against Britain. In the first World War, when it was found that although a foreigner in Iraq he was trying to stir up trouble against the occupying Power, he was asked to leave; and in the second War he was interned as an enemy agent, at the request of the British military authorities. Far from denying the accuracy of the charge, Kashani now boasts that he was a German agent and, moreover, that he tried to assist Rashid Ali in Iraq. Among the men who were interned because they were considered a danger by the British or the Russians or the Americans there must be some, and among them General Zahedi, who regard the incident as the fortune of

war, and can even feel relief that Persia was saved by the Allies from drifting into the Axis camp and sharing the penalties of defeat.

The new Government will not expect much support from Russia. The Soviet Government, through its press propaganda, came down on the wrong side just too soon, supposing that the initial check to the Zahedi coup meant final defeat. It must have seemed that the attempt to secure control of Persia had succeeded through internal revolution where the methods of the Tsarist regime had met with failure. Yet it would be difficult for Russia to adopt an attitude of violent hostility towards the new Government. Conciliation is the order of the day in Moscow, and as Russia has offered some satisfaction to Turkey by assurances about the Straits and concerning territorial ambitions, it would be difficult to refuse to continue the negotiations initiated with Persia on three matters in dispute: the frontier; the clause in the 1921 Treaty which entitles Russia to send troops into Persia if she considers that Persian soil is being used as a base for military operations against Russia; and the Persian gold in Moscow (said to be 21 million dollars) which was deposited there during the war in exchange for Persian currency supplied by the Persian Government to the Soviet forces in Persia.

There has been much debate about the strength of the Tudeh Party. General Razmara used the Tudeh as a bugbear in the oil negotiations, and it was one of the charges against him that he gave it too much rope. Dr Musaddiq continued and developed this technique, but he cried 'Tudeh!' so often that his hearers became sceptical. But if Musaddiq used the Tudeh as a tool it is certain that the Tudeh also tried to use him as a tool. Which had the upper hand is a matter of speculation, but Dr Musaddiq, though no statesman, was a shrewd politician, and would not have encouraged the Tudeh so much if he had feared it would get out of hand. The new Government cannot conciliate the Communists, but it might win the approval of many non-Communist supporters of the Tudeh if it took the task of reform seriously. Repression alone will not do. Nor will the policy of that Governor-General appointed to Azerbaijan soon after the evacuation of the province by the Soviet forces in 1946 who, instead of trying to discover whether remediable grievances had not perhaps facilitated the Soviet-sponsored 'autonomy' movement, felt he had done all that was required when he discouraged the population from visiting

the Soviet reading-room. Happily there are signs that the ne Government realizes the need for positive action. Moreover th Shah, now that the hostility of Dr Musaddiq to land reform removed, is resuming the transfer of Riza Shah's estates to th peasants on easy terms, and he is said to favour the distribution o other large estates among small peasant-owners.

Sympathy with the new Government has been shown by th United States, whose President hastened to congratulate the Sha on his return to his country. Persia was already receiving conside able assistance from America—not only that military assistanc which since 1947–8 has been afforded to Turkey, Greece, an Persia to help them to maintain their independence. The militar assistance has been furnished mainly in the form of arms and c advice and help in the reorganization of the armed forces. I addition Persia received last year about $23 million in economi aid and for industrial, agricultural, and welfare projects, and similar sum had been allocated for this year. Sympathy with th new Government has been expressed in an immediate grant o some $43 million. This allows time to take stock of the situatio but no time to drift, and it gives no encouragement to Persia t postpone settlement of the oil dispute.

The ambitious Seven-Year Plan was to have been financed fron oil revenues, and is therefore in its major aspects in suspense, bu under the Point IV scheme American experts, with Persian co operation, have drawn up a number of projects which seemed to b within the financial capacity of Persia, supplemented by th aid expected from the United States. A perusal of the Plan generous in intention and worked out with much care, prompt several questions. How far do these schemes depend upo officials such as Persia does not possess? How far down will th benefits filter, and how far will development continue whe American help comes to an end? Finally, will Persian suspicio and complacency allow Persia to profit appreciably by this foreig help?

Has Persia profited by American help in the past? The Shuste case of 1912 is inconclusive because he was driven out by Russia hostility, but the experiences of Dr Millspaugh in the 1920 and the 1940s were not encouraging. The American firm whicl drew up the Seven-Year Plan met with difficulties: several of it engineers resigned on the ground that Persian co-operation wa lacking, and the firm was dismissed abruptly by the Persia

Government. Not even Point IV has met with the appreciation it deserves. Dr Musaddiq was not the only Persian to reveal that in his opinion what Persia needed was not technical help but plentiful financial assistance.

Perhaps, it may be urged, the many young Persians now being educated abroad will bring about a renaissance. Yet many older Persians enjoyed a foreign education without, apparently, acquiring a Western attitude towards the public weal. Moreover the students now abroad will not necessarily return to Persia. There are some fourteen hundred Persian students in American universities, but it is believed that nine-tenths of them will go to almost any lengths to remain in the United States for good. Some eight hundred of them have been receiving dollars from Point IV since the Persian Government ceased to be able to provide them with foreign exchange for their education. Will these students return? Will even those return who, it is suggested in the Point IV Plan, should be trained abroad to fill posts under its various schemes? It is true that education and merit have hitherto been no passport to official employment and promotion in Persia, but if the young foreign-trained Persian is not prepared to make some sacrifice for his country, who is to rescue it from the desperate situation in which it stands?

Are we then driven to complete pessimism about Persia? Not, the writer believes, until a remedy never yet tried proves, if it is tried, to be ineffective. It is one of the misfortunes of history that when the East goes to the West for models of self-government, it often overlooks all levels but the highest. Persia has had a Parliament for nearly fifty years, but no local government. The result has been disastrous: the national talents for oratory and political manoeuvre have been encouraged, while for the practical side of politics there has been no scope except in some feeble municipalities usually run by a paid official from Tehran. The central government is choked with work; the provinces stagnate. The need for local authorities was understood by the first Persian Chamber of Deputies, which in 1907 passed a law providing for the establishment of provincial councils; but the law has never been applied. General Razmara brought in a bill for the setting-up of provincial, rural district, and parish councils, but it was shelved. If the new Government would study this subject seriously, much good might result. There is no need to evolve a plan on first principles, as Dr Musaddiq did with his decrees and the Persian journalist does

with his articles, for there is a mass of experience in foreign countries to draw upon, though the tribal areas in Persia would call for special treatment.

The advantages of local government, so obvious to Britain, need listing for the Persians. It would relieve over-centralization, which is a common subject of complaint. It would help to make up for the lack, not of officials, who are only too numerous, but of competent and honest officials, and would ensure a continuity not guaranteed by the Ministries in Tehran, which are subject to frequent political changes. It would harness local patriotism, often very strong in Persia, and employ hundreds of people who at present have no opportunity for social service on such practical objects as education, public health, and the building of schools, bridges, and roads. It would teach the public the connection between politics and public welfare—a connection which the Persian Parliament has never illustrated. It would provide supervision or co-operation for government schemes such as the establishment of the two hundred dispensaries now promised, or for Point IV projects. Point IV can start a plantation of suitable trees, but will any influence in Persia, except perhaps that of a local authority conscious of local needs, ever protect the growing forest from the goat and the human marauder? When Point IV has irrigated a hitherto barren area, local authorities with a stake in the region might even be able to ensure that at least some of the land went to deserving and competent cultivators.

Dr Musaddiq will not have misruled his country in vain if it has learned that hatred is not enough; and the loss in oil revenues, past and to come, may yet do good if the Persian thereafter comes to blame foreign influences less and to examine his own conduct with greater severity. The development of local government could exercise an influence in the right direction, towards the practical rather than the theoretical, the future rather than the past. An authority on Persia was once asked whether young Persians studying in England ever looked outside their books and lecture rooms and examined activities which might perhaps serve as models for action in Persia, such as co-operative societies, local authorities, or such voluntary organizations as the Women's Voluntary Services. The reply was that what the young Persian goes to see is the Persian carpets in the South Kensington museum. The history of Persia's past seems in fact to encourage the modern Persian to rest on ancient laurels rather than to strive to make the

present worthy of that past. The Shah has called for deeds, not words, thereby deprecating the Persian tendency to believe that if you only describe a castle in Spain with sufficient eloquence, you can move your furniture in at once. Every friend of Persia will hope that His Majesty's summons to action will be acted on by his people.

R. W. B.

France's Economic Deadlock

RECENT events have once again focused attention on France's apparently insoluble economic problems. The resignation of M. Mayer on 21 May was followed by a Governmental interregnum of five weeks, which established another melancholy record for the Fourth Republic. When, at the end of June, M. Laniel finally formed a Government, nothing was left of the cautious optimism which, fifteen months earlier, had greeted M. Pinay, the only other Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic belonging to M. Laniel's party, the Independent Republicans. The Pinay experiment was dead and nothing was hoped for from the Laniel expedient.

After the Assembly had approved finance proposals differing little from those put forward by M. Mayer and granted to the new Government special powers to legislate by decree, almost identical with those refused to its predecessor, it voted a Bill introducing three minor Constitutional reforms—including the abolition of the investiture procedure, with its requirement of a special majority—and then rose for the summer recess. Within a fortnight the country's transport and other essential services were dislocated by confused strike movements whose precise purpose and extent were neither clear nor consistent. They continued for three weeks and seemed likely at times to develop into a general strike. Demands were made, mainly by Socialists and Communists, for the recall of the Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Constitution, which makes recall obligatory if demanded by a third of the Deputies (209). This was at first refused, as the authenticity of some of the signatures was held by the

President of the Assembly to be doubtful, but it was finally agreed that an extraordinary session of the Assembly should be held on 6 October.

The strikes appeared to develop without warning. But the discontent which they revealed had been growing for almost a year (there had already been short-lived strikes in the postal services in May) and its immediate cause was the failure of the Pinay experiment.

M. Pinay had set out to do three things: to bring down prices and so stimulate French exports; to cut down expenditure and so balance the Budget without having to impose new taxes; and, thirdly, to maintain as far as possible the traditional structure of the French economy—to rely, that is, on persuasion and to avoid controls. An essential condition of his success was that there should be an immediate and substantial fall in prices. Otherwise he would not be able to prevent fresh wage demands, and expenditure, and therefore taxation, would be bound to rise. By the autumn, in spite of a favourable psychological atmosphere and falling prices in world raw material markets, he had achieved an overall reduction of only 2 per cent, almost wholly restricted to industrial prices. Some food prices were, indeed, actually beginning to rise at the end of August.

This was not enough. In July the Assembly had finally voted the Bill to introduce a sliding wage scale. The minimum wage had then been fixed in relation to a price index which had already risen by eight points since the previous wage adjustment in September 1951. Wages were, therefore, lagging behind prices to the extent of some 5 per cent from the start. At the beginning of September the Government was obliged to impose some price controls because otherwise there was a danger that the price index would reach the ceiling at which the sliding scale provision would automatically take effect. The trade unions considered this index to be doubly unsatisfactory. It was based, they claimed, on an inaccurate estimate of minimum needs and it was also inaccurate as a reflection of changes in the cost of living. They were anxious to substitute for it a 'representative family budget' (*budget-type*). The first effect of this would have been to raise wages independently of the sliding scale. Both the Government and the employing side of the Commission responsible for studying movements of the cost of living were therefore opposed to the idea and were able to postpone a decision owing to disagreements between the rival

ade Union Confederations, each of which had its own *budget*-
ye. There was growing resentment among the workers, who felt
at they were bearing the brunt of the cost of M. Pinay's experi-
ent.

The failure of the experiment brought serious consequences
at affected all sections of the community. The limited reduction
prices was not sufficient to close the gap between French and
orld prices and the end of 1952 saw a general worsening of
ance's foreign trade position. She was in difficulties with the
her O.E.E.C. countries (with whom she had had a surplus in
51) and the dollar deficit had almost doubled during the year.
ne failure to increase exports was accompanied by signs of re-
ssion in the home market. This was due to a number of causes;
e discrepancy between agricultural and industrial prices re-
icted agricultural purchasing power; the slight fall in prices
scouraged speculative buying; and the accumulation of stocks
l to a falling off of the rate of production and a consequent in-
ease in unemployment and a more disquieting rise in short-time
orking.

All of this meant renewed budgetary difficulties in December. In
ct, M. Pinay had solved none of the real problems. The 1952
idget was balanced on paper, but thanks only to the inclusion of
number of items which could not be counted on as regular
urces of revenue (such as the proceeds of the 1952 loan and the
ms available to the Treasury as a result of the slackening of
eculative buying), or which provided current resources only at
e expense of the future (the blocking of credits for capital ex-
nditure), or which would only in practice be available on certain
nditions (such as administrative economies, which, as usual,
led to materialize). The 1953 Budget, presented to the Assembly
December, was balanced only by the device of overestimating
x revenue for that year. To count on a 3 per cent increase in tax
venue in 1953 was highly unrealistic, both in view of the reduced
onomic activity in 1952 and in view of M. Pinay's admission that
en the 1952 figure had been an overestimate. M. Pinay had kept
s promise not to impose new taxes. But since the Assembly
fused to accept his alternative of a series of fiscal reforms,
ning at simplification, a better distribution of the burden, and
e repression of tax evasion, he had no real hope of obtaining the
venue needed to meet expenditure, and he therefore resigned.
is successor, M. Mayer, was left with the unenviable duty of

revealing the extent of the real budgetary deficit which M. Pinay's accounting had managed to camouflage.

M. Mayer was faced with a deficit of nearly 800 milliard francs, and with an Assembly whose members were irreconcilably divided regarding the methods by which the gap was to be bridged. He was also without either the psychological advantages or the loan-raising possibilities which had kept M. Pinay in office for nearly ten months. The former supporters of M. Pinay were determined not to accept either increased taxes or a thoroughgoing fiscal reform, the effect of which would be to increase the proportion of taxation paid by the small farmer and the small business man. They were equally determined that France must not abandon her position as a great Power or her colonial responsibilities, which now accounted for a defence bill amounting to a quarter of her total expenditure. Their remedies were economy in public expenditure and wage stabilization. The former always remained in the realm of theory, for, in practice, the Assembly (often including the same people) consistently voted for increased spending. The only alternative was to give the Government power to introduce economies by decree, a procedure to which the Left was opposed in principle, and even more opposed in practice in an Assembly dominated by right-wing elements whose desire for economies was openly associated with criticisms of the management of the nationalized industries and the social security services. The latter could not conscientiously be supported by parties representing working-class interests, while prices failed to fall and large sections of the poorer-paid sections of the community were visibly living only just above the subsistence level.

This conflict of irreconcilable interests has defeated four Prime Ministers in two years, four would-be Prime Ministers in five weeks, and now seems likely shortly to defeat a fifth Prime Minister. In January 1952 M. Pleven was defeated by Socialist opposition to the grant of powers to the Government to reorganize the nationalized railways by decree; in February M. Faure was defeated by the Right's opposition to a proposed 15 per cent increase in taxes. M. Pinay was unable to carry even his own supporters with him when he proposed to reform the fiscal system and to limit the fiscal privileges enjoyed by some two and a half million private distillers, at an estimated cost to the nation of 18 milliards a year. As a French commentator remarked bitterly: 'For the majority of Deputies the repression of tax evasion remains an

article of faith which must on no account be translated into an article of law.'[1] M. Mayer was defeated in an attempt to obtain special powers to introduce economies by decree (powers which were not expected to yield cuts of more than 8 milliard in the current year). When M. Reynaud sought investiture, he proposed to ensure greater governmental authority by a reform of the Constitution which would make dissolution automatic in case of a Government defeat within the first eighteen months of office. Both he and M. Mendès-France, the next candidate for the Premiership, insisted on the need for austerity and for radical economic and financial reforms. M. Reynaud was defeated by the votes of the Left and M. Mendès-France by abstentions on the Right. The Right would have been prepared to accord special powers to M. Reynaud (in spite of some qualms regarding his European policy) but the Left would not accept his conception of austerity. The Left was in general sympathy with M. Mendès-France's conception of austerity, but it is doubtful whether that would have been sufficient to overcome their opposition to the grant of special powers. The subsequent candidate, M. Bidault, also stressed the need for special powers to introduce structural reforms. But neither he nor M. Marie, who followed him, had anything new or even definite to propose. Both were defeated. It looked as if the Assembly wanted neither a Prime Minister who proposed to act nor one who did not.

When, after five weeks of this fruitless argument, M. Laniel was invested by a large majority, all that was clear was that there was a substantial majority in favour of a Government headed by a Conservative with views similar to those of M. Pinay. It was by no means clear that there was a majority to support anything he might do. M. Laniel was thus compelled to go back to the familiar search for day-to-day compromises. He was no doubt tactless in the way he announced the first decrees. But that alone would not have brought about the strikes. The age of retirement was a symbol; the real cause of the strikes was a general protest against the governmental inactivity resulting from political deadlock.

There is, however, one significant change in the political climate. A growing body of opinion on the Left—including a number of Radicals—now sees in a substantial reduction of France's defence commitments, including, if possible, a negotiated settlement in Indo-China, the only solution of the most pressing economic and

[1] *Le Monde*, 13 December 1952.

financial problems which is at the same time justifiable on econom ic grounds and possible of achievement in the present politica situation.

It is understandable that Frenchmen should resent having had t carry the burden of the war in Indo-China virtually alone. Th failure of some to realize the extent to which French attitude might still seem, to some outside opinion, to be over-coloured b out-of-date colonialist conceptions is perhaps less understandable The conversations now going on between France and the Viet namese and Cambodian Governments may help to clear up wha remains of this misunderstanding.

Unfortunately, however, the call for a reduction in defence com mitments, like the call for fiscal reform, sometimes hides a certai amount of wishful thinking. For neither the defence burden no the deficiencies of the tax system can legitimately be made th scapegoat for the present economic and financial crisis, any mor than can the admittedly crushing burden of post-war reconstruc tion. If, therefore, these are used as smoke-screens to hide from th French public the need for more radical reforms, it will mean tha a vital opportunity has been lost. As M. Mendès-France put i recently,

> . . . ignorance is one of the greatest obstacles to progress in France Among few countries with a comparable level of civilization is there a little grasp of the most elementary economic facts as there is in France In few countries would one be greeted with the astonishment that greet one in France when one affirms that no financial jugglery can make i possible to do everything at once and that it is necessary to choose be tween incompatible objectives.[1]

If there is little understanding among the public and insufficien understanding by some politicians, there is a considerable con sensus of economic opinion which is agreed that France's basi economic problem, reduced to its simplest terms, is her failure— or her inability—to accept either the discipline of a planned econ omy or the obligations of a really free competitive system. She get the worst of both worlds. The French economy is characterize by the co-existence of undertakings whose techniques belong t different economic epochs. On the one hand, there are the basi industries, now modernized and re-equipped in accordance wit the principles of the Monnet plan, and a small number of well equipped and highly productive concerns. On the other, there is

[1] *Le Franc, mythe et réalité*, Paris, La Nef-Julliard, 1953, p. 239.

host of small, under-equipped, and under-productive farms and industrial and commercial undertakings, many of which owe their survival only to tax evasion or to one or more of the forms of State aid or private self-protection which have made of the French economy a complex network of restrictive practices, effectively preventing the working of the competitive regulatory mechanisms. Protective tariffs and quotas, import and export licences, exchange control, price-fixing, both governmental and private, special privileges, including subsidies and tax exemptions, guaranteed markets, including State purchases of unmarketable surpluses, legal restrictions on the formation of rival concerns: all these enable essentially uneconomic undertakings to survive. As a result, prices are too high to enable France to compete effectively in the export market, and too high to provide an effective stimulus to the more efficient concerns to expand their production. These either make high profits with a restricted level of production, or even higher profits if they expand their production. The small concerns have not the capital resources to enable them to produce at lower cost, nor have they any incentive to try to do so while prices are fixed to suit them rather than the consumer.

Some indication of the size of the problem is afforded by figures included in the recent report submitted by a Committee of the Finance Ministry to the Committee of Public Accounts set up in February 1952 under the chairmanship of M. Mendès-France, the present President of the Assembly's Finance Commission.[1] In spite of a 12 per cent increase in production since 1938, French agriculture is still among the least productive in Europe. French imports of agricultural products are still twice as high as her exports; about a third of the two and a half million farms employ no outside labour, 60 per cent are worked by only one or two persons, and only 8 per cent have five or more workers. A third are estimated to be so small or so inefficient as to be uneconomic. The agricultural community, which pays only some 13 milliard in taxation, receives 16 milliard in subsidies and the equivalent of about 100 milliard in the form of legal fiscal privileges of different kinds. Out of a total of just under a million industrial establishments, almost half employ no wage-earner, and of just over a million commercial undertakings 700,000 employ no wage-

[1] *Rapports du service des études économiques et financières du Ministère des Finances sur les comptes provisoires de la nation* . . . Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1953.

earner. The number of small businesses employing no labour has increased since the war. A 10 per cent rise in the number of persons employed in commerce has been accompanied by a rise of only 3 per cent in the production of consumption goods. In 1949, out of every 1,000 French citizens, fifty-four were employed in commerce, and commercial incomes accounted for 16 per cent of the national income, a proportion higher than in any country in the world except the United States.[1]

France thus remains, in 1953, essentially a country of small farms, small factories, small shops, and small towns. The rigidities created by the perpetuation of this small-town economic structure go far to explain the economic backwardness of France, both before and since the war. French industrial production has risen by about 50 per cent since 1938. But, in 1938, British industrial production was already 80 per cent and American production over 200 per cent higher than French. 'France's position in the world,' said M. Reynaud during the debate on his investiture—and the criticism was echoed a few days later by M. Mendès-France—'is one of perpetual retreat. Since 1929, American production has doubled. In Great Britain and Western Germany it has increased by over 50 per cent. Our production has increased by only 8 per cent. Germany is constructing 437,000 houses, while we build 80,000'.[2]

To introduce structural changes equivalent to a major economic revolution would have been a long and difficult task at any time; France's revolutionary tradition has always been strictly limited to politics. The political configuration of post-war Assemblies has made radical changes politically impossible. In the present Assembly, a sixth of the Deputies (the Communists) are in permanent opposition; a quarter (the Socialists and the ex-Gaullists) are in semi-permanent opposition; the remaining seven-twelfths inevitably rely on the support of precisely those groups in which the interests of small producers and traders are most strongly represented. Nor does the suggestion that a workable alternative coalition exists really stand up to close examination. The *majorité d'union démocratique et sociale*, called for by M. Guy Mollet and his friends,

[1] It has been estimated that France has one retail business for every thirty-two persons, as against one for every eighty in the United States, and one for every hundred in Great Britain, but in the absence of adequate evidence that the bases of comparison are identical, the figures do not mean much.

[2] Quoted in Mendès-France, *Gouverner, c'est choisir*, Paris, La Nef-Julliard, 1953, p. 18.

would either consist of the majority of those Deputies who voted n June in favour of M. Mendès-France, or would appear to presuppose a dissolution. Today, such a coalition would have at best only a fragile majority; at worst, it could survive only if it did nothing. For there are deep divisions of opinion on current issues, both between and within the groups which would be included in t. Many Radicals share the economic outlook of the Right; a number of M.R.P. Deputies distrust Socialist foreign policy; neither the Radical nor the M.R.P. groups can impose party discipline, and split votes are the rule rather than the exception. The religious issue is still a cause of friction in the constituencies, even if it could be shelved for a time in the Assembly, and so, ultimately, would be bound to exercise a disintegrating influence. The coalition would therefore be unable to carry though a programme unless power to act by decree were delegated to the Government, a procedure which the Socialists have always opposed.

Moreover, the Left is not without its own economic rigidities. The Left believes in principle in State control in the economic field. But while parliamentary majorities are unstable, and while the bitter memories of the political influence of organized economic interests in the pre-war years survive (or are revived by the present attitude of the Right to problems such as fiscal reform) neither side trusts the other to use State power with either objectivity or moderation. The result is that State controls have always been envisaged by the Left as requiring close and clearly defined parliamentary supervision. This may help to prevent abuses, but it also makes for rigidity. For example, the structure of the nationalized industries presents a complex and relatively uniform pattern, their administration is centralized and closely controlled by the appropriate Government Departments. Yet the Left is afraid to entrust the task of their reorganization to the Government, because it does not trust a predominantly conservative Government to carry out reforms without undermining the principle of nationalization.

In this context, it is not difficult to understand how strike movements could develop, even in the middle of the holiday season, and rapidly gather momentum, until they seemed to threaten a general strike. These strikes were, in the main, expressions of frustration, of justifiable dissatisfaction which can find no relief through normal political channels, while Parliament remains in a state of

deadlock. It is a negative reaction, but no more negative than most of the votes in the Assembly over the past two years. The argument that fresh wage adjustments, if not accompanied either by increased production or by price controls, would merely lead to another turn of the post-war inflationary spiral is no doubt reasonable. But the workers might, with equal reason, prefer a short-term bird in the hand to two long-term birds in the bush. To judge by the post-war record of successive Governments, the long-term measures might well not be taken until many of the intended beneficiaries are dead. In the meantime, others are profiting from inflation while they suffer from its effects.

The first condition of effective long-term economic reorganization would be the existence of a clear majority in Parliament for a specific policy. The second would be its application without the whittling down of important elements, in response to electoral or other individual or group preoccupations of Deputies. It would be utopian to expect either condition to be met in the near future.

There are, however, a number of short-term expedients which could alleviate the situation sufficiently to give both Parliament and public a breathing space until fresh elections or changes in world political or economic conditions relieve some of the present tensions and lift some of the burden. For it ought never to be forgotten that France has had to carry an almost intolerable burden since the war and that the presence of 5 million Communist voters, a hundred Communist Deputies, and a Communist-dominated trade union movement has created difficulties which more stable political systems and more prosperous economies would have found insurmountable.

The first step is to increase real wages. M. Laniel has granted small increases to 300,000 Government employees, and is now trying, as so many of his predecessors have done, to force down retail prices. The second is for the Assembly to agree on some measure of fiscal reform. That, too, is not beyond the bounds of possibility. It would not do all that the Left seems to hope from it, partly because tax evasion is, in the main, in inverse proportion to the size of undertakings, and the total turnover of the mass of small businesses is only a fraction of that of the large concerns which are already heavily taxed and, in addition, paying heavy social insurance contributions. Since four-fifths of the total tax revenue comes not from individual incomes, but from business concerns, increased taxation is likely to lead to increased prices, unless State

controls are exercised more effectively than they have been in the past.

The third step, and one whose effects would be felt most immediately, would be a substantial reduction of the military burden. Expenditure on defence now constitutes almost a quarter of the country's total expenditure and, of that, a third goes to support the war in Indo-China. Whether negotiations will be possible is something that still remains to be seen. At the moment it is not so much a policy as a hope, since it takes two to negotiate a settlement.

When the Assembly meets again in the autumn, it will be under the shadow of the 1954 Budget. M. Laniel has had a greater initial success than any of his predecessors, in that he has got his special powers and has already produced some of the decrees that constitute the first part of his programme, while the Finance Minister has, for the first time since the war, succeeded in producing an estimate of expenditure lower than that of the previous year. But Parliament can still find ways, if it wishes, of expressing displeasure at the decrees; it still has to pass the Budget; and fiscal reform is still only a promise. If all these are to be achieved (and especially if they are to be achieved before working-class discontent leads to further strikes) Ministers will have to show more courage and Parliament more public spirit than either has done so far.

D. M. P.

New Policy in Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia, as indeed throughout the Soviet sphere of influence, policies are at present in the melting pot. What was orthodox yesterday is heresy today. But in the past, change has been accompanied by drastic purges. Individual Communists have been found wanting, guilty, and traitorous, and have been hanged or gaoled because of the deviations from the path of Marx-Leninist rectitude for which they were held responsible. This time the changes, far more spectacular ones, are advocated by the very leaders who admit they were responsible for the policies which are now being thrown overboard. As yet there have been no major

purges, with the sole exception of the dramatic removal of Lavrentiev Beria in the Soviet Union.

So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, the first sign that change was in the air came when the Czechoslovak Government on 7 July suddenly rescinded an order, issued only about a week previously, making the Communist Party responsible for tightening discipline in the factories. The order was replaced, without any explanation, by another which put the onus for keeping the workers up to the mark on the shoulders of the trade unions. Apart from this, there has up to the time of writing been no dramatic reversal of policy or recantation in Czechoslovakia such as took place in Hungary early in July when not only was the Council of Ministers remodelled but also the basic framework of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party itself. The first act of the new Hungarian Premier, Imre Nagy, was to clothe himself in sackcloth and outline to the National Assembly a long list of 'reforms' which he promised would be put into operation at once. They included, at any rate on paper, such major changes as the abolition of the police State (which he described as 'a relic of the old regime'); important concessions to individual peasants, including the so-called 'kulaks', to the intelligentsia, to workers, and to the Churches; and the revival of the small traders. Matyas Rakosi, a week later, admitted that the revised Five-Year Plan had been wrongly conceived and then went on to confess that he and his colleagues had 'somehow lost sight of the basic Communist principle that the most important value is Man'. Not long afterwards the Rumanian Premier, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, similarly proclaimed himself and his colleagues guilty of 'serious mistakes' though without specifying what they were.

Prague has now begun to follow suit. The Government was reorganized on 15 September and immediately began to modify internal policy, though, for special local reasons, the changes have not yet been on the grand scale, as in Hungary.

It goes without saying that the new sackcloth suiting was designed in Moscow, and it seems likely that the pattern came as a surprise to the satellite leaders, for otherwise the Czechoslovak Government would hardly have issued its order on workers' discipline only to withdraw it before there had been time to implement it. One may also infer with reasonable certainty that the various satellite Communist Parties have now received detailed instructions from Moscow in the form of a general directive about

he new policy which each of the recipients is left free to interpret nd enforce according to the particular conditions obtaining in the oviet colony for which it is responsible and within the framework, f course, of the particular function allotted to it by the Kremlin in he joint task of building socialism at home and achieving world evolution without war.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, a cardinal point in the new policy is that Moscow is no longer prepared to go on supplying food, and erhaps raw materials, on the same lavish scale as during the past our years. There has so far been no announcement of the amount f grain the Soviet Union has 'given' Czechoslovakia during the urrent year—the first time that there has been no publicity for oviet 'generosity' since 1947–8. It can only be assumed that the apid tempo forced on Czechoslovakia under the Stalin-Gottwald eadership to supply industrial milk for the building of socialism n the Soviet Union has proved both unrealizable and expensive —to the U.S.S.R. as well as to Czechoslovakia.[1] Each successive ear since the *coup d'état* in February 1948 the Soviet Union as had to put its hand deeper into its own pocket—or possibly nto the pockets of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria—in order o supply the needs of Czechoslovakia for food and raw materials. nd each year the Czech workers have fallen further behind in heir deliveries of finished goods to the U.S.S.R. in payment. Recent Soviet purchases of butter and meat in capitalist countries, oupled with the admissions of Comrade Khruschev, indicate that he vast resources of the Soviet Union itself are insufficient to neet its own food requirements and those of its satellites, in each f which countries agricultural production has declined disastrously s compared with pre-Communist times.

Moscow's new economic look would seem to afford a tacit dmission of these facts, and it has evidently been accompanied y changes in other directions the exact nature of which is not yet lear—not at least to non-Communist observers. But what is quite vident is that, taken together, they involve a drastic overhaul of atellite, as well as Soviet, tactics towards the rest of the world as vell as internally. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the new tactics lemand a firm application of the brakes to the advance of Communism. Persuasion is to replace force; carrots are taking the place

[1] For a more detailed account of the situation in industry and agriculture see Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy: The Effects in Industry and in Agriculture', in *The World Today*, February and April 1953.

of whips; restrictions are being relaxed; individual liberty is to some extent being restored. How long these welcome changes are to last is, of course, meant to be regarded as no one's business but the Kremlin's. But in recent months there has been so much pressure and so much resistance by the people of the satellite countries themselves, especially in Czechoslovakia, that the new policy must inevitably appear as a capitulation by the Government rather than as a concession made in the goodness of Comrade Malenkov's heart.

From the point of view of the Czechoslovak Government, Moscow's new line of sackcloth could scarcely have come at a worse moment. It followed close on the heels of a highly unpopular currency 'reform' which had caused riots in various industrial centres, notably Pilsen, because of the hardships it imposed on the workers whose interests the Government claims to represent. The adoption of a policy of conciliation at such a moment could scarcely fail to strengthen the belief—for which there is considerable factual evidence—that the Government is afraid as well as at sixes and sevens.

The details which have recently become available about the Pilsen riots suggest that the Government has good reason to be afraid not merely of the workers but of disaffection in the Army and the police. It was officially admitted at the time that there had been a 'demonstration' in Pilsen on 1 June, the day on which the new currency 'reform' came into operation. But it is now known from the accounts of several eye-witnesses who have since escaped from Czechoslovakia that the 'demonstration' was almost an insurrection and that the town remained in a state of ferment for nearly a week.

The trouble appears to have come to a head when a group of workers tried to break down the main gate into the Skoda works with the object of getting the Skoda workers to join in a public demonstration against the 'reform'. Some members of the factory militia opened fire on the demonstrators and wounded a woman, whereupon the enraged workers instead of running away surged forward and trampled the man to death. They then marched through the streets shouting slogans against the Government: 'We refuse to accept this barefaced robbery!' 'Down with the Government!' 'Give us free elections!' When the Mayor, Josef Mainzer, tried to address them from the Town Hall stones began to fly and sympathizers inside the Town Hall itself started to

throw all the portraits of Stalin, Gottwald, and Zapotocky out of the window. The official records and documents soon followed and were immediately burnt by the crowd below. Then the demonstrators themselves surged into the building. In one room, but only one, an official threatened them with a revolver. Someone shouted: 'Look, chaps, here's a fellow who wants to shoot us! What are we going to do with him?' He did not dare to shoot so they did nothing. Shortly afterwards two army lorries filled with soldiers arrived in the main square but instead of quelling the riot the officer in charge, a lieutenant, shouted: 'Citizens!'—he did not say Comrades—'Demand free elections at your places of work! The Army is with you!' So, evidently, was the local police force which did nothing to stop the trouble, though, unlike the soldiers, it did not join in. The rioters had the town to themselves till evening when a detachment of STB—the Security Police—arrived with some armoured cars. Till they came on the scene the rioters had been buoyed up by reports that similar action had been taken by the workers in Prague, Brno, and elsewhere. Realizing that this was either not the case or that the Government was still on top they dispersed. But it was nearly a week before the authorities dared to withdraw the STB.

The official account published in the Pilsen newspaper, *Pravda*, admitted that the Soviet flag and portraits of various 'statesmen' had been 'defiled'. It added that 'some people who were not politically aware enough allowed themselves to be provoked by bourgeois provocateurs. The demonstrations had been carefully prepared in advance and the reactionary elements selected the vital position occupied by the workers in Pilsen with the object of conquering them for the bourgeoisie. The workers of Pilsen, surprised by the attack, failed both to understand its extent and to nip it in the bud. Only when the organizers of the anti-State demonstration fully revealed their true character did the workers realize the danger and, with the help of the security forces, liquidate the gang of rioters'. In spite of these open and tacit admissions that the affair was really serious, the official account named only four persons as primarily responsible and ended by saying that 'some' of the perpetrators of the 'attempted coup' had been arrested. It is worth noting that a few months previously two or three 'imperialist agents' had been tried and sentenced within less than a week after they had raided a post office in Prague during a power cut. The Pilsen demonstrators have not yet been put on

trial although some three months have elapsed since their arrest.

It should also be pointed out that the Pilsen riots preceded those in Eastern Germany. In other words, discontent with Communism in practice came to a head in a country which had hailed the Russians as liberators before it blazed up in defeated Germany.

The slogans reported from Pilsen suggest that the workers were more annoyed with the Government for almost wiping out their savings through the currency manipulation than for cutting their real wages. Possibly their losses in this connection had not had time to sink in. When introducing the 'reform', Viliam Široky, who succeeded Antonin Zapotocky as Premier after the death of Klement Gottwald, claimed that the workers would be able to buy more with their new wages than they had with the old. For wages, the rate of exchange was one new crown for five old. For the greater part of savings, the rate was 50:1. This was of course not merely barefaced, but rank, robbery. The other robbery effected by manipulating the new prices was not so obvious owing to the fact that before the currency 'reform' there were two sets of official prices: one for goods supplied to holders of ration tickets and the other for goods bought on the so-called free market, the latter being considerably higher than the former. Whereas 'self-suppliers', the 'idle rich', and non-working housewives had to buy everything on the free market, workers in industry and offices were given tickets which broadly speaking enabled them to buy about half the food and clothing they needed at privileged rates. Concurrently with the currency 'reform' the Government abolished the tickets, but kept rationing in force in practice by limiting the amounts that could be sold to each purchaser. The new unitary scale of prices was in every case higher than had previously been in force for goods on tickets but lower than the free market prices. Consequently the self-suppliers, who included the 'kulaks', and the non-workers and housewives who had been held up to obloquy by the Government as 'spivs', benefited by the change, whereas the workers were obliged either to produce more in order to earn the same real wage or to accept a lower standard of living. In the revaluation of savings everyone was a loser, 'spivs' and 'workers' alike—all the more so because for several weeks before the manipulation took place the Government had deliberately withheld goods from the shops to prevent a run on the savings banks for the purpose of buying consumer goods and thus defeating the whole object of the exercise.

In such circumstances, the Pilsen rioters were no doubt correct in thinking that there were demonstrations elsewhere, though they do not appear to have been so serious. Conversely, the account in the Pilsen *Pravda* was the reverse of accurate in alleging that the trouble had been prepared in advance, for if similar demonstrations had been co-ordinated throughout the country the Government would have been in really serious danger. In point of fact, it still is, for whatever may be the long-term result of the new policy of leniency ordained from Moscow, the immediate effect has been to intensify worker opposition. Many, perhaps most, workers are following a go-slow policy. Their sons in the Army and police obviously share the feelings of their parents, and the hand-picked STB are reliably reported to be on sale to the highest bidder. It is not even certain that in a nation-wide crisis the factory guards, who are also hand-picked, could be relied upon. And most of the sincere rank and file Communists have been thrown out of the Party as 'deviationists'.

The fact is that the whole nation, not excluding the Communist Party itself, is so disgruntled and disillusioned that but for the unpleasant nearness of Soviet troops, especially the tanks and aeroplanes, just across the borders of, though not yet inside, the country, Czechoslovakia might soon be in a state of revolutionary chaos.

In some respects it is not far from chaos already. The hard coal output is only maintained by drafting many thousands of unskilled 'brigaders' into the mines from other industries, the Army, and the civil service. Lately the output of the soft coal mines near Most has shown signs of wilting too, the chief trouble in both cases being the annoyance of the older skilled miners at being driven by politicians instead of led by experts. The foundries are also behind schedule. So is the electrical power industry, the output of which is so low that power cuts are enforced not only in winter but even throughout the summer and in factories and offices as well as homes. There is a shortage of railway waggons because of the deliberately slow turn-over in the industrial areas; of railway engines because of faulty handling and lack of repair facilities; of passenger trains because there is a shortage of trained personnel as well as of rolling stock. Many goods trains fail to reach their destination because when their crews are not relieved at the due time they simply go home leaving the trains standing in the stations. In the fields there is a shortage of labour because so many agricultural labourers have been taken for industry. Agri-

cultural work is further hampered by the fact that hitherto machines have been reserved for the collective and State farms, and because the managers of the Government 'tractor stations' either do not know how, or do not trouble, to keep the machines in good repair. The one bright spot in the gloom is the fact that the harvest this year, as in Hungary and Rumania, appears to be much above the average. During the twelve months before it was gathered there had been real hunger in many parts of Czechoslovakia. And owing to the ruthless way in which the Government enforced the compulsory collection of farm produce, the hungriest people in the country have been the farmers themselves.

In the past, the internal policy of the Czechoslovak Government has weather-cocked from one point of the compass to another in the effort to raise output. In the factories, chief responsibility was on the manager one day, on the local Party members the next, and on the trade union officials the third. For example, in the early autumn of 1952 Comrade Zapotocky (who by that time was back as a trade union functionary after having 'resigned' from that position because the order had gone forth—also from Moscow—that politicians were no longer to be allowed to meddle in industrial matters) announced at a meeting of URO, the Trade Union Council, that the Unions were definitely not Communist organizations but represented all the workers. He added: 'Those who, like Šlansky, tried to coerce the Unions followed a bad, non-Communist policy.' Less than three months later, by order of the Presidium of the Communist Party, the local Party branches in the factories were given complete control over trade union activities. Now yet another change appears to be in progress which will temporarily restore some of the rights of the non-Communist workers, who, until now, have been branded as Social Democrats and regarded as traitors.

The same shilly-shallying has gone on in agrarian policy. One of the 'sins' attributed to Otto Šling and his alleged partner in crime Mrs Švermova was that they had tried to murder Richard Šlansky who, when his turn came, was accused among other things of conspiring with the Šling-Švermova 'gang' to delay the progress of collectivization in the interests of their Western capitalist employers. After these 'traitors' had been liquidated collectivization was speeded up. Now it is to be slowed down again. Indeed, there is considerable hope among the farming community that collective farmers will soon be allowed to resume individual farm-

ing as is already happening in Hungary. The more cynical, however, point out that the wheels of policy may again be reversed at any moment without any more warning than on the present occasion.

It emerges from the above summary of the Czechoslovak scene that not only has a policy of force failed to convert the country to Communism—or even to the kind of socialism which the Czechoslovak Government proclaimed as its temporary goal on the road to a classless society—but also that Moscow has decided to slow down the campaign for world revolution which has turned out to be a much more expensive luxury than was expected during the first years of Stalinist fervour which followed the defeat of the Germans. Whether this discovery was made while Stalin was still alive, or whether his demise was a lucky chance, or was even artificially hastened in order that the new policy could be implemented, is a matter on which at least three opinions exist in Czechoslovakia—as is also the case in regard to the sudden elimination of Gottwald. It should, however, be stated for what it is worth that signs of a more moderate Soviet policy towards Czechoslovakia's capitalistic neighbour, Austria, became observable at least three months before Stalin died.

The exact pattern of the new policy in Czechoslovakia is not yet clear. But there are definite indications that it entails—at any rate for the time being—greater consideration for the individual whether in the factory, field, home, or even in church and school. Small-scale private enterprise is to be resuscitated. As in the Soviet Union itself, there is to be a switch from heavy industry to light with the object of putting more consumer goods on the home market. Coffee and other 'luxuries' are to be imported more freely. Less is to be heard of the 'class enemy' at home, though not necessarily abroad. Some political prisoners and internees are being set free. But even if the prison doors were thrown wide open, this would not bring back the many hundreds, perhaps thousands, who have been executed. The regime, in other words, can never divest itself of its reputation of being the bloodiest of all the Communistic People's Democracies.

If the new policy is to succeed, a good many of the factories which have been deliberately closed since the *coup d'état* of February 1948 will have to be reopened. This will involve the retransfer from heavy to light industry of many thousands of workers who have been engaged almost entirely on Russian orders for

the past four years. A considerable number of these workers were in the glass and textile industries and were forcibly uprooted from their homes when assigned to their new work. Possibly they will now be repatriated. But regaining the lost export markets for which these light industries used to cater is not likely to be an easy matter, the less so because the majority of the workers in these industries were of German race who have established themselves in the same line of business in Germany and Austria since they were expelled from their old homes in Czechoslovakia after the war.

So far, however, the Czechoslovak Government has not got further than trying to sort out the mess it had already got itself into before the new clothes arrived from Moscow. It is still concerned with the problem of preventing leniency from being interpreted as weakness not only by the workers but also by the post-*coup* members of the Communist Party. At least half the present membership has jumped on to the band waggon since February 1948. Practically all of them would jump off again with relief if they thought the Party wheels were beginning to wobble.

All this adds up to a position which could have most serious international repercussions. Not only is the Czechoslovak Government extremely unpopular both collectively and individually but it also has no outstanding leaders. President Zapotocky, known derisively among the workers as 'that mouth-organist', is neither the physical nor demagogical equal of his predecessor, Klement Gottwald. His own successor as Premier, Viliam Široky, is a Slovak. The Czechs despise him for that reason and the Slovaks hate him because they regard him as a traitor who has sold his country to the Czechs. There is little doubt that the majority of the Czechs are eager for a return to the kind of democracy they understand and that the Slovaks hanker after a semi-clerical republic of their own. What restrains both races from going all out to get what they want is the proximity of Russian tanks and the difficulty of finding a set of men to replace those who usurped power in 1948. There appears to be little enthusiasm for the 'old gang' who are blamed for having let Dr Beneš down when he lay on what was to all intents and purposes his death-bed. Nor do the workers or the farmers want to give back the factories and estates to their former owners. Meanwhile, below, but not far below, the surface is the deep-seated longing for new and free elections voiced by the rioters in Pilsen. If the Government seemed

to be losing its grip, the longing might easily lead to a revolt. And if the Russian Army were no longer too close—or, being close, did not intervene—the present regime would stand little chance of surviving.

G. L.

Progress in Refugee Settlement

THE refugee problem is no new phenomenon of this age. Flight from political, racial, or religious persecution is a constant thread in the fabric of history. It was left to this century, however, to add two important new factors, both typical of our times: a vertiginous increase in the number of refugees; and a considerably smaller but respectable number of international efforts to solve this challenging problem.

It was in 1921 that international action, under the League of Nations, first replaced private or national initiative in the care of refugees. Created to assist the 2 to 3 million persons who fled from Communist Russia, and the Armenian refugees, the Nansen Office and its successor, the Office of the League High Commissioner for Refugees, both played an important role in shaping the form of the agencies that were to follow.

In 1938, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was established to aid refugees from Germany, Austria, and the Sudeten area who at that time totalled 350,000 persons. Only five years later the mandate of the IGCR was extended 'so as to include, as far as practicable, also those persons wherever they may be who, as a result of events in Europe, have now to leave or may have to leave their countries of residence, because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs.'[1]

The war's end found some 8 million United Nations nationals in the ruins of the Nazi Third Reich, its satellites, and its victims. The tasks of feeding, clothing, and housing the survivors, healing the sick and starving, and repatriating them fell to the Allied Armies and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad-

[1] For further details on the pre-war refugee situation see *The Refugee Problem*, by Sir John Hope Simpson (O.U.P. for R.I.I.A., 1939). For the post-war period see *Refugees in the Post-War World*, by Jacques Vernant (Allen and Unwin, 1953).

ministration (UNRRA). The IGCR concerned itself with finding emigration opportunities for those who did not want to return home, the 'irrepatriables.'

As early as midsummer 1946 it became apparent that the work would not be finished by July 1947, when UNRRA was scheduled to end its operations. At its closure date, there was a new non-permanent specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Refugee Organization, ready to take over the multiple duties of protection, care and assistance, repatriation, and resettlement for some 1,600,000 refugees remaining from both UNRRA and IGCR.

In the first two years of the IRO, about 65,000 persons were repatriated. When the organization in its turn ceased operations at the beginning of 1952 the total repatriated was 73,000, while some 1,045,000 'irrepatriables' had been resettled overseas in new homes. Its fifty-five months of existence had cost its eighteen member Governments some $400 million and they were unwilling to continue such an expensive operation even though the IRO Council warned in its final report that 100,000 of the remaining 400,000 refugees not firmly settled were living under difficult or desperate conditions that required the urgent consideration of the United Nations. The Council also estimated at that time that between 1,000 and 1,500 'new refugees' were entering Western Europe each month, 'a fact', they stressed, 'which underlines the permanent character of the refugee problem, particularly in Europe'. This influx was shortly to be increased to 1,500 a day.

After the liquidation of the IRO a High Commissioner for Refugees again took charge, this time under the United Nations His function, roughly similar to that of the Nansen Office, is to provide international protection, under the United Nations, for refugees, and to seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugess by assisting Governments and private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities. Like the Nansen Office, the U.N. High Commissioner's tenure is a temporary one and the funds provided are to be used for administrative purposes only.[1]

THE PROBLEM TODAY

What are the conclusions to be drawn from these thirty-one years of international action in the refugee field? First, that the

[1] See 'Refugees: An Unsolved Problem', in *The World Today*, August 1952.

problem is a continuing one, symptomatic of our era which has already been named The Age of the Refugee. Secondly, since 1948, it has become a Western problem. (Of the eighteen member nations of the IRO, only one, China, was not a Western nation, and China after 1948 ceased to be an active member.) And thirdly, that the present problem is fundamentally one of 'irrepatriables'.

For the refugee problem of our time has come full circle: starting with those fleeing the new Communist State; then concerned with the victims of the Axis partners; and now returned again to the refugees from Communism. Its definition, is, then basically a political one, and the problem itself is seen for what it is, an inextricable part of the far greater problem of political conflict. For wherever there is the clash of political ideologies, whether or not that situation degenerates into war, the refugee is born.

The refugee who flees to the West at his life's risk, sacrificing home and land and position, has more than a humanitarian claim to the assistance of the group he joins. If the Western defence of freedom is to mean anything, he must be aided to re-establish himself securely under freedom's flag. Failure to do so is to hand the opponent a double advantage: he can add to the problem (as he has done in the past) by dumping unproductive or unreliable (by Communist standards) elements on to the already overburdened economies of the countries that border the Iron Curtain, there to form ever-growing pockets of idle and desperate men; and he can use Western neglect of these refugee-allies as a powerful psychological weapon to break the spirit of those who resist Communism on its home ground.

The possibilities for assistance are these: assimilation locally in the countries of first asylum; emigration within Western Europe; and emigration overseas. For the first of these, local assimilation, there are serious factors to be taken into consideration. Two of the countries of first asylum, Italy and Greece, have staggering excess population problems of their own and the refugee is added to an already surplus group. Not only has Italy 2 million unemployed but almost an equal number of under-employed. The cession of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia after the war brought nearly 250,000 Italian refugees back to Italy, exclusive of the numbers returned from the lost colonies in Africa. Finally, the almost total halt to Italian emigration during the Fascist regime built up a backlog of excess persons. In all, there are today more than 47 million inhabitants on an area of 324,000 square kilometres, much

of which is mountainous or extremely difficult of cultivation.

In Greece, the authorities estimate that the country has a surplus of 960,000 persons in the productive age groups, including native Greeks whose chance of a livelihood was destroyed in the second World War or in the civil war that followed, ethnic Greeks expelled from Bulgaria and Rumania, as well as an annual net surplus of perhaps 30,000 from the annual increase in population.

The Free Territory of Trieste, another station on the escape route from the East, has a population density of well over 1,300 persons to the square kilometre. Crowded in this tiny area in addition to the Triestines are the many thousands who have left the former Italian provinces ceded to Yugoslavia, and approximately 4,000 refugees from Yugoslavia and the East.

The situation in Germany is rather different. Its normal population is about 38 million. To this has been added a German refugee problem of over 10 million—a group greater than Australia's entire population—and the influx, from Eastern Germany at least, is not ended. More than 9 million of these refugees have already been absorbed by the German economy, which continues to expand. But the Bonn Government sees no hope of a future in Germany for a portion of the farmers among the ethnic German refugees (*Volksdeutsche*) or for the foreign refugees.

In still-occupied Austria, the foreign refugees and some of the *Volksdeutsche*, who together number approximately 300,000, are not eager to remain.

Nevertheless, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is making valiant efforts to assist the local assimilation of the refugees under his mandate, particularly of that portion whose chances for emigration overseas are slender.

As for intra-European migration, while such a solution may appear desirable and theoretically feasible, it has not worked in practice. France and the United Kingdom accepted very substantial numbers of refugees during and after the war, but apparently feel that the saturation point for such immigrants has been reached. Others of the Western European community, where refugees admitted have formed unassimilable groups, would like to encourage their emigration abroad. And still others, such as Holland, must look for outlets for their own nationals. The Netherlands, whose population density is the greatest of any nation in Western Europe, is seeking emigration possibilities for fifty to sixty thousand of its people annually. The Dutch, as well as the

other over-crowded countries mentioned earlier, have found little relief for their population pressure in neighbouring lands, and the outlook for the refugees is even darker; though small special groups of refugees, drawn from the aged and tubercular, have been placed recently in permanent homes in Western Europe.

Thus we are left with overseas emigration, the solution to which the majority of Western Europe's excess population of 3 to 4 million has turned its hopes. To the foreign refugee, whose inclusion in the excess group is virtually automatic, emigration overseas has an even greater attraction. He has already left his homeland. For him, a new start and a new continent are practically synonymous.

AN INTERNATIONAL PLAN FOR MIGRATION

On 5 December 1951, sixteen of twenty-three nations who had gathered in Brussels at an International Conference on Migration adopted a resolution to establish a provisional intergovernmental committee for the movement of migrants from Europe. The founding nations recognized 'that there exists a problem of surplus population and refugees in certain countries of Europe, while certain overseas countries offer opportunities for the orderly absorption of additional population; that the problem is of such magnitude as to present a serious obstacle to economic viability and co-operation in Europe'. They agreed to constitute a provisional intergovernmental committee whose purpose 'will be to make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities are inadequate and who could not otherwise be moved, from certain European countries having surplus population to countries overseas which offer opportunities for orderly immigration, consistent with the policies of the countries concerned; ... that among the migrants with whom the Committee will be concerned are included refugees and new refugees for whose migration arrangements may be made between the Committee and the Governments of the countries affording asylum; that membership in the Committee will be open to Governments with a demonstrated interest in the principle of the free movement of persons and which undertake, subject to approval by the proper governmental authorities, to make a financial contribution to the Committee, the amount of which will be agreed to by the Committee and by the Government concerned'.

The provisional Committee was given an eleven-month trial

period to see what international action could accomplish in the migration field. It was assigned the target of moving over 100,000 migrants from Italy, Germany, Austria, Greece, the Netherlands, and Trieste to the United States, Canada, Australia, and Latin America.

The income of the organization was to be derived from Government member contributions to the administrative Budget as well as voluntary contributions to the operating fund and reimbursements for services rendered.[1] The Committee established its headquarters at Geneva and on 1 February 1952 began operations. IRO had ceased its resettlement activities on 31 January and had turned over to the Committee the charters of its twelve-ship migration fleet as well as $2,737,096 toward the completion of its remaining resettlement projects. These included 12,000 refugees who had completed the formalities of pre-embarkation processing and held visas, chiefly, for the United States, Canada, and Australia. Part of the fund was earmarked for the resettlement of approximately 600 European refugees from the thousands stranded in the Shanghai area. And there was also the remaining 28,000 of the 45,000 *Volksdeutsche* refugees, approved for admission to the United States under the provisions of that country's Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, and on whose behalf the United States was ready to provide the money needed for their transport.

To assist the movement of individual refugees, the Committee set up a 1 million dollar fund from which grants were to be made to the international voluntary agencies.[2] Working agreements had already been formalized with many of these agencies who had long experience in refugee resettlement. The individual refugee resettlement programme, which provided for passage loans against later reimbursement, was assigned a movement target of 10,000 refugees for 1952.

During the year, however, it became increasingly apparent that the provision of transport alone was not the complete key to the complex task of widening the migration stream from Europe. Some countries had to reduce or close down their mass immigration programmes for various domestic reasons, while others, especially in Latin America, found that they could not undertake larger scale immigration without international assistance, technical

[1] 1952 Budget: administrative, $2,359,060; operating, $31,594,940; 1953: administrative, $2,147,000; operating, $34,608,475.

[2] The Committee's contribution had risen, by 30 June 1953, to $2,100,000.

or financial, beyond that involved in transportation alone. Thus the necessity was recognized for developing, on an international level, technical services providing for the preparation of migrants (information, orientation, language and vocational training), selection and documentation, and their placement in the reception countries.

Towards the end of the first year, the member nations, convinced that the need to continue international action in the migration field still existed, decided: (i) to continue the activities of the Committee at least throughout 1953, to make plans during that year for the future, and to draft a Constitution; (ii) to change the Organization's name to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM); (iii) to authorize the Committee to develop and improve its technical services in the expectation that this would substantially speed up and increase movement; and (iv) to investigate the possibilities of securing outside financial and technical assistance for the establishment of land settlement projects in immigration countries, and to assist these countries in the preparation of such projects.

On 31 July 1953, after eighteen months of activity, ICEM had aided the emigration of 119,284 persons. Of these, 59,746 came from Germany, 17,772 from Italy, 14,005 from Austria, 12,106 from the Netherlands, 1,035 from Trieste, 2,592 from Shanghai, and 9,751 from other areas.

The United States had admitted 41,347 of this total; Canada, 28,663; Australia, 23,000; Brazil, 15,906; Venezuela, 3,210; Israel, 1,782; Chile, 1,766; Argentina, 1,219; and 2,391 went to other destinations.

Of the total of 119,284 Europeans resettled, about 35,000 were refugees under the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and 25,000 were *Volksdeutsche* refugees. Thus approximately 60 per cent of the total movement involved refugees.

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

The possibilities of further refugee resettlement must be examined within the framework of ICEM's expected over-all movements, just as this in turn is influenced by the general migration picture. The Committee began its operations at a time when European emigration already showed a downward trend. This decline continued into the beginning of 1953. The Committee's achievements in the field of assisted migration, modest though

they have been, have been made at a difficult time for migration generally. Nevertheless, they helped to maintain the flow of migrants from Europe and encouraged receiving nations to re-examine their immigration possibilities in the light of international assistance. The recent growth in ICEM movements gives promise that the general migration stream is widening again. In the first quarter of this year the Committee moved slightly more than 11,000 persons overseas. The succeeding two-month period of April–May surpassed this figure, and July alone accounted for the movement of some 10,700 ICEM-sponsored migrants. The projected movement for the remaining months of 1953—close to 41,000—will give the Committee a year's total of approximately 80,000, which is roughly similar to that accomplished in 1952. Such a comparison, however, gives no evidence of the real progress that has been registered this year. For one thing, the early movements carried out by the Committee in 1952 included a substantial number of refugees whose resettlement had been planned by the IRO before its liquidation. For another, last year ended at a low-point of post-war migration, while 1953 has maintained a constant trend upward, a trend that is supported by the increasing number and variety of immigration plans that are becoming operative, particularly in South America.

The Committee's estimated programme for 1954, which will be submitted for the approval of member Governments at their conference in October, calls for the movement of 132,900 persons. Of these, 49,200 are expected to come from Germany, 45,500 from Italy, 12,300 from Austria, 6,200 from Greece, 4,800 from Trieste, 4,400 from the Netherlands, 4,200 from the refugee groups in the Near and Far East, and 6,400 others. The major immigration countries, in order of reception, are expected to be the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil.

What percentage of this movement will be refugees is extremely difficult to forecast, but a short analysis by country may give some indication. In the United States, President Eisenhower has signed the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, which will admit, in addition to the regular immigration quotas, some 200,000 persons in the next three years. Australia is giving consideration to a special quota for East German refugees. The recent Australian approval of the Lutheran World Federation's nominated scheme, under which that agency guarantees individual sponsorship and placement of migrants, will undoubtedly create new opportunities for numbers

of refugees. Similar schemes have been presented to the Australian Government by the World Council of Churches and the International Catholic Migration Conference.

Voluntary agencies co-operating with ICEM and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, particularly the World Council of Churches, have received from the Brazilian Government a substantial number of visa authorizations for European refugees in China. Canadian authorities have given particular attention to the selection of East German refugees. And the Canadian Government has given its approval to a dependants' scheme from Germany and Austria which is part of the revolving fund programme of the international voluntary agencies.

The Committee's special agreement with the Israeli Government has accounted for movements to Israel of Jewish refugees at present in Germany and Austria, and of those coming out of the Eastern European countries. The Committee has also assisted in the resettlement to Israel of European refugees from China. The 1953 ICEM movement to Israel is estimated at 1,900, and a similar number is expected for 1954.

Paraguay has agreed in principle to issue several hundred visas for refugees in the Shanghai area with some agricultural background.

CRITICAL AREAS OF REFUGEE CONCENTRATION

There are three critical areas of European refugee concentration, where the situation of the group is serious enough to warrant urgent consideration. These are China, the Near East, and Trieste. In China, it is believed the number of refugees concerned may be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 18,000. To assure emergency relief for this group and to assist them in resettlement, ICEM and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees maintain a joint office in Hong Kong. As was pointed out earlier, the Committee has already moved 2,592 refugees out of China, 1,714 of them this year. Since June a monthly average of 300 to 350 has been maintained. This progress is largely due to the successful search for placement opportunities carried on by the World Council of Churches and other voluntary agencies, including the Lutheran World Federation, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the American Joint Distribution Committee. Despite the fact that the movements from this area have continued at an encouraging rhythm, there were still over 3,700 potential visas available on 1 July, some 2,000 more than at the beginning of the year.

The Committee's mandate does not permit it to use funds from its regular operating Budget for the resettlement of refugees outside Europe. The China programme has been able to continue thus far through special allocations from the IRO Trust Fund, set up at the time of that organization's liquidation. These funds will run out some time in December of this year, with approximately 17,000 European refugees still remaining in China, of whom at least 10,000 are potential migrants. The Committee estimates that their evacuation could be accomplished in two to three years, assuming that the political situation in China remains substantially unchanged, for about $6 million. To raise this amount, ICEM will launch an appeal to its 22 member Governments[1] and others.

In the Near East, refugee movements this year have been meagre, amounting to sixty-eight at the end of July. Nevertheless, the two voluntary agencies playing major roles in this programme, the World Council of Churches and the Tolstoy Foundation, have been able to advance plans for settlement to the extent that there are now specific possibilities for somewhat more than 650 persons. There is also the possibility that several hundred more may obtain visas under the new U.S. Refugee Relief Act. Difficulty in movements is partly due to the wide dispersal of the cases throughout the Near East and more particularly because individual placement in special conditions is required for virtually every case.

On behalf of the refugees in Trieste, ICEM received early this year a million dollar trust fund, in lire, authorized by a committee representing the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States and concerned with the liquidation and disposition of ex-army assets. The fund is being used principally for projects developed by the voluntary agencies that will make possible institutional care for virtually all the aged and ill among the refugee group and thereby release healthy family members for overseas resettlement. Nineteen difficult cases have already been moved to Switzerland and Sweden, and further schemes have been developed which will provide institutional care for about 270 more. Meanwhile the voluntary agencies have undertaken extensive promotional work to obtain individual sponsorships in overseas countries for those refugees not requiring special institutional care.

From the foregoing it can readily be seen that there is continuing

[1] Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S.A., and Venezuela.

action on behalf of refugee migration from Europe, spearheaded by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the various voluntary agencies engaged in the field, and supported by the Western Governments. A further important stimulus to overseas resettlement is the United States Escapee Programme, authorized by presidential order in March 1952, and allocated Mutual Security Act funds up to $4,300,000. Under agreement with the U.S. State Department, ICEM provides overseas and intra-European transport for eligible escapees who obtain valid immigration visas for permanent resettlement.

These resettlement efforts are making an appreciable dent in the refugee problem which, it must be remembered, is a continuing one and will remain so as long as the political causes that breed refugees continue to exist. Of the three possible approaches to the problem, resettlement overseas is the most desirable in the eyes of the refugees and of the burdened countries of first asylum. It is extremely fortunate that at the same time a drive to increase population exists in many of the overseas countries.

Obviously, there can be no let-up in efforts to integrate some portion of the refugee population in the communities where they now reside. And the search for the permanent institutional care that the difficult cases require must go on. But as long as there are openings abroad in the 'new' countries, Europe's refugees will elect to go there, if they are aided to do so.

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was called into being to furnish such international assistance. With its allies in the field, the voluntary agencies, the Committee is not only hunting down emigration possibilities, but is also stimulating countries to create them, through land settlement and other development projects. Western nations with a direct interest in this question, are building through ICEM a programme of population transfers in substantial numbers that will aid the further development of the lands and other great resources of the immigration countries. Joined with them are a group of 'sympathetic' member nations who see evolving from this programme a more strategic distribution of manpower in moving the excess from Western Europe and in fortifying the overseas countries in a single co-ordinated process. All of them have affirmed their belief in the promise that such a programme holds for a fuller life under better social conditions for the disinherited millions of Europe.

H. G.

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Notes of the Month

Trieste: The Latest Phase

THE Trieste question has arrived at its present state via a series of misapprehensions, of which those surrounding the Anglo-American declaration of 8 October are only the latest example. It was born under a misapprehension when the Yugoslavs, already in prior occupation of Trieste city when the New Zealand 2nd Division reached it on 2 May 1945, set up their own form of administration there under the impression—in default of precise political agreements to the contrary—that Trieste was to be theirs.[1] And the *ad hoc* line agreed to on the spot six weeks later between Generals Morgan and Jovanović was destined to become perpetuated, as to that part of the frontier, in the line agreed upon in the Italian peace treaty as the future international boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia. It should also be recalled that at the time of the treaty drafting, early in 1946, the Iron Curtain had not yet fallen, and it then seemed reasonable to expect that the port of Trieste could rely as heretofore on traffic from the hinterland countries for its economic livelihood.

But misapprehensions continued after the treaty was signed. Yugoslavia, acting in the belief that Zone B, whose military occupation was allotted to her, ought to be Yugoslav territory, proceeded to introduce measures tending to assimilate its legal and administrative set-up to her own: but in fact 'occupation' here, as elsewhere, legally implied a care-and-maintenance basis, with Italian sovereignty abrogated but Italian law and other institutions retaining their validity until the Free Territory Statute came into force. Italy, on the other hand, from the first contested the Trieste settlement, maintaining that Istria (including Trieste) had been formally assigned to her after the 1914–18 war by the Treaty of

[1] See 'Trieste Diary', in *The World Today*, October 1945.

Rapallo; that previously it had not been 'Yugoslav', but an Italian-speaking province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and that, as far as the proposed Free Territory was concerned, statistics showed that the population was predominantly Italian.[1]

Further misapprehensions arose concerning the Western allies' tripartite declaration of 20 March 1948, which recommended the return of the whole Free Territory to Italian sovereignty. This was done in view of the 'virtual incorporation' of Zone B into Yugoslavia, and of the Security Council's failure to reach agreement on a Governor. The justification of this declaration has been widely questioned, especially since, given Yugoslavia's exit from the Cominform three months later, it has proved a source of considerable embarrassment to its promoters.[2] But it was formally reaffirmed by the British Government after the London Conference of March 1951 and was subsequently adhered to, if with diminishing conviction, by all the signatories until Mr Foster Dulles on 3 September gave an inkling of things to come by his incautious remark that the declaration should not necessarily be regarded as 'a law of the Medes and Persians'. Italy has always attached an almost legal significance to the declaration.

By tacit consent the Trieste dispute remained in abeyance this summer during the Italian elections and the subsequent search for a Government, which eventually led to the withdrawal of Signor De Gasperi's experienced hand from the Italian helm. The present crisis arose at the end of August out of small beginnings—reaffirmations of the well-known claims of both sides little or no more explicit than before, but soon expanded, in the welter of Notes and counter-Notes, and of speeches made with an eye to domestic consumption, into positions from which there could be no retreat. Into this impasse the Anglo-American decision of 8 October to evacuate Zone A appeared at first sight to have brought only more confusion: its ambiguous wording led Signor

[1] Population estimates of 1949 for Zone A were

Commune	*Italian*	*Slovene*	*Total*
Trieste	230,000	50,000	280,000
Other 5 communes	16,500	13,000	29,500
Total	246,500	63,000	309,500

The latest estimate for Zone B, of 1940, gave a population of 73,500; no precise statistics are available as to the proportion of Slovenes to Italians, but Slovenes are known to predominate to a considerable extent, especially since the Italian exodus and the Yugoslav infiltration of the post-treaty years.

[2] For an ingenious argument of the legal aspects see *Relazioni Internazionali*, 10 October 1953.

Pella to assume that abrogation of the 1948 tripartite declaration was not necessarily implied, while President Tito was incensed both by its purport and by the fact that he had not been informed beforehand. Since then each side has proposed a conference between the two claimants and the Western Powers, President Tito making it a prior condition that the decision to evacuate Zone A should not be carried out, while Signor Pella insists that it should, and proposes a plebiscite in both Zones, to apply only to pre-1918 inhabitants. In the meantime Mr Vyshinsky on 13 October urged the Security Council to implement the peace treaty and appoint a Governor. Though the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London of 16–17 October discussed the Trieste question the statement subsequently issued brought no clarification, and at the time of writing, while no final date had been fixed for the evacuation of Zone A, it was still uncertain whether, or when, it would be possible to arrange a conference of the Powers concerned.

The New German Government

Dr Adenauer's new Cabinet, announced on 20 October, reflects his desire to put his coalition on as broad a base as possible in order to be assured of a two-thirds majority for his policy of European integration. In addition to his former partners, the Free Democrats and the German Party, he has included members of the Refugee Party, now represented in the Bundestag for the first time.

The elections of 6 September turned out even better for the Christian Democrats, and worse for the other parties, than had been expected. Extremist and splinter parties were obliterated, the coalition parties weakened. Of the two 'regional' parties only one, the German Party, survived. It is now the smallest partner in the coalition, since the other, the Bavarian Party, is no longer in the Bundestag, its seats having been captured by the Bavarian version of the C.D.U., the Christian Social Union (C.S.U.).

Dr Adenauer seems to have decided that he must let the German Party retain its two ministries in order to reattach it to the coalition. Everything else followed from this. The stronger Refugee Party could not be offered fewer posts; the Free Democrats had to have four. The C.D.U./C.S.U., much stronger than all these together, had to have at least ten. Here a further complication arose: the C.S.U., pointing to its electoral victory, had to be rewarded with a just proportion of the C.D.U. posts. Thus it was found necessary

to enlarge the Cabinet to accommodate all these claimants. Dr Schaeffer, the Minister of Finance, was opposed to this on budgetary grounds, but yielded in the end when it was decided not to give ministries to four of the new Ministers.

Governmental algebra had also been complicated by the religious factor. Since Protestants had voted for Dr Adenauer in unexpectedly large numbers, Protestant groups were vigilant when it came to the allocation of ministerial seats. It is generally stated that the new Minister of the Interior, Gerhard Schroeder (C.D.U.), owes his appointment to youth, vigour, and his Protestant denomination. One of the Ministers without Portfolio, Robert Tillmanns (C.D.U.), is a prominent Protestant churchman. The only new ministry, that for Family and Youth Questions, has gone to a Catholic.

The C.D.U./C.S.U. triumvirate Adenauer-Erhard-Schaeffer remains in charge of Foreign Affairs, Economics, and Finance; Storch (C.D.U.) and Kaiser (C.D.U.) stay in the Ministries of Labour and All-German Affairs; Bluecher (F.D.P.) remains Vice-Chancellor and Minister for European Economic Co-operation; Seebohm and Hellwege, both of the German Party, keep their Ministries of Transport and Bundesrat Affairs.

The F.D.P. succeeded in keeping the Ministry of Justice, but the former Minister, Dr Dehler, has been succeeded by Fritz Neumayer, once a lawyer and judge, and Minister of Housing since 1952. Viktor-Emanuel Preusker, a young and prominent financial expert, has joined the Cabinet as Minister of Housing; and in addition the Party has, in Hermann Schaefer, a Minister without Portfolio.

The new C.D.U. Ministers are Heinrich Luebke for Agriculture and Franz-Josef Wuermeling for Family and Youth; the former was an able and energetic Minister of Food and Agriculture in North-Rhine Westphalia in the difficult years of 1946 to 1948 and an advocate of land reform; the latter was a civil servant before the war who was dismissed for political reasons in 1936. Tillmanns, the C.D.U. Minister without Portfolio, suffered the same fate in 1933. The C.S.U. 'Liaison' Minister (without Portfolio), Franz-Josef Strauss, at thirty-eight the youngest Minister, has so far been mainly concerned with E.D.C. questions; he is regarded as the architect of the Union's victory in Bavaria.

Another Bavarian, Theodor Oberlaender, has exchanged the Bavarian for the Federal Refugee Ministry. He is the first repre-

sentative of the Refugee Party to head a Ministry at Bonn. His Party chief, Waldemar Kraft, has become Minister without Portfolio. Herr Kraft was between the wars a leader of German farmers in Poland and member of the Sejm, and was later active there under the Germans as an agricultural expert. He joined the Nazi party in 1943 and was given an honorary SS rank. The Refugee Party (B.H.E.) is as yet an almost unknown factor in Federal politics. In Land coalitions it has worked with the S.P.D., and in the Bundestag sits next to the S.P.D. and on the left of the C.D.U. But it is committed to Dr Adenauer's policy of European integration.

The Partition of Kashmir

IT has been suggested that the brief reference to the fate of Sir Owen Dixon's proposal in 1950 for the partition of Kashmir, made in the article on 'The Kashmir Problem' which appeared in *The World Today*, September 1953 (p. 393), does an injustice to Mr Nehru. It was there stated that 'At the time, while the Pakistan Prime Minister agreed to discuss this proposal, Mr Nehru refused to do so.' This may have given the impression that Mr Nehru refused to discuss any proposal for partition and a partial plebiscite.

In fact what Mr Nehru refused to discuss was the particular proposal which Sir Owen Dixon intended to put forward. At the beginning of his mission Sir Owen had set out to secure Indian agreement to arrangements which would, in his view, permit a free and fair plebiscite for the whole of the State of Kashmir. India, however, would not agree to the proposals he suggested, and he therefore inquired what the Indian attitude would be if he were to put forward either a plan to take a plebiscite by areas, allocating each area according to its result, or a plan to allocate those areas which would clearly vote for one country or the other to the country concerned, and only to hold a plebiscite in the Valley of Kashmir itself, with perhaps the addition of some adjoining areas. India agreed to discuss the second of these proposals, though it put forward tentative suggestions for the division of the State which Sir Owen regarded as unreasonable. Pakistan at first refused to discuss such a proposal on the ground that it had been agreed to hold an over-all plebiscite for the whole State and that this agreement should be adhered to. She was unwilling to attend a conference for fear that this might be regarded as an

abandonment of her claim that an over-all plebiscite should be held. She also claimed that the Indian position was too indefinite. Pakistan did however indicate that she would agree to a solution involving simple partition if under this the Valley was to go to Pakistan. Sir Owen put this proposal to India, who declined to consider it.

Sir Owen then proposed that he himself draw up a plan for a partial plebiscite and partition of the rest of the State. Mr Nehru informed him that India would agree to attend a conference to discuss such a plan provided that Pakistan made it clear beforehand that the fact that the plan was based on a partial plebiscite and partition would not in itself lead to its rejection by Pakistan. After some hesitation the Pakistan Government agreed to attend a conference on this basis, but in turn made a condition. Sir Owen had decided to propose, in his plan, to set up a United Nations administrative body with certain powers, which he listed, to carry on administration in the limited plebiscite area until the poll was declared. Both he and Pakistan regarded such a proposal as essential to the operation of any plan for a partial plebiscite, and Pakistan was only willing to attend a conference if India did not regard the placing in the intended plan of such a provision as an insuperable objection to it. When, however, Sir Owen inquired of Mr Nehru whether he would discuss a plan of this kind, Mr Nehru refused, and the whole proposal was abandoned. Mr Nehru's objection to Sir Owen's proposal for a partial plebiscite was principally based, as was his refusal to accept the suggested arrangements for an over-all plebiscite, on the doctrine that Pakistan was an aggressor with no legitimate interest in the State. In Sir Owen's view, whatever the position beforehand, once the State was divided under a proposal for partition and partial plebiscite, each party would obtain a legal right to the part allotted to it and a legitimate interest in the part to be allotted by plebiscite.

It will be seen therefore that it was not partition and the holding of a partial plebiscite itself that Mr Nehru refused to discuss, but the form of plan which Sir Owen Dixon regarded as essential and was prepared to put forward.

Jordan's Frontier Villages

The Scene of Border Tension

THE Israeli attack on 14 October against the Jordanian village of Qibiya is only one of several serious incidents which have recently taken place on this frontier. For nearly a year tension on the border has been mounting. Both Israel and the Arab States have helped to provoke antagonism. While the politicians in Baghdad and Damascus thunder away about the 'second round' against the Jews, the Israelis increase Jordanian uneasiness by their practice of holding military exercises with live ammunition close to the demarcation line. In recent months a greater number of the Arabs who cross illegally into Israel are believed to have been carrying arms; Jewish attacks by long-range fire and incursions into Jordan have, according to independent foreign observers and the Jordanian security forces, been on a larger scale and of a more military character. Whatever the underlying motives for the intensification of Israeli operations, no one could deny that the present armistice line, which was drawn up at Rhodes in 1949, invites trouble.

THE ARMISTICE LINE

Villages on the Jordanian side are separated from their water supplies, their orchards and fields. Not even the local inhabitants are always sure where Jordan ends and Israel begins. In the Latrun gap a long, narrow stretch of once fertile acres—now covered in hogweed and thistles—is the only suggestion of no-man's land; the shepherd grazing his flocks, the unwary traveller who strays across an invisible line, are in danger of being shot dead on sight. Arab communities are cut in two, as at Beit Safafa, where the wire runs down the main road; here the Jordanian who talks to his father in the house across the way, which is in Israel, is technically guilty of 'communicating with the enemy'. In the valley below a well-built sanatorium is of no use to either country because the frontier comes through the middle of the buildings.

In Jerusalem, the boundary which separates the Jordanian area from the Jewish, and the Old City from the New, is marked by a corridor of gutted houses. In five years the weeds have grown high and the wire between the gaps has long since rusted. Arab homes, shops, and offices lie in Jewish Jerusalem; and Jordanian territory cuts off from Israel the Jewish Hospital and Hebrew University

on Mount Scopus. Incidents arise out of attempts to occupy houses in the demilitarized zone; and from time to time firing breaks out in the heart of the city. At only one point on the frontier has a working compromise been reached in a difficult situation. This is on an unofficial basis at the Jordanian village of Battir, which from a strategic height dominates the Jewish-controlled Lydda to Jerusalem railway. Many of Battir's olives and its school are on the far side of the cutting and in Israel. The Jews allow the residents of Battir to cultivate within the original boundaries of the village; and the children cross the frontier daily to attend school. Israeli trains pass regularly without danger of being blown up. The arrangement has obvious advantages for both sides.

POVERTY IN JERUSALEM

In most places the frontier has resulted in economic disaster. Arab Jerusalem today is congested with destitute. Among the thousands without a livelihood are lawyers, merchants, mechanics, and artisans whose premises were in the New City, landless peasants, and ex-employees of the former Mandatory Government. Many who were able to bring savings with them from Jewish-held Palestine face a steadily deteriorating situation as these become exhausted. Out of the British Loan to Jordan £25,000 has been allocated to the Municipality to relieve unemployment, and £50,000 is being used to help carpenters, blacksmiths, and others to replace their tools and machines so that they can start up new businesses. Contact between Arab and Jewish Jerusalem is limited to a furtive exchange of daily newspapers at the Mandelbaum Gate, the only official crossing place on the frontier. The Jewish papers, however, are never openly sold on the Arab side.

In the past, charity and tourism were the mainstay of Jerusalem; charity continues, but the present barriers with their total disregard for natural communications and trade routes are responsible for substantial losses of revenue. Bishops and diplomatic officials move with comparative freedom from one side to the other, and back; foreign tourists are allowed to cross once. The fact that they cannot return can greatly complicate and add to the expense of an itinerary. Regulations are apt to change at short notice and leave the unprivileged traveller precariously dependent on consular cooperation. Jordan is the only member of the Arab League to grant visas to foreigners who are known to have visited Israel. In consequence ordinary visitors (as opposed to pilgrims in large groups

organized at Christmas and Easter) who enter Arab Jerusalem from Israel are obliged to leave Jordan by air for a destination outside the Arab States. Because the Old City and Bethlehem are on the Arab side of the demarcation line, Jordan has advantages over Israel in the way of pilgrim traffic. But the full potentialities of tourism in the area and urgently needed foreign currency can never be realized so long as travellers are unable to move freely throughout the Holy Land as a whole, and so long as a visit to Israel jeopardizes future contacts with the Arab States. Few people have either the time or the means to make special journeys to Cyprus, where a new passport unblemished by an Israeli visa can be obtained, in order to satisfy the Arab authorities.

Prospects for the future are bleak unless the present situation changes. And many of the Palestinian Arabs in the Old City now express the desire for the internationalization of Jerusalem, on the lines of earlier United Nations resolutions, which would revive the normal flow of traffic and facilitate trade with the Jews. This, however, would not only clash with the determination of the Zionists to make Jerusalem Israel's capital, but also with the deep reluctance in Amman to relinquish Jordanian sovereignty over the Old City. Outside the hard-headed circles of commerce which seek a practical solution the mood is one of mounting bitterness. The recent removal of the Jewish Foreign Office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in defiance of the United Nations, has added to Arab resentment and dealt yet another blow to Western prestige in the Middle East.

DISTRESSED VILLAGES

Conditions in the villages along the Jordanian side of the frontier are still worse. Even during the Mandate the barren hills of Palestine could not support the population, and until 1948 many villages, especially near Jerusalem, worked for the Mandatory Government or the British Army, and on the railway which is now in Israel. Refugees add to the burdens of the frontier villages. Out of nearly a million refugees half are concentrated in the impoverished Kingdom of Jordan where, for the most part destitute and demoralized, they form a third of the total population. Some 360,000, or more, live west of the Jordan. They cling tenaciously to the frontier area in order to be within easy reach and in sight of their old homes which are now in Israel. In many villages refugees are more numerous than the local inhabitants; houses are severely

overcrowded, for only 30 per cent of the refugees are in camps organized by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Free rations and, in the case of those who live in camps and caves, free shelter enable them to undercut the villagers in the limited opportunities for employment, and this frequently leads to friction.

The indigenous population of the villages in the frontier districts is estimated at 120,000. A small percentage of the people draw half rations; this dates from an emergency allocation, arranged by the Red Cross, which UNRWA continued but was unable to extend to other equally needy groups. Because they have not lost their houses most villagers do not qualify for official relief. Yet their conditions are often more desperate even than those of the refugees who are kept alive at barest subsistence level by United Nations help.[1] A handful of relief workers from voluntary societies has struggled to deal with some of the worst emergencies. But sickness and malnutrition are widespread and the need for additional resident medical and welfare teams is urgent; at Dharariya 40 per cent of the people were found to be suffering from tuberculosis. Foreign relief organizations, however, have on the whole been hesitant to spend large sums on the frontier area mainly because of the uncertainty of its future. Hardship is increased by the tendency of the authorities to keep supplies down to the minimum in order to reduce opportunities for smuggling to Israel.

Most of the fertile coastal plain is in Israel, and the former pattern of agriculture in which the produce of the terraced hillsides was exchanged for the crops grown at lower level has been completely disrupted. Some villages have lost 80 per cent of their land; and conditions in the following are characteristic of the district. The arid village of El Burg, near Hebron, formerly owned 40,000 to 45,000 dunums,[2] with extensive grazing lands. Today it has 4,000, and the huge herds of cattle, camels, and small stock which used to provide its livelihood are reduced to insignificant numbers. Qalqiliya, which used to depend on citrus fruits, has lost nearly two-thirds of its land. Its population is 7,000; and in the opinion of foreign experts the village, even under the most favourable conditions, cannot support more than 1,500 people. Out of the 17,278 dunums formerly belonging to Imwas 2,500 remain, about a third of which is considered unsuitable for cultivation. The

[1] The average annual cost of UNRWA relief per refugee is $31·4.
[2] 4 dunums = 1 acre.

tables below give the losses of land in the frontier villages by sub-districts and a classification of the remaining areas. (A small percentage of the land now in Arab hands was in a few districts cultivated by Jewish settlers until the Palestinian war.)

TABLE I

LAND LOST TO ISRAEL

Sub-District	*Population excluding refugees*	*Original area in dunums*	*Present area in dunums*	*Percentage of original area lost*
Jenin	10,260	311,110	114,008	63·3
Nablus	7,500	327,912	305,883	6·8
Tulkaram	39,020	267,424	109,153	59·2
Bethlehem	6,230	30,741	20,742	32·5
Jerusalem	7,230	31,107	21,673	30·3
Ramallah	2,850	28,647	22,887	20·1
Ramallah (ex Ramle)	11,430	139,146	58,708	57·8
Hebron	34,630	709,699	490,556	30·9
Total	119,150	1,845,786	1,143,610	38·0

NOTE.—Nineteen frontier villages which have lost only a negligible proportion of their lands are excluded and also the larger towns.

TABLE II

CLASSIFICATION OF REMAINING LANDS IN FRONTIER VILLAGES

Sub-District	*Present Area in dunums*	*Cultivable Land in dunums*	*Non-Cultivable Land in dunums*	*Percentage of present area classified as non-cultivable*
Jenin	114,008	39.698	74,310	65·1
Nablus	305,883	105,217	200,666	65·6
Tulkaram	109,153	93,291	15,862	14·5
Bethlehem	20,742	9,474	11,268	54·3
Jerusalem	21,673	8,934	12,739	58·8
Ramallah	22,887	14,705	8,182	35·7
Rammallah (ex Ramle)	58,708	27,671	31,037	52·9
Hebron	490,556	168,438	322,118	56·7
Total	1,143,610	467,428	676,182	59·0

Many starving villagers have been forced to sell their animals, doors, and windows to pay for food. Many travel great distances in search of work, and on failing to find it are forced to beg. Some exist by raiding Israel, usually their former homes; one community near Jenin, which during the Mandate worked on a large estate, now in Israel, found that this was the only way to survive. Daily the peasants face the provocation of seeing their fields lying fallow in the neutral zone, or at greater distance being worked by Israelis.

A burning sense of injustice, hunger, and a deep attachment to his own land will drive the peasant to risk his life for the sake of ploughing a few acres, or gathering a sack of olives, across the border. At Imwas, where not long ago starving villagers were eating grass, the olive trees are on the Israeli side of the wire, but within a few yards of their Arab owners.

Incidents reach their peak during the harvest, and according to official sources about 3,500 Arabs a year are caught by the Jordanian authorities either on the outgoing or the homeward journey. As well as peasants who go to pick crops, infiltrators include traders, families visiting relatives, and a small criminal element wanted by both the Jordanian and the Egyptian police for traffic in hashish. Members of the Arab minorities in Israel, and Arabs in the Gaza strip under Egyptian control, which is separated from Jordan by Jewish territory, also cross the border. Illicit journeys and smuggling are encouraged by the lack of any legal means of entry and by the disruption of normal trade routes. Jordanian villages within twenty-five miles or so of Haifa and Jaffa can buy shirts and razor blades far more cheaply from the Israelis because, except when the inconvenient port of Aqaba is used, goods legally imported into Jordan have to travel several hundred miles across Lebanon and Syria. By the time they reach Amman and Jerusalem their prices have trebled or quadrupled. Equally, certain Jordanian produce, such as meat, which is desperately short in Israel, fetches far higher prices from the Jews than in distant home markets.

A frontier villages loan scheme was recently inaugurated. By raising the standard of living and by providing paid employment—even for limited numbers—this should help to lessen the temptation and the need to pilfer in Israel. The Village Loans Sub-Committee has been set up in Jerusalem under the supervision of the Agricultural Adviser to the British Middle East Office who has been seconded to the Jordanian Government. During the current fiscal year £190,000 of the British loan to Jordan is being devoted to the frontier villages. Acute poverty has placed many villages seriously in the debt of local merchants; and it is hoped that the loan scheme, combined with efforts to revive co-operatives on the West Bank of the Jordan, will help to break this stranglehold over the peasants. Villagers can now borrow for approved projects, and this enables them to buy material for planting, mules, and tractors, and to install pumps where local initiative has shown by

laborious and primitive methods that water exists in sufficient quantities to justify the construction of wells. Especially important are the plans for terracing the rocky terrain remaining in Arab hands. Loans for terracing are granted in three instalments; repayment does not start until the fifth year. Inspectors examine the work, and the amount done with each allocation determines eligibility for further aid. In some districts it has been difficult to persuade cultivators to revert to the vegetables, fruits, and other crops which are best suited to certain localities; in their anxiety to be assured of bread supplies many have abandoned these in favour of wheat.

Nevertheless, the response has on the whole been excellent. Most borrowers do more work than the minimum necessary to qualify for full assistance. Families turn out to share the tedious tasks of picking the rocks out of the soil; in some places dynamite has had to be used. Only a small percentage of the applicants receive loans, and there are already signs that, if the programme cannot be extended, resentment may grow among the groups who do not benefit directly and who are in genuine need. It has been suggested that the present scheme could usefully serve as a pilot project to a much larger venture to be sponsored possibly by UNRWA. This would provide work and a livelihood for refugees as well as for the villagers. Experts consider that in the frontier district alone 150,000 dunums could be reclaimed. The estimated cost is about a million and a half Jordanian dinars (£1 = J.D.1).

VILLAGE SECURITY AND MORALE

Despite the financial limitations of the loan scheme it is nevertheless important. The fact that money is being spent at all on the frontier villages should help to restore confidence and promote stability. The Arabs today have little faith that the Western nations will abide by their commitments to guarantee the present frontier, and fear of Israeli expansion is uppermost in the minds of the villagers. Israel's persistent economic difficulties, which the Arab blockade helps to bring about, are viewed on the West Bank with a mixture of satisfaction and apprehension; the sight of cramped Jewish settlements spreading in all directions with mushroom rapidity inevitably gives the impression to Israel's immediate neighbours that the new State must, sooner or later, burst out of the tight framework of its present boundaries. In places the Arabs have not had the heart, the strength, or the funds to rebuild ruins

which date from the Palestine war. Some villages, such as Sarafat, near Jerusalem, with its strategic position overlooking the railway, have been completely evacuated as the result of Israeli attacks since the Armistice. On the whole the morale of the local inhabitants is good, especially in the communities where help is being received. Outwardly the attitude adopted by the villagers to the return of their lands is as uncompromising as that of the rest of the Arab world, but unlike the refugees they have shown a great readiness, as an interim measure, to make the most of any opportunities put in their way.

The defence of the Jordanian frontier villages is entrusted mainly to the police and to home guards. The latter service, formed about a year ago, is compulsory and unpaid, and is being gradually strengthened. The Israelis complain that the Arab Legion is failing to control the border. In Jordan it is maintained that no army can patrol every strip of a frontier 300 miles long[1], that infiltration is a social and economic problem which cannot be solved by military violence and which should be handled by the police. According to official sources about half the inmates of West Jordan's prisons are serving sentences for infiltration. Crossing into Israel is in itself no crime against Jordan, but these Arabs are punished—despite strong popular resentment—as a deterrent to activities which might compromise Jordan politically and which have led to reprisals against innocent villages. The authorities claim that the bulk, and the most serious, of the infiltration offences are not committed by local villagers, but by refugees from squalid camps and self-made settlements close to the frontier. The refugee population is increasing at the rate of 22,000 to 25,000 a year, and bitterness is turning to desperation. But for their poor state of health and the fact that the greatest concentration of their numbers has occurred in Jordan, which has the most efficient security services of any Middle East State, the danger of unrest and lawlessness would be even greater than at present. It is frequently suggested in Israel and elsewhere that the solution lies in their resettlement in the underpopulated areas of the Middle East. This, however, is an oversimplification of an immensely complicated social and economic problem. For apart from the obstructionism of the Arab States on political grounds, it ignores the attachment of the settled Arab to his own land, and the fact that to the average Palestinian, who is familiar with a Mediterranean landscape and way of agri-

[1] Excluding the Dead Sea strip.

culture, the great wastes of the Syrian and Iraqi deserts are alien terrain. Among the Palestinians who take up employment in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq there are many who leave their families behind in order to retain, as one explained, the 'link with the Homeland'.

The current annual report of the Director of UNRWA to the eighth session of the U.N. General Assembly, referring to the resistance of many refugees to resettlement outside Palestine, states that a 'formidable obstacle' will have to be overcome if 'tangible progress' is to be made in this direction.[1] Probably no other single factor is doing more to perpetuate Arab hostility towards Israel and the West then the unending question of the refugees, and it is not surprising that Jewish settlers who today cultivate Arab lands within close range of the original owners should feel perpetually uneasy. So long as the refugee problem remains unsolved, and so long as adjustments are not made to the demarcation line to remove some of the more obvious causes of friction, measures taken for the improvement of conditions in the frontier villages can only be of limited effectiveness. As the years go by the attitude of both sides is hardening and the chances of a peaceful solution grow progressively less.

N. C.

British Guiana

A Background Note

ALTHOUGH rumours that troops had been sent to British Guiana had brought the political situation in the colony to the public eye, the British Government's announcement on 9 October 1953 of its decision to suspend the Constitution of British Guiana was none the less unexpected. At the same time it was announced that an Order in Council revoking the Constitution would be laid before Parliament and that a Commission of Inquiry would be sent to British Guiana to advise on a new Constitution. The Governor, Sir Alfred Savage, was given emergency powers and withdrew the

[1] U.N. General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/2470), p. 2, para. 9.

portfolios of the Ministers in the Executive Council. The immediate occasion of the British Government's action in suspending the Constitution appears to have been the hasty introduction of a controversial Labour Relations Bill by the Government of British Guiana, but, according to the Colonial Office statement[1], the Ministers themselves had shown that their 'sole object' was 'to seize control of the whole life of the territory and to run it on totalitarian lines' and that 'they were prepared to use violence and to plunge the state into economic and social chaos'. A White Paper published on 20 October[2] states that this conduct 'had seriously endangered the economic life of the country' and points out that turnover in wholesale and retail trade has decreased by 9½ per cent compared with the corresponding period in 1952, that four North American firms have abandoned their plans for mineral exploration and another firm has abandoned a large building project, while the level of savings deposits has fallen by $BWI 1,699,722 between 19 August and 30 September 1953.

The Constitution of April 1953 which has been in effect for so short a time was based largely on the proposals of a Constitutional Commission sent out to British Guiana by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1950. The Commission's recommendations were largely accepted by the Colonial Secretary, and a Constitution based on universal suffrage, a bicameral legislature, and ministerial government was accordingly introduced, after a general election, in April 1953. The House of Assembly (the lower Chamber) consisted of twenty-four elected representatives and three officials holding the posts of Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary, and Attorney General, while the State Council (the revisionary Chamber) was mainly nominated by the Governor. The Executive Council comprised the Governor, three ex-officio members, six Ministers elected by the House of Assembly, and a Minister without Portfolio elected by the State Council.

The considerable advance which the new Constitution represented can best be measured by looking back at the earlier political history of the colony. In 1927 a Commission investigating economic conditions in British Guiana stated that in their view the Constitution was the main obstacle to economic progress, and a Constitutional Commission was therefore appointed. At that time the colony had a cumbersome system of government based on

[1] *The Times*, 10 October 1953; subsequently included in Cmd. 8980.
[2] *British Guiana: Suspension of the Constitution* (Cmd. 8980).

legislative institutions inherited from the Dutch settlers, in which elected representatives had authority in financial matters but no further responsibilities. British Guiana was, in fact, described by the Constitutional Commission as 'politically precocious', and in 1928 the old Constitution was abrogated and the colony was given 'an advanced type of Crown Colony Constitution', consisting of a Governor, an executive council in which officials had a majority, and a single-chamber legislature with an unofficial but not an elected majority. Although the shortcomings of the old Constitution were admitted, the new Crown Colony government was regarded by many Guianese as a step backwards and left a 'psychological sense of grievance' still apparent when the 1950 Constitutional Commission visited the colony.[1] Nevertheless, the 1928 Order in Council gave British Guiana the opportunity to advance through the various stages of increasing popular representation; in 1943 the Executive Council was reformed to include an unofficial majority and the Legislative Council was given an elected majority. In the same year advisory committees of the Legislature were established, but the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of public affairs still lay with appointed officials and not with elected representatives. The position was complicated by the fact that the heads of departments did not have seats in the legislature, so that all legislation had to be channelled through the Chief Secretary. The franchise, although extended in 1945, was still based on a literacy and small income or property qualification up till 1953. The introduction of universal suffrage had been under consideration by a local commission for several years but because of racial difficulties the question was not resolved. The East Indians, who are the largest racial group (198,000 in 1951), included a high proportion of illiterates, and the Africans were unwilling to forego their advantage by abolishing the literacy test.

It was largely for this reason that in 1950, contrary to usual practice, an external Commission, rather than a local one, was appointed to report on the possibility of constitutional progress. The Commission reported that 'the present system is outworn and no longer satisfies the wishes of the people' and was firm in its recommendation that the colony should have 'the greatest, and not the least, degree of self-government that can be sustained'.[2]

[1] *British Guiana: Report of the Constitutional Commission* 1950–1 (Colonial No. 280. Colonial Office, 1951), p. 17.
[2] op cit., p. 17.

The Commission itself noted 'unwholesome tendencies' in the colony, for example, the excessive concern with politics in the trade union movement and the fact that many Guianese held an over-simplified view of democracy which made it impossible for them to grasp the idea of a Constitution based on a system of checks and balances. One of its members has stated recently that the People's Progressive Party representatives and the trade unions connected with them who gave evidence before the Commission 'interpreted democracy as what I can only describe as "one-party rule". The idea that the minority also had rights to be respected; that democracy meant "government by consent", that is, by the consent of everyone governed; that to ensure this it was usual to insert certain checks and balances in democratic constitutions, was alien to their thoughts. They interpreted any check as a negation of democracy'.[1] But the Commission, when it reported in 1951, was of the opinion that 'many, though not all, of the present unwholesome tendencies have been fostered by a sense of inferiority springing from inadequate opportunities for responsible political expression',[2] and that when given responsibility the Guianese would honour the spirit of their Constitution.

In the event, the most extreme Left-wing organization, the People's Progressive Party led by Dr Cheddi Jagan, swept the board at the election. Most of the parties which put up were Left-wing, competing as they were for an electorate which included some 60,000 illiterates and which for the most part had a very low standard of living and particularly wretched housing conditions. The P.P.P., however, with its energetic leadership and efficient propaganda was first in the field with its call for self-government, racial unity, and extensive social legislation. The opposition, though numerically strong—there were 134 candidates for the twenty-four seats—was very much divided, and therefore although the P.P.P. polled only just over half the votes cast it gained eighteen of the twenty-four seats in the House of Assembly and consequently the six ministries in the Executive Council. Of the other six seats in the House of Assembly the National Democratic Party gained two and the Independents four.

The first concrete indication that the Constitutional Commission's faith in the willingness and capacity of the P.P.P. Government to work the Constitution on democratic lines was not to be

[1] Rita Hinden, in *The Manchester Guardian*, 17 October 1953.
[2] *British Guiana: Report of the Constitutional Commission* 1950–1, p. 17.

justified was given by Dr Jagan in his opening speech as Leader of the House of Assembly when he criticized the creation of the State Council as 'reactionary and undemocratic',[1] and took exception to the presence of three ex-officio members in the House and to the Governor's reserved powers. The White Paper has since stated that Ministers undermined the loyalty of the police, attempted to gain control of the public service and statutory committees, and intended to extend their political influence to schools by revising the curriculum and textbooks 'to give them the true Guianese Socialist and realistic outlook'. Moreover, P.P.P. Ministers retained their positions as trade union officials and 'espoused the cause of the Guiana Industrial Workers Union, of which Dr Lachhmansingh remained President although Minister for Health', and tried to force its recognition in place of the established Man-Power Citizens' Association, first by encouraging strikes and then by introducing legislation in the House of Assembly.

The economic consequences of the Government's policy are particularly serious in a colony with largely undeveloped resources and thus needing considerable capital investment. Although the total area amounts to some 80,000 square miles, 90 per cent of the population live in a narrow coastal strip about 270 miles long, which is itself open to flooding both from the sea and from the colony's many rivers. In this area are grown British Guiana's main crops, sugar and rice. The sugar industry is the dominant factor in the economy, employing about 33,000 workers and accounting in 1952 for about half the value of total exports. Except for some 8,000 square miles of savannahs, most of the rest of the colony is covered by forests, of which about one-fifth are as yet accessible. The colony's known mineral resources are mainly bauxite (of which over 2 million tons is now exported annually), gold, and diamonds. Recently, however, deposits of columbite and iron ore have been confirmed and as the interior is explored other minerals may of course be found. The colony has already been the subject of numerous economic commissions. In the 1930s the possibility of settling refugees in British Guiana was explored by commissions sent by the League of Nations and by President Roosevelt. The matter was shelved during the war but in 1948 a Settlement Commission was sent to British Guiana and British Honduras to see if these mainland colonies might absorb some of the surplus population of the British West Indies islands. The Commission reported

[1] *New Commonwealth*, 20 July 1953.

that this would be possible only if the latent resources of British Guiana and British Honduras were developed, and it made various proposals in this connection. But the idea of migration from the islands has not been well received in British Guiana, her East Indian population fearing that it would be soon outnumbered if African migrants were allowed to enter. Now, however, a Report by a Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has drawn attention to the annual rate of growth of British Guiana's own population (now 2·8 per cent compared with 1·5 per cent in 1945) which makes economic development a necessity if even the present standard of living is to be maintained.

Since the war a considerable amount of development has been undertaken and output generally has increased. Budget surpluses accumulated in the war years helped to finance a ten-year development plan launched in 1947, and by December 1952 Colonial Development and Welfare funds had contributed over £1½ million to the cost of the programme. The colony has also received grants from the U.S. Economic Co-operation Administration. The largest schemes in progress are for water control in the coastal area, and it is calculated that these will add some 67,000 acres to the cultivable area over the next five years. In the Rupununi savannah region an abattoir and cold storage plant are now under construction to improve the colony's meat supplies. The Colonial Development Corporation since its establishment in 1948 has allocated £3½ million to British Guiana, nearly as much as the total allocation to all the rest of the British Caribbean territories. Following a suggestion of the 1948 Settlement Commission a large timber concern was launched by the Colonial Development Corporation, and exports will expand considerably when the large saw milling plant and wharf which have just been completed come into use. More recently the Corporation has provided most of the capital for a Rice Development Company which is to take over and expand the Government's rice farms and mills.

'With energy and good will' the colony's economic problem can be resolved and continued progress assured. This was the summing up of the recent Mission sent to British Guiana by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.[1] The Mission's Report has not been published but is understood to recommend Government investment expenditure of nearly £14 million during the years 1954–8, chiefly on the development of

[1] *The Times*, 24 August 1953.

agriculture and communications and the rest for forestry, industrial credits, housing, and public works. The Mission also suggested the establishment of a credit corporation and an economic council. The Governor has already announced his intention of implementing these last two proposals and has also said that he will follow up economic proposals made by the Guianese themselves. But the first step must, of course, be the restoration of confidence. In the words of the Constitutional Commission of 1950: 'In a country such as British Guiana, where development is impeded by lack of knowledge, confidence is a tender plant, and its prerequisite is stable and honest government.'[1]

V. K.

The Fall of Beria and the Nationalities Question in the U.S.S.R.

IN the course of the Nineteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, at which a balance sheet was drawn up of Soviet achievements since the previous Congress in 1939, the nationalities question once again came to the fore. Although the speakers abstained from open polemics—for in the higher spheres of the Party any real discussion is carried on behind closed doors—two distinct theses could nevertheless be discerned. The first of these was put forward by Lavrenti Beria, himself an expert on the subject since he had for many years governed the destinies of the most turbulent of the countries within the Soviet Union, Georgia, his own birthplace as well as that of Stalin. According to Beria, the nationalities problem had been definitely settled in all regions of the Union. He described the situation in the U.S.S.R. as giving proof of 'the absolute triumph of equality of rights for all races and nations and of friendship between peoples'.

'In the struggle against the enemies of Leninism,' he added amidst the applause of the audience, 'the Party has preserved the Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy and has assured the complete and final defeat of great-Power chauvinism, of nationalism, and of

[1] *British Guiana: Report of the Constitutional Commission* 1950–1, p. 13.

bourgeois cosmopolitanism.' No shadow fell upon this happy picture of the progress realized by all the nations of the U.S.S.R. under the wise direction of the Party. Beria contrasted this progress with the 'stagnation' of the capitalist countries of the East and West. Thus he emphasized that in Azerbaijan, before 1918 one of the most backward countries in existence, there was now a doctor for every 490 inhabitants. 'The population is thus eight-and-a-half times better provided with medical aid than that of Turkey, and twenty-three times than that of Persia.' Similarly, the development of the Ukraine could stand favourable comparison with that of France or Italy. Beria's account stressed that the different peoples of the U.S.S.R. had every reason to be satisfied with their lot. And it was 'the Russian people, the Russian nation, as the most outstanding of all the nations comprising the Soviet Union', which 'cements the friendship between the peoples of our country', he said—irresistibly recalling George Orwell's aphorism: 'All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others'.

TWO ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION

Beria's speech was like a monument sculptured in that neoclassical style which in the U.S.S.R. generally receives the appellation of 'socialist realism'. He showed the Soviet St George triumphant, with his foot on the head of an expiring nationalism. Nevertheless his optimism did not seem to be shared by the other speakers on the same subject. In fact, most of the delegates from the non-Russian republics whose speeches preceded or followed that of Beria complained of the traces of 'bourgeois nationalism' which still persisted. For example, the representative of the Ukraine, Melnikov, first secretary of the Party, emphasized, in the words of the official record, 'the need to fight against harmful ideologies, and especially against that of bourgeois nationalism'. Similarly, the secretary-general of the Party in Azerbaijan, Bagirov, deplored the 'nationalist deviations' which abounded in his country's literature. Notably, he insisted on 'the importance of the Russian language in the preparation of qualified cadres'. The Lithuanian representative, Snieckus, expressed the view that 'the essential condition for the further development of Lithuania' was 'an implacable struggle against bourgeois-nationalist ideology' whose devotees among the intelligentsia were still numerous. The Georgian delegate, Mgeladze, also pointed to the survival of this heresy in his country; Shayakhmetov, from Kazakhstan, declared

that it was 'essential to continue to wage a resolute struggle against erroneous interpretations of history and against nationalism'; and similar arguments were put forward by the Tatar delegate, Muratov, by Kebin from Estonia, and by the delegate for Uzbekistan, Niazov.

In October 1952 no one pointed to the contradiction inherent in these two attitudes towards the nationalities question: that of Beria, confident to the point of complacency, as against the combative, almost threatening standpoint adopted by most of the other delegates surrounding Malenkov. And in fact, the serenity of Beria and the vigilant sternness of Malenkov might appear, at the feet of a deified Stalin, as merely two aspects of the same will to power of a Party grappling with a complex situation. It was not until the crisis of July 1953 that some light was shed retrospectively upon the significance of the two theses put forward at the October Congress by the protagonists of the drama. It showed up Beria as an adversary of 'the policy elaborated throughout many years by the Party', for which, in the sphere of relations between Moscow and the various republics, he wished to substitute 'a policy of capitulation'.[1]

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 'NATIONALIST DEVIATIONS'

But what was the Party's real policy before Stalin's death? It was characterized by an incessant struggle against 'nationalist deviations' and 'bourgeois nationalism'—a struggle whose necessity was reaffirmed at the Nineteenth Congress by Malenkov and his lieutenants in the non-Russian republics. In fact, after a lull of several years due to the war,[2] the struggle against the remaining vestiges of nationalist ideology revived in the U.S.S.R. as a result of the celebrated Zhdanov resolution adopted by the Central Committee in August 1946 against the reviews *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*. This resolution, which condemned bourgeois nationalism together with cosmopolitanism, was the signal for a new 'heresy-hunt'. The wave of anti-nationalist purges which first broke over the Ukraine, Tataria, and Bashkiria spread rapidly to all the other republics, where between 1939 and 1946 'ideological vigilance' had relaxed. This was in reality a new and vigorous uprising of Russian nationalism, strengthened by the war and now tending to

[1] *Pravda*, 10 July 1953

[2] Though only a relative lull, if one recalls the large-scale deportation of two small Muslim populations of the Caucasus, the Chechens and the Ingushi.

identify 'Soviet patriotism' and 'socialist internationalism' with the recognition of the hegemony of the Russian people and of the incontestable superiority of Russian culture and language. A significant pointer was the reappearance in the official vocabulary, after years of disuse during the revolutionary upheaval, of the epithet 'elder brother' to denote the Russian people in relation to the other peoples of the Soviet Union.

It was Stalin himself who inaugurated what might be called the cult of the Russian people, in his famous toast of 24 May 1945 in honour of the commanders of the Red Army troops: 'I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people, not only because it is the leading people, but also because it possesses a clear mind, a staunch character, and patience.'

It may appear surprising that in the succeeding years so much importance was accorded by the official Party organs and the various Central committees to seemingly purely theoretical questions which apparently were of concern only to a restricted circle of intellectuals—writers, poets, historians, and the like. But it must not be forgotten that it is precisely through the intermediary of debates of this kind that the Communists, an eminently doctrinaire Party, are accustomed to clarify their *praxis*, recalling in this the ancient Byzantines who were wont to confront their interests and their passions under the name of ideas apparently so little contradictory as 'the homoousian and the homoiousian'.[1] In deciding, for example, that the Azerbaijan historian Guseinov (who received a Stalin Prize for his work on the development of nineteenth-century thought in Azerbaijan) was wrong in presenting as a progressive figure the legendary Shamil, hero of the struggle for independence in the mid-nineteenth century, whom the Soviet Encyclopaedia in its 1934 edition had also described as a great democrat, the Communists of Azerbaijan took a fresh step forward in their submission not only to Moscow, but also to Moscow's most ardent agents in Baku. Under the guise of history, it was the present that was in dispute; and while humiliating Guseinov, the most zealous servant of the central power, Bagirov, strengthened his own hold on the Party and the country.

We shall revert later to the social background of this drive for 'Great-Russian chauvinism' which became observable after 1946 not only within the Soviet Union itself, but also in the relations of

[1] 'The same substance' and 'the like substance': watchwords of the Arian controversy.

the Soviet Union with the countries of Central Europe. It contributed, for example, to the outbreak of the conflict between the Cominform and Yugoslavia. Tito's deviation gave a fresh impulse to the campaign directed against the various manifestations of 'bourgeois nationalism'—that is to say, against Russophobe sentiments, for Russian chauvinism, repeatedly criticized by Lenin, ceased to be denounced after 1934, as if by that date it had suddenly disappeared. In 1950 Stalin offered the Party ideologists and organizers of this campaign a new intellectual pabulum in his articles on questions of philology. Stalin there envisaged the birth of 'zonal languages', which should serve as a transition between the multiplicity of national languages and the single international language. Clearly his intention in publishing these studies was to reinforce the authority and prestige of the Russian language and culture, predestined to play the 'zonal' role.[1]

It is in this sense that his views were interpreted and expanded by Soviet linguists, notably by the Soviet academician V. Vinogradov, who was then put in charge of philological research in the Soviet Union. 'The language of the great Russian nation,' wrote Vinogradov (*Pravda*, 21 July 1951), 'is a powerful instrument for understanding between the peoples of our country. . . The great Russian language is a source of inexhaustible life for the languages of all the peoples of the Union.' Once this dogma of the 'mission' of the Russian language had been proclaimed in Moscow, the scholars of the other republics were called upon to submit to it with a good grace, retracting everything in their past work which might seem contrary to the new views.

During June and July 1951 *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, recalling the terms of the Zhdanov resolution of August 1946, launched a new offensive against the 'ideological lacunae' in the various republics. The president of the Society of Authors in the Ukraine, Korneichuk, was strongly reproved for not having prevented the publication of a 'nationalist' poem of Sosiura's. Korneichuk humbly pronounced his *mea culpa*, acknowledging that 'We have not carried on a resolute struggle against the survivals of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.' At the same time he apologized for the tactlessness of a Ukrainian linguist, Beloded, 'a discipline of Marr', who, in one of his studies, had placed the

[1] Cf. in this connection F. Barghoorn's excellent study, 'Stalinism and the Russian Cultural Heritage', in *The Review of Politics* (Notre Dame, U.S.A.), April 1952.

Ukrainian poet A. Malychko—true, from the linguistic point of view only—higher than the Russian poet Mayakovsky; and he paid homage to 'Russian literature, the most advanced in the world'. Although Korneichuk's self-criticism was adjudged inadequate by the Party secretary, Melnikov, this writer, as shrewd as he was affable, nevertheless managed to extricate himself from his *faux pas* by abandoning with a good grace his various official functions (he had been successively Vice-President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and President of the Praesidium in the Ukraine) to divide his time between literature and work for the Peace Committee. It is possible that Beria was among his protectors; in any case, the return of Korneichuk to the political scene last June, when he was appointed Vice-President of the Council and Party Secretary, coincided with the general promotion of Beria's protégés.

Some information is also available as to the role played by Beria in discussions on the nationalities question, and on the settlement of accounts between rival groups which accompanied them, in his native country. The political history of Georgia during the last two years would appear to be extremely complicated. An initial wave of purges struck the administration at the end of 1951: it was at this time that, according to the revelations made in the Moscow *Pravda* of 19 April 1953, the Georgian Minister of Security, Rukhadze, 'staged an affair of which some of our most valued workers were victims', among them the Party secretary Mikhail Baramia and two other leaders, Ivlian Zodelava and Avksenti Rapava, accused of nationalist conspiracies. Early in April 1952 Beria came to Tiflis, to assist at a stormy session of the Central Committee as a result of which the Secretary-General of the Party, Charkviani, was replaced by A. I. Mgeladze. A fresh purge followed in which the Minister of Security, Rukhadze, himself succumbed. At the Nineteenth Congress it was Mgeladze who led the Georgian delegation; and he was elected a member of the Central Committee.

COMMUNIST INTELLECTUALS AND ANTI-COLONIALIST TRADITIONS

During these years Moscow gave her support solely to such of the Communists among the non-Russian nations who not only recognized Russia's present leading role but who also showed themselves ready to disavow the traditions of their respective

nations as far as anti-colonialism and anti-Russianism were concerned. In this connection, a speech pronounced at Tashkent, at the Uzbek Party Congress, by the Secretary-General O. Yusupov is highly significant. While declaring that 'we must do everything to enhance the national pride of the Uzbek people', Yusupov inveighed strongly against the 'narrow glorification' of the past, and in particular against the glorification of the 'feudal struggles' for independence.

There can be no doubt that it was among the Communist intellectuals of the Turki and Muslim peoples that this new tendency in the application of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy showed itself most clearly. The case of the Kazakh historian Suleimenov, who was taken to task in *Pravda* (13 January 1953), well illustrates the swing-over: this scholar, who believed that he had put himself thoroughly into line by attacking the 'bourgeois-nationalists', found himself suddenly hauled over the coals on the grounds that he was himself an agent of nationalism and a double-dealer. The truth was that the study of the past, to which, it must be conceded, the Bolshevik revolution had given a genuine impulse,[1] had led Suleimenov, in common with many Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen intellectuals, to become conscious not only of the anti-colonialist traditions of their people, but also of a community of culture extending throughout all the Turkish-speaking peoples. Moscow was not slow to realize the danger to the central Government which the propagation of these apparently inoffensive ideas might represent, for, were they to become widespread in regions where Communist dictatorship was often regarded as a foreign dictatorship, they might well act as an explosive force. Consequently Moscow deliberately applied the principle of 'divide et impera', utilizing it to nip in the bud any Pan-Turanian aspirations; and Yusupov, in the speech just quoted, denounced the error inherent in speaking of a 'single Turkish culture': 'All the Turkish-speaking peoples, and in particular the Uzbek people,' he proclaimed, 'have their own history and have followed their own particular lines of evolution.'[2]

Another heresy of nationalist character to be contested by Moscow in Uzbekistan, as also in the other Muslim regions, is Pan-Islamism. If we are to believe the official publications, many

[1] Cf. Professor S. Tolstov's article on 'Recent Studies of Russian Archaeologists and Ethnographers', in *Izvestia*, 10 May 1953.

[2] *Pravda Vostoka*, 15 May 1950; quoted by Vincent Monteil in his *Essai sur l'Islam en U.R.S.S.* (*Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, 1952).

Communist intellectuals of these regions tend to welcome with sympathy the idea ('of imperialist and Anglo-American inspiration'[1]) of a common Islamic culture in which the ancient Uzbek, Tajik, and other similar cultures all had their roots. 'The corrupt ideology of the Pan-Islamists constitutes a danger for the Eastern republics no less great than the ideology of the tools of the Vatican for the Western republics,' said the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (20 November 1952).[2]

The Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences had frequently been criticized of recent years for the 'Pan-Islamic' views expressed by certain of its most eminent scholars. *Izvestia* (2 September 1951), too, denounced this 'dangerous' deviation, while the problem was also the subject of a lively discussion at the Uzbek Party's national conference, held at Tashkent from 20 to 22 September 1952. Then, at the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R., the leader of the Uzbek delegation, Niazov, underlined afresh 'the need to struggle against the idealization of the feudal past', and another delegate, Alimov, pushed his zeal so far as to demand that the duty of 'educating members of society in the spirit of Soviet patriotism' should be inscribed in the new statutes of the Party. (Alimov also made another interesting suggestion, that in all kolkhozes numbering more than fifty Communists a full-time secretary should be appointed who should be 'freed from the work of actual production'.)

The same tendency is to be found in Azerbaijan, where the Party journal (18 July 1950) rewrites history with the statement that 'the Azerbaijan peoples awaited the Russians as liberators'. From December 1950 onwards the Moscow *Pravda* criticized the 'national deviation' of certain Kazakh historians whom it accused of having 'idealized the feudal-monarchical movement of Khan Kenesseri' who during the second half of the nineteenth century had carried out an important revolt against the Tsarist Government. One of the historians in question, M. P. Viatkin, in February 1952 published in the Moscow review *Voprosy Istorii* a very circumstantial disavowal, admitting the justice of the thesis that the national independence movements which in the past had been

[1] Cf. G. Osipov, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 16 July 1949.

[2] V. Monteil, in his study quoted above, remarks that 'the Soviet Government appears more concerned to preserve its Muslim masses from external ideas than to utilize them for the spread of Communism' (*op. cit.* p 128). But the Yugoslav *Borba* (26 April 1953) mentions some curious attempts on the part of the Soviets to infiltrate the Pan-Turk organizations abroad.

directed against Russian colonization were of a feudal and reactionary character, in contrast to which Russia, even Tsarist Russia, represented social and economic progress. During the Congress of the Turkmen Party (Ashkabad, 21–22 September 1952) the most celebrated historian of Turkmenistan, Nepesov, was also denounced as a 'promoter of the bourgeois nationalist ideology'. He had just published a work on 'The triumph of Sovietism in Turkmenistan'.

Another criticism made in the course of the anti-nationalist campaign and directed against certain scholars of the Central Asian Republics concerned the enthusiasm which research workers at the Institutes of Oriental Studies in Tashkent and elsewhere were alleged to have shown for studying 'dusty ancient Arab manuscripts', instead of devoting themselves to 'the study of present-day problems'.[1] Similarly, in his study on 'The historical past of the Uzbek people' (*Red Uzbekistan*, 15 and 29 May 1949), Professor Zagidov criticizes the 'excessive influence of the Arabic language'. The same writer also denounces elsewhere the fondness of certain Uzbek, Tajik, or Azerbaijan scholars and writers for Persian literature, which in the past strongly influenced their classical literature. To Pan-Islamism, a political and religious deviation, and Pan-Turkism, a political deviation, there must, in fact, be added a third deviation, that of Pan-Iranianism—a cultural deviation, but with a political aspect too, since the Pan-Iranians attempt, according to Professor Zagidov, 'to detach the Tajiks of the Soviet Union and reunite them with Iran', and also 'oppose the diffusion of the great Russian culture'.

A curious discussion on this subject took place at the Nineteenth Congress last year. On that occasion the Tajikistan delegate, Gafurov, a member of the Academy of Sciences founded in 1951 and author of a highly controversial 'History of the Tajik people', admitted that 'serious deviations had occurred in his republic's art and literature'. But he did not hesitate to throw the responsibility for these deficiencies on to the 'leader' of Soviet literature, Fadeev, the main representative of the trend towards neo-classicism and the glorification of Russia. According to the Tajikistan delegate, the Union of Writers in the U.S.S.R., of which Fadeev is the head, 'takes no interest in national literatures and is very ill-informed about their situation'. Had not Fadeev himself made an ill-considered accusation against the Tajik

[1] *Izvestia*, 6 June 1949.

republic, saying that it had 'annexed to itself the classics' of Persian literature'?

FROM ARMENIA TO THE BALTIC STATES

But the struggle against the various forms of 'nationalist deviation' was not confined to the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Turki and Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union. The same problems also arose, with greater or less acuteness, in the other republics. Take, for example, the small republic of Armenia. The Armenian Party's Secretary-General, Arutinov, in his speech at the Nineteenth Congress protested against the so-called 'single stream theory' in history—a theory which put 'on the same plane the movements for bourgeois liberation and the true class struggle'. In fact, inasmuch as the members of the new leading class—the 'cadres' of Soviet Russia—identify themselves with everything in the past of Tsarist Russia which made for progress and dynamism, they can no longer admit that the other peoples of the Union should find common cause in their traditions of opposition to Russia. It is *sub specie* the growth of the power of the *Russian* State—of which the present Union is the culmination—that the history of all the peoples of the Empire must be re-envisaged. And that this adaptation is meeting with serious obstacles even among the intelligent and supple Armenians, who provided the Soviet State with one of its greatest administrators in the person of Mikoyan, is clearly shown in an article in *Pravda* of 25 January 1953, on the occasion of a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, inviting Party leaders to 'wage an active struggle against national errors in history and literature, as well as against all forms of bourgeois nationalism'.

Nor did the Communists of the Baltic States on whom fell the difficult responsibility of the rapid sovietization of their countries escape criticism. Intellectual circles in these countries found it very difficult to break off contact with the West and to adopt an exclusively Soviet orientation. During the past few years reproofs were often directed against them from Moscow. In Estonia, for example, among the victims of the latest great purge was the Prime Minister, A. Vejmer, who was dismissed in 1951 and 'unmasked' at the September 1952 Congress as an enemy agent. Vejmer and a secretary of the Central Committee, Kuzmin, were held responsible for manifestations of nationalism within the Party, and the Congress decided to undertake a new and vigorous

offensive on the intellectual plane against cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Nevertheless some weeks after the Nineteenth Congress the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* expressed the view that this programme fell far short of achievement, and it specifically blamed the Estonian writers' official organ for failure to adopt a sufficiently energetic attitude on the ideological front. The same problems also appear in Lithuania: the Congress of the Lithuanian Party in September 1952 had subjected to searching examination the country's highest dignitaries on account of their 'deviations'. Even the President of the Praesidium, J. Paleckis, was accused of having 'made some vague declarations against bourgeois nationalism solely in order to camouflage his refusal to unmask the true partisans of the nationalist idea which he does not wish to oppose'. At the same time the Academy of Sciences was accused of a serious lack of the international proletarian spirit. Events took a tragic turn after the discovery of the 'Doctors' Plot', when on 31 January 1953 the arrest at Vilna was announced of a group of 'bourgeois nationalist Lithuanians'.

THE SWING-OVER AFTER STALIN'S DEATH

The anti-nationalist campaign appears to have reached its culminating point at this time in the Soviet Union as a whole. It was then that Moscow propaganda showed a tendency to associate the idea of 'nationalism' with that of Zionism and Semitism in general. At the same time exaltation of the virtues and power of the Russian people was pushed to its highest point.

Then came Stalin's death, and hostilities on the ideological front were abruptly suspended. During the succeeding months all the Governments and Party directorates in the non-Russian republics were subjected to far-reaching changes, and many of the most zealous inquisitors disappeared from the scene, such as, for example, the Ukrainian leader Melnikov, whose fall coincided with the return to grace of Korneichuk; Bagirov in Azerbaijan; the Georgian leader Mgeladze; and many others. The interest of these changes, which appeared to foreshadow a swing-over in the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union, lies in the fact that they cast a light on the social background of the struggle against nationalist deviations. In the Ukraine, the powerful Party secretary Melnikov, who after carrying on a veritable reign of terror of recent years was dismissed from office on 15 June, was accused of

having 'appointed to leading posts persons of foreign origin and having instituted teaching in the Russian language in the secondary schools of western Ukraine'. The Central Committee of the Lithuanian Party, too, according to Moscow radio (18 June 1953), made mention of 'faults and errors consisting of the systematic distortion of the Party's Leninist-Stalinist national policy', notably in the 'highly inadequate application of the principle according to which it is important to recruit, and to appoint to responsible posts in the Party and in economic spheres, national cadres of purely Lithuanian origin'. Similarly in Latvia, the Central Committee of the Party on 28 June stigmatized 'the violation of Leninist-Stalinist principles' in the matter of utilization of national cadres.

At the Nineteenth Congress Beria had mentioned as characteristic of Tsarist colonization the extensive establishment of Russian officials in the subjected countries. He had contrasted these methods of colonization with the example of the Soviet republics, which, he affirmed, were administered by 'popularly elected persons who know the customs and psychology of the local population and administer affairs of state in the native languages'. Now, only a few months later, official communiqués published at Kiev, Lvov, Riga, and Kaunas gave the lie to Beria's declarations. Encouraged by the 'new line', tongues became unchained: men dared to speak of things hitherto considered taboo in Party milieux, and to denounce the excesses of russification as a deviation from the Leninist line. It was thus that appeared in the eyes of the world a situation which in fact bore hardly greater resemblance to Beria's optimistic picture at the Nineteenth Congress than did the Stalin of late 1952, wrinkled with age, to the handsome young man of Picasso's picture.

SOVIETIZATION A FORM OF COLONIZATION

E. H. Carr, in his trilogy on the early years of the Bolshevik regime,[1] shows how contact with a confused reality and with the imperatives of action gradually led the Communist doctrinaires to act, in almost every sphere, counter to their utopian ideals. Thus centralized sovietization revealed itself as merely a specific new form of colonization; and the antagonism between the Communist officials—in the majority Russian—sent out by the Central Government, and the subordinate local cadres, almost inevitably

[1] *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 1917–23 (Macmillan, 1950–53).

took on a *national* character. True, it would be wrong to attribute to Stalin—himself a Georgian—or to other high authorities in the Soviet Union a conscious will to 'russify' the non-Russian republics. But their initial incontestable respect for Leninist principles repeatedly came up against the difficulty of finding reliable personnel for the application of their policy. Such was the case, for example, after the war, in Lithuania and in the western Ukraine, where it was barely possible to find sufficient local personnel to enforce the instructions connected with rural collectivization. This gap was filled by sending out Russians. In the same way, the political police in all the countries of the Union were recruited by preference from Russians. Even the Ministers of the Interior in some of the republics were Russians. The teaching, now compulsory, of Russian and of Marxism-Leninism also caused difficulties. In certain cases it was desired to ensure a privileged position for the Russian teachers in the secondary schools; local teachers were enjoined to follow their advice, and to regard them as missionaries of a superior civilization.

Moreover, the increasing tendency of Russian intellectuals to confuse 'Communist culture' with 'Russian culture' created difficulties among the Communist intellectuals of the other republics. To an ever-increasing extent the Russians, who often enjoyed better pay than their non-Russian counterparts (as happened also in the popular democracies), conducted themselves like the sons of a nation of 'cadres' called upon to lead their 'younger brothers'. They were, too, so sure of being 'in line', of bringing, by their administrative methods, happiness and progress to the other peoples of the Union, that any hostile manifestation towards them seemed like an insult to their most sacred principles, and a survival of outworn bourgeois mentality. They were quite honestly shocked if anyone accused them of chauvinism, as did, for instance, the Yugoslavs. But in their haste to 'civilize' the whole immense territory of the Soviet Union the Russian Communists took less and less account of the susceptibilities of the other peoples concerned. *Izvestia*, in an article of 14 November 1952 on the education of intellectuals in the far North, stated that 'all the teachers in the schools of this region are a long way from knowing the local language'. In the case of the Nenets or the Selkup, tiny populations in the extreme North of the Union, this might not be very serious. But it was a different matter in the civilized regions of Lithuania and the Ukraine.

BERIA AND THE NEW ORIENTATION

The 'chauvinist' attitude of the Russian officials, and the constant struggle ordered by Moscow against the 'bourgeois nationalists' who had infiltrated into the ranks of the non-Russian parties (in other words, against recalcitrant local Communists), without doubt constituted a factor of tension and discontent in Stalinist Russia. It was this same tension and discontent that the new team sought to diminish by measures tending to give a more 'national' character to the administration and the Parties within the republics. The initiative for this new orientation has generally been attributed to Beria. Arguments are in fact not lacking in favour of this hypothesis: it is recalled that in his speech at the Nineteenth Congress Beria never evoked the necessity for the struggle against bourgeois nationalism; and that, on the contrary, he stressed—perhaps as a warning—the anti-colonial theories of Lenin. Later, the new policy (or new tactics) on the nationalities question inaugurated after Stalin's death in fact coincided with the appointment of Beria as one of the Deputy Premiers of the U.S.S.R. Was it not he, too, who, according to the general opinion, was behind the rehabilitation of the 'terrorist doctors' and the accusations advanced against the promoters of the anti-Semitic campaign, Riumin and Ignatiev? It seems likely that it was Beria, too, who caused the rehabilitation of the Georgians earlier accused of bourgeois nationalism by Rukhadze. Three of these Georgians, when freed from prison in April 1953, were at once appointed ministers in the new Cabinet.[1] It is also generally supposed to have been Beria who brought about the dismissal of Melnikov and the condemnation of his errors in the field of nationalities policy. Finally, one of the accusations advanced against Beria on his arrest concerned his 'insidious manoeuvres, which tended to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, to sow discord between the peoples and encourage the action of bourgeois-nationalist elements in the republics of the Union'.

There were nevertheless gaps in these arguments. The main indictment, just quoted, is itself equivocal: Beria might have encouraged the action of bourgeois-nationalist elements *indirectly*, that is to say, by carrying out in his own administration that very 'russification' of which he was accusing others. And it is quite true that throughout the Union in the reorganized Governments of April and May, into which each member of the Politbureau seems

[1] After Beria's fall their appointments were revoked.

to have introduced his own trusted followers, Beria often nominated Russians as Ministers of the Interior—Dekanozov in Georgia, for example, Gubin in Kazakhstan, and others. It is also possible that the accusation of 'bourgeois nationalism' was brought against Beria merely in order to mask the true reasons for his dismissal. In any case, Beria could never be regarded as a 'pure Leninist', a man of principle, or a Saint-Just of Stalinism. Had he not in the past been one of the main authors responsible for the 'colonization' by the Russian Party of the other countries in the Union? The most likely hypothesis would seem to be that the need for some degree of appeasement in the nationalities sphere was recognized by the Praesidium as a whole. Beria no doubt profited by this change of policy to bring back certain of his trusted followers who had been earlier evicted on the pretext of 'bourgeois nationalism'. It is also probable that Beria tried to increase his popularity among the cadres and the intellectuals of the Union republics by taking to himself the merit for the new measures. After, no less than before, the death of Stalin, group and personal rivalries concealed themselves behind a façade of theoretical ideas.

But whatever Beria's role may have been in the new orientation of nationalities policy in the U.S.S.R., one does not gain the impression that Malenkov and his colleagues—once Beria's men had been eliminated[1]—intend to go back on their promises of the past summer. In this connection it is significant to note that the appointment of Korneichuk to the post of Vice-President of the Council in the Ukraine—an appointment which has, so to say, a symbolic value—was confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine on 10 September; and that in Estonia too the tendency to replace Russian Ministers and Party secretaries by Estonians has been maintained.

REFORMS WITHIN LIMITS

It appears nevertheless that Malenkov and his team are making efforts to confine within fairly restricted limits their measures towards the appeasement of national sentiment among the non-Russian peoples. These measures amount, as far as can be judged, to the more or less widespread promotion of young local cadres,

[1] By 10 September 1953, nine of the Ministers of the Interior appointed after Stalin's death in the different republics of the Union had been dismissed. In three instances—Estonia, Moldavia, and Byelorussia—Ministers of the Interior or of Security who had been dismissed after Stalin's death were actually reinstated after the fall of Beria.

and to a renewed development of the teaching of national languages. Doubtless the Russian cadres are being asked to behave with greater regard for the national susceptibilities of the peoples under them, and the campaign against bourgeois nationalism is being played down; but it must be emphasized that this campaign has never completely ceased. Even on 7 April, the date on which the rehabilitation of the doctors was announced, *Pravda* emphasized that 'the Communist Party and Soviet power have always fought against any manifestation of bourgeois nationalism'. It is true that the *Pravda* article was obliquely directed against Russian chauvinism and anti-semitism, and that was something new; but two days later, on 9 April, *Izvestia* launched a violent attack against the historians, this time of Yakutia, who were accused of having 'a too indulgent attitude in relation to bourgeois-nationalist deviations and local partriotism'. The paper also blamed some Buriat-Mongol historians for not having explained sufficiently clearly 'the historical conditions of the birth and development of friendship between the Russian people and the non-Russian peoples of Siberia'.

On 6 June the same paper, which seems to specialize in articles of this kind, criticized a 'History of the peoples of Uzbekistan', published by the Historical Institute of the Academy of Tashkent. In particular, the organ of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet blamed the authors of this work for 'under-estimating the progressive significance of the re-attachment of Uzbekistan to Russia; . . . dissimulating . . . the reactionary character of Islamism; showing exaggerated timidity in denouncing Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism; idealizing in certain respects the feudal regime; attempting to represent the feudal and nationalist uprisings stirred up by the Muslim priesthood and the agents of the imperialist countries as revolutionary movements for national liberation'. And the Party secretary in Uzbekistan, Niazov, who retained his post after Stalin's death, published an article in the Moscow review *Communist* (May 1953) urging the intensification of 'the struggle against the slightest manifestation of bourgeois nationalism and of unpatriotic cosmopolitanism, which in the Soviet East manifests itself under the guise of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism'.

Thus it is not possible to speak of a break in the continuity of Soviet views on the nationalities problem. Like Stalin, Malenkov's team must take account of the extension of Russian nationalism which accompanies the development, by Russian cadres and in

accordance with the particular social techniques of Sovietism, of the natural wealth of the various countries in the Union. Certainly the central Government, as its recent measures show, is trying to tone down the impact between Russian nationalism and the local nationalism which is now rather unexpectedly developing among the young intellectuals of the non-Russian peoples who have been reared within the Party. But it is difficult to reconcile the feeling of superiority shown by the new Russian intelligentsia with the equality demanded by the non-Russian personnel in the name of the Marxism-Leninism on which they have been brought up. And one cannot but wonder whether the claim of the Soviet Communist Party's theoreticians, that they have 'successfully resolved one of the most complex questions in the history of social development: the nationalities question',[1] will prove justified.

F. F.

Labour under the European Coal and Steel Community

THE Schuman Plan is one of many proposals made in the last few years for the creation of a united Europe; it is important in being the only one, up to the present time, that has been realized in concrete form. In fact, the European Coal and Steel Community suggested by M. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in May 1950 has been in active existence since July 1952. The six signatory countries—Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—now form a single market, as far as coal and steel are concerned. For the next fifty years, under the terms of the Treaty, the operations of the coal and steel industries in the six countries will be directed by a supranational High Authority at present situated in Luxembourg.

The significance of the Schuman Plan goes far beyond its effect on the two industries, or the six countries, directly concerned. In a certain sense it is a kind of laboratory experiment, on whose outcome will be judged all other plans for unifying Europe. It appears timely, therefore, to consider the Plan from a standpoint hither-

[1] *Pravda*, 7 April 1953.

to rather neglected: from the point of view of the workers.

In the last resort, the success of the Schuman Plan depends on the men who work at the coal-face or in the steel mills. All the efforts of the administrators and technicians who are now directing the coal and steel industries of the six member nations will be in vain unless the workers in those industries give their willing co-operation. It is likely that the workers' attitude towards this experiment will be determined by what happens in the early stages of the Coal and Steel Community's existence. The operation of the common market for coal and steel is bound to have its impact on the labour market in the six countries. Industries in some of them will be adversely affected: for example, in the uneconomic coal-mines in Belgium and in some of the smaller coalfields in France. For the miners in such areas the Schuman Plan may therefore mean unemployment. The worker will judge the Coal and Steel Community by the way it affects him personally. The fact that his leaders in the trade unions have given the C.S.C. their support and are now collaborating in the work of the High Authority will be outweighed for him by immediate material facts.

This the Communists have fully understood. Ever since M. Schuman first made his proposal, the Communist propaganda machine has been working full blast against it. One has only to visit one of the steel towns in Eastern France, for instance, to see how the walls are plastered with posters attacking the Plan, for the most part emphasizing that it means unemployment, wage cuts, and the 'speed-up'. It cannot be denied that this campaign has already had some success. The non-Communist unions, on the other hand, have from the beginning given their support to the Schuman Plan and committed themselves to participating in it.

The majority of the workers in the coal and steel industries of France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries are organized in trade unions. Most of these unions belong to national federations affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.). In France and the Benelux countries, however, the Catholic-inspired unions also have members in these industries. Finally, both in France and Italy, the dominant labour federations are under Communist control, and in each country are particularly strong in the metallurgical industry.

With about 2,200,000 members among the workers concerned, the I.C.F.T.U. took a keen interest early on in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community.

Shortly after M. Schuman's announcement, the Confederation set up a special committee composed of representatives from the miners' and metal-workers' unions in the six countries. Meeting at frequent intervals, this committee kept abreast of the progress of negotiations by the national delegations. It studied the various draft proposals presented before the Treaty was finally worked out and submitted observations and amendments. Members of the I.C.F.T.U. committee had a number of interviews with the heads of the governmental delegations. Meanwhile, the trade union federations in the six countries put forward their point of view to their own Governments. This 'lobbying' over a period of months was the most important undertaking of its kind ever carried out by the trade union movement on an international scale. There is no doubt that it was effective. Labour's influence can be clearly seen in many of the Articles of the Treaty. When the Community was finally set up the I.C.F.T.U. representatives expressed themselves satisfied with its general provisions.

One of the I.C.F.T.U.'s major preoccupations during these negotiations was to win representation for workers' representatives on the C.S.C.'s governing bodies. To this end it co-operated closely with the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions. Its efforts bore fruit in the agreement that the I.C.F.T.U.'s nominee should be appointed a member of the nine-man High Authority. Paul Finet, general secretary of the Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique and president of the I.C.F.T.U. at that time, was therefore appointed to this position. At the same time, a Dutch trade unionist long associated with the international Catholic labour movement, Paul Serrarens, was appointed a member of the High Court of Justice. In addition, the trade unions are represented by one-third of the fifty-one members of the C.S.C. Consultative Committee. The I.C.F.T.U. nominates twelve of them; the Christian unions five. The secretariat of the High Authority in Luxembourg has established a labour division, though it appears that difficulties have been encountered in finding suitably qualified candidates to fill the various posts.

The I.C.F.T.U.'s interest did not cease with the establishment of the Community. In order to co-ordinate the activities of its representatives on the Consultative Committee and observe developments in the functioning of the High Authority, a special I.C.F.T.U. office has been set up in Luxembourg. It must, however, be admitted that the trade unions are somewhat at a dis-

advantage in this respect. Most of the matters dealt with by the High Authority and the Consultative Committee are highly technical. There is a great shortage of suitably qualified experts within the unions to prepare the necessary reports and analyses, and the unions' resources are not large enough for them to engage experts from outside, as can, for example, the employers' organizations.

The General Report of the High Authority on the Activities of the European Community (10 August 1952 to 12 April 1953) devotes a special chapter to labour problems. An introductory paragraph outlines some of the questions affecting the workers:

In particular, it (the High Authority) has demanded the drawing up of a statement on the man-power situation in the coal and steel industries of the Community by assembling all available information on the free movement of labour prior to applying the provisions of the Treaty, by conducting an inquiry into wages and conditions of work, and by making a survey of the present position concerning occupational training. Finally, the High Authority has turned its attention to the action required in the sphere of workers' housing conditions, in view of the inadequacy of housing within the Community and the importance of this problem in relation to improved productivity and a higher living standard and also to the increased mobility of labour.

On reading this chapter, it becomes clear how much preliminary study has to be done before any practical measures can be taken to solve any of the problems raised. Statistics on many of these matters are incomplete; even where they exist it is a major undertaking to collate the separate figures for the six countries in such a way as to establish valid comparisons.

In studying the man-power situation in the coal and steel industries, the High Authority is co-operating with the International Labour Office and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. The aim is to produce an annual survey of the state of employment and unemployment, and the amount of man-power needed and available; the first survey should be ready this year.

This survey is part of the preliminary work necessary before Article 69 of the Treaty can be put into operation. The object of this Article is to bring about free movement of workers in the coal and steel industries of the six countries. For this purpose it is also necessary to arrive at an agreed classification of the various jobs in the two industries. Thus, parallel with the first survey, a second inquiry has been undertaken to define the specialities and qualifications of the various categories of workers, to determine the limitations imposed on the free movement of labour by the

ember nations on the ground of public health or other considera-
ons, to co-ordinate procedure of registering offers of and de-
ands for employment within the Community, and to ensure that
cial security measures do not impede the movement of workers.
A first step has been made towards solving the last problem by
amining the social security regulations governing the foreign
orkers already employed in the member countries. Coal-mines in
e six countries employ about 120,000 foreign workers, while the
on and steel industry employs 40,000. In negotiations now being
nducted with the I.L.O. and the miners' unions, an attempt is
ing made to draw up an international convention on social
curity for migrant miners in Europe.

Free movement of labour cannot be brought about satisfactorily
less the levels of real wages, in terms of purchasing power, can
brought more or less into line. If the Coal and Steel Community
hieves its objects, there will then almost inevitably follow a
velling of real wages. The unions will naturally insist that this
velling be upwards—to conform with real wages received by the
ghest-paid workers. The High Authority has no power to alter
isting methods of fixing wages and social benefits in member
ates. It can make recommendations in a limited number of cases:
r example, if an enterprise maintains wages on a level that is
normally low for the area, or if a Government keeps wages
normally low, or if wages are cut in order to lower living stand-
ds or as a method of economic competition. On this subject,
e General Report of the High Authority gives some idea of the
mplexity of the inquiry into wages in the two industries. Forms
payment and of book-keeping differ widely between enter-
ises within each country and from one country to another. In
e coal industry the aim is to obtain detailed knowledge of the
ements making up the wages, earnings, and income of the miners,
order to have a basis for comparison between different mining
eas, and later to work out the possibilities of harmonizing the
vel of wages with the progress made within the common market.
he position in the iron and steel industry is more difficult, as
uch less information is available. At present, the High Authority
collecting data and collating the available statistics.

The implications arising from the concept of free movement of
bour are many and far-reaching. A common market for coal and
eel, in which workers are able to move from one country to an-
her to find jobs for which their qualifications fit, must in the long

run considerably modify the distribution of man-power and the location of industry. Even in the early stages of the Community there must inevitably be 'technological unemployment' in certain areas when uneconomic mines and plants are closed down. The High Authority has certain powers to deal with such situations. At a Government's request, it will share in the study of means of replacing workers in existing or new industries, if they become unemployed owing to market or technical changes. In addition, the High Authority may make loans to enterprises for the development of new activities to absorb 'technological unemployment'. Workers in this category may themselves receive unemployment indemnities from the Community, as well as allowances for re-installation and technical re-training. Assistance of this kind may be made conditional on equal payments by the member State in question.

Occupational training, as far as the Coal and Steel Community is concerned, is of two kinds. Firstly, there is the re-training necessary for those workers who lose their jobs because of 'technological unemployment'. The need for this has not yet appeared, but already a study is being made of the subject. Secondly, there is training within the coal and steel industries. The level of workers' earnings, the security of their job, and their possibility of advancement are directly related to the amount of training they have received. Not only that, the improvement and expansion of the industries concerned depends on a constantly increasing supply of skilled labour. The High Authority intends to base its action in this field on these considerations. In its vocational training programme it will pay special attention to the training of key workers and those 'destined to act as leaders'. Moreover, the High Authority's report continues, 'if labour is to be mobile, efforts must be made to harmonize training and make it more homogeneous to achieve a truly open labour market within the Community. The blast-furnace worker or the miner must have a sufficiently wide training to retain his chances of employment whether in Lombardy, the Briey coalfield, at Campine, or in the Ruhr'.

But the most important factor affecting the mobility of labour within the Community is housing. In most of the industrial areas closely affected by the High Authority's operations, workers' houses are desperately short. The shortage is particularly great in those areas whose industries are likely to expand as the working of the common market makes its effects felt: for example, in the

Ruhr. Although efforts have been made since the war to provide low-cost workers' dwellings in some areas, progress has in most cases failed to keep pace with growing needs. It is notorious how little housing construction there has been in France, and equally well known that, despite the immense amount of reconstruction in Germany since the currency reform, many families in the Ruhr still live in bomb-damaged buildings, temporary shelters, or at least in extremely over-crowded conditions. In certain localities in other countries the situation is also bad. In the Belgian coal-fields, for instance, foreign workers are often housed in wooden barracks, left over from the war, where conditions are dreary at the best and squalid and oppressive at the worst. To meet this situation the High Authority has instituted an inquiry into housing requirements and present building programmes in the coal and steel industries. The High Authority is also attempting to break down the structure of building costs in order to find out how these costs may best be reduced. It is comparing building techniques in order to assess the possibilities of standardizing programmes. In this connexion it has already begun to co-ordinate the results of national research on prefabricated building. But the most important aspect of the whole question—the present and probable future need for housing in the various industrial areas—cannot yet be studied, as the necessary figures are still lacking. The collection of this material has been given priority. A detailed inquiry to collect, district by district, statistical information necessary for determining long-range housing targets is now in progress.

It will be seen from this description of the High Authority's activity in matters affecting labour that its progress towards solving any of the problems must necessarily be slow. To assemble the information on which to base decisions will, in many cases, take months of research. Yet already workers are being affected by the functioning of the common market. 'Technological unemployment' has already occurred in some areas—for example, in the relatively unimportant coal-mines in Southern France. This was apparently due mainly to a French Government decision taken before the common market was instituted, yet it is attributed by the workers affected to the Schuman Plan. Naturally, such situations are exploited to the full by Communist propaganda. The fear of unemployment is deep-rooted among European workers. Instances such as the one in Southern France, spread and magnified in the Communist press, undermine the workers' confidence

in the experiment of the Schuman Plan. To counter this danger it is necessary to ensure that measures are ready to deal with unemployment as soon as it arises. The most important of these, from the point of view of the workers' psychology, would be the setting up of re-training schemes for displaced workers and the starting—in bricks and mortar, not on blueprints—of pilot housing projects. These would be tokens of the Community's good faith towards the workers and would have a great effect on their attitude.

In the past few years the Communists' control over workers' organizations has been greatly reduced, especially in France and Italy. But there are increasing signs at present that they are making a come-back. The success or failure of the Schuman Plan to deal in time with some of the labour problems that it faces may determine whether or not the Communists can win back the influence they have lost in the French and Italian trade unions, and gain a foothold in the unions of other countries in the Community. Failure to solve these problems would have another, and in the long run more important, result. The support which the non-Communist unions now give to the Community and their participation in the High Authority is in fact conditional on the carrying out by the Community of the undertakings made to the workers in the Treaty. It may be assumed that the labour representatives in Luxembourg will do all they can to see that these promises are kept, but their power is limited. The Community as a whole must fulfil its commitments. If it does not do so, either because it does not take the necessary action in time or because it pursues policies that conflict with these undertakings, it will lose labour's support.

It is encouraging to note that the High Authority, and other responsible bodies of the C.S.C., are aware of these dangers. When the High Authority's report was debated by the C.S.C. Common Assembly at Strasbourg last June, one of the resolutions unanimously adopted insisted that more be done to develop contacts with labour and to carry out the social objectives of the Treaty. Replying to the debate, M. Paul Finet, the trade unionist member of the High Authority, promised that this would be done, though he pointed out that the High Authority is hampered by its lack of positive powers in this field and depends on the concurrence of member Governments. It therefore lies with the High Authority to propose, and with the six member States to accept, bold action to satisfy the workers and thus, indirectly, to ensure that the Schuman Plan experiment does not fail. R. F.

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Notes of the Month

Saudi Arabia after Ibn Saud

THE death on 9 November of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Arabia raised the question which had been haunting the minds of foreign observers of the Arabian scene for almost thirty years—what would become of the vast kingdom, stretching from Persian Gulf to Red Sea, when its architect was no more? At first sight this question, the answer to which had been delayed so long, and the doubts attending which had to that extent become attenuated, resolves itself. All, for the moment, is well. Ibn Saud's eldest surviving son, now King Saud, has succeeded by acclamation, without a dissentient voice, and his second son, Amir Faisal, has been made Crown Prince. Any idea which might have been entertained that there would be a feud between the sons of Ibn Saud, or that the Hejaz might take the opportunity of Ibn Saud's death to split from the Nejd, is seen to have been baseless, or, even to those who cynically hoped that such a dichotomy might reveal itself, at least premature.

Actually, there is no intrinsic reason why King Saud should not enjoy as untroubled a reign as his distinguished father had and deserved. The new monarch has begun very well, with protestations, the genuineness of which there is no need to suspect, of friendship towards all his father's old friends, and with a guarantee that there will be no change in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. More than that, King Saud has gone out of his way to express a hope that the now long outstanding, if sole, difference with Great Britain, over the Buraimi oasis (which is in fact the whole problem of Saudi Arabia's eastern frontier), may soon be settled. It is on that question, and particularly in the providing of the right conditions for arbitration, that Britons will look to King Saud for a new lead. So far, there has been no known advance in this problem since Ibn Saud's death; but there will be every readiness to allow

King Saud time to investigate internal affairs before he turns his attention to external matters.

Yet if from a short-term point of view all seems well with Saudi Arabia, there are, from a long-term viewpoint, abundant problems ahead, problems by no means caused by Ibn Saud's death, for they were perceptible during his life-time. These problems concern, fundamentally, what may be called the qualities of the Saudi Arabian nation, or peoples. For the riches induced by the discovery of oil in the Hasa induced also a change of outlook, and in conduct, in some of the more responsible men in Saudi Arabia. The erstwhile religious fervour, containing at least the embers of pristine Wahhabism, was apparently dying; and an open materialism was taking its place. Oil royalties were being spent prodigally, and by but a few of Saudi Arabia's millions. Thousands of pounds were expended on luxuries which in States that knew how to distinguish between genuine democracy and mere egalitarianism would have been spent on schemes for the improvement of the mass of the people. But to this trend Ibn Saud was seemingly unable to call a halt.

There is at least a chance that King Saud will do better in this respect. Unlike his mighty father, King Saud has seen something of the Western world, and though he is unlikely to have been impressed by the wisdom of giving votes to illiterates, he at any rate is aware that if rule is to be either autocratic or oligarchic, it must have a social conscience. He is unlikely to devote as much time as has been devoted in Riyadh and Mecca for the past thirty years to the depreciating of certain other Arabs; and he has the inestimable advantage of possessing first-hand acquaintance with leaders in other Arab lands. On balance, it would seem that the most searching test of Saudi Arabia will arise on the issue, not of its foreign relations, but of its internal development. Something, patently, must be done to arrest the falling-off in religious zeal. The old thriftiness, the old self-sufficiency must be re-invoked, and upon them can be superimposed whatever amenities and developments are possible with the oil wealth at the command of the Government of Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, King Saud has immediately recognized some of the danger symptoms. Just as, in his early days, and even till well on in years, Ibn Saud led his band of faithful followers in prayer, so King Saud has ordered that gangs of workers, particularly in the 'industrialized' regions in the east of his realm, shall be led in prayers by their foremen. This is a

striking adaptation of a very good, time-honoured custom. Whether it will successfully combat the trend of materialism is one of the many questions facing Saudi Arabia that the future alone can reveal.

Great-Power Consultations

THERE is fairly general agreement that the Russian Note of 3 November has finally dashed the hopes of a four-Power conference 'at the highest level' in the near future which have been entertained since Sir Winston Churchill's speech of 11 May. Sir Winston himself, speaking in the debate on the Address just before the delivery of the Russian Note, seemed to have come sadly to that opinion. The time has not yet come to judge whether Sir Winston's initiative in May was ill-timed or whether it was rendered abortive by supervening events (such as the riots in Berlin in June), or whether it has on balance turned out a loss to the Western cause. The immediate question is: what happens next?

The idea of a meeting of chief executives was not a new one—in this country it has played its part in two General Elections—but it was reanimated last March by the death of Stalin, that is to say, by a sudden and portentous event, whose timing was fortuitous. A new situation developed overnight; it was impossible to tell how different this new situation was from the old; but there was more than a chance that it might be turned to good account by a bold turn of policy. The wind blew up a number of straws: the cancellation of the 'doctors' plot' and the amnesty in Russia, General Chuikov's apology for the shooting down of a Lincoln bomber, moves for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in Korea, *Pravda*'s pacific commentary on a speech by General Eisenhower. These and other incidents might be signs of a change in the Kremlin's policy. They might equally be no more than a drawing in of horns during a distracting month or two. Sir Winston decided that there was little or nothing to be lost and possibly a lot to be gained by sailing up to the enemy and hailing him. He spoke of a four-Power meeting and threw out hints of a European settlement, including a guarantee of the U.S.S.R. in the manner of Locarno.

In retrospect it is easy enough to see that one result of this initiative was to push the policy hitherto pursued by the West into the background. And the failure of that initiative means likewise that the earlier policy must now be taken out of the cupboard,

dusted, and put back into service. The West, led by Britain, tried to take a short cut which did not get anywhere; the venture was not necessarily blameworthy, but the failure involves a return to the beaten track, to the Acheson Way. Mr Acheson's policy rested upon the avowed fact that the West had dangerously reduced its strength relative to that of the U.S.S.R., and upon the well-grounded hypothesis that no East-West talks would be fruitful until the West had regained some sort of parity with the U.S.S.R. Therefore, said Mr Acheson, the first thing to do was to build up situations of strength. Once strong enough, the West would try to reach a settlement; until then, it could not sensibly hope to do so. In the last two years the current phase of this policy in execution has been the attempt, through E.D.C., to bring Western German arms into the Western scale of the balance. The doubts and difficulties which cluster round E.D.C. are too well known to require recapitulation; what has been less generally acknowledged is that there is no practicable alternative method of achieving the stated object. Therefore E.D.C. has survived and, although put on ice during the Churchill interlude of May-November, it is now re-emerging with an added air of being businesslike, urgent, and inescapable. It may be indeed that the Churchill interlude, by expressing and then confounding hopes of a different kind, has in the end strengthened the case for E.D.C. and so contributed materially to its success; in which case the six months' delay do not have to be written off as time lost.

The Philippine Elections

THE Presidential Elections held in the Philippines on 10 November were encouraging for two reasons: the quality of the successful candidate and the fairness of the elections. The victor, Mr Ramon Magsaysay, appears to stand out amongst Filipino politicians for his honesty and ability and for his grasp of, and desire to deal with, the real problems of the country. He has an impeccable political record. The local manager of a transport company in Zambales Province before the war, he was commandeered by the American Army after Pearl Harbour along with his lorries and was subsequently commissioned as a captain in the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in the Zambales area. He was notably successful as a guerrilla leader and during the brief American military occupation of the islands was made military governor of his Province. In 1946 he was elected as a Liberal

Party Congressman for Zambales and in this capacity served with success as chairman of the Committee on National Defence of the House of Representatives. In 1950, at a time when the Hukbalahap revolt was at the height of its success, he accepted office as Secretary for National Defence under President Quirino. His appointment is sometimes said to have been at least partly the result of pressure by the United States.

Mr Magsaysay transformed the fight against the Huks. He reorganized the army and constabulary and weeded out the elderly, the corrupt, and the inefficient. The troops were taken out of their barracks, formed into combat teams, and sent into the jungle and swamps after the Huks. Promotion was made dependent on ability and on the achievement of results. Use was made of rewards for captures and of psychological warfare. A vigorous effort was made to restore public confidence in the armed forces, and to improve conditions of service. And an attempt was made to wean the Huk peasants away from their Communist leaders by offering them more in practice than the Communists could promise them, and by meeting their real grievances with constructive help. For this purpose a body called EDCOR (the Economic Development Corporation) was set up to develop land in Mindanao, the large southern island, on which former Huks, who surrendered and had not personally committed capital crimes, might be settled with their families. The effect of these measures seems to have been immediate and striking. The Huk strength dropped by casualties and surrenders to perhaps a quarter, and where they had terrorized whole provinces they were reduced to scattered bands.

In November 1951 mid-term elections were held in the islands. The elections of November 1949 had been marked by widespread violence and fraud. In 1951 Mr Magsaysay used the armed forces to ensure free and fair elections, and the Liberal Party suffered a very severe defeat. This action, combined with his reiteration of the need for social reform, seems to have set some leading Liberal Party politicians against Mr Magsaysay, and by the end of 1952 it was becoming increasingly clear that differences had developed between him and the President. On 28 February 1953 Mr Magsaysay resigned. In his letter of resignation he said that 'it would be useless for me to continue as Secretary of National Defence with the specific duty of killing Huks as long as the administration continues to foster and tolerate conditions which offer fertile soil for Communism' and 'I have repeatedly and publicly said that

merely killing dissidents will not solve the Communist problem. Its solution lies in the correction of social evils and injustices and in giving people a decent Government free from dishonesty and graft.'

Meanwhile the opposition Nacionalista Party, led by Senator Jose Laurel, casting about for a presidential candidate with sufficient popular appeal to defeat the Liberals in the forthcoming elections, had begun to make approaches to Mr Magsaysay, and on 9 March he left the Liberal Party and joined the Nacionalistas. A change of party of this sort is facilitated in the Philippines by the fact that the major parties differ rather on personalities than on policies. The past nine months have indeed been remarkable for the ease, and in some cases the frequency, with which politicians have changed their party allegiances. On 12 April Mr Magsaysay was nominated by the Nacionalista convention as candidate for the Presidency by 705 votes to 48 and Senator Carlos P. Garcia as candidate for the Vice-Presidency by 598 votes to 149—the defeated aspirants for these nominations subsequently transferred their allegiance to the Liberal Party. In the actual election Mr Magsaysay received 2,890,401 votes, as against 1,292,395 votes for President Quirino, and Senator Garcia 2,504,461 votes as against 1,466,290 votes for the Liberal Vice-Presidential candidate Mr Jose Yulo.

Whether Mr Magsaysay will fulfil his promise as President or not remains to be seen. It has been claimed that he is impatient and brusque, ill-informed on international questions, and at times lacking in respect for the normal safeguards of the law, and many of his supporters in the Nacionalista Party are probably as anxious to savour the fruits of office as were many Liberal politicians. But whatever his failings may turn out to be, his record suggests that he will do something to clear away the stagnation and corruption which have characterized Filipino politics in recent years. The Americans at least appear to believe so, for it was an open secret that the United States hoped to see him elected. Quite apart from any prospects of better administration, however, the fact of Mr Magsaysay's election is in itself encouraging. It is unusual for the party in office to be defeated in a Philippine election, and fears were expressed on this occasion that the election would be rigged. That they were not, and the vigorous activity of such bodies as the National Association for Free Elections and the Committee for Good Government which helped to keep them free and fair, are encouraging signs for the future.

Franco's Foreign Policy

From U.N. Outcast to U.S. Partner

THE recent signature of the U.S.-Spanish agreement and of the Concordat between Spain and the Vatican has not only brought General Franco's Government into the limelight but has crowned with success a policy which has been both carefully planned and skilfully executed. In 1945, when the war ended, the odds were heavily weighted against him. It is said by many in Spain, and they are probably right, that had the Allies sent even a dozen planes over Madrid at that time the Franco regime would have fallen. He had supported the Axis with all aid short of outright participation,[1] and the vicious outpourings of the Spanish press are on record to show that even Goebbels was frequently beaten at his own game. Because of his actions during the war and the nature and origins of his regime, Franco found that his country had become a pariah among nations and a butt of moral indignation. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 at which the United Nations Charter was drafted, a resolution was passed debarring Spain from membership of the United Nations, a measure that was confirmed by Great Britain, the United States, and Russia at Potsdam.

At this time the Allies suffered from the delusion, partly inspired by the wishful thinking of Spanish exiles, that the Franco Government would fall at any moment, and they imagined that it was possible for Franco's opponents inside Spain to overturn the Government. It is probable that this was not in fact at any time possible without some help, however small, from abroad. From this unrealistic Allied appraisal of the situation arose their equally unrealistic actions which were to shape the course of Franco's foreign policy. In March 1946 Great Britain, the United States, and France published a Note condemning the Spanish Government and expressing the hope that the Spanish people would find a peaceful means of changing their Government. This merely served to dishearten Franco's opponents who fervently hoped for Allied action, and to antagonize the Spanish Government. In December 1946 the famous resolution was passed by the United Nations calling upon members to withdraw their diplomatic

[1] The fact that he did not allow German troops to cross Spanish territory can be attributed to his concern for Spanish interests rather than to his love for the Allies.

representatives from Madrid and debarring Spain from all activities or agencies of the United Nations while the Franco Government remained in power. Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru voted against the resolution, while Afghanistan, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, the Lebanon, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and South Africa abstained. The Argentine, far from withdrawing her Ambassador, appointed a new one amid much publicity.

Franco has said in a recent speech: 'In politics it is necessary to distinguish between what is possible and what is not possible and to know the exact moment in which to act. Every battle needs a plan and a strategy, and an elementary rule of the latter is to give battle only when victory is certain and not when there is a chance of defeat. In this lies the heavy responsibility of the commander.'[1] Although, as has been shown, Franco was by no means friendless even at the nadir in his fortunes in 1946, it seems likely that he proceeded to work out a strategic plan by which to win the active support of many more nations and so to pave the way for an eventual comeback into international society. The keystone of his positive foreign policy had hitherto been friendship with Portugal, with whom a treaty of friendship and non-aggression had been signed in 1939 and subsequently renewed. Portugal has proved a staunch friend, championing Spain's cause on every suitable occasion, and Franco has acknowledged her action by paying Portugal his only state visit abroad. But it now became necessary to cast the net wider. During this period of Spain's weakness and ostracism there was an almost morbid public concentration on her great past. Her Golden Age of the sixteenth century became the subject of innumerable articles in her censored and controlled press, and the days of her great Empire were remembered with pardonable nostalgia. What more natural, then, than that Franco should seek to develop the links (in many cases already close) between Spain and her former colonies, the Latin American States and the Philippines. Delving still further into the past, to the time when the Moors occupied the greater part of Spain, Franco must have decided that much could be built on the perhaps slender foundations of Spain's link with Islam. Such a policy would enable closer ties to be sought with all the countries of the Middle East and with Pakistan. These two groups of States would to-

[1] *Arriba*, 30 October 1953.

gether provide a useful number of votes in the United Nations. Meanwhile other countries with some point of common interest, such as the Irish Republic and South Africa, would not be neglected.

Among the principal instruments used to carry out this policy were the press and radio, which gave prominence to events in the countries which were the target of Franco's attentions, and the organization of visits, in the first place by the heads of States or other prominent persons from these countries to Spain, and later of return visits, principally by the present Spanish Foreign Minister, Martin Artajo. To the onlooker it can be a matter of some entertainment to watch, for example, the fulsome and space-absorbing praise meted out in the Spanish press to Perón and everything pertaining to the Argentine in 1946, in 1947 when Eva Perón visited Spain, and in 1948 when the Franco-Perón Protocol to the Spanish-Argentine trade and payments agreement of 1946 was signed. Then came the gradual diminution of this process as the working of the 1948 Protocol brought a cooling of relations. When Spain failed to fulfil her side of the trade agreement Perón became tough, and at the end of 1949 held up urgently needed supplies of wheat for Spain, thus forcing Franco to buy elsewhere out of Spain's very meagre gold reserves. By 1950 news of the Argentine was no longer to be found on the front pages and, if found at all, as likely as not would not redound to Perón's credit. Since then relations have been slowly improving. The press was also used to support those who might later support Spain; in the war between Arabs and Jews, for example, Spain took the side of the Arabs.

As to the policy of official visits, anyone who has been fortunate enough to enjoy Spanish hospitality will testify to what a heady wine this can prove. Even on a humbler plane than a state visit there is a special quality about Spanish hospitality that cannot fail to leave its mark on the recipient. Small wonder then that this policy should have paid dividends when practised on a long succession of distinguished guests which has included the late King Abdullah of Jordan, the former Regent of Iraq, the former President of the Philippines, the Crown Prince of Japan, the King of Libya, and a host of others. When Artajo paid his much publicized round of visits to the Middle East countries in 1952, the seed-bed of Spanish-Arab friendship had already been well prepared. A statement of Artajo's at this time made it clear that Spain

hoped to be the catalyst in a Middle East Defence Pact. This would have served to forestall the British, whose thoughts had been moving in the same direction; to plug what Franco rightly regards as a vulnerable gap in the world's defences against Russia; and last, but by no means least, to gain prestige for Spain. Nothing came of the project, however, and the results of the visit were confined, apart from the value of personal contacts, to the conclusion of a series of cultural treaties. Hopes had also been entertained in Spain that the visit would open up markets for Spanish goods, but so far little trade has resulted.

On the delegation that Artajo took with him to the Middle East were not only Franco's daughter, but also—and from a psychological point of view of far more importance—a Moor whom Franco has appointed a general in the Spanish Army. Spain's policy towards her colony in Morocco is framed with an eye to impressing the Arab countries. It is true that Spain gets little material benefit from her colony, which is a liability rather than an asset; but despite the much-vaunted recent reforms Franco has shown few signs of allowing any real political independence, probably because of fear that his prestige might suffer if the nationalist hotheads were to demand independence from Spain. The reforms, decreed in 1952, allowed the formation of political parties, with their respective papers, but shortly afterwards the Arab paper *Al Ouman* was suppressed and little has since been heard of the parties.

Yet another instrument for promoting the policy of better relations with the Islamic and Latin American countries has been the development of cultural relations by various means. Centres such as the Islamic Institute and the Institute of Hispanic Culture exist in Madrid and some of the provincial cities, as well as similar centres devoted to a particular country, such as the Egyptian Institute. In addition, there are societies devoted to the various countries, such as the Hispano-Chilean Society, and scholarships are provided for the exchange of students, for example with Pakistan. Conferences devoted to various Hispanic subjects have been organized in Spain; particularly successful have been those for Hispanic international lawyers.

The impetus of Franco's policy of 'hispanidad' has definitely come from Spain and not from the 'daughter' countries, whose interests are clearly not engaged to the same extent. Nevertheless, except for the set-back in regard to Argentina which has already

ɔeen mentioned, the policy has on the whole proved very successul. Early this year the present Minister of Education is reported to ɪave said that 'hispanidad' had ceased to be pure rhetoric and had ɔecome a concrete reality which was growing each day—a remark ɔerhaps more illuminating than he intended. Artajo has also ecently suggested that the Hispanic countries should form an nternational organization with a special legal status. Spain has, noreover, achieved her object of acting as a link between Latin America and the Middle East; for example, Franco was recently ısked by the Arab League to mobilize the Latin American counries in support of its views on Israel, the Suez Canal Zone, ınd the Sudan. When in November 1950 the General Assembly vithdrew the ban on Ambassadors to Spain and gave permission or Spain to join the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, ll the Latin American and Middle East countries voted in her avour with the exception of the hard core of Franco's opponents n these areas—Mexico, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Israel. Franco ould rightly feel that his strategic plan had yielded rich dividends nd that he had won a major battle.

Meanwhile another battle, closely linked with the first, had oomed on the horizon—the fight to secure U.S. aid. In June 1947 General Marshall had given hope to Europe by his offer of U.S. ıelp. The main aim of Franco's foreign policy from now on was to ecure a share of the U.S. bounty which was being so generously listributed to other countries of Western Europe and of which Spain stood perhaps more sorely in need than any of them. An ndication of the hopes entertained at that time is to be found in a vell-known report by one of Spain's principal banks published in he spring of 1948.[1] This report outlined Spain's economic needs ɪased on the assumption that aid would be forthcoming. The U.S. House of Representatives in March 1948 voted to include Spain mong the recipients of Marshall aid, but President Truman xerted his influence to secure a reversal of this decision. Stung by his slap in the face, Franco stepped up his policy of 'hispanidad' nd hastily concluded the ill-starred Franco-Perón Protocol reerred to above. The failure of the Communists to win the Italian lections in 1948 was another blow for Franco, who doubtless alculated that, in the event of a Communist success in Italy, Spain would be regarded by the U.S. as an important bastion gainst Communism and would consequently become the happy

[1] Report of the Banco Urquijo, Madrid, 1948.

recipient of suitable aid. As he said later, 'If there are eight hungry men on a desert island and a ship arrives bringing food for seven of them, imagine the feelings of the eighth. Well, we in Spain happen to be that eighth man.'[1]

Meanwhile the international wind had started to blow in Franco's favour as Russia's post-war actions dissipated the fund of goodwill earned by her war-time exploits and roused the Western nations to the menace that she presented. As Russia's stock declined it was only logical that that of Franco, who had so consistently opposed her, should rise. The keynote of Franco's regime and of his negative foreign policy has always been opposition to Russia and to Communism. One used frequently to hear it said in Spain that were it not for the menace of Communism the Franco regime would disappear overnight. For these reasons Franco undoubtedly owes Russia a debt he would find it hard to repay! He has suffered from a deep sense of grievance in that having, in his view, been proved entirely right over Russia and having, in his own words, himself won, during the Spanish Civil War, the first round against Communism, the Allies should nevertheless have continued to treat him as an outcast instead of hailing him as the hero of the hour. But as the Russian menace grew, the asset of Spain's strategic geographical situation far overshadowed in importance even the fact that Franco had consistently opposed the Russians. The U.S. Service Departments, in view of the circumstances in the rest of Europe, began to think longingly of bases in Spain. The prevailing view in the State Department, however, was that the Franco regime in its existing form was unacceptable, and in this they had the full support of President Truman. It was, incidentally, a bitter blow to Franco when Truman was re-elected in 1948. The breaking down of this opposition was a long and hard struggle in which, despite many setbacks, Franco was very fortunately favoured by events. It is reported in Spain that, acting on the principle of casting his bread upon the waters, he allowed precious dollars to be spent lavishly but judiciously in the United States in provision of such hospitality as would be likely to bring some return to the Spanish cause. Apart from the Pentagon, support for Spain in the United States was to be found among Roman Catholics and in certain business circles, particularly those connected with the cotton-growing south, and this support was reflected in Congress. Nevertheless,

[1] The *Daily Telegraph*, 1 February 1949.

Franco failed in 1949 to secure an Export-Import Bank loan, and in the same year he suffered a further reverse in the United Nations when a resolution to allow the resumption of diplomatic relations with Spain was defeated.

The year 1950, however, saw a turn in his fortunes. The U.S. was now prepared to support a withdrawal of the ban on Ambassadors to Spain and on Spain's membership of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, and a resolution to this effect was passed later in the year. In August Congress voted Spain a loan despite President Truman's objections. But the most important factor in the improvement of Spanish fortunes was the war in Korea. The entry of Chinese forces on the side of the North Koreans had, by December 1950, produced an atmosphere approaching panic among the Western Powers, particularly the U.S.A. Pressure from the Pentagon, thinking in terms of Spanish man-power and bases, was such that President Truman was forced to give way and appoint an Ambassador to Madrid. At this stage it almost seemed that Franco had allowed his recent successes to dim his usually very acute political sense, for when, early in 1951, approaches came from the U.S. for negotiations for bases in Spain, he imagined that he had only to state his demands for the U.S. to be most happy to satisfy them. The U.S., for their part, appeared to entertain equally unrealistic ideas about the conditions which they would be able to impose, and at that time there was much loose talk of Franco being made to introduce democratic reforms.

A year later these hopes had completely faded. Admiral Sherman had been a keen protagonist of Spain's strategic value and with his death, just after his visit to Madrid in July 1951, and also with the stabilization of the Korean front, the impetus to the negotiations faded. Because the two countries had started so far apart in viewpoint, the negotiations dragged on until 26 September of this year —by which time the negotiators on both sides were probably sadder and wiser men. U.S. military and economic missions had come and gone, while the seemingly tranquil progress of U.S.-Spanish relations was occasionally ruffled by statements such as that of Truman, that he had 'never been very fond of Franco's regime',[1] and of Eisenhower, to the effect that the inclusion of Spain in N.A.T.O. would be no contribution to the moral force in Western Europe.[2] Meanwhile in Spain it was a case of 'hope

[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, 8 February 1952. [2] *ibid.*, 5 February 1952.

deferred maketh the heart sick', and the whole subject of U.S. aid became something of a popular joke, epitomized in the amusing Spanish film 'Welcome Mr Marshall', where, after the most elaborate preparations have been made by a Spanish village to receive a Marshall aid delegation, when the crucial moment of their arrival comes the astonished and disappointed villagers get only a 'that's Shell, that was' view of several huge American cars whizzing through their village. The amount eventually granted ($226 million for the fiscal year 1954, $125 million of which had already been voted in 1951 and 1952 and was carried over by Congress) must have been a disappointment to Franco, but the important point is that U.S. aid has started to flow and there is promise of more to come.

The Americans found Franco a tough bargainer, and his hand was greatly strengthened by the good harvests of 1951 and 1952. In the autumn of 1951 it was being rumoured in Madrid that the Army was insisting that there should be no infringement of Spanish territorial sovereignty, and Franco's success in wringing from the U.S. the concession that the Spanish flag should fly over all bases in Spain is of supreme importance to a nation that produced Don Quixote. On the other hand Stalin's death this year and the relaxation of tension that followed at once diminished Franco's bargaining power. Moreover, Spain was once more in the throes of a drought and the harvest was expected to be poor (although fortunately for the country it has turned out to be better than was at one time anticipated). These circumstances may possibly account for some of the terms that have been accepted by Franco, for example, the promise to allow the Americans information regarding Spain's balance of payments position, hitherto a closely guarded secret, if indeed the Spaniards themselves know the exact answer; the exclusion of monopoly organizations from contracts for the bases; and the close powers of supervision accorded to the Americans. It has also clearly been a source of disappointment to Franco that he did not achieve Spain's inclusion in N.A.T.O. and the other organizations of Western Europe. For this Great Britain and France have been jointly blamed, but particularly Britain since her influence with the U.S. is considered to be the greater. There would certainly seem to be some grounds for this blame, for in July 1951, at the time of Admiral Sherman's visit to Madrid, both Britain and France issued protests against Spain's admission to N.A.T.O. or, in the

words of the British protest, 'to any closer association between Spain and any members of the (Atlantic) Pact', and it has been made abundantly clear since then that the attitude of the British Government has not changed.

Franco has not unnaturally fiercely resented Britain's attitude and regards her not only as the principal impediment to his full restoration to international society but also as illogical and hypocritical in her different dealings with Spain and with Yugoslavia. Britain is the constant subject of attack in the press and radio, and a campaign of pin-pricks is carried on. The return of the Conservatives in 1951 was expected to bring an improvement in relations, but such has not been the case. It is tempting to attribute the chronic refusal of licences for the import of British goods to the anti-British campaign, but it may well be that Spain is now finding the same goods on better terms in other markets, principally German.[1] (Incidentally, Spain's political ostracism did not noticeably affect her trading relations with those countries who condemned her,[2] Great Britain being a case in point, and she concluded or renewed a large number of trade agreements while being 'sent to Coventry'). The Spanish cry for Gibraltar is much older than Franco's advent to power. When Britain is thought to be weak Spain seizes the opportunity to raise the question, as during the 1914–18 war. There is little doubt that Franco is very much in earnest on this subject, and his regime, and therefore his prestige, is inevitably linked with the claim. It has always been a plank in the Falange programme and the subject of a great deal of propaganda in literature produced for their youth organizations. After Britain's evacuation of so many territories, Franco no doubt sees no reason why she should balk at Gibraltar. This claim is likely to loom large in his future foreign policy and it would be a mistake to underestimate his determination.

France, less powerful than Great Britain, has been a secondary target for attack. Besides long-standing rivalries in North Africa, France has given hospitality to Spanish exiles and allowed her territory to be used as a base by the Spanish underground movement. In addition, she has opposed Spain in the United Nations more strenuously than Britain. Franco has no doubt derived considerable satisfaction from the fact that his Arab policy has served

[1]Germany seems rapidly to be regaining the rather special position of 'favoured friend' that she held before the war.

[2] France and Norway were the sole exceptions for a short period only.

a dual purpose in promoting his interests and in embarrassing France in her difficulties with her North African territories. Prayers are still being said in Spanish Morocco in the name of the exiled Sultan of French Morocco whom the French removed to Corsica without consulting, as they were legally bound to do, the Spanish authorities. Franco will no doubt continue to fish in France's troubled waters as long as it is safe, as a fellow colonist, to do so.

Franco has long sought a Concordat with the Vatican as another plank in the bridge to his goal of respectability. For years his overtures were repulsed by the Pope who, despite Franco's favourable treatment of the Church, did not wish to associate himself more closely with the Falangist regime. But by 1951 the climate of opinion had changed sufficiently to allow negotiations to begin, and they were successfully concluded on 27 August 1953, just a month before the signature of the U.S.-Spanish agreement.

In so short a space it has only been possible to deal with the more important aspects of Franco's foreign policy and not to detail minor successes such as Spain's readmission to a major share in the administration of Tangier, her election to Unesco and other U.N. organizations, or Artajo's visit to the Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, and Pakistan. Again, it has only been possible to mention a few of the means by which these successes have been obtained, although such apparently minor items as the development of tourism in Spain and the popularity of Spanish dancers abroad have contributed towards the changed attitude towards Spain that exists today. A small illustration of this change even within the last year is the visit of the Lord Mayor of Madrid to New York. In April 1952 the Mayor of New York had to cancel the invitation he had sent because of public reaction. Last month the Mayor of Madrid received a warm welcome in New York.

There is no doubt that Franco's foreign policy, given the poor hand he was originally dealt, has been highly successful. Thanks to forthcoming American aid, his armed strength, the basis of all foreign policy, will be increased, and he is well on the way to achieving his goal of full respectability in international society. Were it not for the Russian veto Spain would probably shortly be elected a member of the United Nations. It is rumoured that even Mexico is thinking of establishing diplomatic relations, which would mean the return of the gold now in the possession of the exiled Republican Government in that country. Franco has

achieved all this, moreover, by pulling Spain up by her own bootstraps, almost without aid and till now without sacrifice of independence. Good fortune has played a large part in his success, but it has principally been due to Franco himself, who directs his own foreign policy. He has shown himself to be astute, skilful, determined, and endowed with an excellent sense of timing. Even his opponents are forced to acknowledge his success, but they add, somewhat cynically, that so far it has been circuses without the bread, since living conditions in Spain, particularly of the working classes, show little signs of improvement.

D. K. M. K.

President Shishekli and the Shaping of Syrian Policy

ON 9 October the Syrian electorate, including for the first time women, went to the polls to elect a new Chamber of Deputies. As an election it was much more significant than most such events in the Middle East, for it marked the effort of a man who has been dictating the affairs of Syria for four years to find a form of democracy which would successfully replace a system which had proved itself a conspicuous failure. The affairs of Syria from 1949 to 1953 are intelligible only in the light of the character of Adib Shishekli, a soldier turned reluctant dictator because he could not trust anyone else to run the country.

Adib Shishekli was born of landowing parents of Kurdish origin in the village of Hama in 1909. He was educated at the Hama Secondary School and attended the Salamiya Agricultural College. But farming was too dull a pursuit for a man of his temperament, so in 1929 he entered the Military School at Damascus where in due course he graduated as an officer. He was married and the first of his eight children was born while he was still a cadet.

The only story of his earlier military career, and it may well be apocryphal, concerns a brush with some French officers who were thought to have been discussing 'sales Syriens'. When everything was sorted out it transpired that they had been talking about

'Saint Cyriens'. At all events he emerged at the end of the Mandate with the reputation of a strong Nationalist and the rank of Captain, the highest open to a Syrian at that time. After the departure of the French he was promoted Major in recognition, according to the official biography, of his bravery in the operations which led to the end of the Mandate. Two years later he was released from the regular army to join Fowzi Kawukji's ineffectual volunteer force which entered Palestine shortly before the British withdrawal.

Like many other officers Shishekli felt keenly the blow to Arab pride inflicted by the debacle of their armies in Palestine and blamed the incompetent politicians who had sent these armies untrained and ill-equipped into the fight and sabotaged them by their intrigues during the battle. His subsequent career is marked by a determination that the Syrian Army should never again be the victim of the politicians.

On rejoining the regular forces he played a leading part, along with General Husni Zaim, then Army Chief of Staff, in overthrowing the discredited Quatli regime on 30 March 1949. Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed Chief of Police by Zaim's new regime, he carried out with notable efficiency the restoration of public order in a situation which, since the fall of the Mardam Cabinet in the previous December, had been perilously near anarchy. As his ability and ambition were a danger to Zaim he was transferred to Aleppo as Army Commander, and finally, as Zaim's megalomania and ineptitude increased, the two quarrelled. Some days before the end of Zaim's regime he was sent to a political prison.

Sami Hinnawi, who eliminated Zaim on 14 August and succeeded him as Chief of Staff, released Shishekli and reinstated him in the Army. But when his regime repudiated the pro-French and pro-Egyptian policy of its predecessor and turned to plans for union with Iraq, Shishekli reacted sharply. As commander of units near Damascus he was well placed to lead the military event of 19 December 1949 which expelled Hinnawi, put an end to ideas of unity, and led to strained relations with Iraq which have never been entirely relaxed. Having achieved his object he retired behind the scenes, a manoeuvre which was to characterize all his intervention in politics until, in despair of finding anyone of any calibre who would co-operate with him, he was obliged to offer himself as President in July 1953.

During Zaim's regime elections for a Constituent Assembly had

returned a Chamber almost equally divided between the People's Party and the Independents. From December 1949 to October 1951 one group or the other formed a succession of governments, whose undistinguished careers need not be recorded in any detail. The key man in each case, and the only one who mattered, was the Minister of Defence, the Army nominee, who conveyed the wishes of the Supreme Military Council (in other words, of Shishekli) to the Cabinet. In the first Cabinet their nominee was Akram Hourani, whose Arab Socialist Party had plans for land distribution to the peasants and looked as if it might become the Army's popular movement; but he was replaced in all subsequent Cabinets by General Fowzi Selo, and his party in time disintegrated.

During the latter part of 1950 there were indications that a struggle for power was working itself out in the Army. Though nominally only an Assistant Chief of Staff, Shishekli was setting the pace, but he was not getting things entirely his own way. The officer commanding the Air Force was ambushed and shot in the outskirts of Damascus soon after a meeting at which he had opposed further army intervention in politics. An elaborate treason trial, in which a number of well-known public figures were implicated, was staged after an alleged attack on Shishekli's own car. The atmosphere of gangsterdom which accompanied these events had an unfortunate effect on his reputation which he has been unable to live down either in his own country or abroad.

Meanwhile the politicians were occupied in drafting, debating, and enacting a new Constitution which permitted the Constituent Assembly to vote itself into four years of continued existence as a Chamber of Deputies. All the available foreign currency and a good part of the budget voted for other purposes was being devoted to the object of raising the Syrian forces from the deplorable state which they had reached at the time of the Palestine war. The Army began acquiring large quantities of second-hand arms and equipment from France, the only source willing to provide them. As a consequence the French gained much popularity in Syria at a time when British stock was declining rapidly because of continued delays in the delivery of jet fighters which the Syrians had bought.

Having started to put the Army on its feet, Shishekli sent the Prime Minister, Nazim Kudsi, on a tour of the Arab capitals. His assignment was not only to seize for Syria the initiative in the formation of an Arab Collective Security Pact, but also to persuade

members of the Arab League that, in spite of their misgivings over the series of coups, Syria was still stable and strong, and that he, Shishekli, was the obvious leader of the next round against Israel. In April 1951 he became Chief of Staff, a position which brought him one step nearer official responsibility for the policy he was controlling from behind the scenes.

A Cabinet crisis in March 1951 produced an official denial from the Army of the obvious fact that disagreement between the Cabinet and soldiers was reaching serious proportions. But the situation did not reach a climax until October, when Egypt's rejection of the Middle East Defence proposals caused a crisis which had far-reaching internal consequences. Faidi Atassi, the Foreign Minister, supported the Egyptian attitude and denounced what he called the imperialist schemes of the States which had founded Israel. He was repudiated by his Prime Minister, Hassan Hakim, who announced that, in his view, Syria should take advantage of this means of acquiring military and economic assistance with which to check Israeli aggression. The public outcry which this caused led him to offer his resignation, but it was not accepted by the President.

The situation was already tense when the Minister of the Interior offered his resignation on the grounds that his Bill to transfer control of the gendarmerie to his Ministry from the Ministry of Defence, where it had rested for the previous two years, had been vetoed by the Army. On 10 November the Prime Minister succeeded in his determination to resign, but no one acceptable to the Army could be found to take his place. In the end Maaruf Dawalibi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a member of the People's Party, decided that no further compromise was possible and resolved to challenge the Army on three issues: the control of the gendarmerie, the status of the Minister of Defence, and the trial of civilians by Army courts. The names of his Cabinet, which included a supporter of Iraqi Union at the Foreign Office and a victim of the treason trials at the Ministry of Justice, were submitted direct to the President without reference to Shishekli.

Shishekli lost no time in taking up the challenge. By the following morning he had rounded up Dawalibi and his Cabinet, the leaders of the People's Party, and a number of Independents, and had them all in prison. One of the Cabinet's first acts had apparently been to prepare the documents for Shishekli's retirement

from the Army, but he had intercepted them before they reached the President. A communiqué announced that the Army had taken control, and Syria's fourth coup in three years had passed off without bloodshed in an atmosphere of public apathy. From his place of detention Dawalibi submitted his resignation. Hamid Khoja, a Liberal Republican, was asked to form a Government but, according to an official announcement, intrigues of the People's Party not only prevented him from doing so but also brought about the resignation of the President himself, Hashim Atassi. Shishekli, acting through the Supreme Military Council, then dissolved Parliament on the grounds of its failure to discharge the functions of constitutional government and appointed himself to be Chief of State with full powers to govern by decree.

On the radio he explained how the Army's action was designed to protect the will and interests of the people from exploitation by a group of conspirators against the Constitution. He recapitulated at length the sins of the People's Party. They were 'liars and unscrupulous merchant politicians; they were incompetent, vicious, and corrupt; they had made government impossible by their refusal to co-operate with any other Cabinet; they were fossilized idols at the helm of State'. They were a great many more things besides, and all this had forced the Army to step in to 'interpret the irresistible will of the people'.

After one day in office Shishekli resigned his position as Chief of State and again became Chief of Staff. Colonel Fowzi Selo, the late Minister of Defence, was charged with all legislative and executive powers pending the election of a new Chamber of Deputies. Shishekli pointed to Selo's appointment as proof of his own lack of ambition and his desire to serve his country to the best of his ability as a soldier. He assured the country that elections would be held as soon as arrangements could be put in hand to secure freedom of voting. In his speeches he threw more light on the events of the coup. It had been provoked, not by dissension over Middle East Defence, but by the attempt of the People's Party to destroy the Army. Identifying the people with the Army, he said that he had been compelled against his own wishes to take forceful action to save the people and Syria from destruction. At one moment he had contemplated resigning, but had been horrified by the confusion it would have created in the Army.

Since the Nationalist Party had been eliminated from political life since 1949 and the People's Party and many Independents

had now suffered the same fate through the coup of December 1951, it seemed as if a complete silence had fallen on the country. There was much truth in the accusations levelled at the People's Party by Shishekli, but they applied with equal vigour to the other politicians as well. It was not so much that individual members of the Government had been vicious as that, both individually and collectively, they had been ineffectual and weak. No leader had emerged to impose order among bickering colleagues, and ministerial decisions had too often bowed to the last caller with an axe to grind. Students had demonstrated in the streets at every opportunity, and the Chamber had wasted its time on the emotional views of small men on subjects which they did not understand. Personal interest had obstructed progressive legislation or modified it into complete ineffectiveness. One hundred and fifty draft laws and three hundred other draft measures remained unenacted. It was an atmosphere in which the intriguing intelligentsia of the coffee shops thrived but respect for authority was undermined, and the country was getting nowhere.

The new regime lost no time in making itself felt. Demonstrations were banned and students were forbidden to participate in any political activity; parents and teachers were warned that they would be held responsible for any breach of this order. This move was naturally unpopular, and resentment against Shishekli is probably stronger in the university than anywhere else in the country. Civil servants were also required to give up all party connections. The press was reorganized on the basis of compulsory amalgamation; only seven papers remained in Damascus and a few in the provinces, all under strict control.

On 6 April 1952 all the political parties were dissolved on the grounds that they had been a waste of time and led only to a division of effort. Shishekli explained that he wanted an administration capable of uniting the ranks of the people and directing their disused talents towards prosperity in trade, agriculture, and industry. The way was to be paved for a return to parliamentary life as soon as circumstances permitted, and there were signs in his speeches that Shishekli was sensitive to Western criticism of the absence of democracy in Syria. The first step towards a new democracy was the formation of a single party under Shishekli's own leadership, to be known as the Arab Liberation Movement. By this time all the politicians detained in December 1951 had been released.

Profiting from the legacy of unenacted legislation left over by the last Government, Shishekli set about the promulgation of an avalanche of legislative decrees. By June 1952 over two hundred and fifty had been issued, many of a highly socialistic flavour. The civil service was reorganized and taxation amended to put more emphasis on income tax as a source of revenue; a committee was formed to study a currency law and the establishment of a national bank; foreign companies were required to appoint Syrian partners or agents in order to eliminate some six thousand foreign agencies still in the hands of Lebanese. Large areas of neglected land belonging to the State were to be rehabilitated and leased to small-holders, cotton growing was to be regulated, and wide powers were given to the Ministry of Agriculture for the development and mechanization of agriculture. There was scarcely an aspect of social affairs, education, health, or economics which was not covered by the decrees. Major irrigation and water supply projects which had languished on paper for years were to be given fresh impetus. The Lattquia Port contract was given to a Yugoslav concern.

It was unfortunate that at this moment, when the stage at last seemed to be set for a genuine effort to develop the country's resources, Shishekli was compelled to divert his attention to the consolidation of his own position. Either because he felt the burden was too much for him or, more probably, because he wanted to find a broader basis of political support which might hasten the return of some kind of democracy (and, incidentally, might permit his eventual return to the Army to prepare for the next round in Palestine), he intoduced in June 1952 a Cabinet of leading members of his Arab Liberation Movement. General Selo was Prime Minister and Shishekli himself became Deputy Prime Minister as well as Chief of Staff. But nothing he could say or do could raise any enthusiasm for the movement amongst his carping countrymen, and the Cabinet was eventually made up of men of little standing or ability. Their contribution was almost entirely negative. When the country was most in need of capable men none were prepared to come forward. Shishekli's conception of hard work, sacrifice, and discipline had taken the spice out of office for the established politicians. They were brooding revenge.

Having failed to engage any wide measure of popular support, Shishekli perhaps felt that he was moving too fast for his public, with its persistent anti-Western bias. So Point IV aid was rejected;

an International Bank mission studied various projects but departed without any decision being reached; development, it seemed, was to be done the slow hard way with the aid of a few technicians from United Nations agencies.

Towards the end of the year latent opposition again broke out, and a coup engineered by Akram Hourani, the former Army nominee as Minister of Defence, along with some officers and politicians, was forestalled. Hourani fled to the Lebanon where he announced that the coup had aimed at eliminating Shishekli before he carried out his intention of selling out to the West over Middle East Defence and the Palestinian refugees.

In an interview with foreign journalists Shishekli said that he personally was anxious to come to a close understanding with the West and to co-operate in their defence arrangements, but it would be suicide for him to do so in the present state of Arab opinion. There were three steps which must be taken by the West before any rapprochement could be possible. The refugee question must be settled by the payment of compensation and the implementation of U.N. decisions. A positive approach was required to the Communist danger: up till now nothing had been done but repression. Standards of living in Syria must be raised, and money was needed to do it, but he did not want charity or loans with strings attached; he wanted half the proceeds of the savings effected by the oil companies by piping oil through Syria instead of shipping it through the Suez Canal. Lastly, arms should be made available so that Syria could build up an army capable of participating effectively in Middle East Defence. After that arms should be given on the same basis as to Greece and Turkey.

As it was now clear that no progress was possible in any direction until some form of political arrangement had been reached, affairs were allowed to drift while Shishekli and his advisers prepared a new Constitution. They argued that the system of a Prime Minister and a Cabinet drawn from, and entirely responsible to, an elected Assembly had proved a failure: the executive must be freed from the daily interference of a hundred or more influence traffickers intriguing to further their own interest in a so-called Chamber of Deputies. The Constitution which they evolved provided for a President elected for a four-year term by popular suffrage, with powers to select his Cabinet from outside the Chamber of Deputies; and for a legislative body and supreme court on the lines of those in the United States.

A draft was published and constructive criticism invited, but little was offered. The rusticated politicians carped over its legality to little effect, for it was approved by the electorate on 10 July 1953, and two days later Shishekli was elected by a larger vote against no opposition to be the first President. A new Cabinet not restricted to members of the Arab Liberation Movement, and containing considerably more talent than its predecessor, was appointed on 20 July. A General Election was promised within three months and duly took place on 9 October. In a Chamber reduced to 82 seats, 72 members of Shishekli's Movement, one member of the Parti Populaire Syrien, and 9 Independents were returned.

Little has been said of the character of the man who now embarks on the dual task of governing Syria for the next four years and making the new experiment in Arab democracy work. Election posters give him a hard face and a scowl. But socially and round the conference table he has a soft voice and a ready smile, and possesses a large degree of personal charm. Until he became President he lived with a family of eight children in a modest flat in a middle-class district of Damascus. He has worked himself to the limit for what he considers best for his country and only with great reluctance and from force of circumstances accepted any honour or publicity for himself. He is primarily a soldier who will stand no nonsense from the politicians, and his ambition seems to be to create the conditions in which he could return to pure soldiering with the assurance that the politicians would not let the Army down. As this seems unlikely of fulfilment he is resigned to doing the job himself.

P. M. G.

The Doukhobors

Canada's Intractable Minority

THE Doukhobórs in Canada present an interesting example of the refusal on purely religious grounds of part of the population of a Western country to be controlled in certain matters by its Government. These peculiar people are first heard of in the first quarter of

the eighteenth century, some seventy years after the appearance of the great Russian schism, the Raskol. The word is short for Doukhobórtsy, 'spirit-wrestlers' (Aylmer Maude's translation), a name originally given to them by the Orthodox Church signifying 'fighters against the spirit', and adopted by themselves (as so many pejorative nicknames have been by minorities) as meaning 'fighters for (or with) the spirit'. They first appear widely, though thinly, scattered about Russia, and they ascribe the origin of their sect to a legendary retired Prussian non-commissioned officer, or to a Quaker.

It is most difficult to set down their religious beliefs, for, first, they have always been secretive about communicating them in entirety (it is quite possible that they do not all themselves understand them), and, secondly, not all of them have believed the same things all the time: there has been on the one hand backsliding and on the other increase of austerity in their tenets and behaviour. They have no written scriptures—they do not consider the Bible to be divinely inspired, though they quote it freely to justify themselves; but they talk of a 'Book of Life', monitions handed down orally and used in conjunction with the prompting of each man's conscience. Their most important article of faith is that the spirit of God is in every human being, and that therefore no man has the right to give orders to another, still less to enforce them by violence. It is not clear how they reconcile this belief with the apparently unquestioning obedience which they accord to their theocratic leader, who would appear to be credited with, as it were, a double portion of the spirit; or with the fact that one of them, Peter Petróvich Verígin, who came over to Canada from Russia in 1927 to be their leader after the mysterious death in 1924 of his father Peter Vassílyevich Verígin, was always ready to use his fists, and was fined £10 in 1930 for chasing some of his followers with a club (violence, when used by them, is nearly always directed against their own people, and has seldom resulted in death). Nor is it known how their leader is chosen: heredity has a good deal to do with it, but not everything. Some people were said to have looked on Peter Vassílyevich as the Apostles looked on Christ; some thought him a God-man, some only a prophet, and others an ordinary man: but there is no doubt of the influence he had as a public leader.

They believe that each man can, and therefore must be allowed to, decide for himself what he should do; and that therefore the

hierarchy of government, and church are unnecessary and even evil. Their belief in abstention from violence has been refined until some of them will not kill animals, some not even use them, or eat flesh. Many of them do not smoke or drink strong liquor. Some of them have gone so far as to refuse to use things made of metal (for this would encourage people being made to work in the mines, which had a very bad name in Russia), or to 'wound the earth by tilling it' (although on the whole they are extremely good farmers and market gardeners), or even to wear clothes. This last belief did not persist, and now they are apt to take their clothes off in public only when they wish to make a protest. They do not build churches or use ikons, but meet in each other's houses, the only symbols displayed being bread, salt, and water, and greet each other with a *nízky poklón*, a bow down to the ground expressive of respect for the spirit of God immanent in everyone.

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century they were allowed by Alexander I to settle near the Sea of Azov. Nothing is heard at this time of their actually refusing military service, though it is known that they were opposed to it; but the hiring of substitutes was then legal. In this settlement the thirty elders and twelve 'apostles', ruling in the name of the leader of the time, a weak man who had taken to drink, established a reign of terror of the utmost cruelty; and after a five-year investigation they were all—more than 4,000 of them—transported to the Caucasus in 1841–4, in the hope that they would be wiped out by the wild Mohammedan hill-men, or forced to learn to defend themselves. But their behaviour excited admiration in the hill-men, and the Doukhobórtsy succeeded in prospering in spite of the severe climate. In 1886 Peter Vassílyevich Verígin, in some way not easily to be understood, but not without scandal, succeeded the then leader, a woman, who had died. There were objectors to his succeeding; the sect split, most of them following him; and in 1887 he was banished to the north of Russia, without trial, as a disturber of the peace. He was kept well supplied with money, and was frequently in communication with his followers in the south. Among the orders he sent them—he called them recommendations, and they obeyed them while he was in banishment and after his release—was one that they were not to perform military service, 'since war offends God'. They decided to have a ceremonial burning of all weapons on 29 June, o.s., 1895. This was represented to the authorities as the beginnings of an armed rebellion, and they were

attacked by Cossacks and driven from their homes, to be settled among the Georgians and other tribes.

Attention was drawn to their plight in the press of the world, and, largely through the help of the followers of Tolstoy and of the Quakers, who looked upon them as harmless primitive Christian anarchists, about 8,000 of them were enabled in 1899 to migrate to Canada, some of them via Cyprus where they made an unsuccessful attempt to settle, with the specific proviso by Order in Council (without which they would not start their journey) that they should not have to perform any military service. They started their settlement at and near Yorkton, Saskatchewan, and in 1909 some of them moved to British Columbia. How many there now are in Canada cannot be known with certainty because of their refusal to furnish vital statistics; there are probably about 20,000, more than half of whom live in British Columbia. Little is known about what happened to those of them who were left in Russia: the Soviet Encyclopaedia says that some of them became Orthodox and some Baptists.

They arrived in Canada without a leader, rather resembling a termitary without a queen, if that can be imagined, and without understanding the language or the laws of the country—they all still talk Russian, and not all of them speak English. The life was necessarily hard and they made it harder for themselves by finding religious objection to using money, to making private property of God's earth, to forcing animals to work for them, and even to raising stock. Several times some hundreds of them set out on a pilgrimage 'to meet Christ, to preach the Gospel, and to reach a warm country where there would be no Government, and where they would eat fruit from the trees'. This search for Cockayne was not prompted by laziness; apparently, industrious people that they were, they had to pray hard to be saved from the temptation which assailed them to work. During a pilgrimage in May 1903 the participants started taking off their clothes, especially when entering a town or settlement, to show that they were as simple as Adam and Eve; and this was the first, though by no means the last, time that this manoeuvre was seen in Canada. Verígin, who had arrived from exile in December 1902, discountenanced the pilgrimage, and indeed all extremes.

The Doukhobórs arrived in Canada with a grievance. They had thought, comprehensibly, that the Tsarist Government was evil, and by extension that all Governments were evil. Perhaps they

thought—though not all of them can have thought this, for there were some intelligent men among those who made a preliminary visit to Canada—that they were to be allowed to live without imposed government; that they would be able to live under their own government, or lack of it. Secondly, their ideas of property were ambiguous: one can see the idea of the Russian *mir*, the village community where the land was held in common and where the council of elders decided what land should be farmed by whom, with the religious belief to back it that private ownership was evil and led to war—one can see this idea struggling against the ideas of a country where property and wealth seemed to be the highest criteria of human success. Their movement had started as a rebellion against oppression, as they termed it, from outside, and depended on this and on strong spiritual leadership for its homogeneity. The history of the Doukhobórs in Canada is a story of the realization that it was no longer necessary to band together spiritually against oppression. This led, on the one hand, to a relaxation of the laws of austerity, to fraternization with non-Doukhobórs, and to prosperity, accompanied or not by departure from the group; and, on the other hand, to a tightening by the more extreme Doukhobórs of their rules and customs, in an attempt, in the name of spirituality and tradition, by attacks, verbal and physical, to prevent defection and to recall backsliders to their pristine austerity. This last procedure is carried on chiefly by the sub-sect called the Sons of Freedom, in the Kootenay region.

They have not all been able to decide yet whether they should live communally or as individuals, although the individualists have achieved far greater prosperity (this is not necessarily an attraction to the true Doukhobór: in fact he may even disapprove of it) and the community attempts have generally been failures. One grand attempt at community ownership was begun in 1926 under the name of the Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood Ltd, but this did not prosper; possibly through mismanagement, it got into difficulties in the 'thirties, its mortgages were foreclosed, and, again not without scandal, it came to nothing. There is one small community of about 100 people at Hilliers, on Vancouver Island, which is said to live communally, even husbands and wives being in common, though this last has been denied.

The aspects of the Doukhobórs' beliefs which have led them to give the governments (Provincial and Federal) most trouble have been their refusal to supply vital statistics and to comply with the

Education Acts; though it must be said now that there are many Doukhobórs, indeed the greater part of them, who do conform. It is not a case of 'He that complies against his will', for the only thing about which all the Doukhobórs are of their own opinion still is that they will not take active part in war; but many of them, particularly of the 'Orthodox', the Union of Spiritual Communities of Christ, which succeeded—spiritually, not financially—to the C.C.U.B. Ltd mentioned above, find that if they conform they prosper, and that they like prosperity. It is the unassimilable lump, those whom the newspapers call 'fanatics', who are the most interesting, and who give (and get) most trouble. Even by 1912 a Royal Commission was reporting that 'the Doukhobórs are desirable settlers from the standpoint of their personal character, farming skill, devotion to agriculture, and general industry. The investigation has failed to establish any valid objection to them, except their refusal to comply with the registration laws and the "Schools Act".' And ever since then the struggle against compulsory school-attendance has gone on. Whenever there are reports of houses being burnt, of railway lines being blown up, and of people parading naked, the reason will usually be found to be one of the following: protest against having to send children to school; protest against those who consent to send their children; protest against relaxation of the 'old laws of our faith'.

It all stems from an attempt to hold the sect together, by force if necessary. The reasoning is: education tends to break up the sect, showing another and possibly more desirable way of life; and education in English, and the registration of births, marriages, and deaths, is the thin end of the wedge for conscription. So fire is used, (*a*) as a symbolic purifier—to purge out the 'new ways'; (*b*) to punish those who have succumbed to their temptation; (*c*) as a protest against something either as vague as 'the coming of a Third World War' or as specific as the sentencing to hard labour of people who have taken part in a naked procession; and (*d*) in the burning of one's own property as a joyous personal sacrifice for no reason except that 'property is evil' and 'our people are becoming too worldly'.

Canada has had difficulty in dealing with these immigrants almost ever since they arrived. As well as private enterprise in the shape of 'vigilante' movements, and police raids, there was the segregation in 1932 of about 600 Doukhobórs, convicted of nudism, on Piers Island in the Gulf of Georgia (they were released in 1935);

and the imprisonment in 1950 of about 400 Doukhobór men at New Westminster. These last were placed in quarters which were inflammable—unwisely, in view of their notorious propensity for arson—and the quarters were burnt. The prisoners were transferred to the main prison, and one of the conditions for their release was that they should give a pledge of respect for Canadian laws: some of them steadfastly refused to give it. Economic loss has been high, to Doukhobórs and others, both from the actual burning of school houses, community buildings, and homes; from people staying away from work to guard their property; and from the general feeling of insecurity which their outbreaks engender. Suggestions have been made that the Sons of Freedom should be deported, but with memories of the expulsion of the Acadians from Nova Scotia in 1758 the Canadian Government has been unwilling to do this, and while the Sons of Freedom have expressed their readiness to emigrate—the Russian peasant has always been footloose—no country has yet been found willing to accept them. Another proposal has been to 'relocate' them elsewhere in Canada; but this would not solve the problem, unless it were possible to segregate them altogether, which seems undesirable, especially after the failure of the Piers Island experiment. The latest and most humane effort to deal with them was the setting up of a Doukhobór Research Committee, which worked under the auspices of the University of British Columbia, and published a long and competent report in 1952. One of its recommendations is that there should be a permanent Commission on Doukhobór Affairs, responsible to a Minister, appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.

The problem is more complicated than it is shown to be here. In their purest form the Doukhobórs rely on a theocratic leader; and it is possible that if they had one, a practical man like Peter Vassílyevich Verígin, and if he were in constant touch with such a Commission, much might be done to make it possible for the extreme Doukhobórs to continue to live in Canada without being segregated. But there is no such leader. John Verígin, great-grandson of Peter Vassílyevich, is the secretary of one sub-sect, the Union of Spiritual Communities of Christ (the other sub-sects are the Sons of Freedom, who date from 1902, the small community at Hilliers, and the Society of Independents, which has existed for about ten years), and he carries much less weight than did his grandfather and great-grandfather. There is a legend that in

1939, on his death-bed, Peter Petróvich referred to a son of his whom he had left behind in Russia, and who is said to have been exiled to Siberia in 1934 for opposing the Communist regime, and warned his followers against sending to Russia for him, saying: 'When the time is ripe, he will come, or send for you.' There is a tradition that the Doukhobórs will return to Russia before they finally find a country where they can settle in peace. The Quakers are looking for this man, but it is not known whether he is alive or dead. If his uncle were dead the way would be open for John Verígin to assume the leadership of the whole sect.

In December 1949 the Sons of Freedom made a public admission of their misdeeds—it had always been difficult to obtain evidence, for Doukhobórs will not inform against each other, even though they may belong to different sub-sects: 'we have no time to help the law'—and said that they repented and would never repeat them. Incidentally, they coupled this with an appeal to the leaders of the world 'to stop preparations day and night to destroy each other'. But pledges had been given before, and the authorities were sceptical. There was another outbreak in September 1953, when about 150 Doukhobórs were charged with nudism and contributing to juvenile delinquency. It was estimated then that the Doukhobórs had caused damage and incurred costs of $30 million in the past forty years.

Besides the invaluable Report of the Research Committee referred to above, much may be learned about the Doukhobórs from Aylmer Maude's *A Peculiar People* (London, Constable, 1905) which deals with the Doukhobórs up to the time of their arrival in Canada, and from *Slava Bohu: the Story of the Doukhobórs*, by J. F. C. Wright (Toronto, Nelson, 1940).

H. R. A. H.

Changes in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning

Emphasis on Agriculture?

THROUGHOUT the spring and summer of 1953—a period in which the political high-lights for the Communist world were the death of Stalin, the East German revolt of 17 June, and the disappearance of Lavrenti Beria—the Communist leaders in Russia, and even more in the satellite countries, have been openly stating the economic difficulties with which their regimes are beset. Simultaneous statements, almost identical exposés, have shown to the peoples of the Soviet bloc and to the rest of the world that the Stalinist economic system is facing grave problems.

More surprising than this was the admission that these problems were by no means new. They were the same dilemmas with which the economy of 'socialism in one country', and Communist economy itself, have been confronted from the first. The words 'consumers' and 'consumer-goods', soft-pedalled for so long, reappeared with the force of new slogans: the 'consumers', who are primarily the industrial workers and the intelligentsia, are to be given satisfaction, while 'consumer-goods', ranging from food to clothing, must be produced and delivered at great speed. Official attention was switched to the 'producers' of food and raw materials for the consumer-goods industry—in other words, the peasants.

Thus the problem of agriculture in the Communist world came once again into the foreground, bringing with it the still more fundamental question of the rate of development of industrialization and the practicability of concentrating on heavy industry. The essential formula of industrialization *cum* collectivization *cum* forced productivity was brought into question. The application of the theory upon which the economic Plans of the People's Democracies have been built is itself in doubt, the Plans entirely reversed. Whether this is but another tactical withdrawal, in order to appease the dissatisfied peoples, a new-style NEP for the whole Soviet bloc, or whether the economic plans of Eastern Europe are in fact collapsing under the consequences of their initial mistake, is a question which cannot as yet be answered. But it is important to see why and how this problem of the role of agriculture in Communist economic planning has been so dramatically revived at the present time.

STALINIST PLANS IN EASTERN EUROPE

In a study published in this journal four years ago, an attempt was made to deal with what seemed even then to be the underlying problem of the Eastern European Plans.[1] At that time the Communist planners were urging the need for rapid industrialization. Only the immediate building-up of heavy industry, they affirmed, could solve the two main problems with which these countries were faced: it alone could 'emancipate' them from the disadvantageous and permanent 'scissors-relationship' with the industrial West, and it could also absorb the agricultural over-population symptomatic of the maladjustment of these countries' economies.

The need for industrialization and its advantages from this dual point of view were already recognized, even before the Communists seized power, by most political and social experts in the Eastern European countries. But the objections they raised against the rapid industrialization proposed by the Communists centred around the means by which this end could be reached. In their view, lack of capital and of industrial plant formed the greatest impediment; and financial and technical capital could only be obtained from the West, particularly from the United States and the United Kingdom, since Germany at that time was still out of the running and Soviet Russia, herself industrially backward, was faced with her own problems of investment. Therefore, they argued, the two reasonable methods by which industrialization could be brought about were, first, to improve and increase agricultural production in order to buy from the West, importer of agricultural products, the necessary machines and plants; and secondly, to introduce the plan for industrialization only by gradual stages, starting with those industries for which the raw materials could be found within the country itself, and reaching the higher level of specialized heavy industries when the foundations had been well laid.

The study questioned whether Stalin's blueprint for the Russia of 1929 was applicable to the Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Rumania of 1949. The investment policy outlined in the Plans not only appeared to be directed against agriculture but also seemed insufficient for industrialization;[2] moreover, from a social point of

[1] 'The Peasant in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning', in *The World Today*, August 1949.

[2] See table in *The World Today*, August 1949, p. 359.

view the Plans entailed coercive measures against the agricultural producers—in other words, against more than half the population of these overwhelmingly agrarian countries. The study therefore suggested that 'The result of the Comecon Plans taken as a whole might be that the new industries would not expand, or at least not adequately, the national income would not show the expected rise, while in the meantime the basis of agricultural productivity would have been damaged, if not destroyed'.

Further developments have resulted in the crumbling of the whole façade of the Plans. The first setback was that, after Soviet Russia forced the satellites to restrict their trade with the West, any hope of importing machinery from the Western industrial markets had to be given up. Another stumbling-block was the growing interference of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Russian-dominated regional organization which was supposed to co-ordinate and synchronize the various national plans. Projects regarded as of paramount importance by the national planners had to be abandoned at very short notice in order to concentrate upon new ones, unnecessary for the individual country itself, but dear to the Soviet planners either for far-fetched regional purposes or, more often and more simply, for the convenience of the Soviet Union.[1] Finally, by the summer of 1950 the intensive re-armament drive had jeopardized whatever remained of the initial plans.[2] Intensive production of raw materials, both industrial and agricultural, became the major concern of the Communist economists. Purges and prison sentences were the lot of those Communist leaders who held too firmly to the 'structural' aspect.

As for the countries and their peoples, the results of this new strain, added to the previous ones, soon became apparent. More acute shortage of consumer goods; faster inflationary spiral; higher norms of production; higher compulsory quotas for agricultural producers; more severe repressive measures in the pro-

[1] Typical of this kind of sudden change is the history of the construction of the Black Sea-Danube Canal, now officially abandoned. The project was not included in Rumania's first One-Year Plan, announced in January 1949, but was launched immediately afterwards in March 1949 as the 'greatest economic operation' undertaken 'on the initiative of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance'.

[2] 'In all Cominform countries, output plans were revised upwards with an increased emphasis on heavy industry, and one of the reasons given for the revisions was the need to secure much larger armaments production and the maintenance of larger forces'. U.N. *Economic Survey of Europe* 1951.

duction field; and, in each country, the introduction and increasing use of forced labour as the means for coercing the population and securing cheaper manpower—this was the pattern throughout Eastern Europe during the last two years of Stalin's reign. Yet, in spite of this, up to the first quarter of 1953 (the period in which Stalin's death was announced and the change in the Soviet administration took place) the general line of economic policy in the satellite States remained unchanged: the plans still aimed at the increase of industrial output at all costs. 'The economic plans and budgets of Eastern European countries published at the beginning of the year continued to reflect the concentration of resources upon producer goods output, as in previous years. . . A comparison of these originally planned increases in industrial output with the annual budgets shows a tendency for the increase in public expenditure to be larger than the planned expansion of the national product, a consequence of the spread of the government sector, or inflation, or both.'[1]

By September 1953 dramatic changes had taken place everywhere. The new leniency of Malenkov's promises, made immediately after Stalin's death, that the Soviet Government would try to improve the conditions of life of its citizens; the violent reaction of the Eastern Germans on 17 June 1953 towards the first experiment in relaxation effected by a Communist Government; the hurried self-indictment of the new Hungarian Government on 4 July, when it announced the complete reversal of its economic policy and put the blame for past failures on excessive collectivization and industrialization; the subsequent statements by Bierut on 21 July, by Gheorghiu-Dej on 23 August, by Viliam Siroky on 7 September, and by Valko Tchervenkov on 9 September, revealing some faults of the plans in their respective countries—all these culminated in Khrushchev's agricultural directive of 7 September which, taken in conjunction with that of Malenkov himself on 8 August, opened the trial of the Stalinist economic policy.

This does not necessarily mean that the causes, or for that matter the effects, of the changes in Soviet Russia are identical with those in the Eastern European countries. In Soviet Russia the main concern of the new Government is to gain popularity, at least among the managerial circles of the population, through immediate improvements in the supply of goods. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the Governments seem still to be concerned with

[1] *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, First Quarter, 1953, Geneva, July 1953.

avoiding a total breakdown of the economic machine, while at the same time maintaining at the requisite rhythm the production demanded by Soviet Russia for her own needs. In order to disentangle these two different trends, this examination of the revision of the Plans in Eastern Europe must first start with a cursory glance at the original developments inside Soviet Russia itself.

IS THERE A COMMUNIST ALTERNATIVE TO STALINISM?

For Malenkov, the policy of over-all industrialization decided upon in 1928 still seems to be fully justified in 1953. But the end for which it was originally intended has a slightly different slant from that which we have heard constantly repeated during the past quarter of a century which has witnessed the five Soviet Five-Year Plans. 'The Party,' he said on 8 August, 'has firmly and unswervingly implemented its line in the struggle against Trotskyists and Right-wing capitulators and traitors who opposed the construction of heavy industry and demanded the transfer of funds from heavy to light industry. Acceptance of these proposals would have meant the doom of our revolution, the doom of our country, for we would have found ourselves disarmed in the face of capitalist encirclement. This was the main reason for developing heavy industry, metallurgy, the fuel and power industries, and machinery construction.' In other words, the gigantic sacrifices of a whole generation of Russians were dictated largely by the immediate political consideration of defence.

Further, Malenkov, after pointing out that at present, eight years after the end of the war, heavy industry was employing about 70 per cent of all the industrial workers, gave it as his view that 'at the present time we can—and therefore we must—ensure a more rapid increase in the material and cultural levels of the life of the people'. To this end it was 'essential to increase considerably the investment of funds for the development of light industry, for the food industry, and for the development of agriculture'. Indeed, 'in order to ensure a drastic advance in the production of consumer-goods, we must first of all take care of the development and advancement of agriculture, which supplies the population with food and light industry with raw material'. 'Socialist agriculture has achieved great success', but it is impossible 'not to notice that the present-day level of agricultural production does not correspond to the increased technical equipment in agriculture,

to the potentialities inherent in the collective-farm regime'.[1] His conclusion was that a switch in production was necessary because 'the Soviet people are right to demand it from us . . . and we must answer this demand by action'. It was, he said, his unshaken conviction that the present structure and regime could carry out this new task; and by adjusting and smoothing the functioning of the Stalinist economic machine of 'socialism in one country', it would be shown that the machine could also solve new problems, and that the difficulties which might arise were not fundamental results of its own structural contradictions.

Yet if Malenkov drew this conclusion, it was left to Khrushchev to deal with the first premise of the underlying syllogism on which the whole new-style Economic Policy is based, and which Malenkov formulated in the sentence: 'We must first take care of agriculture, which supplies the population with food and light industry with raw materials.' The directive on agricultural development, adopted by the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee on 7 September,[2] is the text which brings into the picture the most important dramatis persona of the crisis: the peasant; and the man who introduced it, N. S. Khrushchev. The directive asserts from the first that the 'level of agricultural production does not correspond entirely to the needs of a growing population and to the raw materials requirements of light industry'. It therefore sets a dual task: to see that in two or three years a considerable improvement is brought about in the food-supply of the population; and to assure to the peasants a higher standard of living.

The reasons given for the grave shortcomings of agriculture are fourfold. First comes the failure during the past twenty-eight years to 'ensure simultaneously a speedy rhythm of development both to heavy industry and to light industry and agriculture'. This conjures up the fundamental problem with which all backward countries are faced: the problem of how to use inadequate national capital and unskilled manpower for the purpose of industrialization without lowering below a decent minimum the standard of living of the people. Secondly, there has been a perpetual violation of the principle of the 'material interests of the workers in the

[1] He quoted livestock breeding as the most unsatisfactory branch, adding that in the past twenty years the output of production goods had increased by fifty-five times, while that of consumer goods had increased only by twelve times. Figures for State investment over that same period (in thousand million current rubles) were: heavy industry, 638,000; transport, 193,000; light industry, 72,000; agriculture, 94,000.

[2] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, 18 September 1953.

development of production'. This raises the question whether it is possible to deprive the agricultural producer of his land and of the fruits of his labour without transforming him into an indifferent and stubborn tool of production. Thirdly, another principle to be violated has been the right of the collectivized peasant to possess his own limited smallholding; and the result has been 'a diminution in the number of cattle'. This is again a variation of the same question, that of the Russian peasant's willingness to work for the Government. Lastly, there were grave shortcomings in the mechanization of agriculture. 'Up to now no systematic plan for machinery has been created which could ensure the complete mechanization of agricultural work in the various parts of the country with their differing natural and economic conditions.' This refers to the regional differences in mechanization and the consequent discrepancies in output. But what it seems to mean in reality is that in spite of twenty-eight years of heavy industrialization, the industry is still incapable of producing enough agricultural machines for the intensification of agricultural production.

It is certainly too early to say just how practicable or even how genuine is the line of the new Russian Government on agricultural policy. It may well be that the main object of all these statements is to create abroad the impression of intensive concentration upon domestic problems and peace-time production. It is probable, too, that the new rulers, as yet uneasily seated in the chair of Stalin, want to start with a period of internal prosperity. Whether the 'toiling masses' will be able to share in this prosperity or whether, as Professor Mosely recently suggested,[1] the increase in consumer-goods will principally benefit the 'apparatus' which alone will be able to buy more and more expensive goods, is yet another question. But taken at their face value, as doctrinal problems, these statements reveal the same unsolved dilemma with which Communist economy has been faced from the first.

Stalin's formula for success lay in the unhesitating brutality with which he governed a country the size of a continent, economically under-developed, and with a people politically uneducated. It may be said that forced labour was the logical outcome of the Stalinist system, both politically, as a means of coercion, and economically, as a weapon of productivity. By the use of terror Stalin kept his society running regardless of the Communist

[1] 'The Kremlin's Foreign Policy since Stalin', by Philip E. Mosely, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1953.

economic and social theory which it was supposed to embody. Bı at the same time it must not be forgotten that up to the preseı time Stalinism has been the only form in which Communist theoı has been put into practice. It still remains to be seen whether tł new Communist rulers for one reason or another—reasons of fea opportunism, or common sense—can try to govern the countı with less disregard for those they govern, exacting fewer sacrific from them and providing them with a higher standard of livin without endangering the very foundations of such a regime. Ca individual freedom be re-introduced, even temporarily and in par into such a closely-knit edifice without disrupting it? In othe words, can Communist economy take a form other than Stalinism

Economic Leninism stopped at the 1921 NEP. Economi Malenkovism starts with the new-style 1953 NEP. Both version of the New Economic Policies were evoked by the problem c adjusting Marxist Communism to the needs of an agrarian countr In both cases the spectre which haunts the Communist world is th peasant, indispensable to the production and supply of the whol society and yet the inevitable enemy of the whole structure an philosophy of the regime. From Tito's Yugoslavia (where the firs attempt to relax collectivization was made) to Mao Tse-tung' China (where the 'original ideology' differs from European Com munism especially on the role of the peasantry) and now to Malen kov's Russia, the peasant problem, stifled by Stalin, reappear again as intractable as at the beginning.

THE REVERSAL OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ITS MEANING

Returning now to the Economic Plans in Eastern Europe, it i obvious that the Malenkov-Khrushchev line of thought has beeı adopted by the leaders of the People's Democracies. Self-criti cism[1] and self-denunciation are even stronger in some cases, an are expressed with a characteristic lack of shame.

[1] The Prime Ministers of Eastern Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Czecho slovakia were the most outspoken in this respect. M. Tchervenkov's speech oı the anniversary of Bulgaria's liberation on 9 September 1953 was the leas repentant of all. But in a letter in *Rabotnıscesko Delo* (21 September 1953) th Bulgarian Premier confessed that 'our planning activities still show great short comings'. As for Poland, after a puzzling silence of several months, the 'nev course' was endorsed recently when the Government announced that a specia congress of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party had been called foı 16 January 1954 to discuss the revision of the economic Plan for its last two yearı (1954 and 1955) and the development of a special agricultural plan for those tw years.

The structural problem of these economies is, in theory, still the conflict between industrialization and agricultural production, and the terms in which their spokesmen describe their present difficulties are similar to those of the Soviet directive on agriculture and of Malenkov's speeches. Yet the differences between Soviet Russia and the satellites appear so great, both in the actual situations described and the aims and targets proposed, as to suggest that the two problems are in reality entirely different.

What are these differences? They are legion; but in general they can be grouped under three main headings. First, differences in cause: while the announcement of a New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia coincided with the change of government and leadership, in the Eastern European countries it coincided with, or rather was heralded by, popular unrest and by signs of economic breakdown. Secondly, there are differences in emphasis and in the general presentation of the problem. The Russians are told that owing to, and following upon, a long and successful phase of industrialization, a new phase can now be opened in which the needs of agriculture and light industry can be fostered. But some Eastern European administrations have had to recognize that their industrialization plans have failed and had to be reduced or postponed before fulfilling even their first term, and that an interim economic policy must be introduced at once. Thirdly, while a summary study of the new Russian economic programme can lead one to assume that a relative improvement, for a shorter or a longer period, can be achieved and can reach a more or less limited part of the population, study of the new satellite economic programmes leads one to wonder how agricultural production can be increased and how more consumer goods can be manufactured. Paradoxically what can be detected in the satellites' figures is the aim of helping the import plan of Soviet Russia, thus leaving too little for their own domestic markets. These are differences in effects.

In the spring of 1953 the Communist Governments in Eastern Europe were forced to draw the bitter conclusion that they were faced with the active opposition of the main section of the population which they were supposed to represent and which they thought of as the backbone of the regime: the industrial workers. The vicious circle created by the high norms of production and the scarcity of necessities[1] exasperated the workers. Absenteeism and

[1] To finish the inside of a boring machine a Hungarian worker was allotted 108 hours in 1949, 58 hours in 1951, and 36 hours in June 1952. The norms

sporadic strikes had been noticeable for the last year or so, especially in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. But by May and June 1953 the situation was more serious, culminating in the events of 17 June in East Berlin but accompanied by a wave of unrest throughout Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Rumania. It was because the workers began to strike and to demonstrate in the streets that the Governments decided that a change must be made. Yet the Zaisser experiment, the attempt to improve the supply of goods on the domestic market by providing farmers and retailers with incentives, ended in the hostile action of the German workers against privileges being granted to other sections of the population while the working class was neglected. The economic machine therefore seized up: the villages refused to send more food to the towns, and the factory workers refused to work unless they were provided with more and cheaper food and goods. The strikes, in their turn, definitely paralysed the execution of the Plans. Finally, when a further attempt at relaxation was made the two apparently hostile blocks of producers, the agricultural and the industrial, owing to whose opposition the economic activities of the Eastern German Government had been paralysed, united and on 17 June tried to get rid of the regime by a single political movement in towns and villages alike.

How far international events affect domestic politics in the Communist bloc, or, for that matter, how far events in one satellite country influence subsequent events in the others, must always be a moot point. But in the present instance it is possible to assess the effects of the Eastern German revolt, on the one hand, upon the internal and international policy of the Soviet Government—as witness the disappearance of Beria and the renewed refusals to discuss the German question. On the other hand, the satellite leaders' reactions between July and September have provided a perfect example of the merging of two different trends into one single political move. From their German colleagues they caught a sense of panic and of the imminence of their own economic disaster; but they wrapped this in the terminology and line of reasoning which was already being discussed in Moscow and which

have been raised again since then. On the other hand, on the basis of figures published by F.A.O. for the consumption of textile fibres such as cotton, wool, and rayon for the years 1938 and 1949 to 1951—a method of comparing the standard of living in different countries—it appears that in the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, and Rumania the total consumption of such goods per head of the population was lower than in 1938.

came into the open with the Malenkov-Khrushchev speeches. Communist official language usually has a double meaning. But in certain of the speeches of the satellite Premiers the self-criticism goes beyond this, and the second meaning can be taken as a defence of their administration against the imperious demands of their masters. When, for instance, Nagy says, 'In its economic policy the Government will observe the proverb: "Cut your coat according to your cloth". We have to note, and to state frankly before the whole country, that the objectives of the augmented Five-Year Plan are beyond our strength', or when Gheorghiu-Dej proclaims that 'the slogan of achieving the Five-Year Plan in four years was launched without sufficient study', these self-confessions take on a self-justifying note if one remembers that after 1949 all the Plans were correlated, adjusted, and stream-lined by the Russian-controlled Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.[1]

The official apologists, in recognizing the scale of the disaster, are also forced to admit that the standard of living has fallen since they came to power. Thus Nagy: 'The implementation of the Plan is greatly hampering the growth of the material foundations of the country's welfare and has recently resulted in a deteriorating standard of living'; and Gheorghiu-Dej: 'It resulted in an insufficient increase of the living standard of working people as compared with the general development of national economy.' Such an admission will not be found in the statements of the Russian leaders. But, too, the standard of living has risen in Soviet Russia as compared with the satellite countries since the Communists came to power.[2]

Finally, the satellite spokesmen can see no solution other than to renounce the ambitious plans of industrialization and to assign to themselves the humble task of restoring agricultural production at least to the pre-war (bourgeois) level, with or without collectivization. 'There is no justifiable reason for an exaggerated industrialization and a striving for self-sufficiency', said Nagy,

[1] Quotations from Nagy's speech of 4 July 1953 are taken from the official version in *Szabad Nep* (5 July 1953); Gheorghiu-Dej's speech of 23 August 1953 appeared in *Scanteia* of the same day.

[2] According to an investigation of the Bureau of Labour Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labour (*Labour Review*, July 1953), the average Soviet worker has to work 45 per cent longer in 1953 than he did in 1928 to buy the same weekly quantities of seven basic foodstuffs; but a Polish economist, Mr A. Zaubermann, has calculated that the index of real wages shows that the real wage of a Czechoslovak worker, as expressed in general purchases, is 89 per cent, that of a Polish worker 56 per cent, and that of a Hungarian 46 per cent of the real wage of a Soviet worker.

'—all the more so since Hungary does not possess the necessary raw materials. The Government regards it as one of its foremost duties to increase substantially agricultural investments, while cutting those in industry.' 'In order to improve the supply situation it is necessary to attain and exceed the pre-war agricultural level. But to do so the individual farms of the working peasants must be given more assistance than formerly,' is Gheorghiu-Dej's version. 'We have come to the conclusion,' said Siroky, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, on 15 September 1953, 'that we can slow down the rhythm of development of the large projects in heavy industry... We shall reduce the rhythm of building up new plants.'[1]

But the greatest contrast between the Russian and the Eastern European attitude to their present economic problems is to be found in the way the 'new line' is put into practice. Little has been put into absolute figures or plain words. But from what has been said, and from comparative studies, four points can be fairly assumed.

(i) There will be no fundamental changes in the agricultural policy. Indeed, even in Rumania and Hungary, the two countries whose Communist rulers have confessed most openly the failure of their agricultural production, nothing of real importance seems to have been undertaken since the summer. In Rumania the measures taken up to now amount to some reductions in water and sewerage rates and in taxes; cancellations of produce-deliveries owed by producers from the 1952 harvest; improvement of veterinary services (generally speaking there is more propaganda stress on the improvement of livestock); and the transfer of 448,000 hectares of 'small and isolated plots' to collective farms and individual 'working peasants'. In Hungary, a resolution adopted by the Communist Party Central Committee on 31 October 1953 reveals that the decision taken by the Party and Government in July 'met open resistance in certain Party circles'—particularly on the part of the State Planning Office. 'An end must be made to this ideological vacillation', states the Resolution. These and many other signs show clearly the reluctance of the Communist Governments and Parties to embark upon an economic policy to which they are ideologically hostile.

[1] According to the Munich correspondent of the *Observer* (18 October 1953), more than half the furnaces of Hungary's new steel industry have been extinguished, while in Czechoslovakia the famous Huko smelting combine near Kosice has been completely abandoned.

(ii) Nor will there be any appreciable increase in the production of consumer-goods; on the contrary, a reduction of the total amount of consumer-goods for internal consumption can be noticed in some cases, as compared with the figures of the initial Plans. Here, for instance, are comparative figures for the new and old Rumanian Plans. The figure for shoes is the most striking, since it can more easily be compared with the population figure, which is 17½ million.

Commodity	(1955 *Target*) New Plan	Old Plan
Cotton	250,000,000 sq. m.	266,500,000 sq. m.
Woollen cloth	32,500,000 sq. m.	39,400,000 sq. m.
Silk	19,000,000 sq. m.	41,000,000 sq. m.
Leather shoes	10,000,000 pairs	20,700,000 pairs

(iii) Most of the consumer goods produced will be exported to Soviet Russia. It is interesting to note that during this present year, in which the satellites are supposed to produce more consumer goods, the Soviet Government is said to have purchased abroad £300 million worth of food and consumer goods. *Izvestia*, explaining this considerable purchase, said that two-thirds of the imports for Soviet consumers this year would come from the Eastern European Popular Democracies.[1] One may even wonder whether the whole surplus of consumer goods for 1953–5 is not ordered by the Soviet Government (otherwise, one wonders, for instance, why the Rumanian internal market will get less consumer goods in spite of the increased production, and why the new Rumanian agricultural programme should stress so much the need for improving the livestock position, which had not fallen in Rumania, but had fallen in Soviet Russia). The part reserved for the satellites in the changed Plans appears to be merely the negative one of closing down their industrial and public projects.

(iv) What is being cut from the Plans are the long-term public-utility projects. But the production of raw materials, and especially of fuel, required by the Soviet Union is to be intensified.[2] Poland's coal production is to be raised from 85 to 88½ million metric tons, and her exports of coal to the Soviet Union are in-

[1] *New York Times*, 1 November 1953

[2] The most important task is to ensure a large development of raw material heavy industry. 'We must increase substantially the extraction of iron and ore', said the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Siroky. 'As regards heavy stry, special attention must be paid to those branches which constitute a basis of raw materials' (Gheorghiu-Dej).

creased from 14 to 20 million tons[1], while in the new Rumanian Plan oil rises from 10 to 11 million tons and coal remains at 8·5 million. This intensified production without new machinery spells ruin for the respective industries. At the same time the projects for electrification and for navigability of the internal waterways, the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the Oder-Danube Canal, and so on, are being abandoned.

Some general conclusions can be drawn from this summary survey of the new aspects of the economic problems of the Communist bloc. The problem of the peasant class and of agricultural production has not yet been solved by any of these agrarian countries which have been forced into industrialization at speed—and this includes the U.S.S.R. But at the same time the special problem of the Eastern European countries dominated by Soviet Russia remains that of their relations with that Power, which, with or without Plans for the socialist transformation of their economies, continues to regard them as secondary quasi-colonial markets which must be adapted to fit her needs and requirements, whatever these may be.

G. I.

[1] 'Under the recent trade agreement for the year ending 28 February 1954, Sweden contracted to receive only 2·2 million tons of (Polish) coal. This compares with a figure of 3 million tons in the previous agreement which, incidentally, Poland did not complete in the stipulated time' (British Iron and Steel Federation, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, October 1953: 'Steel Developments in Poland'.) This is a remarkable example of how Russia's demands affect the satellites' Plans, for, as the study points out in its conclusion, 'The 1955 prospects for Poland, in steel, therefore seem to depend on her ability to obtain Swedish ore by offering coal cheaper than other European producers.'

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